

GOD, MAN AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
OF JACQUES MARITAIN

By
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
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ii
INTRODUCTION	2
 Chapter	
SECTION I. POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEOLOGY	
I. THE STATE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY	5
II. GOD AND POLITICS	34
III. THE POLITICS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY	56
IV. DEMOCRACY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY	97
SECTION II. THOMISM AND JACQUES MARITAIN	
V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOMISM	115
VI. THE NATURE OF THOMISM	134
VII. THOMISM AND JACQUES MARITAIN	150
VIII. THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVOLTS OF JACQUES MARITAIN	181
SECTION III. THE FOUNDATION OF JACQUES MARITAIN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY	
IX. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF MARITAIN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY	228
X. THE SPECULATIVE ORDER	248
XI. THE PRACTICAL ORDER	272

SECTION IV. THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JACQUES MARITAIN

XII. MARITAIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY: A THEOCENTRIC HUMANISM	296
XIII. MAN: PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY	347
XIV. THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SOCIETY	365
Natural Law and Human Rights	369
The Common Good	403
Maritain's Philosophy of International Relations. .	412
The Relation of Church and State	422
XV. MARITAIN'S PERSONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY	440
SECTION V. CONCLUSION	
XVI. CONCLUSION	473
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	506
Appendix	
I. DIAGRAM OF THE ORDERS	567
II. DIAGRAM OF THE SCIENCES	568
III. THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY	569
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	570

My teachings are very easy to understand and very
easy to practice,
But no one can understand them and no one can
practice them.
In my words there is a principle.
In the affairs of men there is a system.
Because they know not these,
They also know me not.
Since there are few that know me,
Therefore I am distinguished.
Therefore the Sage wears a coarse cloth on top
And carries jade within his bosom.

-- Lao Tzu

INTRODUCTION

In the beginning was Methodology. This is the spirit that more or less represents the present state of political science. Arnold Brecht aptly comments that the twentieth century is the century of methodology in the social sciences. The primary concern of political scientists with methodology is related to "the decline of political philosophy" in the contemporary world.

The decline of political philosophy implies the fact that we are no longer concerned with the question of a good political life. The exclusion of the question of a good political life from the "cognitive" research of political science is due to the idea that a value theory has no place in political science (science in the sense of the natural sciences like physics and chemistry). Thus, the cognitive theory of political science is tantamount to the denial of the idea that a good political life is worth seeking.

A sound political philosophy is one which can legitimately search for a good political life as once did the classical philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. The question of a good political life implies a value system. Therefore, in political science, the search for a good and better political life becomes a perennial question. It is the most pressing quest for the political philosopher and the political scientist to provide a system for political man and political society in order that the life of mankind as a collection of moral agents may be worth living.

The political philosophies of Christian theologians provide us with value systems which are derived from their theological concepts and dispositions. In contemporary political science, the investigation of their political ideas and philosophies has been unduly neglected. As the main title of this essay indicates, a trinity of "God, Man and Politics" suggests a possibility for what we might call "political theology." Political theology, from a political point of view, is that part of political philosophy whose principles are derived ultimately from what is theological.

Jacques Maritain is a Catholic theologian and philosopher. It is hoped that an examination of his political philosophy and theology will be a small contribution to the systematic analysis of political theology. As it will be shown, his political philosophy is deeply rooted in his Thomistic metaphysics and theology. Therefore, what he says on a metaphysical and theological level is closely related to his cultural and political views. As William Ernest Hocking has once said, there is no settled truth. Philosophy, conceived as a perennial quest for truth, opens the door to the examination of the political philosophy and theology of Jacques Maritain.

SECTION I

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEOLOGY

CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The contemporary scene finds "the science of politics"¹ pre-occupied and hopelessly entangled in a labyrinth of heated and unresolved controversies over methodological problems or what is ironically called a "methodology of methodology."² Professor Arnold Brecht aptly describes the state of political science when he says that the twentieth century ". . . has become the methodological century in the social sciences."³

The voluminous literature concerning the affairs of politics and the study of politics emphasizes the "scientism" and the "scientific-ness" which characterize the modern Zeitgeist, somewhat belatedly fulfilling the prophetic understanding of Auguste Comte.⁴ The outcome of this would

¹"The science of politics" here refers to a cognitivist definition of science. See, for example, Hans Kelsen, "Science and Politics," American Political Science Review, XLV (September, 1951), pp. 641-61.

²Arnold A. Rogow, "Comment on Smith and Apter: or, Whatever Happened to the Great Issues?" American Political Science Review, LI (September, 1957), p. 765.

³Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 5.

⁴Bernard Crick, a British political scientist, deplores the scientific orientation of American political science in his American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959).

Auguste Comte's sociology is based upon his categorization of the three stages of the intellectual development of the West: theological,

seem self-evident, if not self-defeating. Such a preoccupation would lead to methodological solipsism, hence to the poverty of creative, constructive political philosophy upon which rests not only the foundation of a political society, but also the guidance and direction of the science of politics. Despite the ample evidence that scientifically-minded political scientists have attempted to employ Ockham's razor to sever the whisker of philosophy from the science of politics, Professor Carl J. Friedrich has concisely illustrated the indispensable correlation between philosophy and the science of politics.⁵ And John Plamenatz of Oxford University firmly believes that political philosophy cannot be, and is not, dead.⁶

Unfortunately, the extreme emphasis on methodology and the attempt at scientific method as a means of studying "the objective society"⁷ has

metaphysical and scientific. The theological and the metaphysical stages are the things of the past; the scientific stage is distinctively a modern phenomenon. See a concise exposition of Auguste Comte in Harry Elmer Barnes, "The Social and Political Philosophy of Auguste Comte: Positivist Utopia and the Religion of Humanity," An Introduction to the History of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 81-109.

The immediate influence of objectivity in the social sciences is a more recent event. The sociology of Max Weber has a decisive influence on formulating the objective mood of contemporary social science. See his Methodology of the Social Sciences, tr. and ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949).

⁵See his "Political Philosophy and the Science of Politics," Approaches to the Study of Politics, ed. Roland Young (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 172-88; Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); John Plamenatz, "The Use of Political Theory," Political Studies, VIII (February, 1960), pp. 37-47.

⁶Op. cit.

⁷This phrase is taken from Everett Knight, The Objective Society (New York: George Braziller, 1960).

only a false claim to be truly in the spirit of the Enlightenment. As the reputed historian of ideas Carl L. Becker shows, the "climates of opinion" in the Enlightenment were full of the "didactic impulse" and "messianic enterprise" which were expressed in the key symbols of "bienfaisance" and "humanité."⁸ Such a didactic impulse is anything but the scientific spirit of our age.

This essay is concerned with the relationship between God and politics. More specifically, it is concerned with the Christian political philosophy and theology of Jacques Maritain. From a political point of view, political theology is not a part of theology which is essentially a systematic inquiry into the "ultimate reality." Instead, political theology is primarily political and secondarily theological: it is a part of politics which has a theological foundation. Political theology, in short, is a part of the whole corpus of politics.

Politics may be divided into "the practice of politics" and "the theory of politics."⁹ Since the former is the art of politics, it is

⁸The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932). Also see Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, tr. Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961); Alfred Cobban, In Search of Humanity: The Role of the Enlightenment in Modern History (New York: George Braziller, 1960); Charles Frankel, The Faith of Reason (New York: King's Crown Press, 1948).

Judith N. Shklar, who seems somewhat nostalgic about the "Aufklärung," has written one of the most stimulating works of political theory in recent years. She traces the reasons for "the decline of political faith" in the rise of romanticism, fatalistic Christianity, existentialism, and the decline of liberalism and socialism. Unfortunately, she does not discuss the possible implications of scientism and scientific relativism on the decline of political faith. After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

⁹George Catlin, "Political Theory: What Is It?" Political Science Quarterly, LXXII (March, 1957), p. 2 and "The Function of Political Science," Western Political Quarterly, IX (December, 1956), p. 817. See his earlier expositions on the method of politics in

beyond the scope of this essay. The latter, when it is defined in a loose manner, is "political science." Carl J. Friedrich states:

Modern political science is largely a critical examination of common-sense notions concerning the working of political institutions and procedures. Three axiomatic truths regarding the nature of power lies at its foundation: namely, that power ordinarily presupposes a group of human beings who can share objectives, interests, values, in other words, a community; second, therefore power presupposes objectives, interests, values, ends, which these human beings can share, fight over, or exchange; third, that all power situations contain both consent (shared objectives) and constraint (contested objectives). . . . Modern political science . . . is concerned with the instruments or techniques of political action in terms of the objectives they are supposed to serve.¹⁰

As John H. Mallowell states, ethics or moral philosophy is the rational understanding of the nature of "the good" and, in politics, man "seeks the implementation of that good in social life; and to assist in the implementation of that good is . . . the major function of political science."¹¹

However, there is no consensus among political scientists regarding what "political science" is and ought to be. In contrast to what Mallowell defined above, Hans Kelsen explains: "Science is a function of cognition; its aim is not to govern but to explain. . . . the scientist must not presuppose any value . . . he has to restrict himself

The Science and Method of Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927) and A Study of the Principles of Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1930).

¹⁰As quoted in Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 132 from Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941), pp. 593-94.

¹¹Main Currents in Modern Political Thought (New York: Henry Holt, 1950), p. 1.

to an explanation and a description of his object without judging it as good or bad" Therefore, "The principle of objectivity applies to social science as well as to natural science, and in particular to so-called political science." For Kelsen, who is expressing the representative opinion of what we may call the "scientific school" in the social sciences, the ascertainment of fact is the goal of scientific research whether that scientific research deals with the natural sciences or with the social sciences. For him, the only valid method of political science is the canon of "scientific method."¹²

What we may call the "pure theory of political science" of Hans Kelsen is derived from an over-emphasis of the term "science" at the expense of what is truly "political" and the purpose of politics. As the ancient philosopher Aristotle thought, the purpose of politics is to guide a good political life. Thus, ethical consideration is primary to the study of politics. The factual findings in political science must serve the ends of a good political life. In this sense, political philosophy logically precedes political science, that is to say, the former is an end whereas the latter is but a means.

In recent years, the term "political philosophy" is used interchangeably with that of "political theory." As Harry Eckstein says, "What we called 'political philosophy' is generally called 'political theory' in the department of political science."¹³ George Sabine uses the term

¹²Op. cit., p. 641.

¹³"Political Theory and the Study of Politics: A Report of a Conference," American Political Science Review, L (June, 1956), p. 476. George Catlin uses the term "political theory" to include political science and political philosophy. See his "Political Theory: What Is It?" and "The Function of Political Science." George Sabine uses the term "political theory" in the inclusive sense as Catlin does. Sabine

"political theory" in the most comprehensive manner when he says: "A political theory . . . covers three kinds of factors: it includes factual statements about the posture of affairs that gave rise to it; it contains statements of what may be roughly called a causal nature, to the effect that one kind of thing is more likely to happen, or may be more easily brought about, than another; and it contains statements that something ought to happen or is the right and desirable thing to have happen." In short, a political theory is "factual, causal, and valuational."¹⁴

It goes without saying that the factual, causal and valuational aspects of political theory are intricately related. They are three different but integral parts of the thing called politics. Political philosophy, in particular, is concerned with what is valuational. That is to say, "there are elements of valuation: an estimation of importance, not in the sense of what is likely to happen, but of what ought to happen, the discrimination of a better from a worse way, the conviction that some

includes in political theory the factual, the causal and the valuational. "What Is a Political Theory?" Journal of Politics, I (February, 1939), pp. 1-16. Leo Strauss uses "political philosophy" in the sense of classical political philosophy, which the author has adopted. "What Is Political Philosophy?" Journal of Politics, XIX (August, 1957), pp. 343-68. John Plamenatz uses political theory and political philosophy interchangeably. "The Use of Political Theory." Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan use political theory to include political science and political philosophy when they say: "Political philosophy includes not only doctrine, but also logical analysis of both doctrine and science; the term political theory may be used as a comprehensive designation for all these types of sentences." Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. xi. It seems, however, that the most comprehensive distinction of political theory is made by Jerry Hauptmann in The Dilemmas of Politics (Parkville, Mo.: Park College Press, 1957). He distinguishes between political science, political policy, political theory and political philosophy (pp. 12-20).

¹⁴"What Is a Political Theory?" pp. 5-6.

courses of action are morally obligatory, an expression of choice or preference growing from an attitude of desire, or fear, or confidence toward what the present holds and what the future may bring forth."¹⁵

Political philosophy is concerned with what ought to be or ought to be done. It is primarily normative and prescriptive and thus goes beyond the boundary of what is factual. David Easton speaks of a "value theory," and Thomas P. Jenkin calls it "prescriptive political theory." Thus what we need in political philosophy is a value system. Essential to a political philosopher is an ability to make value judgments: that is to say, he has to make the correct assessment of facts, discriminate and evaluate them in order to prescribe certain preferable action for a good political life. Thus, political philosophy is essentially evaluative. No one better expresses the valuative nature of political philosophy than Leo Strauss when he writes:

The meaning of political philosophy and its meaningful character are as evident today as they have been since the time when political philosophy first made its appearance in Athens. All political action aims at either preservation or change. When desiring to preserve, we wish to prevent a change to the worse; something better. All political action is, then, guided by some thought of better or worse. But thought of better or worse implies thought of the good. The awareness of the good which guides all our actions, has the character of opinion: it is no longer questioned but, on reflection, it proves to be questionable. The very fact that we can question it, directs us towards such a thought of the good as is no longer questionable -- towards a thought which is no longer opinion but knowledge. All political action has then in itself a directedness towards knowledge of the good: of the good life, or the good society. For the good society is the complete political good.

In short, "political philosophy," according to Leo Strauss, "is the attempt truly to know both the nature of political things and the right,

¹⁵Ibid., p. 11.

or the good, political order."¹⁶

Political philosophy is intimately related to philosophy. As a matter of fact, many political philosophers would consider political philosophy as a branch of philosophy. Leo Strauss says, "political philosophy is a branch of philosophy."¹⁷ For George Catlin, "Political Philosophy is merely a part of the seamless robe of Philosophy."¹⁸ For the reason that political philosophy is closely related to philosophy, especially moral philosophy or ethics, we must begin with the nature of philosophy itself.

The term "philosophy" has many meanings and connotations.¹⁹ Karl Jaspers writes: "What philosophy is and how much it is worth are matters of controversy. One may expect it to yield extraordinary revelations or one may view it with indifference as a thinking in the void. One may look upon it with awe as the meaningful endeavour of exceptional men or despise it as the superfluous broodings of dreamers. One may take the attitude that it is the concern of all men, and hence must be basically

¹⁶"What Is Political Philosophy?" pp. 343, 345.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 343.

¹⁸"Political Theory: What Is It?" p. 23.

¹⁹William Ernest Hocking defines a man's philosophy as "the sum of his beliefs." Philosophy as a science is defined as "the examination of belief." Types of Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), pp. 3-4. Paul Tillich, a theologian, defines philosophy as "the attempt to answer the most general questions about the nature of reality and human existence. . . ." And "philosophy tries to find the universal categories in which being is experienced." Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 90-94. Philosophy is also defined as "the science of sciences" that concerns "the criticism and systematization or organization of all knowledge, drawn from empirical science, rational learning, common experience, or whatever." Philosophy includes "metaphysics, or ontology and epistemology, logic, ethics, aesthetics, etc." Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), The Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, n. d.), p. 235. Another dictionary defines

simple and intelligible, or one may think of it as hopelessly difficult. And indeed, what goes by the name of philosophy provides examples to warrant all these conflicting judgments." Thus, if philosophy is anything at all, it is not something that offers "compellingly certain and universally recognized insights." In philosophy "there is no generally accepted, definitive knowledge."²⁰ As Alfred North Whitehead says, "In human experience, the philosophic question can receive no final answer. Human knowledge is a process of approximation."²¹ Similarly, Karl Jaspers writes: ". . . the essence of philosophy is not the possession of truth but the search for truth, regardless of how many philosophers may belie it with their dogmatism, that is, with a body of didactic principles purporting to be definitive and complete. Philosophy means to be on the way. Its questions are more essential than its answers, and every answer becomes a new question."²²

philosophy as "a theory of truth, reality, or experience, taken as an organized whole, and so giving rise to general principles which unite the various branches or parts of experience into a coherent unity." James Mark Baldwin (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (Vol. II; Gloucester, Mass.: Petee Smith, 1957), p. 290. Philosophy is also defined as the "process and expression of rational reflexion upon experience." James Hastings (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Vol. IX; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 844.

²⁰Karl Jaspers, Way to Wisdom, tr. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 7.

²¹Science and Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), p. 131.

²²Op. cit., p. 12. Paul Tillich, referring to the term "philosophia perennis," comments that "only the philosophical question is perennial, not the answers." Op. cit., p. 94. A. N. Whitehead says that philosophy asks the simple question: "What is it all about?" Op. cit., p. 131. Herbert Feigl also states that philosophy must ask two questions: "What do you mean?" and "How do you know?" "Logical Empiricism," Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 5.

Nonetheless, philosophy strives to ask questions about the whole. "Philosophy," A. N. Whitehead writes, "is an attempt to express the infinity of the universe in terms of the limitations of language." As he says again, "philosophy should aim at disclosure beyond explicit presuppositions."²³ Or, as Ludwig Wittgenstein suggested, "whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent"?²⁴

Philosophy contains that element which is concerned with human action and human things, i. e., moral philosophy. Political philosophy is close to, or a part of, moral philosophy. Consequently, it is not limited to knowledge itself. Knowledge is the pre-condition for moral judgments and always has moral action in view. Aristotle called it "a practical philosophy." For George Catlin as well as for Aristotle, political philosophy is a branch of ethics. "Political philosophy," John H. Hallowell says, "is most directly and intimately related to ethics, since the reconciliation of conflicting purposes can only be brought about by a prior commitment to an objective good that transcends subjective desire and it is one of the functions of ethics to determine what that objective good is."²⁵

Political philosophy is a branch of philosophy, which is concerned with the political: political philosophy may be called a "public philosophy." If philosophy and politics are conceptually distinct, political philosophy

²³Op. cit., pp. 21, 130.

²⁴As quoted in Herbert Feigl, "Logical Empiricism," Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 16.

²⁵Op. cit., p. 8.

is a sort of hybrid of the two. Carl J. Friedrich says that political philosophy is "that branch of philosophy and political science . . . by which the two are linked; it brings the main knowledge, both facts and generalizations, of political science into philosophy; and it brings the relevant aspects of philosophy to bear upon this knowledge."²⁶

In political philosophy, theorizing must be based upon what is factual. "Theorizing without relevance to fact," William A. Glaser states, "is a dilettantish hobby rather than a useful contribution; and fact-finding without theory produces a jumble that either is wholly useless or is used to justify defective empirical or ethical propositions."²⁷ Moreover, if the purpose of political philosophy is to guide a good political life, then we must try to bridge a chasm between political philosophy and practical politics. As Leo Strauss writes, classical political philosophy "is characterized by the fact that it was related to political life directly."²⁸

However, we always find a gap between philosophy or theory and practice. Kenneth W. Thompson is acutely aware of this gap when he says: "a perennial problem for Western civilization has always been the relationship between theory and practice."²⁹ The lacuna between reason and

²⁶Op. cit., p. 173.

²⁷"The Types and Uses of Political Theory," Social Research, XXII (Autumn, 1955), p. 291.

²⁸"On Classical Political Philosophy," Social Research, XII (February, 1945), p. 100.

²⁹Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 62.

experience, theory and practice, thought and action, and the abstract and the concrete is a problem in the entire area of human knowledge and action. Hans J. Morgenthau most aptly points to the crux of this problem in politics: "Here, in this inescapable tension . . . between theoretical and practical knowledge, between the light of political philosophy and the twilight of political action, is indeed the ultimate dilemma. . . ." ³⁰ Nevertheless, we need not consider that philosophy and practice are two entirely isolated things as does Michael Oakeshott when he says that "Philosophy is not the enhancement of life, it is the denial of life." ³¹

Political philosophy must guide a good political life. As John Plamenatz considers, political philosophy is not primarily concerned with "explanations of how governments function" but with "systematic thinking about the purposes of government." ³² Therefore, a political philosopher plays, in a sense, the role of an "umpire" in the games of politics. The ability of a political philosopher to make value judgments seems indispensable. Furthermore, political philosophy itself is not limited merely to the linguistic analysis and clarification of political concepts and ideas as T. D. Weldon conceives it to be. ³³ Since political philosophy

³⁰Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 381.

³¹Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: University Press, 1933), p. 355.

³²Op. cit., p. 37.

³³See his Vocabulary of Politics (Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1953). Peter Winch criticizes Weldon from a less radical philosophical point of view. See The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). He agrees with Weldon in defining philosophy as what he calls the "underlabourer conception." However, he distinguishes "philosophy" from "science." "Whereas the scientist," he says, "investigates the nature, causes and effects of particular real things and processes, the philosopher is concerned with

does not repudiate its dependence on the factual, value judgments necessary to political philosophy should not be construed as an emotive expression of personal preferences. They are to be construed as a kind of preference but a preference which is based on meaning and factual contents.

As Leo Strauss states, it is impossible to study all important political and social phenomena without making value judgments.³⁴ John H. Hallowell says that "the refusal to pass an ethical judgment is a kind of ethical judgment none the less."³⁵ "What," Eric Voegelin asks, "could a judgment that resulted in reasoned preference of value over value be but a value-judgment?"³⁶ J. Roland Pennock considers that "an increased emphasis on precision and on concrete and verifiable facts" would naturally create "the tendency to avoid the intangible subject of values, or at least to avoid analysis in this basic field." Nor can the validity of value judgments be measured with a mathematical precision. However, Pennock hastens to add that "this is not to say that we can do without analysis and without being able to communicate to others the grounds for

the nature of reality as such and in general." He conceives the role of philosophy to elucidate concepts and the clarification of linguistic meanings, but "the philosopher's concern is not with correct usage as such and not all linguistic confusions are equally relevant to philosophy. They are relevant only in so far as the discussion of them is designed to throw light on the question how far reality is intelligible and what difference would the fact that he could have a grasp of reality make to the life of man." Thus, he maintains that in considering concept and thought the philosopher must deal with reality. He rejects Weldon's conception of philosophy having "a purely negative role" in promoting the understanding of social life and institutions (pp. 7-15).

³⁴"What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 349.

³⁵"Politics and Ethics," American Political Science Review, XXXVIII (August, 1944), p. 645.

³⁶The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 16.

our judgments."³⁷ Therefore, as Gunnar Myrdal suggests, we can and should make our value judgments explicit rather than implicit.³⁸

For Jacques Maritain, political philosophy is a moral or practical philosophy, that is to say, it deals with the ends and norms of human conduct. It is a practical philosophy as distinct from a speculative philosophy because it is essentially concerned with the application of knowledge rather than knowledge for the sake of knowing.

Political philosophy, for Maritain, is distinguished from the science of politics. "Political philosophy," he says, "does not claim to supersede and replace either sociology or political science." In contrast with the latter, the former is more "abstract" and "less bound to 'the detail of phenomena'." Political philosophy may be materially dependent upon political science, but the latter is formally dependent upon the former. Maritain's position is clearly normative in that for him "should be" becomes "an incentive to make something be." Political philosophy considers "not only things as they are, but also things as they should be." For him "devoir être" is an incentive to action. Political philosophy, in short, "raises the material scrutinized by sociology and political science both to a higher degree of intelligibility and to a higher degree of practicability, because it sees this material in the light and perspective of a more profound and more comprehensive, a sapiential knowledge of Man, which is Ethics and deals with the very ends and norms of human conduct." As value and fact are closely related, for Maritain, political

³⁷"Political Science and Political Philosophy," American Political Science Review, XLV (December, 1951), pp. 1082, 1083.

³⁸See his Value in Social Theory, ed. Paul Streeten (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958).

philosophy, although it may be distinct from political science, is interrelated with the factual contents which political science may find.

Furthermore, Maritain believes that political philosophy is efficacious "because it deals with the terrestrial hopes of the human community."³⁹ Therefore the significance of Maritain's political philosophy lies primarily in his offering a moral basis, in the form of his profound Christian theology, not only for political society but also for the science of politics. Maritain himself expresses his concern over the lack of this moral basis in political science when he says that "the facts of political science taken apart from political philosophy have only a technical but no 'cultural' value."⁴⁰ The political philosophy of Jacques Maritain is a Christian political philosophy. The word "Christian" is a theological notion: Maritain's political philosophy as knowledge has its foundation in Christian theology and his political philosophy as the practical guide for a good political life is grounded in Christian faith.

Oswald Spengler at the turn of this century boldly predicted the decline of Western civilization.⁴¹ The word "decline" suggests an intellectual atavism.⁴² And it is a healthy atavism. In the recent literature

³⁹The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, ed. Joseph W. Evans and Leo R. Ward (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. xi-xii.

⁴⁰Charles O'Donnell, The Ideal of a New Christendom: The Cultural and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation; Cambridge: Harvard University, 1940), p. 150.

⁴¹The Decline of the West, tr. Charles Francis Atkinson (2 vols.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950).

⁴²Ayn Rand describes the attitudes of modern intellectuals as follows: "If we look at modern intellectuals, we are confronted with the grotesque spectacle of such characteristics as militant uncertainty, crusading cynicism, dogmatic agnosticism, boastful self-abasement and self-righteous depravity -- in an atmosphere of guilt, of panic, of

of political philosophy the idea of "decline" is not absent.⁴³ There are good reasons why the decline of political philosophy may be justified. Plato wrote his Republic with the decline of Athenian democracy; Thomas Hobbes finished his Leviathan to restore order and unity in the chaotic days of the Cromwellian revolution; and many others have followed and will follow the footsteps of Plato and Hobbes. "The owl of Minerva does not take flight until the shades of night are falling"?⁴⁴ Although we may not find a Plato or a Hobbes in the modern world, we find a few scholars who see our need for a Plato or a Hobbes. No one seems to have ever pictured such a fatal portrait as Michael Oakeshott, when he poetically wrote: "In political activity . . . men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and enemy; and the seamanship consists in using the resources of a traditional manner of behaviour in order to make a friend of every hostile occasion."⁴⁵

despair, of boredom and of all-pervasive evasion." As quoted in the New York Times Book Review (April 9, 1961), p. 3 from her book, For the New Intellectual (New York: Random House, 1961).

⁴³For example, see: Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Theory," op. cit., pp. 20-28; David Easton, "The Decline of Modern Political Theory," Journal of Politics, XIII (February, 1951), pp. 36-58; Sheldon S. Wolin, "Liberalism and the Decline of Political Philosophy," Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), pp. 286-351; Judith N. Shklar, op. cit.

⁴⁴T. V. Smith, Power and Conscience (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950), p. xii.

⁴⁵"Political Education," Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 15.

The intellectual, for Oakeshott, can at best engage in "the sweet delight which lies in the empty kisses of abstraction."⁴⁶

A political philosopher may be likened to the captain of a sailing ship of politics. There are many factors in our society which deny the role of this captainship. This seems to be a tragic scene of our era. Despair may not be cherished for its own sake. But, as Everett Knight says, it is "better than the paradise of complacency."⁴⁷

"Today," Leo Strauss writes, "political philosophy is in a state of decay and perhaps of putrefaction, if it has not vanished altogether."⁴⁸ Miss Judith M. Shklar made a sweeping analysis of "the decline of political faith" after the Enlightenment. If the word "decline" implies a high point at a certain historical juncture, her historical point of reference is the Enlightenment. Sheldon S. Wolin, on the other hand, comes to the conclusion that "the judgment that political theory is dead is premature." Moreover, it needs no "artificial respiration." "The task," he says, "therefore, is not to revive political theory but to rescue it." The rescue work for him is to restore what is "political" to political philosophy.⁴⁹

There are several reasons why some political thinkers consider

⁴⁶Experience and Its Modes, p. 356.

⁴⁷Op. cit., p. 12.

⁴⁸"What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 345.

⁴⁹"Shklar's After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith," Natural Law Forum, V (1960), p. 177.

For Wolin, the term "politics" includes: "(a) a form of activity centering around the quest for competitive advantage between groups, individuals, or societies; (b) a form of activity conditioned by the fact that it occurs within a situation of change and relative scarcity; (c) a form of activity in which the pursuit of advantage produces consequences of such a magnitude that they affect in a significant way the whole society or a substantial portion of it." Politics and Vision, pp. 10-11.

that political philosophy or theory is in the decline. The first reason, as Sheldon S. Wolin stated, is that the loss of what is political, that is, the loss of the status of politics, is the decline of political philosophy. The second reason for the decline of political philosophy is given by Leo Strauss,⁵⁰ Eric Voegelin,⁵¹ and Alfred Cobban.⁵² They all maintain that the decline of political philosophy is due to the rise of positivism. The third reason for the degradation of political philosophy is the prevailing trend of "historicism." (The term historicism has several meanings as explained below on pages 29-30). The fourth and last reason for the downfall of political philosophy (and political science) is related to the first reason. It is stated by Hans J. Morgenthau and Benjamin E. Lippincott, for example, who maintain that political philosophy and political science are taken over by philosophers, sociologists, and theologians.⁵³ We shall now proceed to consider these four reasons in order in the remainder of this chapter.

To return to the first reason for the decline of political philosophy Wolin states that the basic task of political philosophy is to do as Hobbes did: to identify and define what is truly political.⁵⁴ He maintains that the recent controversy between political philosophy and political science misses the whole point if political philosophers and political scientists believe that the real issue is solely methodological

⁵⁰"What Is Political Philosophy?" and "On Classical Political Philosophy."

⁵¹Op. cit.

⁵²Op. cit.

⁵³Hans J. Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 25; Benjamin E. Lippincott, "Political Theory in the United States," Contemporary Political Science (Paris: UNESCO, 1950). Also, see: Jerzy Hauptmann, op. cit., p. 17.

⁵⁴Politics and Vision, p. 289.

or primarily ethical. The issue, Wolin thinks, is "substantive; that is, it concerns the status of politics and the political."⁵⁵ "The decline of political categories and the ascendancy of social ones," he states, "are the distinguishing marks of our contemporary situation where political philosophy has been eclipsed by other forms of knowledge."⁵⁶

Therefore, according to Wolin, when modern social science explains what is distinctively political in terms of sociology, psychology and economics it is tantamount to the erosion of distinctively political phenomena. Wolin urges us to make efforts "to restore the political art as that art which strives for an integrative form of direction."⁵⁷ This was of course what classical political philosophy did for the attainment of a good political life. For Aristotle, politics was undoubtedly an integrative force: politics was "the supreme practical science" and all others were "subordinate and ministerial."⁵⁸

Leo Strauss deplores the fact that political philosophy and political science of our time are "cut into pieces which behave as if they were parts of a worm." Like Wolin, he maintains that "large segments of what formerly belonged to political philosophy or political science have become emancipated under the names of economics, sociology, and social psychology."⁵⁹ Thus the function of political philosophy seems to be to rescue the study of politics from this deplorable condition.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 288.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 292.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 434.

⁵⁸W. D. Ross, Aristotle (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p. 183.

⁵⁹"What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 346.

Leo Strauss, in his consideration of the decline of political philosophy, begins with a historical reference to the classical political philosophers: Plato and Aristotle. If the history of Western philosophy, as A. N. Whitehead once said, is merely footnotes to Plato, we might as well say that the history of Western political philosophy is footnotes to Aristotle's Politics.⁶⁰

The second reason, according to Strauss, for the decline of political philosophy is due to the rise of "science." Scientism (or positivism) in the modern world has eventually succeeded in destroying the very possibility of political philosophy.⁶¹ When political science is concerned unswervingly

⁶⁰George Sabine says that political philosophy began in Athens, and that the most significant political writings were produced in Athens in the fourth century B. C. (Plato and Aristotle) and in England between 1640 and 1690 (Hobbes and Locke). He further comments that ". . . Aristotle's Politics was probably the most important treatise on the subject [political theory] that was ever written." "What Is a Political Theory?" pp. 3-4.

⁶¹"What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 346.

Thomas I. Cook believes that the positivistic attitude results in "a mechanistic interpretation" of man. He maintains that man should be "valued" rather than "described." He argues that "the social sciences, if they are to be scientific, must abandon the misguided and misleading hope of reducing man and society to a complete pattern of descriptive -- predictive law, must accept the inherent and insuperable limitations of human existence as a necessary and limiting postulate." In short, the social sciences are the sciences of values. "The Methods of Political Science, Chiefly in the United States," Contemporary Political Science, pp. 75-76.

Ernest Nagel, for example, comes to the defense of scientific philosophy when he says: "The recommendation to use scientific method is the recommendation of a way for deciding issues of factual validity and adequacy; it is not the recommendation of an exclusive way in which the universe may be confronted and experienced." Logic without Metaphysics and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), p. 382.

with scientism, it becomes preoccupied with methodological questions. "The most striking difference," Strauss writes, "between classical political philosophy and present-day political science is that the latter is no longer concerned with what was the guiding question for the former: the question of the best form of government, or of the best political life. On the other hand, modern political science is greatly preoccupied with a type of question that was of much less importance to classical political philosophy: questions concerning method."⁶² Thus, in a sense, political "science" ossified political philosophy altogether.

Strauss maintains that modern positivism is not even what Auguste Comte desired it to be. While modern positivism holds that science is the highest form of knowledge as did Comte, it no longer concerns itself with "absolute knowledge of the Why" but it has receded into the "relative knowledge of the How." By insisting that political science should be value-free or ethically neutral, positivism becomes "nihilism."⁶³ Like Strauss, Eric Voegelin believes that positivism, especially the objectivism of Max Weber, has vitiated political science altogether. For Voegelin the sin of positivism is its exclusion of value judgments from political science. Thus, the restoration of political science is essentially "a return to the consciousness of principles" which was completely destroyed by the positivistic era. He urges us to put value judgments "back in science in the form of the 'legitimate beliefs' which created units of social order."⁶⁴ Leo Strauss insists that "The social scientist is not

⁶²"On Classical Political Philosophy," pp. 100-101.

⁶³"What Is Political Philosophy?" pp. 346-47.

⁶⁴Op. cit., pp. 2, 3. Voegelin lists the following three characteristics of the scientific creed: "(1) the assumption that the mathematized science of natural phenomena is a model science to which

immune to preferences; his activity is a constant fight against the preferences he has as a human being and a citizen and which threaten to overcome his scientific detachment." Worst of all, moreover, "The value judgments which are forbidden to enter through the front door of political science, sociology or economics, enter these disciplines through the back door."⁶⁵

Alfred Cobban also feels that "political theory" has declined and he proposes to restore "moral and political theory."⁶⁶ The decline of political theory, he says, "may be regarded as a reflection of the feeling that ethical values have no place in the field of social dynamics and power politics." For Cobban, the rise and fall of political theory is a general law of history: political ideas and doctrines grow, change, and decay. Moreover, political ideas are related to the conditions of

all other sciences ought to conform; (2) that all realms of being are accessible to the methods of the sciences of phenomena; and (3) that all reality which is not accessible to sciences of phenomena is either irrelevant or, in the more radical form of the dogma, illusionary." "The Origins of Scientism," Social Research, XV (December, 1948), p. 462.

⁶⁵"What Is Political Philosophy?" pp. 347, 350.

John H. Mallowell criticizes positivism in the following manner: "The inadequacy of positivism as the most valid perspective in which to achieve a description and understanding of physical and social phenomena is proven by this fact: that the positivist cannot avoid engaging in the metaphysical speculation he claims to have dispensed with." Op. cit., p. 321. Julius Rudolph Weinberg also says: "It is now clear that Logical Positivism cannot eliminate metaphysics without destroying itself, and that it cannot establish the logical foundations of science without alteration of the principles absolutely essential to its teaching." An Examination of Logical Positivism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1936), p. 199. For a comprehensive criticism of logical positivism, see C. E. M. Joad, A Critique of Logical Positivism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950). The effect of logical positivism on ethics, Joad thinks, is that "the spread of logical positivist modes of thought may well tend to the erosion of desirable and to the growth of undesirable beliefs" (p. 144). Criticism of positivism from a Catholic point of view is found in Frederick C. Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy: Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism (London: Burns and Oates, 1956), pp. 1-124.

⁶⁶Op. cit., especially pp. 36-58, 229-45.

political life at a given time. "For political theory to exist," he writes, "it seems to me, there must be an active political life."⁶⁷

Alfred Cobban is a child of our age: he is pessimistic. He believes that "political pessimism is deeper than it has been since St. Augustine wrote the De Civitate Dei." The decline of political theory may not be saved, and the same can be said of the decay of present political life. "Conceivably," he says, "political theory at the present day may not be undergoing one of its many metamorphoses, passing through a chrysalis stage before emerging in a new form. It may just be coming to an end."⁶⁸

As Miss Judith N. Shklar nostalgically looks back to the Enlightenment, Cobban happily returns to the same era in search of solutions for our age. His "search of humanity" is primarily that of the great men of the Enlightenment. He deplores the fact that our century has neither Bentham nor Burke. Like Sheldon S. Wolin, religious revival is no answer for the present crisis and for the decline of political philosophy. While Arnold Toynbee consoles himself with the possible rise of a religion in the midst of decaying Western civilization, Cobban thinks, on the other hand, that "the religious approach to political problems is not without its dangers," although "religious revival may be a way out." But, for him, religious revival is "not a political way." It is not the solution simply because "Western civilization is essentially

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 23, 26. However, George Sabine is of the opinion that ". . . when political philosophy is produced in quantities, it is a sure symptom that society itself is going through a period of stress and strain." Op. cit., pp. 2-3. Possibly, then, the less political philosophy there is, the happier society is!

⁶⁸Op. cit., pp. 21, 26.

political, and politics has been its vital centre throughout the modern period, even though the last great age of fundamental political thinking was the eighteenth century."⁶⁹ For Cobban, the political crisis of our age is the crisis of civilization itself, since Western civilization is essentially political. Unlike Leo Strauss who seeks the solution of political philosophy from the classical Greek period, Cobban returns to the Enlightenment: neither Plato nor Aristotle, but Bentham, Burke, Rousseau, Montesquieu and Locke are the saviors of the present crisis. However, like Strauss, Cobban maintains that "politics was essentially a branch of morals or ethics . . . the decline of political theory is a necessary result of the decline of moral philosophy."⁷⁰

Cobban comes to the same conclusion, as does Strauss, that "the influence of two modes of thought which have had a fatal effect on [the] ethical content [of political theory] . . . are history and science." For him, the "autonomy and primacy of ethics" were essential to the Enlightenment. "The Enlightenment," Cobban explains, "may sometimes have mistakenly derived its history and its science from its ethical ideas; at least it never made the mistake of trying to derive its ethics from its history and science. This is what its successors have done."⁷¹

Cobban believes that the rejection of moral philosophy is the cause of the decline of political philosophy. He finds a target of attack in T. D. Weldon's Vocabulary of Politics which embodies the spirit of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein whose analytic mind has greatly influenced the present shape of logical empiricism. For Cobban, The

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 27.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 237.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 237-38.

Vocabulary of Politics is "a declaration of the bankruptcy of political philosophy." Weldon becomes the protagonist of scientism that alienates politics from ethics altogether. Moreover, according to Cobban, the "esoteric jargons" used in modern political science do not help political philosophy to become a practical science. On the contrary, "a good deal of what is called political science seems to [him] a device, invented by academic persons, for avoiding that dangerous subject politics, without achieving science." The political philosopher should be "essentially concerned with the discussion of what ought to be. His judgments are at bottom value judgments."⁷²

A. N. Whitehead said that the Enlightenment was "an age of reason based upon faith" whereas the Middle Ages was "an age of faith based upon reason."⁷³ Alfred Cobban finds the solution for the decline of modern society and political philosophy in the rational and ethical contents of the Enlightenment. However, the Enlightenment itself is not the solution. Instead, as he sees it, it "can only be a starting-point."⁷⁴

The third reason for the decline of political philosophy is the rise of historicism. Leo Strauss defines historicism as the study which "considers history as an integral part of political science."⁷⁵ He criticizes historicism because it rejects the question of the good society. Strauss maintains that in historicism there is no essential necessity for raising the question of the good society because it is based on the

⁷²Ibid., pp. 234, 239-40.

⁷³Science and the Modern World (New York: New American Library, 1948), p. 57.

⁷⁴Op. cit., p. 244.

⁷⁵"On Classical Political Philosophy," p. 98. Leo Strauss distinguishes historicism from positivism. When the former reaches its full growth, then it may be distinguished from the latter by four characteristics: "(1) It abandons the distinction between facts and

assumption that the character of society and of human thought is historically relative.⁷⁶ For Cobban, historicism is no better than scientism. History, like science, leaves us in a "drift." The modes of inquiry of science and history would alienate political thought from ethics. Historicism is lacking in the sense of direction and purpose. However, Leo Strauss distinguishes what is "historical" from what is "historicist." He may reject what is historicist, but he upholds what is historical. He explains that "a historical interpretation is one that tries to understand the philosophy of the past exactly as that philosophy understood itself. The historicist interpretation is one form of the attempt to understand the philosophy of the past better than it understood itself; for it is based on the assumption, wholly alien to the thought of the classics, that each philosophy is essentially related to its time -- to the 'spirit' of its time or to the 'material conditions' of its time, or to both."⁷⁷ What Strauss upholds as historical seems to coincide with Etienne Gilson's statement that "the ultimate explanation of the history of philosophy has to be philosophy itself."⁷⁸

For David Easton historicism means something essentially different. Historicism is an exclusive engagement in the investigation of a history or analysis of political ideas at the expense of developing

values, because every understanding, however theoretical, implies specific evaluations. (2) It denies the authoritative character of modern science, which appears as only one among the many forms of man's intellectual orientation in the world. (3) It refuses to regard the historical process as fundamentally progressive, or, more generally stated, as reasonable. (4) It denies the relevance of the evolutionist thesis by contending that the evolution of man out of non-man cannot make intelligible man's humanity." "What Is Political Philosophy?" p. 355.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 356.

⁷⁷"On Classical Political Philosophy," p. 99.

⁷⁸The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 304.

"some ideas about the desirable course of events" and of "creatively constructing a valuational frame of reference." Thus Easton says that historicism diverted "the systematic theory about political behavior and the operation of political institutions." While Strauss and Cobban stress the development of political ideas based on moral judgments, Easton is concerned with a "systematic empirically-oriented theory about political behavior" which would make possible the discovery of the "uniformities in human, and in particular, in political behavior which can be used as a basis for predictions."⁷⁹

The fourth and last possible reason for the decline of political philosophy is closely related to what Sheldon S. Wolin calls "the sublimation of the political." Having pointed out the intellectual sterility of political scientists, Hans J. Morgenthau remarks that, "It is not by accident that some of the most important contributions to contemporary political theory have been made not by professional political scientists but by theologians, philosophers, and sociologists."⁸⁰ However, Morgenthau, unlike Wolin, does not conceive these contributions as the decline of political philosophy. Instead, he seems to welcome them. The names of Reinhold Niebuhr, Jacques Maritain, Russell Kirk, John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Talcott Parsons, Walter Lippmann, George

⁷⁹Op. cit., pp. 36, 40, 51.

⁸⁰Op. cit., p. 25. Exactly the same point is made by Benjamin E. Lippincott when he says: "The paradox is that there has been more creative work done in political theory by men outside the professional field than by those within it." Op. cit., p. 220. Jerzy Hauptmann also says: "To find genuine political philosophy nowadays one has to go to religion (Reinhold Niebuhr), journalism (Walter Lippmann), philosophy (Russell Kirk)" Op. cit., p. 17.

Orwell, John Maynard Keynes, and others indicate that "outsiders" have made many contributions to political philosophy.⁸¹

The decline of political philosophy has meant several things. As Sheldon S. Wolin has noted, it is essentially the sublimation of what is political. The restoration of political philosophy is a rescue work that would make politics an integrative force. However, the decline of political philosophy seems to be deeply rooted in the rise of positivism which has been striving to make political science "scientific" in the sense of the natural sciences. Thus value judgments become not only "meaningless" but also undesirable. The question of a good political life, as Strauss and Cobban have pointed out, has ceased to be a major concern of the political scientists. Instead, the main question of political science is the question of methodology to achieve the "scientific" status of political science itself in the image and pattern of the natural sciences like physics and chemistry.

The restoration of political philosophy will depend upon the cooperative efforts to ask the questions concerning the ends and goals of a good political life in society. A sound political philosophy, therefore, becomes the question of creating a good political life and society based on a value system. Sheldon S. Wolin seems to have rejected altogether a theological politics or a political philosophy based on theological notions as "a confused mixture of diluted religious ideas

⁸¹Lindsay Rogers, for example, mentions Reinhold Niebuhr, R. G. Collingwood, N. Lenin, Michael Oakeshott, George Orwell and John Maynard Keynes. Except for Lenin and Oakeshott, they are "outsiders." "Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Appraisal of Its Contribution to the Study of Politics," Approaches to the Study of Politics, pp. 189-214.

spiced with a dash of market place virtues."⁸² However, Alfred Cobban has been suspicious of religious ideas in the resuscitation of a good political society, but he has not entirely rejected religious ideas. When political ideas and ideals become stagnant with professional political philosophers and political scientists, we must inevitably look for the sources of inspiration from "outsiders." In the contemporary world, the theologians are an indispensable group of intellectuals who can provide the genuine sources of inspiration in the regeneration of political ideas and ideals. Among these theologians, we discover the Catholic philosopher and theologian, Jacques Maritain.

This essay is essentially an exposition and interpretation of the political philosophy and theology of Jacques Maritain. First of all, we must place Jacques Maritain among other eminent Christian thinkers. Since Maritain is a Thomist, we must examine his political ideas in the light of Thomism. Moreover, Maritain's political ideas are inseparably related to his theological and metaphysical system. The theological and metaphysical system of Jacques Maritain is the foundation of his political philosophy. After his political ideas are expounded, this essay will be ended with a concluding evaluation.

⁸²Politics and Vision, p. 288.

CHAPTER II

GOD AND POLITICS

It was not too long ago that Nietzsche, through Zarathustra, tried to convince the world that "God is dead," and to build "a new way for living" in the inculcation of the transvaluation of all values. Christianity, he thought, was the religion of "the botched and the weak." Power stood for the source of the good, and everything bad sprang from weakness. That was the philosophy of Nietzsche. In less than a century, Christianity and Christian theology have again proved to be the religion of "power" rather than "weakness." The modern world has witnessed the strength of Christian and Jewish theologians. The names of Reinhold Niebuhr, Jacques Maritain, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, Nicolas Berdyaev and Martin Buber have colored the intellectual history of the twentieth century which belongs to us.

Some political theorists have already implied that the decline of political philosophy is partially due to the lack of initiatives on the part of political theorists. The contributions to political philosophy have been made from sectors of theology, philosophy and sociology. As the title of this essay indicates, it is hoped that a step may be made toward a systematic analysis of what is called "political theology," "the theology of politics," or "theological

politics."¹ Political theology has been in existence since the dawn of human civilization, but political theology as a possible subject of study is a fairly recent development. And a systematic analysis of political theology is almost an untrodden path. Political theology is nothing more and nothing less than what Nathaniel Micklem calls "the theology of politics."² Political theology is that part of political philosophy which considers politics from a theological point of view. Therefore, the term "theological politics"³ is less misleading than "political theology" simply because in the former the connotation of politics is preserved better than in the latter. From a political point of view, political theology is a department of politics rather than a part of theology. To say that politics is considered from a theological point of view is to assert: "All political problems are at bottom theological."⁴ Christianity alone, to be sure, is not the source of political theology, but it presently occupies a large portion of contemporary political theology.

¹It is futile to look for any uniform meaning of the terms "political theology," "social theology," "politische Theologie" and "théologie politique." The ideas of "political theology" are frequently found in the current literature. For example, see: Nathaniel Micklem, The Theology of Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1941); Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Thomas Gilby, Between Community and Society: A Philosophy and Theology of the State (London: Longmans, Green, 1953); John A. Hutchison, The Two Cities: A Study of God and Human Politics (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1957); Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought: A Treatise in Political Philosophy (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1945), pp. 91-122; Judith N. Shklar, op. cit., pp. 164-217. Jacques Maritain himself uses the term "political theology" here and there.

²Op. cit.

³Heinrich A. Rommen uses "political theology" or "theological politics." Op. cit., p. 92.

⁴Nathaniel Micklem, op. cit., pp. x, vi, 38.

In the investigation of political theory, theology⁵ is the field of study most neglected by the investigators. Professor Charles S. Hyneman, in his recent volume on the present status of American political science, expresses his legitimate concern with the failure to

⁵Religion must be distinguished from theology. Religion may be defined as a system of beliefs or "a belief in the conservation of values." It includes certain characteristic types of beliefs, practices, feelings, moods, attitudes, etc. See, for example, James Hastings (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, X, pp. 662-63. Theology may be defined as a systematic exposition of religion and God or the Supreme Being. Theology is defined as "the science which deals, according to scientific method, with the facts and phenomena of religion and culminates in a comprehensive synthesis of philosophy of religion, which seeks to set forth in a systematic way all that can be known regarding the objective grounds of religious belief." Ibid., XII, p. 293. Another dictionary defines theology as "the system of theological doctrine developed dogmatically; that is, by a method whose ultimate appeal is not to reason, but to authority, either that of Scripture or of Scripture and tradition combined." James Mark Baldwin (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, II, p. 693. Theology is also defined as "a study of the question of God and the relation of God to the world of reality." Dagobert D. Runes (ed.), The Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 317.

This essay is concerned only with Christian political theology although political theology must be all-inclusive of various types of world religions as far as they are related to some aspects of politics. Heinrich A. Rommen defines the potential meaning of political theology so that religious experiences, religious sentiments, or irrational feelings are all excluded. Political theology only includes religious "doctrine." Op. cit., p. 93.

As we distinguish theology from religion, we can distinguish theological discourse from religious discourse. Professor Charles W. Morris describes religious discourse as "prescriptive" and "incitive" by its use and mode, whereas theological discourse is "critical," i. e., "appraisive" and "systemic." Theological discourse, by use, has the same characteristic as moral discourse: they are appraisive. Since this essay is concerned with politics, it is worth while comparing political discourse with theological and religious discourses (and moral discourse). Political discourse, like religious discourse, is prescriptive. Theological discourse and moral discourse have an appraisive character. However, we can bridge the gap between the prescriptive and appraisive aspects in theological, moral, religious and political discourses. Morris says: the "ought" is something that is positively appraised. Signs, Language and Behavior (New York: George Braziller, 1955), pp. 125, 138-42, 145-48.

examine and evaluate "the significance of religion for politics."⁶ The intellectual history of the West and the East reveals the significant role played by religion in various cultural systems, past and present.

"Christian theology," Dante L. Germino recently remarks, "has, after long neglect, gradually been reassuming its formerly prominent place among the intellectual disciplines."⁷ And some like Eduard Heimann have urged the consideration of the "Christian foundations of the social sciences."⁸ Heimann deplores the fact that the social sciences exclude, by their formative concepts, the Christian dimension of social life.⁹ "God, spirit, and liberty in history," he writes, "exist in reality but not in the social sciences."¹⁰ Therefore, if the social sciences would be realistic at all, they "must be capable of

⁶The following statement of Hyneman is worth quoting fully: "Religions appear to be virtually untouched. Certainly no American political scientist has provided a noteworthy analysis of the idea-system (or idea-systems) that characterizes religions in general. Neither has an American political scientist carefully explored the significance for legal government of the belief-system, organizations, and rituals we call Christianity. . . ." The Study of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 62-63. Most regretful is the absence of any outstanding study of a relationship between politics and religion similar to those which exist in other fields, such as Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958); R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1926); Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, tr. Olive Wyon (2 vols.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960); Christopher Dawson, Religion and Culture (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1948). The philosopher Ralph Barton Perry's Puritanism and Democracy (New York: Vanguard Press, 1944) may be regarded as an exception.

⁷"Two Types of Recent Christian Political Thought," Journal of Politics, XXI (August, 1959), p. 455.

⁸"Christian Foundations of the Social Sciences," Social Research, XXVI (Autumn, 1959), pp. 325-46.

⁹Ibid., p. 345.

¹⁰Ibid.

integration into a Christian theology of life and history."¹¹ Moreover, a true morality is always the fruit of religion. For Heimann, godless "humanism is often a moving, but always a tragic phenomenon."¹²

In pointing out the neglect of political theology, it is not maintained here that political philosophy should be based upon theology or that political theology is the only good political philosophy. However, to neglect political theology is to make modern political theory incomplete and inadequate.¹³

In an analysis of political theology, a few words of warning are in order. The political theorist qua political theorist must be aware of the fact that he is incompetent to judge the fundamentals of religious knowledge. As Loren P. Beth warns us, "The political philosopher, as political philosopher, is qualified to construct a theory of the state, but he is not a theologian and is in no position to judge of either the existence or the value of religious truth."¹⁴ Therefore, some political theorists, like Arnold Brecht, come to the conclusion that the reality or the existence of God must be accepted as either an assumption or a scientific hypothesis. It is beyond the scope of this essay to question, as does philosopher Walter Kaufmann, the existence of God.¹⁵

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 334.

¹³Arnold Brecht makes exactly the same statement in his Political Theory, p. 459.

¹⁴The American Theory of Church and State (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958), p. 137.

¹⁵Critique of Religion and Philosophy (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1961). See especially chapter v, "The God of the

Arnold Brecht is most notable among those in favor of the "scientific" political theory which, he insists, should accept the possibility of the existence of God as a hypothesis.¹⁶ Having pointed out the fact that religion has played a great role in the genesis of Western culture and the religious influence on the rise of modern democracy, he declares that there is professional recognition that the questions concerning the relation between religion and politics are "within the scope of political science." "In view of the important role played by religion in many public affairs," he urges, "political science must indeed be concerned with religion. To disregard the religious factor would often mean to distort reality and to base analysis and conclusions on defective data. Whenever religion enters political motivations it becomes part of the subject matter of political science."¹⁷ Moreover, he points out that religion can be a source of knowledge. He hastens to add, and rightly so, that ". . . to say that religion as a

Philosophers," which examines Plato, St. Thomas Aquinas and Pascal, pp. 137-72. In one passage, he asks the question: "Can one prove God's existence?" The answer is yes, but "this does not mean that God exists" (p. 168).

¹⁶He makes what he calls the "scientific" exposition of God's existence in relation to political science in Political Theory, especially chapter xiii, "Twentieth-Century Political Science and the Belief in God," pp. 456-79; "The Latent Place of God in Twentieth-Century Political Theory," The Political Philosophy of Arnold Brecht, ed. Morris D. Forkosch (New York: Exposition Press, 1954), pp. 148-60. His theory is reminiscent of the Pascalian wager in the social sciences. Pascal argued that "either God exists, or he does not exist." Since neither proposition can be proved, we must wager: "If we wager that God exists and we are right, we win everything; if we are wrong we lose nothing. If you passed this up, 'you would be imprudent'." Walter Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 170. Kaufmann himself argues: "They say that we cannot induce belief merely by representing to ourselves the great advantage of belief. But it is Pascal's logic that is at fault, not his psychology" (p. 171).

¹⁷Political Theory, pp. 456, 459.

social phenomenon is a relevant factor for political science is not the same as saying that religion is a prerequisite for the scientist's own understanding of reality."¹⁸

Arnold Brecht proposes to offer a "scientific" analysis of God's existence and the reality of God. He condemns the modern scientific element which brackets God's existence and reality as intersubjectively impossible. He argues that the scientific spirit has tended to interpret "the bracketed God as a non-existent God."¹⁹ He believes that this attitude tends to avoid the issue. Neither is this problem that which the theologians and the philosophers should solve, "because we are dealing here, not with the meaning of God, but with the meaning and scope of science and of political science in particular."²⁰

Brecht further rejects the scientific attitude of the "fifty-fifty balance" of God and no God. "We," he writes, "are confronted with the near-paradox that God's reality may some day be scientifically evident, but that if there be no God we shall never know that for certain. In popular parlance, we may some day know his existence, but we can never know his non-existence."²¹ He further argues against the fallacy of assuming that a student "who proposes to open the brackets must first prove the existence of God."²² He points out that this argument is "a legal principle" rather than "a scientific one." In the legal sense only, the burden of proof that the defendant is guilty lies on the shoulders

¹⁸Ibid., p. 459.

¹⁹The Political Philosophy of Arnold Brecht, p. 149.

²⁰Ibid., p. 150.

²¹Ibid., pp. 150-51.

²²Ibid., p. 151.

of the prosecutor, but in the scientific sense, he argues, the burden of proof rests on "both shoulders, not merely on one."²³

However, he makes it clear that his position is not a plea "for a surrender of the negative alternative to the positive one; it is a plea only for due recognition of both." "After fifty years of bracketing God," he writes, "we should by now be mature enough sometimes to remove the brackets and to shift them from the positive to the negative alternative, therewith acknowledging God's latent place in twentieth-century political theory; and still to fulfill our specific function well -- the function of the political scientist to distinguish severely between mere speculations, hypotheses, assumptions and personal beliefs, on the one side, and scientifically established data, capable of intersubjective transmittal, on the other."²⁴ Since the prevailing attitude of the social scientists has been tending towards the negative alternative (the non-existence of God), he argues for taking the positive alternative (the existence of God) in the "scientific" research.

The position of Arnold Brecht may be untenable both to the theologians and to the scientists. That is to say, it would be too "scientific" for the theologians; and it would be too "unscientific" for the scientists. But we must recognize the fact that even from a scientific point of view we can cogently argue for the positive relationship between God and politics. Brecht seems to be essentially Kantian in that the reality of God can be neither proved nor disproved.²⁵ The existence of God is neither scientifically verifiable nor unverifiable: God's existence is beyond the ken of scientific verification. In a scientific political

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 156-57.

²⁵Political Theory, p. 460.

theory, therefore, we must distinguish "religion as a subject matter of scientific inquiry" from "religion as a source of knowledge."²⁶

"In deciding," Brecht writes, "to limit our scientific work to the negative alternative alone, and to keep the other 'bracketed,' we have not eliminated the latter. This is the fundamental situation."²⁷ To bracket God from political theory does not eliminate him²⁸ from reality. The odds are against those who assume the non-existence of God since "we may some day know God's existence, but we can never know his non-existence."²⁹ Thus his conclusion is: a scientific political theory may as well accept the existence of God as a scientific hypothesis.

This agnostic position -- as John Dewey phrases it, "a shadow cast by the eclipse of the supernatural"³⁰ -- is a blasphemy to the religious mind which unquestionably believes in God and in the creation of man and nature as the divine work of God. And it is heresy to the scientifically-minded, who considers the existence of God as a superstition and who believes in God but says that, since God's existence cannot be proved by the scientific method, the question of God is beyond the realm of social and political philosophy. But the plea of

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., p. 464.

²⁸Brecht does not capitalize "him" for the reason that, he explains, "this paper deals with the scientific question of God's reality and, therefore, should not give the answer surreptitiously in the style of printing. Capitalization of the term God is justified even so, in order to distinguish the idea of one God from ideas of a plurality of gods." The Political Philosophy of Arnold Brecht, p. 158.

²⁹Political Theory, p. 470.

³⁰A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 86.

Arnold Brecht to take the positive alternative in the social sciences is to open the gateway for the scientifically-minded political theorists to tread once again the forgotten path of political theology.

"Political theories," George Sabine writes, ". . . live on two planes or play a double rôle. They are theories, or logical entities belonging to the abstract world of thought, but they are also beliefs, events in people's minds and factors in their conduct. In this latter rôle they are influential (if they are) not because they are true but because they are believed."³¹ In this sense the Declaration of Independence, for example, is an influential political document, not because all men are created equal in fact but because it is believed (to be true) that all men are created equal. John Dewey, while distinguishing "the religious" from "religion," even talks about "the common faith of mankind."³² In the same sense, religious documents, doctrines, religious thinkers (i. e., theologians) are influential in politics (if they relate their religious thought to politics). The tao of political theology is its link between theology and politics.

It has frequently been pointed out that modern scholarship suffers from the deplorable condition of compartmentalization. The compartmentalization of the study of politics from religion and theology is no exception. Joachim Wach comes to the core of this problem when he says:

One of the most unfortunate aspects of modern scholarship has been the departmentalization of the study of man. Granted, that man is, at his best, an integral organism of which the physical, mental, and spiritual are aspects, we must deplore the fact that the inquiry into these different aspects of his nature is carried on in widely separated fields of study. But

³¹"What Is a Political Theory?" p. 10.

³²Op. cit., p. 87.

what is much more disturbing is the tendency in some quarters to deny that each of these domains of human existence, notwithstanding their interrelationship and interaction, possesses its own laws. This important fact is neglected or outrightly denied by determinists in different branches of the study of man.³³

Professor John U. Nef, being aware of this compartmentalization, calls it "an axiom of [modern] scholarship."³⁴ The necessity of studying "man's experience as a whole" and the axiom of modern scholarship rightly place him "in a dilemma." "The very separation of science from faith, from ethics and from art, which is so characteristic of our times," he writes, "is at the roots of the industrialized world in which we live."³⁵ To be sure, this integral study of man's experience as a whole confronts the danger of becoming shallow. None the less, this risk is worth taking, as does John U. Nef, in contrast to the narrow approach where the whole man is chopped off into innumerable pieces.³⁶ Thus, the very axiom of modern scholarship becomes its myopia.

With this integral approach of the whole man in view, we must define the scope of political theology itself. By political theology I mean that part of theoretical politics or political philosophy which is based upon the theological as the ultimate source of politics. The proposition that "all the political problems are at bottom theological" is the key notion in political theology or, as Nathaniel Micklem phrased

³³The Comparative Study of Religions, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. xxv.

³⁴Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. xi.

³⁵Ibid., p. 4.

³⁶A humanistic view of "the whole man" is well constructed in Lewis Mumford, The Conduct of Life (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951).

it, "the theology of politics."³⁷ Therefore, as John H. Hallowell thinks, political theology must assume "both an intimate and logically necessary connection" between theological presuppositions and his political philosophy.³⁸ Granted that there is such a connection, however, it should be noted at the outset that a logically necessary connection between theological presuppositions and political philosophy cannot be pushed too far. In the study of political theology, we must thus be able to distinguish historical causality from logical inference. In relating theological concepts and notions with one's political philosophy, we must not only consider the theological reasoning of a political philosopher but also see the material connection and conclusions of his political philosophy based upon certain sets of theological notions and presuppositions. Take the example of original sin. This theological concept alone cannot determine or deduce a uniform pattern of political philosophy among Christian theologians. Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusions that material connections are much more important than logical connections. There is a significant relation between original sin and the political philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr and that of Karl Barth. But their political philosophies are markedly far apart from each other. This does not mean that there is no logical connection at all. An example can be given

³⁷The most comprehensive exposition of a concept in political theology is given by Ernst H. Kantorowicz in analyzing the origin of "The King's Two Bodies." He concludes that "the KING'S TWO BODIES is an offshoot of Christian theological thought and consequently stands as a landmark of Christian political theology." Op. cit., p. 506.

³⁸Main Currents in Modern Political Thought, p. vii.

in the political philosophy of Jacques Maritain and that of Karl Barth. The consequence of the former from the Thomistic emphasis on reason, nature and philosophy gives ample room for realistic and positive thinking in political matters while the consequence of the Barthian Orthodox emphasis on revelation, grace and theology reaches a negative attitude or "indifferentism" towards political affairs.

However, the reasoning of Reinhold Niebuhr seems to have an entirely different practical consequence on politics. The notion of original sin for Niebuhr carries its weight towards a realistic approach to politics. Power politics is the inevitable outcome of man's sinfulness and selfishness. Thus he accepts power struggle in international relations as an inevitable reality. His assessment of the reality of international politics has greatly influenced the American "realist school" of international politics. George Kennan once said that Niebuhr is the father of all the American realists.³⁹ Some consider that Niebuhr is more concerned with Christian ethics than with Christian theology. Dante L. Germino regards Niebuhr as "a theological gadfly rather than a theologian."⁴⁰ In the same sense, Walter M. Horton speaks of the depth of the "continental theology" in contrast to the Anglo-American theology.⁴¹

For Judith N. Shklar, political theology "assumes that all political ideas and institutions ought to be based upon direct revelation

³⁹George Kennan is quoted as having said that Reinhold Niebuhr is "the father of all of us," that is, of the American realists. Kenneth W. Thompson, op. cit., p. 17.

⁴⁰Op. cit., p. 477.

⁴¹Contemporary Continental Theology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938), p. 217.

and that political truths are a part of general theology."⁴² She could thus reach the conclusion that political theology is "certainly not the Christian political theory, par excellence."⁴³ This definition of political theology is based on "revelational theology" alone to the exclusion of natural or rational theology. Revelational theology is represented by the crisis theology of Karl Barth. It is the Orthodox Protestant theology as opposed to the "liberal" theology of the nineteenth century. Revelational theology is less drastically represented by Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr.

The revelational theology of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner is a return to the theology of the Reformation and, especially for the former, to the Word of God. It is contrasted with the Thomistic theology as represented by Jacques Maritain. The supreme emphasis of revelational theology is found in the notions of revelation, grace and the redemption of man's sinfulness coming directly from God. It emphasizes the total "other-ness" of God from nature, the world and man. Thus, man's sinfulness is redeemable only by the grace of God. Infinite God outdistances the finite world, nature and man. Revelational theology minimizes the role of human reason, nature and natural law at the expense of what is supernatural, revelational, and inspired by grace.

Revelational theology, thus defined, is directly opposed to the rational or natural theology of Thomism. It rejects completely the Thomistic concepts of analogia entis (analogy of being), human reason, natural law, nature. As the Catholic political philosopher Heinrich A.

⁴²Op. cit., p. 169.

⁴³Ibid., p. 170.

Rommen points out, the revelational theology "offers scarcely a possibility for a political philosophy and ethics based on human nature and reason."⁴⁴ In this sense, Miss Shklar's definition of political theology is in complete agreement with Rommen when the latter says: "If . . . on the basis of this theology [revelational theology] a political philosophy and ethics should ever be constructed, it will be truly a political theology."⁴⁵

Political theology thus narrowly defined in terms of revelational theology alone excludes the political philosophy based upon natural theology, e. g., Thomistic theology. Natural theology is as much theology as revelational theology. Thus we must define political theology in such a way that it will include political philosophy based upon both revelational theology and natural theology. Heinrich A. Rommen defines theology to mean "either natural theology, i. e., God revealing Himself in His creation to the human rational mind, revealing Himself in the conscience, or supernatural theology, the doctrine of God, revealing Himself positively in Christ and the inspired Sacred Scriptures,

⁴⁴Op. cit., p. 95. He further points out the fact that "St. Thomas in the quaestiones dealing with political philosophy and ethics more often quotes Aristotle and Cicero than the Scriptures, whereas Luther and Calvin must always quote the Scriptures. (Calvin, rejecting natural law not to the degree that Luther does, chooses to quote the Decalogue as the substance of natural law rather than any of the ancient or Stoic philosophers, a fact that must be explained by the Occamist concept of natural law in Calvin's thought)" (p. 112). The Polish Catholic thinker Przywara called St. Thomas the "Christian Aristotle." Walter M. Horton, op. cit., p. 65. However, it seems to be of cardinal importance to remember that St. Thomas Aquinas was Christian first and Aristotelian second. According to Etienne Gilson, there was no doubt in the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas that philosophy was to facilitate man's knowledge of God, and Aquinas baptized Aristotle. For example, see: Elements of Christian Philosophy (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 5-21. Furthermore, St. Thomas Aquinas' notion of the ideal state was found in Holy Scripture (p. 274).

⁴⁵Op. cit., p. 95.

interpreted by the infallible doctrinal authority of the divinely instituted papacy or, as in Protestantism, by divine guidance of the individual conscience, with or without the assistance of tradition . . . and of the consensus of theologians."⁴⁶

Political theology, therefore, must include the canon of Scriptures, the dogmas, the tradition and the writings of theologians in relation to politics. However, political theology is not directly concerned with the practical consequences of these things. Thus, for example, the movements of "Christian Democracy" in the contemporary world are irrelevant to political theology. It is essentially the relationship between theological doctrines (deriving from the notion of God) and political philosophy. The relation of church and state is a subject of political theology as far as it is on a theoretical level.

Political theology includes revelational theology and natural theology as long as they are related to politics; that is to say, when theologians talk about politics in terms of their theological doctrines and concepts. Therefore, the Christian political philosophy, if it is Christian at all, is a political theology par excellence. This does not mean that all political writings of Christians by their religious allegiance to Christianity belong to the realm of political theology. Some political writers who are Christian by faith do not necessarily expound political theology. When a political philosophy is ultimately founded upon the theological, then it becomes a political theology.

Political theology as defined here poses another question when we take into consideration the Thomistic distinction between "theology" and "philosophy." "From the standpoint of Catholic theology," Rommen

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 93.

writes, "a specific political theology cannot be held. St. Thomas bases political philosophy on natural reason and natural law, not on revelation and supernatural theology."⁴⁷ In Thomism, theology is clearly distinguished from philosophy. In philosophy, the role of reason, nature and natural law has a "genuine" but not absolute autonomy from revelation, the supernatural and grace. Thus, political "philosophy" is a real possibility. Political "philosophy" is put in juxtaposition with political "theology." The Thomistic political philosophy is based on human reason and natural law; "political theology" (defined in terms of revelational theology) becomes an impossibility. As Erik Peterson says, "political theology" is a "theological impossibility."⁴⁸ "The merit of 'political theology'," Rommen concludes, "lies, then, in certain aspects of its criticism and not in its positive system, which is inadmissible."⁴⁹

Deriving from the distinction between philosophy and theology, political theology (in the sense of revelational theology) for the Thomistic thinker is not theoretically feasible. The terms "political" and "theology" are mutually exclusive. The theology of Karl Barth, for example, has only the negative connotation for the Thomistic thinker. This amounts to the denial of "political theology" itself.

However, we are not compelled, for the present purpose, to accept

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 111. In this connection, the Protestant thinker Walter M. Horton writes: "I must confess my opinion that Catholic philosophy is much more interesting and rewarding to study, as a possible source of light and guidance, than Catholic theology." Op. cit., p. 83.

⁴⁸As quoted in Heinrich A. Rommen, op. cit., p. 114.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 115.

the strict Thomistic distinction between philosophy and theology. Even a Thomist, like Jacques Maritain, does not separate philosophy from theology. Although philosophy has a "genuine" autonomy in the natural faculties of the human mind, it is not absolutely autonomous from theology. On the contrary, philosophy is illuminated by theology. "Thus," Rommen writes, "a repudiation of political theology does not mean that theological supernatural truth is of no corrective and directive influence in political philosophy or that ecclesiastical authority has no right to teach in this field."⁵⁰ Jacques Maritain himself considers a political theology as the genuinely political philosophy or political science although he recognizes political philosophy and political science as distinct from political theology. Maritain explains that "those fields of research such as the history of religion, anthropology, politics, economics, and the rest, which depend on history or on methods of positive enquiry for all the observational material they amass, and for their empirical basis -- are not constituted as completely and genuinely explicative 'sciences' unless integrated with theology. Only a theological anthropology or a political theology would merit the name of ethical science or political science strictly speaking."⁵¹

Political theology is defined here in such a way as to include natural theology and revelational theology in relation to politics, especially political philosophy. We are not compelled to repudiate "political theology" (in the sense of revelational theology) as in the theology of Karl Barth, despite the strict distinction between theology and philosophy in Thomism. Granted that revelational theology in its extreme

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 116.

⁵¹An Essay on Christian Philosophy, tr. Edward H. Flannery (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), pp. 98-99.

form (i. e., Karl Barth) negates rather than affirms the importance of politics and political philosophy, this negative political theology is as important as the positive political theology of Thomism from a political point of view.⁵² Political theology is that part of political philosophy of which the ultimate foundation lies in the theological. The Thomistic political philosophy is distinguished from theology; nevertheless, its ultimate source is Christian theology. Whether Christian theology is based upon either revelational theology or natural theology, it is a political theology as far as it is related, negatively or positively, to politics. Political theology is a political philosophy under the ultimate aegis of the theological. It is based upon the proposition that all the political problems are at bottom theological. Therefore, the political philosophies of Karl Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, Jacques Maritain, Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich and others are political theologies par excellence. The Christian political philosophy is a political theology in the true sense of the term as it is defined here. J. V. Langmead Casserley, a Protestant thinker, explains why the Christian political philosophy is a political theology par excellence when he says: "Theologians of all traditions agree in rejecting this alleged priority of philosophical reflection over theology and faith."⁵³ Theology is understood as "the study of the content of revelation" and faith, "the acceptance of revelation." Jacques Maritain's philosophy of democracy, for example, has its foundation on the pillar of the Gospel. Thus, his

⁵²From a political point of view, the matter of revelational theology and rational theology has been expounded in a brief but precise form by Dante L. Germino in "Two Types of Christian Political Thought." These two types refer to the "fideists" (revelational theology) and the "rationalists" (rational theology).

⁵³The Christian in Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 186.

democratic philosophy of government is a part of his political theology in general.

Having defined the scope of political theology, we must now state what is not political theology. Jacob Taubes, in examining the relation between theology and political philosophy, notes that "In the beginning theology emerged as a problem of political theory. . . . 'theology' occurs for the first time in a dialogue between Adeimantus and Socrates discussing the place of poetry and literature in the state."⁵⁴ He goes so far to say that, "As there is no theology without political implications, there is no political theory without theological presuppositions."⁵⁵ And he is quite right when he says, "There is, in fact, no theology that should not be relevant for the order of society. Even a theology that claims to be apolitical altogether, and conceives the divine as the totally foreign, as the totally other to man and world, may have political implications." Moreover, it is often quoted that even Proudhon, an atheistic anarchist, said there is theology at the bottom of politics.⁵⁶

Political theology is defined here only in terms of theism and of the recognition of the supernatural. Thus it is useful to distinguish what is a "religion" from what is "the religious."⁵⁷ As Heinrich A. Rommen suggests, theology would exclude "religious experiences, religious

⁵⁴"Theology and Political Theory," Social Research, XXII (Spring, 1955), p. 57.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 58. Nathaniel Micklem also says: "Every conceivable political theory rests upon an implicit anthropology, a theological or anti-theological estimate of man as related to his God, to his fellows and to machines." Op. cit., p. xi.

⁵⁶"Theology and Political Theory," p. 58; Rommen, op. cit., p. 117.

⁵⁷This is a Deweyan distinction in A Common Faith, pp. 1-28.

sentiments, or irrational feelings."⁵⁸ It only implies religious "doctrines" as far as they are related to politics. As many Christian thinkers believe, Marxism is a form of religion or atheism (pseudo-religion). Some would consider the Platonic Idea of Good as a theological concept,⁵⁹ especially through the influence of neo-Platonism. However, these types of "theological" or "pseudo-theological" notions are excluded from the consideration of political theology here. As Etienne Gilson notes, ". . . if Plato has never said that the Idea of Good is a god, the reason for it might be that he never thought of it as of a god. And why, after all, should an Idea be considered as a god? An Idea is no person; it is not even a soul; at best it is an intelligible cause, much less a person than a thing."⁶⁰

In summary, political theology as defined here includes revelational theology and natural theology in Christianity as far as they are related to political philosophy. The extreme form of revelational theology, i. e., the dialectical theology of Karl Barth has a negative connotation in political theology. Nonetheless, it is as important as Thomistic theology from a political point of view. Thus, St. Augustine, Kierkegaard, Luther and Karl Barth are as important as St. Thomas Aquinas and Jacques Maritain. In examining the political theology of Jacques Maritain, we must keep in mind the fact that the Thomist, following the footsteps of St. Thomas Aquinas, makes the distinction between "philosophy" and "theology." However, to say that the political philosophy of

⁵⁸Op. cit., p. 93.

⁵⁹See Jacob Taubes, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

⁶⁰God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 26.

Jacques Maritain is a political theology is not to blur the distinction between philosophy and theology. All the Thomists, including Jacques Maritain, recognize the fact that theology elevates philosophy. Political theology, thus, is based upon the affirmation that all the political problems are at bottom theological. The political philosophy of Jacques Maritain, as well as the political writings of contemporary Christian theologians, is the proper subject of political theology.

In conclusion, let us restate, with the aid of Paul Tillich, what political theology or the theology of politics is. For Tillich, the "theology of culture" (theonomy) is based precisely upon the proposition that "Religion is the substance of culture and culture the form of religion."⁶¹ Let us substitute "politics" for "culture," then we get the formula for the "theology of politics" or political theology: Religion is the substance of politics and politics the form of religion.

⁶¹The Protestant Era, tr. James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 57.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICS OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

We have defined the scope of political theology as the interdependence and interrelation between theological doctrines and ideas and political philosophy. Political theology is also defined in such a way that it should include both revelational theology and natural theology. From a viewpoint of extreme revelational theology as in Martin Luther, Søren Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth of our time, theology has only negative political implications. In revelational theology there is an unbridgeable chasm between God and man, on the one hand, and between reason and faith, on the other hand. Since man is sinful, he can be redeemed only by the grace of God. This attitude creates a kind of total "indifferentism" towards cultural and political matters. Thus theology and political philosophy are not exactly friendly twins.

Nevertheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, there is an intimate relationship between theology or religion and politics. As Arnold Brecht has shown, even the scientific method cannot lightly dismiss the importance of the interrelationship between theology and politics. If we would look at Jacques Maritain in the light of Christian theology as a whole, we would be in a better position to understand his political philosophy.

Political theology, the link between theology and politics, is

almost a terra incognita on the part of political theorists. "The moral and spiritual anarchy of our age," John H. McLachlan writes, "is probably due to opinion being muddled and misled, to the continuing acceptance of archaic conceptions such as the idea that religion has nothing to do with politics."¹ Ernst Troeltsch earlier wrote that politics, without being integrated with religious and ethical conceptions, "can do nothing but further the barbarization and mutual destruction of the nations."²

H. Richard Niebuhr, following the footsteps of Ernst Troeltsch,³ regards the relation between the Christian faith and civilization as "the enduring problem."⁴ Paul Tillich, one of the great Protestant theologians of our time, explicitly states that "the strictly systematic character of a theology does not need to prevent it from being 'practical' -- that is to say: applicable to the personal and social problems of our religious life."⁵ However, for Tillich "it is theology and not philosophy which is able to offer an ultimate understanding of culture."⁶

¹"The Present World Predicament," Hibbert Journal, LVIII (January, 1960), p. 112.

²Christian Thought: Its History and Application, ed. Baron F. von Hügel (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 173.

³Ernst Troeltsch's The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches is certainly the most comprehensive study regarding the relation of Christian religious doctrines to social matters.

⁴Christ and Culture (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956). The first chapter is entitled "The Enduring Problem" which is a preliminary discussion concerning the relation between Christianity and civilization.

⁵The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. i.

⁶Richard Kroner, Culture and Faith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. vii-viii.

Moreover, all cognitive, aesthetic, social, and political matters are "spiritual concerns."⁷ "The history of Christian theology," John Dillenberger and Claude Welch write, "is always the record of a continuous conversation, carried on within the church and between the church and the world in which it lives. Thus the development of theology is always a dual movement, an expression of the inner life of the community of faith as it acknowledges the presence of God in Jesus Christ, and at the same time a partial reflection of the contemporary world."⁸

Jesus himself was not indifferent to culture. As John Moore says, "Jesus was not an anarchist, indifferent or opposed to the claims of political authority; he told his bearers to pay their taxes, to 'render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's.' But that saying continues, 'and unto God the things that are God's.'" However, the essence of Christian thinking is that ultimately "Caesar is subject to God and the things of Caesar must be brought under God's will."⁹

Richard Kroner makes a philosophical excursion into the relation between theology and culture while he recognizes the inherent limit of philosophy which is "determined and also illuminated by faith and theology." The limit of philosophy (in contrast to faith and theology) is essentially analogous to the proposition that "the human mind and the divine mind are separated from each other by a chasm which is reflected by the antagonism between culture and faith." This is the prevailing

⁷Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 1.

⁸Protestant Christianity Interpreted through Its Development (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), p. 179.

⁹"Christian Ethics and Western Thought," The Vitality of the Christian Tradition, p. 307.

attitude of contemporary Orthodox Protestantism. The crisis theology of Karl Barth is extremely emphatic about this chasm that Kroner speaks of.

Unlike Karl Barth, however, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich and Emil Brunner recognize cultural and historical exigencies although they all look at man's ethical problems "from the point of view of sacred theology rather than [from a] philosophic viewpoint." Richard Kroner, critical of the Barthian fideistic position, says that "Karl Barth and other theologians do not solve the problem of how the secular and the sacred are related to each other, because they ignore or disregard the task and the function of philosophic thought." All Christian thinkers, however, would be in complete agreement in that the ultimate solution for cultural problems is the Christian faith. "The philosophy of faith," Kroner writes, "can show that . . . the content of Christian faith does 'solve' the ultimate task of culture which culture can never solve." The Christian faith, for the very reason that it can transcend culture, "is able to integrate" culture and "to embrace and permeate all its realms."¹⁰

Only a few generations ago Ernst Troeltsch came to the deplorable conclusion that the Christian Church "no longer possessed a fixed and objective ideal of unity," and "the social philosophy of the Christian community has also suffered an undeniable disintegration, through its dependence upon continually changing conditions." The result, according to him, was obvious: the secular social theory "has far outdistanced the social philosophy of the Church."¹¹ The same cannot be said of the

¹⁰Richard Kroner, op. cit., pp. ix, 7-8, 208, 209.

¹¹The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, II, p. 991. E. E. Aubrey deplored the theological lag in cultural problems and

contemporary scene. It ranges from the political organization of Churches' laymen to the seminars at various universities. The movements of "Christian Democracy" in Europe range from family and youth organizations to trade unions and political parties.¹² They are a part of continuous efforts to inculcate the Christian principles in politics and economic affairs through laymen rather than through the Churches.

On the part of the Catholic Church, the new innovations began with Vincent Joachim Pecci, later Pope Leo XIII.¹³ On the intellectual level, the encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879) encouraged the study of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Catholic circle. On the practical level, the encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) became the landmark of Catholic social and economic thinking which essentially attempted to avoid the

urged Christian theology to "render a new service to culture. . . . [In order to do this] theology must reorientate its work so as to concentrate upon the cultural problem [The contemporary] situation demands of theology a new religious world-view, which offers an interpretation of civilization itself. This theology will be neither a non-social metaphysical theory nor a non-metaphysical social teaching, but a re-examination of assumptions of culture in terms of a world-view." Present Theological Tendencies (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936), pp. 17-18.

¹²Michael P. Fogarty defines Christian Democracy as "that aspect of the ecumenical or catholic movement in modern Christianity which is concerned with the application of Christian principles in the areas of political, economic, and social life for which the Christian laity has independent responsibility." Christian Democracy in Western Europe 1820-1953 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 5, 345. This book is probably the most comprehensive study of Christian Democracy in Europe. Representing a Roman Catholic point of view, there is Church and Society: Catholic Social and Political Thought and Movements 1789-1950, ed. Joseph Moody (New York: Arts, 1953). There are numerous works written country by country. However, some excellent examples are: Mario Einaudi and Francois Goguel, Christian Democracy in Italy and France (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952) and Alfred Diamant, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

¹³The nine most important social teachings of Pope Leo XIII is found in The Church Speaks to the Modern World: The Social Teachings of Leo XIII, ed. Etienne Gilson (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1954). From a Protestant point of view, Winthrop S. Hudson writes Understanding

one extreme of laissez-faire capitalism and the other extreme of secular or "atheistic" socialism; on social and political matters, we must take cognizance of the encyclicals such as Immortale Dei (1885), Graves de Communi (1901) and, most recently, Pope John XXIII's Mater et Magister (July, 1961).

From a Protestant point of view, the Ecumenical Movement (the World Council of Churches) was an attempt to arrive at doctrinal unity in Protestantism.¹⁴ There is also the "Christendom" movement in England. In the university circle in this country, the Lilly Endowment research program in Christianity and politics at Duke University under the directorship of John H. Hallowell and the Institute of Ethics and Politics at Wesleyan University under the direction of Kenneth W. Underwood are comparatively recent phenomena to integrate Christianity with political and social matters in university teaching.¹⁵

Roman Catholicism: A Guide to Papal Teaching for Protestants (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959).

¹⁴The Ecumenical Movement or the World Council of Churches began with the first Assembly held at Amsterdam in Holland from August 22 to September 4, 1948. One hundred and forty-seven churches from forty-four countries were represented by three hundred and fifty-one delegates and two hundred and thirty-eight alternates. The second Assembly was held at Evanston, Illinois, in 1956. It must be clearly noted that the Council itself is not a church and cannot define doctrine and policy of various churches, although the creation of the Council is an aspiration of a united Christian church. The Council publishes a quarterly journal called Ecumenical Review whose present editor is Willem Adolph Visser 'T Hooft, who wrote The Meaning of Ecumenical (London: SCM Press, 1953). See also: John T. McNeill, Modern Christian Movements (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954) which includes Roman Catholic movements. From a historical point of view, there is A History of the Ecumenical Movement, ed. Ruth Rouse and Stephen C. Neill (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954); and from a doctrinal point of view, Walter M. Horton wrote: Christian Theology: An Ecumenical Approach (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955). From a Catholic point of view, see: Gustave Weigel, A Catholic Primer on the Ecumenical Movement (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1959); Bernard Leeming, The Churches and the Church: A Study of Ecumenism (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1960).

¹⁵The Lilly Endowment program is oriented on a high professional level that includes conference and publication. Its publication

Along with these new developments, Christian political theology is a force that should be recognized in the modern theory of politics. The fundamental supposition of Christian political theology is that all the political problems and political philosophies are at bottom theological. Theology is the first principle of Christian political philosophy. The completely systematic analysis of political theology, of course, must include all the religions of the world, whether they be past or present, primitive or modern. It must include, for example, Christianity, Judaism, Islamism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, and examine their theological implications and influences on politics. In doing so, political theology must learn its lessons from comparative religion, philosophy of religion, sociology of religion, psychology of religion, and other intellectual disciplines.¹⁶

includes such works as Kenneth W. Thompson, Christian Ethics and the Dilemma of Foreign Policy and John Wild, Human Freedom and Social Order (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959). On the other hand, the program at Wesleyan University is primarily aimed at teaching undergraduates the relation between Christianity and social problems. For an exposition of this program, see: James R. Brown, "Inter-Disciplinary and Inter-Faith Dialogue as an Approach to the Study of Ethical Problems in Politics," Ethics and the Social Sciences, ed. Leo R. Ward (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 104-16.

¹⁶Some examples are: Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961) and Patterns in Comparative Religion, tr. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1958); Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa (eds.), The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959); Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), Types of Religious Experience Christian and Non-Christian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) and Sociology of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944); Henry Nelson Wieman and Walter M. Horton, The Growth of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1938); John Milton Yinger, Religion in the Struggle of Power (Durham: Duke University Press, 1946) and Religion, Society and the Individual (New York: Macmillan, 1957); William Ernest Hocking, Living Religions and a World Faith (New York: Macmillan, 1940); Charles W. Morris, Paths of Life

Christianity is a catholic and universalistic religion in the modern world. The sphere of its influence has no longer been limited to the Western hemisphere; it has rapidly spread and taken its roots even in the Eastern hemisphere.¹⁷ "Religion as form of life and Weltanschauung," writes Mircea Eliade, "is represented by Christianity."¹⁸ Despite the catholicity of Christianity in form and substance, it is only one form of religion from a comparative point of view. Therefore, theoretically speaking, Christian political theology is a part, although a large part, of political theology in general. To complete a systematic analysis of political theology, we must include all the religions of the world, be they living or dead.

For the discussion of political theology -- Christianity or Christian theology and politics in this case -- it is convenient to divide human existence into the two fundamental "modalities" given by Paul Tillich: one is the historical order and the other is the eternal order.¹⁹ One is the temporal, the natural, the profane, or the finite

(New York: George Braziller, 1956); F. S. C. Northrop, The Meeting of East and West (New York: Macmillan, 1946); Georg Simmel, Sociology of Religion, tr. Curt Rosenthal (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959); Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: Meridian Books, 1960); William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Modern Library, 1929); Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, tr. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958); C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion: West and East, tr. R. F. C. Hull (New York: Pantheon, 1958); Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); Gordon W. Allport, The Individual and His Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

¹⁷The most comprehensive study of the expansion of Christianity is found in Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of the Expansion of Christianity (7 vols.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1937-1945). A shorter version is A History of Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953).

¹⁸The Sacred and the Profane, p. 162.

¹⁹The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 18.

world and the other is the spiritual, the supernatural, the sacred, or the infinite world. Politics refers to the former, whereas religion refers to the latter. Man can be looked at in the same way: he is homo religiosus and homo historicus, or he is spiritual and temporal. Thus man is fundamentally a two-dimensional being. Regardless of what type of religion it may be, according to Mircea Eliade, a noted historian of comparative religion, all religions encounter the sacred in contrast to the profane.²⁰

Religious man would have a fundamentally different outlook on the world of politics from the non-religious. For him the world of politics as part of the historical order is secondary in the order of importance: there is the higher order of the supernatural, the sacred, or the eternal world. "For religious man," Eliade comments, "space is not homogeneous there is . . . a sacred space, and hence a strong, significant space; there are other spaces that are not sacred and so are without structure or consistency, amorphous. For religious man, this spatial nonhomogeneity finds expression in the experience of an opposition between space that is sacred -- the only real and real-ly existing space -- all other space, the formless expanse surrounding it."²¹

While the sacred world always represents the absolute reality, the profane world appears for religious man to be only a momentary temporality. "Whatever the historical context in which he [religious man] is placed," says Eliade, "homo religiosus always believes that there is an absolute reality, the sacred, which transcends this world but

²⁰The Sacred and the Profane, p. 14.

²¹Ibid., p. 20.

manifests itself in this world, thereby sanctifying it and making it real."²² Here lies the difference between the naturalistic notion of man (anthropocentric humanism) and the theocentric notion of man (theocentric humanism).²³ Man is the center of the universe in the former; if there is God, God is either the object of belief or valuable for the service of man.²⁴ In the latter, however, the order is reversed: God is the pivot of human existence and the world.

It is usually agreed that the naturalistic conception of man is the product of the Renaissance and inculcated in the course of scientific development. Mircea Eliade says that ". . . the completely profane world, the wholly desacralized cosmos, is a recent discovery in the history of the human spirit." Man, however, never seems to be able to escape completely from his religious experience: there is always some object for belief or worship even if it be neither God nor the Supreme Being who governs the universe. "To whatever degree he may have desacralized the world, the man who had made his choice in favor of a profane life never succeeds in completely doing away with religious behavior."

Whatever the nature of man may be, the world of politics for religious man appears to be at its best only one of many possible dimensions of human existence. Politics, considered as such, seems to be more rewarding and exacting. Politics and other dimensions of life are existentially interrelated with one another. Religious dimension

²²Ibid., p. 202.

²³From an anthropocentric point of view, Erich Kahler wrote Man the Measure: A New Approach to History (New York: George Braziller, 1961). Jacques Maritain presents one of the best examples of theocentric humanism in True Humanism, tr. Margot Adamson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938).

²⁴For example, see Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity.

and political dimension, in the last resort, cannot be excluded from mutual dependence. Mircea Eliade pinpoints this fact when he says that the sacred and the profane worlds are "of concern both to the philosopher and to anyone seeking to discover the possible dimensions of human existence."²⁵

A political theorist who studies political theology must keep in mind that, for religious man, e. g., a Christian theologian, politics is always portrayed in the image of the profane world in contrast to religion in the image of the sacred world. It is not too difficult to understand, therefore, why a Christian theologian would consider Communism as a pseudo-religion in which the proletariat has a kind of "soteriological function" and the stateless society has a kind of "Judaean-Christian eschatological hope of an absolute end to history."²⁶

For a theologian who is trying to bridge the chasm between theology and politics or between the sacred and the profane worlds, political theology is the means to achieve this unity. Some theologians, notably Karl Barth, may try to discard the profane world of politics altogether. However, paradoxically enough, they can never escape from political involvement. The record of Barth's opposition to Nazism, despite his theological belief, clearly shows why even the utterly profane world of politics must become the concern for even such a theologian. For more politically-minded theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Maritain, Christianity has cast its lot with the world of politics even though it is profane.

²⁵The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 13, 15, 23, 203.

²⁶Ibid., p. 207.

That was the reason why Reinhold Niebuhr accused Barth of "indifferentism" towards the world of politics.²⁷ Niebuhr's ethical concern over the world of politics is a supreme form of Christian activism. Niebuhr cannot tolerate the Barthian attitude of Christians having "nothing special to say to the godless people of our age which [they] would not have said in any age."²⁸ Even Emil Brunner who shares the Christocentric Barthian orientation "saw some point of contact in man's 'capacity for the world'."²⁹

Will Herberg shows clearly why even Karl Barth had to become involved in politics.³⁰ He considers Barth as "truly the Carlylean Hero as Theologian," and Barth is not merely an "eventful" man but also an "event-making" man.³¹ In examining Karl Barth, Herberg comes to the conclusion that "contemporary theology is reasserting its relevance to all of human life, man's social concerns included." And even in the social philosophy of Karl Barth, Herberg distinguishes "a kind of pre-Barthian Barth" from real Barth. Barth has been concerned with "the

²⁷Essays in Applied Christianity, ed. D. B. Robertson (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), "Barthianism and the Kingdom," pp. 141-93.

²⁸Ibid., p. 173.

²⁹Will Herberg, "The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," p. 16.

³⁰Herberg's exposition of "the social philosophy of Karl Barth" is an indication that Barth had to be involved in politics.

³¹Op. cit., p. 12. "Eventful" man and "event-making" man are coined by Sidney Hook in The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility (Boston: Beacon Press, 1943), p. 154. Hook distinguishes the two categories of eventful man and event-making man: "The eventful man in history is any man whose actions influenced subsequent developments along a quite different course than would have been followed if these actions had not been taken. The event-making man is an eventful man whose actions are the consequences of outstanding capacities of intelligence, will, and character rather than of accidents of position."

problems of society, church, and state, war and revolution, totalitarianism and democracy." This was why Barth expressed his stern opposition to Nazi totalitarianism: his discriminating judgments in politics came to "bring the Christian to the side of constitutional democracy."³²

The fideistic position of Barth totally rejects reason, nature and philosophy. H. R. Mackintosh remarks that "Barth gives no place to Natural Revelation."³³ Revelation, faith, and grace are the key concepts

³²Will Herberg, op. cit., pp. 13, 21, 45.

³³Types of Modern Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 277. The fideistic position of Karl Barth is clear throughout his theological writings. The Epistle to the Romans, tr. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933) was merely the beginning of this great theologian. Joachim Wach comments that "Two theological books profoundly impressed the generation of students which populated the German universities after the First World War: the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans by Karl Barth and The Idea of the Holy by Rudolf Otto." Types of Religious Experience Christian and Non-Christian, p. 209. The most systematic exposition of Barth's theology is found in Church Dogmatics (4 vols. in 7; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936-1958); Dogmatics in Outline, tr. G. T. Thomson (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949) is a sketch of his theological outlook. His Gifford lectures make his fideistic position clear and here we find his negative attitude towards society and culture: The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation, tr. J. L. M. Haire and Ian Henderson (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938). His social thinking can be found in The Word of God and the Word of Man, tr. Douglas Horton (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), Against the Stream and Community, State and Church. An excellent exposition of Barth's social and political thinking is found in Will Herberg, "The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," Community, State and Church, pp. 11-67.

Among numerous materials concerning theological tendencies of the contemporary world, the following works seem to be useful for the present exposition of "the politics of Christian theology": E. E. Aubrey, Present Theological Tendencies, Roger Hazelton, New Accents in Contemporary Theology (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960); Carl F. H. Henry (ed.), Contemporary Evangelical Thought (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957); Walter M. Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology and Theology in Transition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943); H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology; Daniel Day Williams, What Present-Day Theologians Are Thinking (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952); Karl Pfleger, Wrestlers with Christ, tr. E. I. Watkin (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938).

for Barth. In his Gifford lectures, he made absolutely clear that "natural theology" is an impossibility. He somewhat apologetically stated that his lectures could only serve "indirectly" to the intentions of Gifford lectures, which require a general topic on "natural theology" and its relation to the human ethics and the world. The Barthian fideistic position implies an indifferent attitude towards the historical order altogether. "Not ethical autonomy," remarks H. R. Mackintosh, "is the watchword, but obedience to the Word of God, speaking in man's heart to disclose to him his duty for the actual or existential moment through which he is living."³⁴ "The knowledge of God and the service of God" is an antithesis to "natural theology." God (not man) and the Church (not the world) are exalted. "The church," Barth vehemently states, "is neither a charitable institution, nor an institution for the general betterment of the world and man. She is not an institution for the cultivation of fellowship, nor is she a place of intellectual entertainment."³⁵ For Barth, God alone can save the world, and "the synthesis [of God and the world] we seek is in God alone, and in God alone can we find it. If we do not find it in God, we do not find it at all."³⁶

As has been suggested in the preceding pages, there are three possible attitudes, which the theologians may take concerning the relationships between the sacred world and the profane world. According to H. Richard Niebuhr, these are the relations between "Christ and

³⁴Op. cit., p. 319.

³⁵The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation, p. 209.

³⁶Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, pp. 281, 322.

culture."³⁷ These three different attitudes, moreover, correspond to the attitudes concerning the connection between faith and reason, between grace and nature, and between theology and philosophy.³⁸

The first position is that of "Christ over culture." It is the logical consequence of the primary emphasis on faith, grace, and theology at the expense of reason, nature and philosophy. In the Middle Ages, the Tertullian "family" and the Augustinian "family" represented this position. Kierkegaard, Luther and Barth represent the same position when they discard the role of reason, nature and philosophy in the Christian faith. Thus the "other-ness" of God is the necessary chasm between the sacred world and the profane world. A Thomist appears for them as a kind of "semi-rationalist." "Contemporary Protestant thought," Samuel E. Stumpf writes, "is fundamentally critical of natural law theory, even though it does not repudiate the doctrine entirely. The ground of this critical attitude is that the doctrine of natural law is originally the product of rational philosophy, which rests upon certain notions of the nature and capacities of man which Protestantism does not accept."³⁹

The theology of Reinhold Niebuhr revolves around Christian ethics. Thus, his chair of "applied Christianity" is an appropriate title. Dante L. Germino calls him "a theological gadfly" rather than a theologian.⁴⁰

³⁷Op. cit. Ernst Troeltsch classified three types of Christian thought: the Church, the sect, and mysticism in The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, II, p. 993.

³⁸This distinction, as it existed in the Middle Ages, is made clear by Etienne Gilson in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938). Three distinct categories are: the primacy of faith, the primacy of reason, and the harmony of reason and revelation.

³⁹A Handbook of Christian Theology (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 246.

⁴⁰"Two Types of Christian Political Thought," p. 481. Edward D.

Niebuhr's whole political "realism" is based upon the notion of original sin.⁴¹ The natural law of Thomism is totally rejected by him. Roman Catholicism appears to him at its best "the blind child of light," in

O'Connor, a Catholic thinker, writes that "Niebuhr's interest in theology is chiefly motivated by ethical preoccupations, and his theological positions are manifestly influenced by ethical convictions." "The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr," Review of Politics, XXIII (April, 1961), pp. 193-94.

⁴¹All Niebuhr's writings seem to have positive social implications deriving from his ideas of Christian ethics. The Nature and Destiny of Man (2 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941-1943) must be considered as the point at which his theology lays the ground for his social and political philosophy. The theme of the fallen and pessimistic nature of man permeates all of his writings. Among his works, the following are important for the purpose of the present essay: An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Meridian Books, 1956); Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932) which has great impacts on political realism in international politics; Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940); Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940); The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness; The Structure of Nations and Empires (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959); Essays in Applied Christianity.

The most penetrating expositions on Niebuhr's thought are compiled with his own comments in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (eds.), Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought (New York: Macmillan, 1961). Gordon Harland appraises Niebuhr's thought in The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960) which includes the social and political thought of Niebuhr. Holtan P. Odegard critically analyzes the political philosophy of Niebuhr in Sin and Science: Reinhold Niebuhr as Political Theologian (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1956). Ronald F. Howell wrote an excellent article: "Political Philosophy on a Theological Foundation: An Expository Analysis of the Political Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr," Ethics, LXII (January, 1953), pp. 79-99.

It must be noted here that the cardinal virtue of Niebuhr's political philosophy is realism based upon the notion of selfish, pessimistic and sinful man, and yet Niebuhr seems to attempt to transcend this limitation by means of faith, love and justice. This appears to be an engulfing conflict between realism and idealism in Niebuhr's thought. "Indeed, the unsolved problem in Niebuhr's philosophy," Kenneth W. Thompson writes, "arises precisely from this crowning point in his thought," that is to say, "from the depths of human selfishness and sin to the bright summit of transcendent faith." "The Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr," Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, pp. 168, 169.

contrast to the "children of darkness."⁴² He thus characterizes the "misgivings of Catholic politics," first of all, in Catholicism's identification of "the moral ambiguities of politics . . . with eternal sanctities." Secondly, the misgiving of Catholic politics is that "the Catholic church tends to identify the historic church with the Kingdom of God." Thirdly, Niebuhr thinks that an alternative of "moral nihilism" (e. g., the Barthian position) cannot be found in the Catholic principle in "the inflexible propositions of 'natural law'."⁴³

The contemporary Orthodox Protestant theologians -- Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and Paul Tillich -- attack the theological position of Protestant "liberalism" that had been flourishing in the nineteenth century.⁴⁴ They all are critical of the liberal position which brought Christ down to the level of culture -- this is the second possible position that H. Richard Niebuhr calls "the Christ of culture" and Karl Barth calls "culture-Protestantism."⁴⁵ The Orthodox Protestantism of our day completely rejects the Protestantism of Albrecht Ritschl, Friedrich Schleiermacher, the historical Jesus research of

⁴²The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, p. 13.

⁴³Essays in Applied Christianity, p. 248.

⁴⁴For the development of Protestantism, see: John Dillenberger and Claude Welch, Protestant Christianity Interpreted through Its Development and William Hordern, A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology (New York: Macmillan, 1955). Expositions of neo-Orthodox Protestantism are found in William Hordern, The Case for a New Reformation Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959) and Edward John Carnell, The Case for Orthodox Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959).

⁴⁵H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, p. 102. It is what is called Kulturprotestantismus by the Germans.

Albert Schweitzer, and the Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch.⁴⁶ In short, Protestant liberalism is "the acculturation of Christ."⁴⁷ On the other hand, many Protestants would not regard "moral nihilism" of the "Christ-against-culture" type (the first and fideistic position) as the solution of the chaotic world of today. "The widespread reaction," writes H. Richard Niebuhr, "against cultural Protestantism in our time tends to obscure the importance of answers of this type to the Christ-and-culture problem."⁴⁸

Unlike Karl Barth, many Protestant thinkers of our time accept the limited role of reason. Rudolf Otto, who has been concerned with the significant implications of the "non-rational" (feeling) for metaphysic, has even remarked that "no one ought to concern himself with the 'Numen ineffabile' who has not already devoted assiduous and serious study to the 'Ratio aeterna'."⁴⁹ Emil Brunner's acceptance of limited natural theology in the Protestant circle has already been mentioned. Here he departs from his colleague Karl Barth.⁵⁰ Thus, not all Protestant

⁴⁶Albrecht Benjamin Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay (2d ed.; Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1902); Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and M. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1928) and On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, tr. John Oman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958); Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, tr. W. Montgomery (3d ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1957); Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology of the Social Gospel (New York: Macmillan, 1917). For the expositions of liberal theology, see: H. R. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology on Schleiermacher (pp. 31-100), Ritschl (pp. 138-80) and Troeltsch (pp. 181-217); H. P. Van Dusen and D. E. Roberts (eds.), Liberal Theology (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942); L. Harold DeWolf, The Case for Theology in Liberal Perspective (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959).

⁴⁷H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 102.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 101.

⁴⁹The Idea of the Holy, p. xxi.

⁵⁰For the controversy on nature and grace between Barth and Brunner, see: Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Emil Brunner

thinkers reject the role of natural law in the modern world. Robert L. Calhoun sees the necessary correlation between democracy and natural law.⁵¹ Natural law concept for John Wild is an indispensable foundation for reconstructing a "realistic philosophy" and ethics.⁵² Anglicanism also is imbued with the important role of reason in theology.⁵³ "The political side," writes Nathaniel Micklem, "belongs to the sphere of Reason rather than of Revelation."⁵⁴

Paul Tillich has a unique theological character of his own.⁵⁵ By

and the Reply "No!" by Karl Barth, tr. Peter Fraenkel with an introduction by John Baillie (London: G. Bles, 1946). On this problem, also consult: H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1941) and John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).

Karl Barth, in his Gifford lectures, said that he could not, as a Reformed theologian, directly affirm and fulfill the intention of Lord Gifford under whose name Gifford lectures have been initiated. And he declared that "natural theology" exists due to "a radical error" and he intended to keep himself away from it. The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation, p. 5.

⁵¹"Democracy and Natural Law," Natural Law Forum, V (1960), pp. 31-69.

⁵²Introduction to Realistic Philosophy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948) and Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

⁵³Anglican theology has been imbued with rational theology. For example, see: William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London: Macmillan, 1935); E. L. Mascall, He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism (London: Longmans, Green, 1943) and Existence and Analogy: A Sequel to 'He Who Is' (London: Longmans, Green, 1949). As Mascall himself makes clear in the preface of He Who Is, "this book is put forward as a small contribution to the reconstruction of Anglican theology" (p. xii). His philosophical approach is unquestionably "Thomistic" in these two volumes.

⁵⁴The Theology of Politics, p. xii.

⁵⁵The systematic theology of Paul Tillich is found in Systematic Theology (2 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1957) and in The Protestant Era, tr. James Luther Adams (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). His works which have cultural implications include: The Religious Situation, tr. H. Richard Niebuhr (New York:

his own admission, he avoids the party struggle or stands always "on the boundary" between opposing views: "between Barth and Hirsch, between American empirical theology and European dialectical theology, between Protestantism and Catholicism."⁵⁶ It is not strange, therefore, that the Catholic Jesuit Gustave Weigel, in his review of Tillich's The Protestant Era, has said that "There is something Thomistic about this brilliant thinker not in the sense that he subscribes to the more characteristic Thomistic theses -- he rejects many of them violently -- but in the sense that he is moved by the same feeling for unity and completeness in his vision of the real. . . . He has made luminous that strange thing, Protestantism, to which he is passionately attached."⁵⁷

Meridian Books, 1956); Dynamics of Faith; The Courage To Be; The Shaking of the Foundations; The New Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955); Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954). An analysis of Tillich's thought is found in Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (eds.), The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: Macmillan, 1952), which includes Tillich's own comments. Walter Leibrecht (ed.), Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959) is a collection of essays which deal with Christianity and culture in general.

⁵⁶Walter M. Horton, "Tillich's *Rôle* in Contemporary Theology," The Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 45-46. Walter Leibrecht makes Tillich's position most clear when he says: "For Tillich, theology and philosophy are called to actualize themselves in continuous dialogue and encounter with scientists, artists, sociologists, economists, depth psychologists and others intent on expressing and interpreting reality." In contrast to the Barthian position, Leibrecht states: "If Karl Barth is the theologians' theologian, condemning the mediating function of theology, Tillich stands forth as the theologian for Everyman in the predicament of his existence." Therefore, the theology of Paul Tillich is "a truly ecumenical theology." His theology provides "in his concept of theonomy a creative possibility for a fruitful encounter of the Protestant and Catholic principles in the present ecumenical discussion." "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," Religion and Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, pp. 10, 17.

⁵⁷As quoted in Walter M. Horton, "Tillich's *Rôle* in Contemporary Theology," pp. 41-42.

Paul Tillich makes clear the relation between reason and revelation. For Tillich, faith is of man's ultimate concern; it is "an act of the total personality." According to him, even modern humanism is a "humanist faith of the moral type." Faith has all the elements of doubt, courage, and love. Thus faith is the "integrating power" of life, and it "determines and unites all elements of the personal life." The truth of faith is determined by "adequacy" of expression of ultimate concern, the adequacy of essentially symbolic expression. Resulting from this conception of faith, Protestantism has been in a position to criticize Roman Catholicism: "no church has the right to put itself in the place of the ultimate. Its truth is judged by the ultimate."

The Reformation, according to Tillich, was essentially the revolt against "the exclusion of the prophetic self-criticism by the authoritarian system of the Church and the growth of the sacramental elements of faith over the moral-personal ones." Tillich, however, has no attachment to Protestant liberalism which has lost sacramentalism and became "more and more a representative of the moral-personal type." It is no better than the authoritarianism of Roman Catholicism, for "the Pauline experience of the Spirit [the Spirit of love, justice and truth] as the unity of all types of faith was largely lost in both Catholicism and Protestantism."⁵⁸

⁵⁸Dynamics of Faith, pp. 4, 69, 72, 98, 108. Karl Barth expresses virtually the same opinion when he says: ". . . the church service both in Roman Catholicism and in Protestantism is a torso. The Roman Catholic church has a sacramental service without preaching. . . . [The Protestant church has] a service with a sermon but without sacrament." The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation, p. 211.

Paul Tillich raises no objection to science as a source of knowledge.⁵⁹ His only objection is the scientific spirit that produced the idea of infinite progress, eternal peace and happiness. Similar to the Catholic thought, Tillich does recognize the role of reason, which has essentially no conflict with faith. "Reason is the precondition of faith; faith is the act in which reason reaches ecstatically beyond itself. . . . Man's reason is finite; it moves within finite relations when dealing with the universe and with man himself. . . . The ecstatic experience of an ultimate concern does not destroy the structure of reason. Ecstasy is fulfilled, not denied, rationality." Thus, there is no conflict between faith and reason, as long as the latter recognizes its own limitation. "They are within each other."⁶⁰

Paul Tillich further speaks of "doubt" as an element in the dynamics of faith. However, "the doubt," he explains, "which is implicit in every act of faith is neither the methodological nor the skeptical doubt. . . . It is not the permanent doubt of the scientist, and it is not the transitory doubt of the skeptic, but it is the doubt of him who is ultimately concerned about a concrete content." The element of doubt for Tillich is truly "the Protestant principle." Hence he believes that "the concept of 'infallibility' of a decision by a council or a bishop or a book excludes doubt as an element of faith in those who subject themselves to these authorities." This is truly the essential criticism of Protestantism against Roman Catholicism. Faith devoid of doubt, therefore, "has become static, a nonquestioning surrender

⁵⁹The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 5.

⁶⁰Dynamics of Faith, pp. 76, 77.

not only to the ultimate, which is affirmed in the act of faith, but also to its concrete elements as formulated by the religious authorities."

In regard to cognitive reason, Paul Tillich recognizes three forms: the scientific, the historical and the philosophical. They have no conflict with the truth of faith. "Science," he writes, "can conflict only with science, and faith only with faith; science which remains science cannot conflict with faith which remains faith."

"Neither scientific nor historical truth can affirm or negate the truth of faith. The truth of faith can neither affirm nor negate scientific or historical truth."⁶¹ Nevertheless, the scientific observer is never absolutely "pure" -- pure in the sense that he can exclude "interfering factors." As regards philosophy and faith, they both are concerned with ultimate reality, but the former is "conceptual" and the latter is "symbolical." Furthermore, there is "a continuous process of interpretation of philosophical elements and elements of faith, not one philosophical faith."

All in all, Paul Tillich recognizes an important role of reason in the scientific, the historical and the philosophical truths. They have no essential conflict with the truth of faith. From this consideration of the important role of reason, he comes to a very significant practical conclusion when he says: "The humanist faith in the essential rationality of man is more favorable for general education and democracy than the traditionally Christian faith in original sin and the demonic structures of reality. The Protestant faith, in an unmediated,

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 20, 28, 29, 82, 89. Emil Brunner also says that it is not necessary that science should be subordinated to theology. Science serves men best if they remain true to its own law. Christianity and Civilisation, Part 2, p. 137.

person-to-person encounter with God, produces more independent personalities than the Catholic faith and its ecclesiastical mediation between God and man." Moreover, "Lutheran faith in personal forgiveness is less conducive to social action than the Calvinistic faith in the honor of God."⁶²

Many political theorists would agree with Tillich in that rationality is an important element for democracy;⁶³ and "independent personalities," when translated into a psychological term, that is, the individualism of democracy, are much more favorable to democracy than are the more dependent personalities who adhere to the Catholic faith. Thus Tillich leaves us in doubt about the possible relation between Catholic rational philosophy and democracy, and the total structure of Niebuhr's political philosophy with which original sin has an intimate relation.

Emil Brunner also has the "scholastic" tone in his own right. In this respect, he differs from Karl Barth. His consistent exposition of Christian ethics deserves due attention along with the ideas of Paul Tillich.⁶⁴ However, Brunner makes it clear that he has no taste for the

⁶²Dynamics of Faith, pp. 93, 94, 116-17.

⁶³For example, see: J. Roland Pennock, Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects (New York: Rinehart, 1950), pp. 23-24. Among a few meanings of "rationalism," Pennock interprets rationalism (which is pertinent to the workings of democracy) as "the assurance that men generally have a proclivity to use their rational powers and to act accordingly" (p. 24). The Christian conception of reason, e. g., Thomism, must not be confused with "rationalism" as in the Enlightenment when reason was emancipated from faith. In the Christian conception of reason, reason is never dissociated from faith although it may have its own distinct function (the rational faculties of the human mind) from theology.

⁶⁴Brunner's most systematic work on theology is Dogmatics composed of two volumes: The Christian Doctrine of God and The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950-1952). Other theological works include: Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge,

intellectualism of Roman Catholicism, especially the Thomistic theology and ethics. He notes that there are many books written under the title of "reason and revelation"; but there is none entitled "revelation and reason" (revelation over reason, not vice versa).⁶⁵ He emphasizes the fact that this is fundamentally a difference between himself and a Roman Catholic theologian. Therefore his book is significantly entitled Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge.⁶⁶ However, the title alone should not mislead the emphasis of contents. For Maritain, there is no doubt that theology is the peak of metaphysics and philosophy. But he would make philosophy or metaphysics the first part and not the last, the beginning and not the end, and base and not the peak of theology.⁶⁷

In comparison with other post-Reformation theologies (perhaps, Barthian crisis theology), Brunner believes that his theology is the true

tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946); The Philosophy of Religion: From the Standpoint of Protestant Theology, tr. A. J. D. Farrer and Bertram L. Woolf (London: James Clarke, 1958); The Divine-Human Encounter, tr. Amandus W. Leos (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1943); The Mediator, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947); The Scandal of Christianity (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1951); The Misunderstanding of the Church, tr. Harold Knight (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953); The Theology of Crisis (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929). His whole cultural thought seems to have culminated in his Gifford lectures: Christianity and Civilisation (2 parts; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948-1949). His ethical and social thought is found especially in The Divine Imperative, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947); Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology, tr. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947); Justice and the Social Order, tr. Mary Hottinger (2d ed.; New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945).

⁶⁵For example, Etienne Gilson's Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages and chapter ii, "Reason and Revelation," A. E. Taylor's The Faith of a Moralists (Vol. II; London: Macmillan, 1930).

⁶⁶Note that "revelation" and "faith" precede "reason" and "knowledge" respectively.

⁶⁷The Dream of Descartes, tr. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944), p. 91.

Reformation theology. "In post-Reformation theology," he writes, "this Reformation point of view was very largely lost." That is to say, the true Reformation theology for Brunner was to start with revelation and "then work outwards to reason." However, he does not tolerate "the Roman Catholic misunderstanding" (Roman Catholicism which is identified with the order of "reason and revelation" instead of "revelation and reason"). Thus he is concerned with "the formulation of a Christian and theological doctrine of revelation as a doctrine of believing knowledge." The essential formula is "revelation and reason in faith." For Brunner, Christian philosophy is "both possible and necessary, because as Christians we neither can nor should cease to think. It is not reason, but rationalism, that makes Christian philosophy appear impossible."⁶⁸ He would regard, without hesitation, the Roman Catholic theology as a kind of rationalism or semi-rationalism. So far, it seems that the difference of Brunner's point of view and the Thomistic view concerning the interconnection between revelation and reason (or between theology and philosophy) is one of emphasis rather than of kind. If we consider the distance between the two poles, theology and philosophy or faith and reason, then we would have some kind of order like "Barth - Brunner and Tillich - the Thomist - the rationalist."

As it has already been suggested, there seems to be an intimate relation between one's theological attitude (i. e., the relation between theology and philosophy or faith and reason) and his view on the cultural order in general. When a theologian like Karl Barth emphasizes the

⁶⁸Revelation and Reason, pp. xi, 12, 392, 393. See also The Philosophy of Religion in regard to the relation between faith and reason.

importance of revelation, grace and theology at the expense of reason, nature and philosophy, he is likely to produce the ideal type of "Christ-against-culture" category. Thus the fideist position tends to produce a kind of cultural and political "indifferentism." On the other hand, when a breathing space for reason, nature and philosophy is given, then Christianity becomes involved with the cultural order. That is to say, the fideist position like that taken by Karl Barth is essentially a negative one, whereas the "rational" position is a positive one in terms of the relation between Christianity and culture. Jacques Maritain, Emil Brunner, and Paul Tillich take the positive position, while Barth stands alone at the negative pole.

The positive attitude of Brunner is expressed in his panoramic view concerning the relation between Christianity and culture in his Gifford lectures. He makes it clear that "only Christianity is capable of furnishing the basis of a civilisation which can rightly be described as human."⁶⁹ However, there is, in a strict sense, neither a Christian civilization nor the Christian state. They have never existed before and will never exist.⁷⁰ Paul Tillich agrees: "There was, and still is, a religiously colored society, but there is no true religious community."⁷¹ For Brunner, the state and civilization have been the "irrational products of history" rather than the moral force of religion (in this case, Christianity). This is the essential position of "Christianity beyond

⁶⁹Christianity and Civilisation, Part 1, p. v.

⁷⁰The Divine Imperative, p. 463; Christianity and Civilisation, Part 2, p. 127.

⁷¹"The World Situation," The Christian Answer, ed. Henry P. Van Dusen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), p. 36.

civilisation" as it is described by Brunner himself. In other words, according to H. Richard Niebuhr, it is the "Christ-above-culture" type. As Brunner says, "Culture-idolatry is the sure road to cultural decay." "Culture and civilisation," he continues, "although they belong exclusively to man, are not in themselves the truly human." To be the truly human, culture must be spiced with the Christian principles. When we use the term "Christian civilisation," according to Brunner, it is "a compromise between Christian and non-Christian forces."⁷²

Emil Brunner is truly a Protestant theologian. For him the ultimate justification of truly Christian ethics can be made by grace alone. "Every form of natural ethics," he states, "is anthropocentric." "All natural morality and ethics -- whether based on religious or rational grounds -- is either eudaemonistic or legalistic."⁷³ This is exactly what the Catholic ethics based upon natural law could imply for Brunner. "The Divine Command" is the basis of Christian ethics. Man's ultimate ethics require the obedience to the Divine Command. Only the order of God is infallible; all human knowledge and natural ethics are subject to error.

Even "irrational" existentialism (not Christian existentialist theology) tinged with romanticism has become imbued with the importance of reason.⁷⁴ What George F. Thomas calls "the tragic dualism of head

⁷²Christianity and Civilisation, Part 2, pp. 127, 129, 131.

⁷³The Divine Imperative, p. 68.

⁷⁴Karl Jaspers emphasizes the idea that contemporary international politics must recognize the importance of "reason" and thus "philosophy" itself. "The new thinking," he writes, "is the age-old one which thus far has not penetrated far enough to form and guide communities of men: it is reason; it is philosophy." Although reason

and heart" is a controversial topic in Christian philosophy and theology.⁷⁵ In the Christian camp, the Thomistic theology (Roman Catholic theology in general) has been continually stressing the important role of reason and the distinct role of "philosophy" (in contrast to "theology"). Etienne Gilson well expressed Thomism as "the harmony of reason and faith."⁷⁶ In the Middle Ages, Thomism was opposed to the Tertullian family (the primacy-of-faith school), on the one hand, and to the Averroists and the nominalists, on the other hand. In the modern world, the struggle of Thomism turned to the opposition to Protestant revelational theology (especially the crisis theology of Karl Barth) on the one hand and, on the other hand, to contemporary "rationalism" and "naturalism" which are regarded as the offshoots of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Even H. Richard Niebuhr, a Protestant thinker, praises St. Thomas Aquinas "who is probably the greatest of all the synthesists in Christian history"⁷⁷

The Thomistic position is the third alternative in regard to the relationship between Christianity and civilization. H. Richard Niebuhr calls it the "Christ-above-culture" school. It is opposed to the other two extreme positions of the fideist and the liberal. This

is essential to politics, reason should not be construed as "a property." But it is "a vehicle." Moreover, "the real meaning of democracy can be established only by reason itself." The Future of Mankind, tr. E. B. Ashton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), especially pp. 187-317.

⁷⁵"Christianity and Modern Philosophy," The Vitality of the Christian Tradition, p. 249.

⁷⁶Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, pp. 69-99.

⁷⁷Christ and Culture, p. 128.

position gives a balanced position, as Thomism is a "balanced philosophy" as described by Frederick C. Copleston.⁷⁸ Christ or the Church remains fundamentally above the cultural order, and yet the cultural order is not viewed as anti-Christ. Christ, in turn, is not considered as the "Christ of culture." Among many Thomists of our time, Jacques Maritain is one of the most outstanding representatives.

Philosophy, in contrast to theology, has a distinct role as to its methods, objects and principles. In the same way, the political order is viewed as distinct from the religious world. For the Thomist, therefore, the state and the church are two equally perfect societies. To recognize distinct philosophy is to permit the rational faculties of the human mind to solve the worldly problems. Thus, differing from the fideist position of either Karl Barth or Reinhold Niebuhr, the Thomist considers human reason and natural law as the direct or immediate foundations of a political philosophy, although theology has an indirect upperhand over philosophy. The political philosophies of Heinrich A. Rommen and Johannes Messner represent the Thomistic position par excellence.⁷⁹ Among political theorists and philosophers, John H. Hallowell, Yves R. Simon and Eric Voegelin recognize the rational approach to politics. There are also many twentieth-century philosophers who

⁷⁸ Aquinas (Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1955), p. 254.

⁷⁹ See Heinrich A. Rommen, The State in Catholic Thought: A Treatise in Political Philosophy and Johannes Messner, Social Ethics: Natural Law in the Modern World, tr. F. F. Doherty (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1957). The representative thoughts of contemporary Roman Catholic thinkers are found in Robert A. Caponigri, Modern Catholic Thinkers (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960).

take the rational approach to theology. Some of their names are C. C. J. Webb, A. E. Taylor, A. N. Whitehead, William Ernest Hocking and Charles Hartshorne.⁸⁰

As it has been pointed out, the balanced position of Thomism avoids the two extreme positions of Barthianism and theological liberalism. Thus this balanced view has even attracted some of the Protestant thinkers. "Because of the intellectual and practical adequacy of [the Thomistic] system," H. Richard Niebuhr writes, "[Aquinas'] way of solving the problem of culture and Christ has become the standard way for hosts of Christians. Many a Protestant who has abandoned the Ritschlian answer is attracted to Thomism without being tempted to transfer his allegiance to the Roman church, while in Anglican thought and practice his system is normative for many; on the Christ-culture issue the lines drawn among Christians cannot be made to coincide with the historic distinctions among the great churches."⁸¹

⁸⁰See C. C. J. Webb, God and Personality (New York: Macmillan, 1918) and Divine Personality and Human Life (New York: Macmillan, 1920); A. E. Taylor, The Faith of a Moralist (2 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1930); A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Macmillan, 1929); William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience: A Philosophic Study of Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912) and Science and the Idea of God (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948).

The approach which is found in the above works might be called a "philosophical" approach to religion or theology. As George F. Thomas points out, it is not entirely true to say that modern philosophy freed itself from medieval theology only to serve science. A. N. Whitehead, for example, recognized the importance of religion to science. Thus, it is not quite true when Frederick Copleston says: "Instead of serving the theologian, the philosopher will serve the scientist, for science has displaced theology in public esteem." Contemporary Philosophy, p. 30.

⁸¹Christ and Culture, pp. 128-29.

Despite the three different positions of Christian political theology, we must recognize these positions as Christian in essence. With a few exceptions (like Karl Barth), a general conclusion can be stated that "all sensitive Christian thought today must define the personal and social principles so that the Christian evaluation of life becomes a prophetic criticism against the evils of present society, and a light to point the way to a better order."⁸² However, what Nathaniel Micklem calls "the ultimate question" remains above the demands of politics, economics and other questions of the profane world. The superior position of the religious order, all Christian thinkers would agree, is truly an integrating factor between the cultural order and the religious order. "We shall not succeed in subordinating the economic to the truly human," William Temple said, "unless we subordinate the human to the divine."⁸³ In other words, "there is no separating religion and economics [or politics]."⁸⁴ What V. A. Demant calls the "vicissitude of civilization"⁸⁵ can only be elevated by the eternal order of the Christian faith. Despite the various contemporary theological tendencies, all Christian political theologies have something in common. That is to say, the cultural order must be elevated by the eternal order of Christianity. From a theological point of view, even continental theology (e. g., the crisis theology of Karl Barth) is justified by Walter M. Horton in that "it makes up in depth: the sense of the sublime, without

⁸²Daniel D. Williams, What Present-Day Theologians Are Thinking, p. 73.

⁸³As quoted in Nathaniel Micklem, The Theology of Politics, p. 107.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 108.

⁸⁵Religion and the Decline of Capitalism, pp. 157-76.

which theology becomes as prosaic as arithmetic."⁸⁶ This "sense of an extra dimension" is not only present in continental theology but also present in the religious order. Thus the ills of the political order are always seasoned with the spice of what is sacred and eternal.

Religion, thus, has the outlook of life-orientation; theologians look at the totality of life: theirs is a synoptic vision. When they appraise democracy, for example, it does not appear to them merely as a set of institutional arrangements of government but as the whole structure of cultural pantheon: democracy is a way of life. No doubt, the religious outlook has its limitations in looking at politics from a distance invigorated by religious considerations. Nonetheless, this wide vision of religion may balance the kaleidoscope of politics. Or is it the maelstrom of political theology?

While Catholic theology looks back to "the thirteenth, the greatest of centuries," the names of Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr signify the Protestant return to the Reformation. Nicolas Berdyaev raises his banner for the rediscovery of Orthodox theology, and "he is primarily concerned to champion the claim of his Orthodox gnosis to be recognized as a genuinely Christian theology."⁸⁷ In the Catholic renaissance of Thomism, Dirk Jellema now speaks of "the second generation" following Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson.⁸⁸ All these names indicate the various trends of contemporary Christian theology, but they are not totally unrelated. "As Tillich's speculative philosophy parallels the

⁸⁶Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 217.

⁸⁷Karl Pflieger, Wrestlers with Christ, p. 291.

⁸⁸"Ethics," Contemporary Evangelical Thought, p. 124.

'Orthodox Gnosticism' of Berdyaev," Walter M. Horton writes, "so a certain scholasticism in Brunner's thought parallels the scholasticism of Maritain and Przywara."⁸⁹ As their philosophical and theological reasonings are interrelated, so are their social and political ideas.

The contemporary theological mood is tragic and pessimistic through and through in looking at the world that is obsessed with the "tragic sense of life" (sentimiento trágico).⁹⁰ Writing in 1946, Reinhold Niebuhr said that "this generation of mankind is destined to live in a tragic era between two ages. It is an era when 'one age is dead and the other is powerless to be born'."⁹¹ "History shows," Paul Tillich writes, "that, over and over again, the achievements of man, as though by a logic of tragedy, turn against man himself."⁹² This is the reason why Judith N. Shklar speaks of the Christian "eschatological consciousness."⁹³ The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset well describes the theologians' attitude regarding the physiognomy of contemporary civilization when he speaks of 'vital disorientation'.⁹⁴

Therefore, it is clear that "the end of the world," "the crisis of civilization," or "the twilight of civilization" suggests the general mood of Christian theologians and philosophers. For these theologians,

⁸⁹Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 230.

⁹⁰Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense of Life, tr. J. E. Crawford Flitch (New York: Dover Publications, 1954).

⁹¹Discerning the Signs of the Times: Sermons for Today and Tomorrow (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), pp. 39-40.

⁹²"The World Situation," The Christian Answer, p. 44.

⁹³After Utopia, p. 166.

⁹⁴The Modern Theme, tr. James Cleugh (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 78.

the world represents the anarchy of spiritual values. The Catholic theologians like Jacques Maritain seeks his guidance for modern philosophical and political solutions from St. Thomas Aquinas, while Protestantism looks for the days of the Reformation. This century may be characterized as the century of "longing for the past." As we recall, political philosophers like Leo Strauss get their inspiration from classical political philosophy, and Alfred Cobban nostalgically looks back to the Enlightenment.

However, we should not confuse the pessimistic mood of these theologians with complete fatalism.⁹⁵ Their views and ideas are not devoid of suggestive insight. The philosophy of democracy of Jacques Maritain, the political realism of Reinhold Niebuhr and the concepts of justice and power of Paul Tillich provide us with profound insight into the political philosophy of modern times.

For Christian theologians, the modern world is stricken by the bacilli of secularism; the anarchy of spiritual values is the disease of our time. This is what Paul Tillich refers to as "the shaking of the foundations." Scientism and scientific relativism have been regarded

⁹⁵Judith N. Shklar, op. cit., pp. 164-217. As the book's subtitle indicates, this work is concerned with "the decline of political faith." According to her, "Christian fatalism" adds only another dimension to the decline of political faith. Thus it offers nothing constructive. What is needed is not mere criticism (as is found in Christian theologians) but "adequate theoretical alternatives." However, her examination of Christian "social theology" is partial in that she sacrifices the constructive ideas of the theologians in order to make Christian social theology suitable for her theme: the decline of political faith. It is one thing to say that Christian social theology offers nothing constructive, and it is another to reject the idea that social reconstruction can be achieved on the basis of the Christian religion.

⁹⁶"When [man] has rested complacently on his cultural creativity or on his technical progress, on his political institutions or on his religious systems," Tillich writes, "he has been thrown into disintegration

as the endless dehumanization of man. Science as a source of knowledge is welcome for Paul Tillich. He is merely objecting to the scientific spirit that, having forgotten "the shaking of the foundations," believes in everlasting progress and happiness. Thus the complacent "liberalism" of the nineteenth century has been completely repudiated. Modern anthropocentric humanism that believes in the goodness of human nature merely represents the further secularization of man and the world. The Christian theologians are theocentric humanists. They believe that man is essentially spiritual. This is the personalist philosophy of the Christian theologians just mentioned. Jacques Maritain, Nicolas Berdyaev and Paul Tillich are all "personalists." Thus Will Herberg concludes that "the strong personalistic emphasis" of Roman Catholic (Jacques Maritain), Eastern Orthodox (Nicolas Berdyaev), Jew (Martin Buber), and Protestant (Paul Tillich) is "a cornerstone of [their] social philosophy."⁹⁷ Maritain's Christian democracy, Berdyaev's "personalist socialism" and Tillich's "religious socialism" are all personalisms that emphasize the spiritual character of man. Democracy (in contrast to totalitarianism) is the only means to restore the lost spirituality of man.

A Christian political theology must take into account the nature of man. To say that all politics are or must be based upon the nature of man is merely to beg the question: what do we mean by human nature?

and chaos; all the foundations of his personal, natural and cultural life have been shaken." The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 6. Therefore, the shaking of the foundations is essentially the hard reality of the eschatological end of the historical order.

⁹⁷ Four Existentialist Theologians (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1958), pp. 3-4. This is not used in the sense of Borden P. Bowne's use of this term, but rather in the sense of individualism.

The great political treatises of the past, like Aristotle's Politics, Hobbes' Leviathan and Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government, explicitly assumed human nature. To be sure, a Christian anthropology is different from what we call the scientific anthropology of our days.

The Christian conception of man is of "the fallen nature." The notions of original sin and the soteriological function of man play an important role in Christian political theology in general. Rudolf Otto, thus, characterizes Christianity as "a 'religion of redemption' par excellence."⁹⁸ The basis of Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism in politics is derived from his conception of the fallen and selfish nature of man. Neo-Orthodox Protestant theologians repudiate theological liberalism and political liberalism because liberalism does not take into consideration the "realistic" (fallen) conception of man. The rationalistic optimism about man (the goodness of human nature) is rejected by the Christian theologians. Johannes Messner describes the two characteristics of "Christian psychology." "The first," he writes, "is the fact of original sin, the reason for the inadequacy of human nature. The second fact is that of the redemption. God entered the world with a human nature, assured man of the covenant which the Creator has inscribed in his nature, and guaranteed the value of man as raised above every earthly value so

⁹⁸The Idea of the Holy, p. 164. "[Christianity's] characteristic ideas today," Otto writes, "are Salvation -- overabounding salvation, deliverance from and conquest of the 'world' and from existence in bondage to the world, and even from creaturehood as such, the overcoming of the remoteness of an enmity to God, redemption from servitude to sin and the guilt of sin, reconciliation and atonement, and, in consequence, grace and all the doctrine of grace, the Spirit and the bestowal of the Spirit, the new birth and the new creature. These conceptions are common to Christendom, despite the manifold cleavages that divide it into different confessions, churches, and sects, and they characterize it sharply and definitely as a 'religion of redemption' par excellence"

that neither society nor state nor nation nor race nor the whole earth can outweigh his dignity. Thus in the view of Christian psychology the world in its ultimate meaning is theocentric."⁹⁹

The sinfulness of man is recognized by all types of Christian theology, but this concept is somewhat graded as is the relation between reason and faith (philosophy and theology or nature and grace). Reinhold Niebuhr makes virtue out of the sinfulness of man, and his political realism is grounded upon pessimism. For Johannes Messner, "human nature is impaired." Thus a Christian cannot idealize human nature. "Man's nature," he says, "is still rational nature with its knowledge of good and evil and the impulse to act in correspondence with reason, but he can no longer take for granted the unerring cognizance of the good in its more particular implications and the firm propensity toward it." For the Catholic thinker, therefore, natural law ethics is a "realistic" ethics which admits "the principle of man's moral consciousness and self-determination" and, at the same time, man's "weakness and perversities." On this ground, the Catholic thinker rejects the optimistic view of man which prevails in theological liberalism and rationalism. He also repudiates the complete pessimism of Luther, Barth, or Niebuhr. He would say that the optimistic rationalism and the Lutheran pessimism "both put a check on man's moral exertion, the Lutheran pessimism by making moral endeavor meaningless, the rationalist optimism by making such exertion

⁹⁹Social Ethics, pp. 7-8. In contrast to the Christian doctrine of man, Messner lists three other types of the concept of man: 1. the naturalistic doctrine of man, 2. the materialist doctrine of man, and 3. the idealist doctrine of man (pp. 8-12). The ideas of human nature in the periods of classical antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance are found in Herschel Baker, The Image of Man (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961).

unnecessary."¹⁰⁰

On the nature of man, Karl Barth and Emil Brunner differ from each other. "There is," Hugh Ross Mackintosh notes, "that fundamental subject on which [Barth] and Brunner disagree somewhat seriously -- the imago Dei in man. Briefly, we may say that in Barth's judgment this imago has been totally lost and obliterated by sin, while Brunner contends that it is still represented even in the sinful by their humanity and personality."¹⁰¹ Therefore, logically and practically speaking, Brunner has more breathing space than Barth for the consideration of reason, philosophy, and culture.

The Christian anthropology is theocentric. Nathaniel Micklem goes so far as to say that ". . . the politicians make an even greater mistake than the theologians when they forget original sin."¹⁰² The concept of original sin delimits the natural world and man himself in Christian philosophy. While the fideist position of Protestantism minimizes the role of reason and thus philosophy, Roman Catholicism represents the intellectualism of modern Christian theology.

All the Christian theologians have deplored the spiritual anarchism of our age, the age of secularism. Criticisms of totalitarianism, capitalism, liberalistic individualism and scientism are essentially based upon non-spirituality. Their explanation of corrupted temporality is a mono-causal explanation. This, however, does not mean that their political thoughts are monolithic.¹⁰³ There is certainly a

¹⁰⁰Social Ethics, pp. 82, 83.

¹⁰¹Types of Modern Theology, p. 316.

¹⁰²The Theology of Politics, p. 16.

¹⁰³"Christian political thought," Dante L. Germino writes, "is

plurality of ideas. Except that there is an extreme kind of Barthian "indifferentism" towards the world of politics, the role of political theology has been generally recognized to bridge the gulf between the eternal and the historical orders.

The Roman Catholic has been extremely conscious of lack of unity and order since the breakdown of medieval Christendom. Thus order and unity for the Catholic thinkers like Christopher Dawson have been of singular concern. "We," Dawson writes, "cannot do this [accomplish social discipline and unity] by politics alone."¹⁰⁴ For him the answer is clear: social discipline and unity demand faith and spiritual sanctities. The gigantic struggle in the modern world is a struggle between the two images of Christ and anti-Christ. The political expression of this struggle is between democracy (spirituality) and totalitarianism (secularism). Whatever the merits and demerits of theological thinking on politics, we cannot lightly dismiss the opinions of the Christian theologians. The ills of politics may well be seasoned with theological "spice." Regardless of a variety of political opinions, all the theologians must agree with Nathaniel Micklem in that: "All the political problems are at bottom theological . . . obviously a man's political outlook is coloured or even determined by his real thought, or thoughtlessness, about God and man and the meaning of human life. . . . No political theory is likely to affect deeply the conduct or outlook of man unless it be reinforced by the sanctions of religion [in this case,

not monolithic; its message is not clear and unambiguous." "Two Types of Recent Christian Political Thought," p. 455.

¹⁰⁴Beyond Politics (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939), p. 12.

Christianity".¹⁰⁵

The theologian, at last, reaches the end of his philosophical journey from the dark night of temporality. Within the private world of the sacred he may once again remember Eliot's portrayal of the hollow world and "the hollow men":

.
 This is the way the world ends
 This is the way the world ends
 This is the way the world ends
 Not with a bang but a whimper.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵The Theology of Politics, p. ix.

¹⁰⁶T. S. Eliot, "The Hollow Men," The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), p. 59.

CHAPTER IV

DEMOCRACY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

In Christian theology, the Christian faith performed a kind of opening gambit for politics. The apotheosis of Christian political theology has to be realized in building a spiritual pantheon on the temporal world. The syncretistic efforts of the theologians against the spiritual nakedness of the modern world, however, have not merely aimed at finding the perfect scapegoat for their theological idiosyncrasies on politics. The vitriolic attack of the theologians on the anarchy of spiritual values is the result of their theological tendency of looking at the political world from the standpoint of the eternal order. The danger of this tendency lies in putting everything into a rigid Procrustean bed of spirituality.¹

Therefore, Christian political theology is a theocentric politics. The cultural and political crisis of our age has been at bottom a spiritual crisis. The urge for the revival of religion for modern society is not the phenomenon of the West alone. S. Radhakrishnan, a renowned Indian

¹William Temple has a formula for the relationship between God and the world:

$$\text{The world} - \text{God} = 0$$

$$\text{God} - \text{the world} = \text{God}$$

In other words, "In the sense in which God is necessary to the world, the world simply is not necessary to God." Nature, Man and God, p. 435.

philosopher, also urges the need of religion in modern civilization and especially for the survival of democracy.² For the Christian theologians, Western civilization has ceased to care for man as a spiritual being. The crisis of our age is its spiritual distemper; and the modern world without the sanctities of the Christian faith is nothing but a moral suicide. In this respect, all theologians share a kind of "togetherness" although they may differ from each other in suggesting their practical solutions.

The relation between democracy and Christian theology deserves special attention simply because many maintain that Christianity is the source of democracy, and democracy is the only spiritual answer against atheistic totalitarianism. In the struggle against the "pseudo-religion" of totalitarianism, we seem to need some kind of absolutistic democratic faith or "the courage to be."³ "We," Nathaniel Micklem writes, "need the impulse of religious conviction at least as passionately held as the pseudo-religion of Germany and Russia. Such a philosophy and such a religion are not to be found except in the Christian faith." "The answer to the Nazi creed," he continues, "is to be found, not in politics, but in theology."⁴ Moreover, all these political aberrations of

²Religion and Society (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1947).

³This is the title of one of Paul Tillich's books, The Courage To Be. Nathaniel Micklem writes: "There is, of course, strictly no theology of Marxism, for the Communists deny the existence of God and regard religion, not without reason, as one of their worst enemies. Yet, such is the religious incurability of man, there is a kind of pseudo-theology or substitute religion of the Communists." The Theology of Politics, p. 13.

⁴Ibid., p. 35.

totalitarianism are derived from bad theology. Ernest Barker, thus, aptly speaks of Communism as "religiously irreligious."⁵

Many have already been imbued with the idea that relativism and skepticism have weakened the democratic faith itself. J. Roland Pennock, although he does not consider religion as a prerequisite for democracy, holds that not only relativism "tended to weaken the belief in unchanging principles of right and wrong," but also "relativism and general skepticism are not the only ideological factors in contemporary society tending to destroy faith in, and enthusiasm for, liberal democracy. It would appear that materialism and secularism have tended to have a similar effect."⁶ It is dangerous to attempt to build democracy on the quicksand of relativism. As A. D. Lindsay tersely remarks, "Democracy implies faith, but a reasoned faith."⁷

Not all theologians treat equally the totalitarianism of German National Socialism and Russian Communism. Karl Barth, for example, makes a discriminating judgment between Nazism and Russian Communism. The former for Barth committed the immortal sin of falsifying Christianity and the crime of Anti-Semitism; but the latter is "non-Christian" but not "anti-Christian." "In its relationship to Christianity, Communism, as distinguished from Nazism, has not done, and by its very nature cannot do, one thing: it has never made the slightest attempt to reinterpret or to falsify Christianity, or to shroud itself in a Christian garment.

⁵The Citizen's Choice (Cambridge: University Press, 1937), p. 9.

⁶Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects (New York: Rinehart, 1950), pp. 131, 138.

⁷The Essentials of Democracy (2d ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 73.

It has never committed the basic crime of the Nazis, the removal and replacement of the real Christ by a national Jesus, and it has never committed the crime of anti-Semitism. There is nothing of the false prophet about it. It is not anti-Christian. It is coldly non-Christian. . . . It is brutally, but at least honestly, godless."⁸ Hence, Karl Barth, Will Herberg remarks, "attempts to make certain positive distinctions which would put Communism in a more favorable light."⁹ Charles C. West also comments that Barth "finds Communism at least a system which has made a serious attempt to solve the social problem."¹⁰

Nicolas Berdyaev, who was born in Russia and attracted by the "idealism" of Communism and its social reform, makes the Barthian position on Communism rather doubtful. He essentially agrees with Barth in that Communism has at least attempted to solve social problems. Communism for Berdyaev was "a transformation and deformation of the old Russian messianic idea."¹¹ Communism generally appears to be an anti-Christian giant. Luigi Sturzo, a Catholic liberal thinker, believed that totalitarianism inevitably "leads to a perversion of Christian civilization" "The totalitarian state," he writes, "is the clearest and most explicit present form of the pantheistic state."¹²

⁸"The Church between East and West," Against the Stream, p. 140.

⁹"The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," Community, State, and Church, p. 61.

¹⁰As quoted in Will Herberg, "The Social Philosophy of Karl Barth," p. 61 from Communism and the Theologians (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), p. 300.

¹¹The Origin of Russian Communism, tr. R. M. French (London: G. Bles, 1937), p. 228.

¹²"The Totalitarian State," Social Research, III (May, 1936), p. 235.

For Berdyaev, Communism states the problem of society, but not that of man. "The spirit of communism, the religion of communism, the philosophy of communism," he writes, "are both anti-Christian and anti-humanist. But the social system of communism possesses a large share of truth which can be wholly reconciled with Christianity, more so, in any case, than the capitalist system, which is most anti-Christian."¹³ Thus, Berdyaev seriously questions the Barthian proposition that Communism is not anti-Christian, although he agrees with Barth in the matters of Communist enthusiasm for social reform. While German National Socialism is the height of anti-Christianity for Barth, capitalism is for Berdyaev.

Nor do all theologians blindly tolerate the "evils" of existing democracies. "We are fighting for 'democracy'," Nathaniel Micklem writes, "while all men of sensitive mind must admit that the evils of our democratic system are intolerable. That is our dilemma."¹⁴ Many theologians have found a spiritual anarchy in modern democratic countries. Their mission is to save the world from its spiritual anarchy, and consequently they are seriously concerned with politics and civilization in general. Religion ceases to be a stumbling block for politics, and Christianity for them cannot remain indifferent to culture. Although they believe that the evil of spiritual anarchy exists in modern democracies, this does not mean they are anti-democratic. When they become concerned with politics they have usually spoken in favor of democracy.

However, for the complacent democrat, Brunner's warning is a lesson. Not unlike his Catholic counterpart Jacques Maritain, Emil

¹³Op. cit., p. 225.

¹⁴Op. cit., p. 92.

Brunner completely rejects "democratism" or mob-rule. "Anarchy," he writes, "must be prevented by the exercise of authority, tyranny must be checked by democracy."¹⁵ He warns the champions of democracy not to forget that "as a rule, the people as a whole is not a very competent guardian of the common weal unqualified democracy nearly always degenerates into mob-rule and latent anarchy."¹⁶ Thus, his criticism of democratism is not unrelated to the Christian notion of original sin. Brunner thinks that democratism "arises out of an optimistic view of the goodness of human nature."¹⁷

The politically and ethically minded Reinhold Niebuhr is thoroughly nauseated by any type of optimism (contrary to the doctrine of original sin); he firmly believes that "a Christian view of human nature is more adequate for the development of a democratic society than either the optimism with which democracy has become historically associated or the moral cynicism which inclines human communities to tyrannical political strategies."¹⁸ What did happen to Tillich's "scholastic" remark that the belief in man's rationality would cultivate more fertile soil of democracy than the Christian conception of original sin and the demonic structures of society? "Man's capacity for justice," Niebuhr remarks, "makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."¹⁹ Thus, for Niebuhr, democracy is based upon man's capacity. And democracy is adaptable to a greater degree of justice than other political forms. Democracy is a social orientation in

¹⁵The Divine Imperative, p. 467.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, p. xv.

¹⁹Ibid., p. xiii.

which freedom and order are made for each other. For Brunner, it is the presence of freedom in the Christian principle that made it differ from collectivism. Not unlike Niebuhr's order, Brunner finds responsibility of individuals to the community as the characteristic which distinguishes the Christian principle from individualism. Thus Niebuhr and Brunner must accept the conclusion that democracy is essentially the embodiment of the Christian principles of ethics, and democracy is necessary to the attainment of this goal.

If, as Niebuhr insists, democracy is a social organization in which freedom and order have a brotherly relation, then Paul Tillich's idea of "religious socialism" or a "theonomous" culture is truly a democracy. Walter M. Horton writes, "[Tillich's] ideal of a truly 'theonomous' culture is one in which freedom and order are united. This ideal needs to be powerfully presented, if modern culture is not to flee from chaos into tyranny."²⁰ Etienne Gilson, a Catholic thinker, considers the purpose of society to be the perfection of personality. This idea is not dissimilar to the personalism of Emil Brunner who has rejected individualism and collectivism as detrimental to the development of human personality. Also, for Gilson, democracy provides society with necessary authority for the benefit of the common good and the "efficacious guarantee of personal liberties."²¹ The notion of the common good of Gilson -- as a matter of fact, of Catholic thinkers in general -- is similar to Brunner's idea of "common weal" or "the Christian principle of community" in which dynamic justice and the freedom of the individual

²⁰"Tillich's Role in Contemporary Theology," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 45. See also Eduard Heimann, "Tillich's Doctrine of Religious Socialism," ibid., pp. 312-25.

²¹"Democracy as We Conceive It," Church and Society, pp. 268-72.

are fulfilled. For Niebuhr, democracy alone is apt to respond to the demands of social justice. The various ideas of these Christian thinkers seem to work toward one goal: the realization of Christian ethical principles. For lack of better terminology, we might call its political expression "Christian democracy."²²

When Christian theologians look at democracy, democracy is not merely "a political device," but it is "an ideal" as well. That is, it is something good (something Christian) to be accomplished. Therefore, Christian democracy is a normative social theory. As Emil Brunner has already warned us, democracy is not what Nathaniel Micklem calls "ochlocracy," the technical name for mob-rule. "Liberal democracy is the assertion in political life of the worth, the dignity, the due freedom of man as man."²³ The essence of democracy is its spirituality, usually the spirituality that only Christianity can offer. Luigi Sturzo said that every code of ethics demands a religion;²⁴ for the Christian theologian, every good code of ethics demands the Christian faith. "The democracies," Micklem writes, "are in danger because they have forgotten or neglected or denied the religious basis of their faith. They can only resist the onslaught of an atheist religious or quasi-religious faith and the corrosion of

²²From an empirical point of view, Hans Kelsen criticizes the democratic philosophies of Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Maritain. Kelsen's essay is a critique on Brunner's Justice and the Social Order, Niebuhr's The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness and Maritain's Christianity and Democracy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945). "Foundations of Democracy," Ethics, LXVI, No. 1, Pt. 2 (October, 1952), pp. 40-67.

²³Nathaniel Micklem, The Idea of Liberal Democracy (London: C. Johnson, 1957), p. 75.

²⁴Op. cit., p. 235.

secularism by a quickening sense of the religious basis of our political ideals."²⁵

It is not merely a theological idiosyncrasy that the theologian looks at democracy and totalitarianism as a gigantic battle between the good of Christianity and the evil of atheism. He alludes to the historical and philosophical insight into Communism itself. The transition from Hegelianism to Marxism, as Etienne Gilson relates, can be seen more clearly through the "materialism" of Feuerbach: "construing Feuerbach as a materialist is one of Marx's most personal contributions to the development of modern philosophy."²⁶ Feuerbach turned the theocentric man into an "Anthropolatry." According to Feuerbach, "God has not created man in his own image, but man has created God in his own image."²⁷ The name "dialectical materialism" bears truly the combination of Hegel and Feuerbach in Marxism.

Therefore, as all Christian theologians would agree, Marxism as a secularism has, philosophically speaking, the fervor of a religion. Communism has not only a religious fervor in its actual operation but also has its philosophical root in the religion of an "Anthropolatry." Thus, the antimony between democracy and totalitarian Communism becomes a religious problem.

Arnold Brecht has already noted the fact that, despite the

²⁵The Idea of Liberal Democracy, p. 136.

²⁶The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 283.

²⁷Ibid., p. 281. Ludwig Feuerbach's view on Christianity is found in The Essence of Christianity, tr. George Eliot (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

secularization of the modern world since the Renaissance, God has continued to play a relevant role in politics. Christianity was a great force in the genesis of modern democracy; judging from the above examination of Christian theologians, Christianity is playing an important role in the development of democracy itself. Arnold Brecht insists that democracy in the modern world "is in need of a constant injection of ethical impulses, and these impulses . . . were supplied in the past, and are still being supplied, chiefly by religious feelings."²⁸

In addition to theologians' interest in democracy, many Christian philosophers, e. g., John H. Hallowell, Yves R. Simon, A. D. Lindsay, George F. Thomas, Theodore M. Greene, Mortimer J. Adler and Walter Farrell,²⁹ have come to the conclusion that Christian morality alone can provide the genuine foundations of democracy. Democratic political institutions and cultural activities must be based upon the assumption

²⁸Political Theory, p. 458.

²⁹John H. Hallowell, The Moral Foundation of Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Yves R. Simon, Philosophy of Democratic Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) and "Thomism and Democracy," Science, Philosophy and Religion: Second Symposium, pp. 258-72; A. D. Lindsay, The Essentials of Democracy and The Modern Democratic State (London: Oxford University Press, 1943); George F. Thomas, chapter xiii, "Christianity and Democracy," Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 283-305 and "Christianity and Democracy," The Vitality of the Christian Tradition (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), pp. 335-58; Theodore M. Greene, Liberalism: Its Theory and Practice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1957); Mortimer J. Adler and Walter Farrell, "The Theory of Democracy," Thomist, III (July, 1941), pp. 397-449; III (October, 1941), pp. 588-652; IV (January, 1942), pp. 121-81; IV (April, 1942), pp. 286-354; IV (July, 1942), pp. 446-522; IV (October, 1942), pp. 292-761; VI (April, 1943), pp. 49-118; VI (July, 1943), pp. 251-77; VI (October, 1943), pp. 367-407; VII (January, 1944), pp. 80-131.

that man is essentially a spiritual being. As such he must define his morality on the basis of religious values. Nor is genuine democracy possible without faith in the ultimate authority of God. It should also be noted that "the second meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life" in September, 1941, has shown the highlight of the philosophical (Christian and non-Christian) interests in democracy.³⁰

Despite the insistence of Christian thinkers that Christian religious values provide the best answer to the foundations of democracy, there is no conclusive consensus among political theorists that democracy is and should be based upon certain elements of Christianity or that Christianity necessarily offers a democratic form of government.

In discussing "cultural prerequisites to a successfully functioning democracy," Ernest S. Griffith advances his hypothesis that the Christian and Hebrew faiths offer "a powerful matrix" for the successful function of democracy. In particular, the Christian character of "absolutes" are not only desirable but also necessary to democracy.³¹ It is worth while quoting Griffith's comparison of seven categories of Christian religious values with the essentials of democracy:

1. Love for and belief in freedom: best based upon belief in the sacredness of the individual as a child of God.
2. Active and constructive participation in community life: best based upon the obligation of the Christian, the Jew, and other believers to accept responsibilities, cooperating with and working for their brother men.
3. Integrity in discussion: best based upon the inner light of truth being primary in a world God meant to be religious.

³⁰See Science, Philosophy and Religion: Second Symposium.

³¹"Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium," American Political Science Review, L (March, 1956), p. 103.

4. The freely assumed obligation of economic groups to serve society: best based upon the Christian insight into the nature of society as set forth, for example, by the parable of the body and its members.

5. Leadership and office holding regarded as public trusts: best based upon or inspired by the example and teachings of religious prophets, such as Jesus, who accepted such a service "to the death."

6. Attitudes assuring that passion will be channeled into constructive ends: best based upon religious faiths that unite an obligation to love and serve with a recognition of the primacy of individual personality.

7. Friendliness and cooperation among nations: best based upon the vision of world brotherhood derived from a faith that we are all children of a common Heavenly Father.³²

John Plamenatz argues against any necessary correlations between democracy and Christianity. He distinguishes the Christian emphasis of the spiritual value of man from the legal and political expressions of the good democrat. "Neither the Christian nor the democrat," he maintains, "exclude or suppose one another." The good Christian believes in the spiritual value of the human soul, and he believes in individualism. "But a good Christian need not be a democrat, nor a good democrat a Christian."³³

For Plamenatz democracy is more than a system of government, but it is also a system of government. "It is a set of political institutions

³²Ibid., p. 113. George F. Thomas lists seven Christian concepts which contribute to the cause of democracy: (1) the Christian faith in the dignity and worth of every person; (2) the belief in the fundamental equality of all men; (3) the Christian notion of liberty and right; (4) the realistic view of man; (5) the existence of the church as an autonomous community that prevents the rise of totalitarianism; (6) the deeper basis of the unity of the community and the common good; and (7) the hope for a world of community based upon the Christian notion of brotherhood of men. Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy, pp. 283-305.

³³"Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium," p. 118.

together with the manners and morals, the ways of thinking and feeling that go with those institutions."³⁴ "The ways of thinking and feeling" of the people are the cultural prerequisites for the successful function of democracy. However, for Plamenatz, these are not necessarily equated with the Christian spiritual values. For example, the individualism of the modern democrat -- "a respect for the right of every man to order his life as he pleases provided he admits the same right in others" -- is different from "the Christian sense that the value of every human soul is infinite."³⁵

While the Christian spiritual values for Griffith and the ways of thinking and feeling of the people for Plamenatz are the cultural prerequisites for the success of democracy, J. Roland Pennock emphasizes the social and economic conditions with which democracy may successfully function.³⁶ It is interesting to note what Pennock says about religion and politics, especially Christianity and democracy. He agrees with Plamenatz in that there are no necessary correlations between religion and politics. Instead, religion is "a two-edged sword." He does not suggest, however, that "religious beliefs may not be favorable to democratic attitudes." But his own conviction is that "it is impossible to

³⁴Ibid., p. 115.

³⁵Ibid., p. 118.

³⁶Like Pennock, Seymour Martin Lipset, a political sociologist, recently discusses the social and economic prerequisites of democracy in Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 45-96 and in "Some Social Prerequisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, LIII (March, 1959), pp. 69-105.

establish any necessary or even probable correlations in this area [in the relation between religion and politics?]." In short, for Pennock, "the political implications of religious belief are ambivalent." Religion may or may not work for democracy. Religion may reinforce a sense of social responsibility; but he says that with a slight shift of emphasis, it may sound like "the credo of fascism."³⁷

In discussing this controversial topic of the relation between Christianity (or religion) and democracy, we must, first of all, distinguish democracy as a set of juridical and political arrangements of government and democracy as a cultural or ethical concept. While the Christian thinkers defend the ethical notions of democracy which are related to Christianity, we cannot merely criticize these ethical concepts from a political point of view. This is a kind of unequivocal fallacy of "disparateness" or disparate levels of conceptualization.

Secondly, we must not confuse the theoretical principles of democracy derived from, or coincided with, Christianity, with the practice of Christian institutions. The authoritarian practice of the Church is usually given as a historical instance as to why Christianity, Roman Catholicism in particular, does not work for the benefit of democracy. It seems that the contributions of the Christian principles for the preservation and genesis of modern democracy should not be outweighed by some ill practices of Christian institutions in history. Another important point to remember is the fact that these contemporary Christian thinkers outwardly exert themselves for the support of democracy and democratic values with firmer conviction than, say, do the ethical relativists of the Dewey school.

³⁷"Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium," pp. 129, 134-35.

In the battle against totalitarianism, democracy based upon scientific relativism has been proven to be weak and powerless. What the Christian principles can offer is the ethical and psychological contents of certainty in the democratic faith. "Religion in its quitesential character," Reinhold Niebuhr writes, "is devotion to the absolute and a yearning after value and truth which transcends the partial, the relative and the historical."³⁸ As Charles W. Morris notes, "Religious language is charged with expressors which indicate approval by an individual or group of individuals of certain supreme goals of life rather than others; it is rich in motivators which aim to induce a certain way of life believed to lead to the attainment of the preferred goal; and it contains statements about the world which are felt to justify the approved goal and the recommended techniques."³⁹

Therefore, the preferred goal and the recommended techniques of Christian theologians, in their political expressions, are without doubt the democratic faith. Moreover, there is no reason why the Christian principles of spiritual freedom, spiritual dignity and worthiness of person, love, human equality in the sight of God and of community cannot be psychologically translated into the "cash-value" of political principles of democracy, that is, political freedom, individualism, fraternity, equality and common weal. There is no reason to deny that what man

³⁸Reflections on the End of an Era (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 183.

³⁹"Empiricism, Religion and Democracy," Science, Philosophy and Religion: Second Symposium, p. 223. His earlier philosophical treatise on democracy from a "pragmatic" point of view is found in Pragmatism and the Crisis of Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). His strong conviction for democracy against totalitarianism is expressed when he says: "If democracy provides no living alternative to fascism and communism, then blood and brawn must meet" (p. 21).

believes on the religious level has political implications. Ralph Barton Perry has already shown why the elements of Puritanism have been instrumental to the cause of American democracy.⁴⁰

As a Barthian "indifferentism" is unrealistic, some political empiricists who attempt to separate religion from politics for an entirely different purpose are equally unrealistic. Christianity, more than any other living religions of the world today, is a positively culture-bound religion. The intolerant empiricist must take seriously what the "liberal empiricists" like Charles W. Morris state: "The empiricist, if equipped with an adequate theory of signs, is not driven to assert that religious discourse is 'meaningless,' and need not find himself in opposition to the religious quest."⁴¹ The myopia of the intolerant empiricist is the sight of a frog that lives in the bottom of a well, sees nothing but a small portion of the sky, and says "this is the whole universe!" The faithful democrat must always remember what A. D. Lindsay said: "Democracy is a faith, but a reasoned faith."

If democracy is a reasoned faith, and, as one of the foremost present-day Christian political theorists John H. Hallowell says, "democracy rests upon a faith in man as a rational, moral, and spiritual creature,"⁴² then Jacques Maritain's philosophy of democracy, which

⁴⁰Puritanism and Democracy. See also: Characteristically American (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).

⁴¹"Empiricism, Religion and Democracy," p. 224. E. A. Burtt points out that "Metaphysics they [the modern philosophers of science] tended more and more to avoid, so far as they could avoid it; so far as not, it became an instrument for their further mathematical conquest of the world." And he urges some sort of reconciliation between "scientific" manipulation and "metaphysical" speculation. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 306.

⁴²The Moral Foundation of Democracy, p. 128.

is based upon the Thomistic philosophical and theological system, is a supreme example of this view. Maritain's philosophy of democracy might well be contrasted, within the Christian camp, with those views of Protestant theologians like Reinhold Niebuhr and Emil Brunner.

SECTION II

THOMISM AND JACQUES MARITAIN

CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOMISM

It is hoped that the preceding section will serve as a kind of prolegomenon to the understanding of the political theology of Jacques Maritain. Political theology, from a political point of view, is defined as that part of political philosophy which has its foundation rooted in the theological, whether it be revelational or natural theology. All the theistic conceptions of political philosophy are political theologies.¹ In short, political theology is founded upon the proposition that "all the political problems are at bottom theological." In political theology, theology is the ultimate reservoir of political philosophy. Christian political philosophy, ultimately speaking, is a political theology.

Strictly speaking, as will become clear later, it is more appropriate to use the term political "philosophy" rather than "theology" for a Thomistic view of politics due to the clear distinction between theology and philosophy in Thomism. However, there is no compelling reason why the Thomistic political philosophy cannot be called a "political theology" (as in the political philosophy derived from revelational theology), simply because, of its being a Christian philosophy,

¹Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese deal with a variety of "theisms" in their Philosophers Speak of God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

it ultimately resorts to (natural) theology. As Jacques Maritain declared, even the truly explicative science of politics must be a political theology, and, for this reason, the truly genuine political philosophy must be a political theology. Nonetheless, it is advisable for us to keep in mind this Thomistic distinction between theology and philosophy.

The political theology of Jacques Maritain must be understood in the context of contemporary political philosophy as a whole. To analyze political philosophy and theology is the proper business of political theory itself. The decline of political philosophy has been largely due to the contemporary tendency to neglect the concern over the ends and goals of political life; and "philosophy" is discarded at the expense of "theory." Largely due to the emphasis on scientific research in politics, political theology seems to have been the most neglected field of investigation in political theory. Arnold Brecht argued that even scientific political theory cannot dismiss political theology.

Although it may be that Christian theologians are critical of our age and speak of "the shaking of the foundations," they have ceased to express merely their "eschatological consciousness." Even the "theologians' theologian" Karl Barth, at times, had to concern himself with historical exigencies, and politics has ceased to become too mundane. The political theorist should not confuse the prevailing theological mood with theologian's contribution to the understanding of politics and culture as a whole. The writings of Reinhold Niebuhr, Jacques Maritain, Paul Tillich and Emil Brunner are cases in point. Their contributions to political notions such as democracy, power, justice,

order, authority, etc. have borne fruitful results, and their insight into political phenomena must be welcomed by political philosophy.

The political theology of Jacques Maritain becomes clearer if it is examined in the total context of Christian political theology. It has been made clear that there is an intimate relation between a theological position and politics or culture as a whole. A theologian's position regarding the interrelation between faith and reason, between grace and nature, and between theology and philosophy decides his attitude towards cultural, social and political problems. Karl Barth who is imbued with the analogia fidei has produced a negative attitude towards or disconcern over cultural affairs. On the other hand, Jacques Maritain, a Thomist who accepts the analogia entis (analogy of being), has a positive attitude towards cultural matters. The cultural concerns of Paul Tillich and Emil Brunner have been justified by their middle-ground (somewhat "scholastic") position between faith and reason. Moreover, the theological concept of original sin has become the foundation of Niebuhr's political realism, based upon the "realistic" account of human nature.

Jacques Maritain is a Thomist by his own admission. No one has contributed more than he to the systematization of Thomism in the twentieth century.² Maritain's Degrees of Knowledge may be considered as a

²Etienne Gilson may be considered to be comparable in status to Maritain, but he is essentially known as a superb historian. Of course, there would be a difference in opinion in determining who is really the greatest Thomist of the twentieth century. For example, Martin Grabmann, himself a well-known Thomist, considers Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange as "the best authority and representative of Thomistic metaphysics in our day." The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Nicholas Ashenbrener (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951), p. 21. Etienne Gilson here and there alludes to the fact that Maritain is "one of its [the Thomist family] finest specimens." Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, p. 84. Be that as it may, all Catholic thinkers and "outsiders" would agree that no one excels Maritain in Catholic cultural and social philosophy. Walter M.

little Summa Theologica of the twentieth century.³ His political philosophy is determined to a large extent by his acceptance of Thomism as the "philosophia perennis." Therefore, contrary to the prevailing attitude of Protestantism, the predominant Catholic position accepts natural law as the basis of Christian ethical theory. The acceptance of natural law is the consequence of accepting Thomism in the Catholic camp. However, one need not be a Catholic to subscribe to natural law theory.

Thomism or Neo-Thomism must be reckoned as a force in the twentieth century philosophy. "Against the great mass of nondescript contributions," Walter Cerf in his brief summary of the Proceedings of the Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy writes, "three grand currents of contemporary thought are easily recognizable: the empiricists, the existentialist, and the Catholic currents. The empiricist current is mainly British, American, and Scandinavian; the existentialist, on the whole, continental and South American; and only Catholicism is represented internationally, although its main strength is in France, Germany, and Italy. Catholicism always surprises the outsider, not only with the variety of views permissible within its dogmatic framework, but also with the energy it exhibits in assimilating to itself the main tendencies of modern thought and science. At the moment, though,

Horton says that in Maritain we find "the best expression of the Catholic critique of modern culture." Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 47. See also Frederick Copleston, Aquinas, p. 250.

³This is certainly his opus magnum; Degrees of Knowledge, tr. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959). See also: Science and Wisdom, tr. Bernard Wall (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940) and An Essay on Christian Philosophy, tr. Edward H. Flannery (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955).

existentialism is its favorite partner."⁴ Moreover, the unity of Neo-Thomists on fundamental issues should not be construed as the non-existence of diversity within the Catholic camp itself. Although Maritain recognizes that he and Etienne Gilson are in agreement on fundamental issues, the "outsider" cannot fail to recognize existing differences within the Catholic camp. "Throughout the work of Gilson and Maritain," a critique of Thomism notes, "one can hardly fail to be struck by the vast difference between their treatment of Thomas and their often very cavalier criticisms of other philosophers."⁵

José Ferrater Mora, recognizing conflicting philosophical tendencies (what he calls "the anarchy of philosophic systems") in contemporary thought, aptly summarizes these two aspects in the following passage:

. . . no one of the present-day Neo-Scholastic currents is a mere repetition of the original systems; changes are constantly introduced into them according to the formula novis vetera augere -- "to add new things to the old ones." Most influential in particular is the revival of Thomism, to the extent that the Neo-Scholastic movement is sometimes equated with the Neo-Thomist movement. The doctrine of the analogy of Being; the theory according to which all beings apart from God consist of essence and existence; the explanation of movement and change in terms of the passage from

⁴"The Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy," Philosophical Review, LXIV (April, 1955), pp. 394-95. José Ferrater Mora probably gives the best summary of various philosophical schools of our time in Philosophy Today: Conflicting Tendencies in Contemporary Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), especially chapter i, "The Present Situation in Philosophy," pp. 1-78, where he mentions Thomism. Thomism is also represented in a survey of Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943). And it is represented in a survey of I. M. Bochenski's Contemporary European Philosophy, tr. Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1956).

⁵Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy, p. 144.

potentiality to actuality; the hylomorphic doctrine of matter; moderate realism in the theory of universals; and other Thomistic tenets often pass as representing the philosophic opinions of all Neo-Scholastics. That such is not the case can be easily verified by even a perfunctory examination of various Neo-Scholastic philosophic periodicals and treatises. But aside from the aforementioned differences within the Neo-Scholastic movement, quite a variety of opinions can be detected in the seemingly more unified Neo-Thomist current. Thus, contemporary Neo-Thomists like Jacques Maritain, Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Etienne Gilson, and Martin Grabmann are at one on a number of fundamental issues. But it would be wrong, and even unfair, to conclude that they all share the same "philosophy." In point of fact, they only agree on what is less philosophical in their philosophies -- on the theological truths which such philosophies are supposed to interpret and clarify.⁶

In order that we may determine the nature of Thomism and Maritain's philosophical and theological position, we must begin with a brief historical account of the development of Thomism. Although it may be said that Thomism as a philosophy and a theology has shown rather an amazing continuity for the past seven centuries, Thomism gained its momentum by the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris (August 4, 1879) in which Pope Leo XIII made Thomism a kind of official philosophy of the Catholic Church.⁷ And a year later, the Aeterni Patris was implemented

⁶Op. cit., p. 59.

⁷The content of the Aeterni Patris is found in The Church Speaks to the Modern World: The Social Teachings of Leo XIII, ed. Etienne Gilson, pp. 29-54. The litterae encyclicae (encyclicals) began with the Ubi primum (December 3, 1740) pronounced by Pope Benedict XIV. The word "encyclical" has a Greek origin: en (in) and kyklos (a circle). They are papal letters usually relating to doctrinal and moral matters. They are infallible, when the Pope speaks, ex cathedra. Anne Fremantle (ed.), The Papal Encyclicals in their Historical Context (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), pp. 21-29.

The "official" status of Thomism in Roman Catholicism is usually a source of criticism by "outsiders." George H. Mead says: "The fundamental difference of attitude which I have recognized between Scholastic thought and that of other schools, lies in the acceptance of authority as an immediate ground for determining the judgment on the part of Scholastic thought. . . . I think all disagreements and unfriendliness that may exist come back to this: the principle of

to establish "Thomas Aquinas [as] the common patron of all the Catholic schools."⁸ Thomism has since become the fermenting ground of Catholic philosophy.⁹ It must be noted at the outset that "the ultimate explanation of the history of philosophy has to be philosophy itself." That is to say, "Philosophy consists in the concepts of philosophers, taken in naked, impersonal necessity of both their contents and their relations. The history of these concepts and of their relationships is the history of philosophy itself."¹⁰

A. E. Taylor said in 1925 that even an educated Englishman of one hundred years ago would not name St. Thomas Aquinas in a list of the great philosophers of the past such as Bacon, Locke, Hume, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Kant. Francis Bacon contemptuously likened Aquinas to "a spider spinning cobwebs."¹¹ Macaulay made the remark in 1828 that "we extol Bacon and sneer at Aquinas."¹² However, today we must include Aquinas and Thomism in the rank of the great philosophers

authority appears to us to have rendered static and immobile the Scholastic mind, when once the Summa of Aquinas had been definitely erected. There exists within it no place for unshackled scientific question, investigation, and imagination." Present-Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism, ed. John S. Zybura (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1927), p. 47.

⁸The Church Speaks to the Modern World, p. 29.

⁹Besides all Catholic Universities, some centers for the study of Thomism and Scholasticism in general are such places as the University of Louvain and the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies at Toronto, Canada.

¹⁰The Unity of Philosophical Experience, pp. 302, 304.

¹¹Joseph Wood Krutch, The Modern Temper (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 201.

¹²A. E. Taylor, "St. Thomas as a Philosopher," St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1925), p. 33.

and philosophical systems of the past. According to Taylor, even those who are not professed Thomists must agree to the fact that "St. Thomas [is] one of the great master-philosophers of human history whose thought is part of the permanent inheritance of civilized Europeans and whose influence is still living and salutary."¹³

It was during the twelfth and the first half of the thirteenth century that a great quantity of Greek philosophical literature had begun to be known in medieval Christendom. Much of this literature was transmitted by the Arab world that discovered Greek philosophy, especially Aristotle. The original Greek texts of Aristotle were foreign to medieval Christendom until the time of Aquinas (1225-1274). The two great Islamic philosophers of the Middle Ages who had been under the spell of Aristotle were Avicenna (ibn Sina) (1120-1198) and Averroes (ibn Rushd) (1126-1198). Through the latter the philosophy of Aristotle was transmitted to the academic world of medieval Christendom. In the Jewish world, there was Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) who also followed the philosophical method of Aristotle.¹⁴ As James K. Feibleman writes, "Maimonides sought to reconcile Aristotle with Scriptures. But he thought of it as the reconciliation of reason with revelation, for he knew no reason other than Aristotle and he recognized no revelation other than the Hebrew Scriptures. The same task had been fulfilled by Averroes in his own time for the combination of Aristotle with Moslem revelation, and was to be fulfilled a century later by

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Irving L. Horowitz has recently written an interesting article on this matter: "Averroism and the Politics of Philosophy," Journal of Politics, XXII (November, 1960), pp. 698-727.

Aquinas for Aristotle and Christian revelation."¹⁵

When the philosophy of Aristotle was introduced to the medieval Christian academic circle through the Arab world, especially to Albert the Great to whom Aquinas owed his knowledge of Aristotle, Aristotle was already modified. Frederick Copleston says, "A theologian-philosopher like Albert or Thomas was not inclined to take over Aristotelianism without modification; for it was quite obvious to him that some of Aristotle's theories were incompatible with orthodox Christian theology, especially if Averroes's commentaries were regarded as giving the true interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy."¹⁶ Aquinas and Maimonides utilized, to a full extent, the pagan philosophy of Aristotle for their theological interests. James Feibleman has said that Aquinas totally abandoned the "theology" of Aristotle.¹⁷ "Thomas," Etienne Gilson says, "has removed from Aristotle all the obstacles to Christian faith that were not evidently there."¹⁸

St. Thomas Aquinas, the official philosopher and theologian of the Roman Catholic Church, followed the footsteps of St. Dominica and Albert the Great and represented "the typical intellectualist saint of

¹⁵However, for Feibleman there was no doubt as to who was really "Aristotelian." He thinks that Aquinas subordinated Aristotle to Christianity as Maimonides "definitely subordinated philosophy to theology, making philosophy subservient to Scripture," and that "it was Averroes who gave back to philosophy an authority of its own while holding theology inviolate, thus resolving all the contradictions between them by keeping them apart." Religious Platonism, pp. 200, 204. Harry V. Jaffa also concludes that "Thomas' charges against the Averroists in the commentary correspond with distortions in his interpretation of the doctrine of the Ethics, and of Aristotle's philosophy in general." Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 166.

¹⁶Medieval Philosophy, p. 100.

¹⁷Religious Platonism, p. 199.

¹⁸Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 32.

the whole Middle Ages" and at the same time "the supreme glory of the Dominican order."¹⁹

Aquinas' position is not only revered by the Catholic thinkers, literary men, philosophers and theologians. There are some followers outside the Catholic circle itself. The influence of Aquinas is largely confined to the Roman and Anglican Catholic circle because of his official position in the Church. Martin D'Arcy, himself a Thomist, notes that "St. Thomas was identified with the Catholic position. Being a theologian as well as a philosopher, it was too much to expect that controversialists would keep the two separate. He does not do so himself in his writings, and undoubtedly this mingling of religion with pure thought has proved a stumbling-block to many who have no religious prejudice against him."²⁰

For Aquinas, there was no doubt that faith itself was above reason or philosophy. But there is a strong indication that, while he distinguished philosophy from theology, he attempted to reconcile the two. Etienne Gilson, the most well-known historian of Thomism and the medieval philosophies, makes the position of Aquinas clear when he says: "Himself a theologian, St. Thomas had asked the professors of theology never to prove an article of faith by rational demonstration, for faith is not based on reason, but on the word of God, and if you try to prove it, you destroy it. He had likewise asked the professors of philosophy never to prove a philosophical truth by resorting to the words of God, for philosophy is not based on Revelation, but on reason, and if you

¹⁹ T. F. Tout, "The Place of St. Thomas Aquinas in History," St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1925), p. 1.

²⁰ Thomas Aquinas (Westminster, Md.: Newman Bookshop, 1944), p. 259.

try to base it on authority, you destroy it."²¹ Ferrater Mora is quite right when he says: "In principle, Neo-Scholastic tenets may be maintained without adhering to Catholic theological dogmas. As a believer, the Neo-Scholastic philosopher abides by theological authority; as a philosopher, he cannot accept any 'authority' but rational proof."²²

There is no doubt that St. Thomas Aquinas, philosophically speaking, was an Aristotelian. However, how much and how far he was an Aristotelian is subject to a historical controversy. From the standpoint of pure Aristotelianism, Aquinas sacrificed Aristotle for Christ. For the present day fideistic Christian thinkers like Barth, Aristotle was exalted at the expense of Christ. In a discussion of Gilson's comment on this subject, Walter Kaufmann says, "St. Thomas made 'Aristotle say so many things he never said'; and Gilson might well have added that St. Thomas also made Scripture say what it never had said. 'In order to metamorphose the doctrine of Aristotle, Thomas has ascribed a new meaning to the principles of Aristotle'; and in order to transform the religion of the Bible, he ascribed a different meaning to God."²³

Be that as it may, the consensus among the Thomists and the non-Thomists is that Aquinas was an Aristotelian but always held the Christian faith (theology) above philosophy. Aquinas himself refers to the pagan philosopher Aristotle as "the Philosopher" throughout his writings. But he would never agree that he had sacrificed Christ for Aristotle. A. E. Taylor said, "The Thomist philosophy is no mere Aristotelianism revised but a masterly synthesis of both Plato and Aristotle

²¹The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 62.

²²Op. cit., p. 58.

²³Op. cit., p. 144.

with one another and with Augustine, effected by original insight of the first order."²⁴ This implies that the reconciliation between faith and reason and between theology and philosophy represents the cardinal virtue of Thomism as a philosophy and a theology.

The philosophy and theology of Aquinas retains essentially the "Christian" character. "St. Thomas," says G. K. Chesterton, "did not reconcile Christ to Aristotle; he reconciled Aristotle to Christ."²⁵

²⁴As quoted in E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, p. 19. We cannot overlook the connection between Augustine and Aquinas as Christian thinkers. Jacques Maritain says that "the whole substance of the Augustinian teaching on truth has passed into St. Thomas." And it is foolish, in his opinion, to "oppose Thomism and Augustinianism as two systems." "St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas," St. Augustine: His Age, Life, and Thought (Garden City, N. Y.: Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 199-223. R. J. Henle shows Platonic elements in Aquinas in Saint Thomas and Platonism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956). James K. Feibleman is of the opinion that the vogue of Aristotle in the Roman Catholic Church since the days of Aquinas has neglected three important facts: (1) Aristotle was a Platonist. (2) Aristotle had his own religious ideas. "Now, nothing in Aquinas can be shown to be in accord with the religious ideas of Aristotle, only with some of his other ideas." (3) ". . . while Aristotle was not an absolutist but, on the contrary, put everything in a suggestive and probative rather than a finalistic way, Aquinas subscribed to the dogma of a revealed religion, and the only possible way in which he could hope to reconcile a probative philosophy with a dogmatic religion was to render the philosophy as absolute as the religion by fusing them into a new and absolute synthesis, which, in so far as it failed to be tentative and probative, meant not only a surrender of the philosophy to religion (which was, as a matter of fact, in this case called for) but a distortion of the philosophy to the extent to which it is involved with its own method." Religious Platonism, pp. 198-200. Despite the differences of opinion in these writers, however, one thing seems to be shown clearly: Aquinas was truly a Christian. In substance, his ideas are Christian, and only in method and approach was he an Aristotelian.

²⁵Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 28. See also Etienne Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 14. Gilson says that Aquinas baptized Aristotle in Aquinas' theological writings.

Philosophy for Aquinas was to facilitate "man's knowledge of God," and "science, logic, and philosophy never serve any other end than to permit a more perfect contemplation of God."²⁶ Although Aquinas considered the pagan philosopher Aristotle as "the Philosopher," it is clear that Aristotle was the philosopher whose philosophical method could be of service to Christian theology. Aquinas, according to Walter Kaufmann, "attempted nothing less than to pull the fangs of reason and to make it subservient to the church."²⁷ For Kaufmann, Martin Luther killed reason altogether; the difference between Aquinas and Luther is that "Aquinas realized no less than Luther that reason poses a great threat to the Christian faith, but he also saw that it could be employed in the service of faith, which he proposed to do."²⁸

Christianity is indebted for its growth to Greek philosophy.²⁹ The thought of St. Augustine is certainly influenced by Platonic mysticism through Plotinus (Neo-Platonism); and the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is methodically Aristotelian. It seems safe to say that, for the cause of Christianity, Aquinas was Aristotelian in his philosophical method alone and close to St. Augustine in spirit. Comparing

²⁶ Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 18.

²⁷ Op. cit., p. 145.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 146.

²⁹ On this subject, see the following two sources: Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957) and Charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944).

St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas to Greek philosophy, Etienne Gilson comments that "the personal philosophical thought of Augustine is to Plotinus as the personal philosophical thought of Thomas Aquinas is to Aristotle."³⁰ We should not assume that religion and philosophy are always incompatible. F. M. Cornford has already shown that the outward difference between them "only disguises an inward and substantial affinity between these two successive products of the same consciousness."³¹ In Christian philosophy, however, we must accept the conclusion of Richard Kroner when he says, "Christian philosophy was centered in the idea of God. It was therefore always theological or theocentric in principle. God, not the cosmos, was in the foreground of interest; he was the arche of Christian metaphysics. He was regarded as the supreme ground of all knowledge and all existence, of world and of man, of the Ideas and of matter, of virtue and of happiness."³²

The synthesis of the pagan philosophy of Aristotle and the Christian faith had been accomplished in Thomas. For him, the ultimate object of theology and philosophy was "one and the same."³³ In this sense, Aquinas sacrificed Christ for Aristotle no more than St. Augustine sacrificed Christ for Plato. The Averroists were truly Aristotelians. Therefore, Copleston writes that "some historians have maintained that the name 'Averroists' is a misnomer. . . . They should

³⁰Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 16.

³¹From Religion to Philosophy: A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).

³²Speculation and Revelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), p. 37.

³³Etienne Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 19.

rather be called 'integral Aristotelians'. This contention seems to me very reasonable." Of course, there was, within the faculty of arts at Paris, the movement of a group called integral Aristotelians or "Latin Averroists" to whose doctrine Aquinas vehemently objected.³⁴

Aquinas and his philosophy were representative of the Scholastics and the Scholastic philosophy.³⁵ "St. Thomas," writes Martin D'Arcy, "in the perspective of history, has come to be accepted as the representative philosopher and theologian of the thirteenth century."³⁶ This implies that there was a diversity of philosophic systems in the Middle Ages, which are usually lumped together under the name of Scholasticism. One of the ablest historians of the Middle Ages, Etienne Gilson, has the diversity of medieval philosophy in many of his works. For example, St. Thomas Aquinas may be compared to St. Bonaventure.³⁷

Although Thomism was the representative of the medieval Scholastics, it never commanded its due position even in the Dominican order in Aquinas' lifetime. The works of St. Bonaventura, John Peckham, Robert Kilwardby, Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham are examples of the existence of strong opposition to the philosophy and theology of Aquinas. "The acknowledged greatness of St. Thomas," D'Arcy writes, "did not . . . bring unity into the Scholastic philosophy of the

³⁴Medieval Philosophy, pp. 66, 101-102.

³⁵Scholasticism and Thomism should be distinguished. Copleston, for example, explains "the term 'Scholastics' to mean in general those philosophers who consciously and deliberately adhered to one of the medieval traditions." Aquinas, p. 237. A Thomist is a Scholastic, but a Scholastic is not necessarily a Thomist.

³⁶Thomas Aquinas, p. 252.

³⁷See Etienne Gilson's The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, tr. Dom Iltyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed (London: Sheed and Ward, 1940).

succeeding centuries. The Franciscan school continued to flourish; the Averrhoists were not silenced, and new systems were invented. The admirers of Thomism look upon the period succeeding the death of St. Thomas as one of decline, and it is hard to resist the impression."³⁸ Etienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris, condemned Averroism. After the death of St. Thomas Aquinas, he renewed his condemnation of Averroism. According to Jacques Maritain, Tempier included in the list of condemnation the theses of Siger of Brabant and of Boethius of Dacia and, above all, a score of Thomist propositions. The opposition of the Paris and Oxford theologians did not subside; nor that of the Franciscan doctors. In 1282, a General Chapter of the Friars Minor prohibited the reading of the Summa Theologica in Franciscan schools. St. Thomas Aquinas was canonized by Pope John XXII on July 18, 1323 at Avignon. Pope John XXII recognized the fact that "Thomas, alone, has illuminated the Church more than all the other doctors."³⁹

The rise of John Duns Scotus and the nominalist movement of the English Franciscan, William of Ockham, had been manifested as the great obstacle to the cause of Thomism, without mentioning the rise of modern philosophy that was rooted in the philosophy of Descartes. However, Thomism had its eminent followers throughout the centuries. Their names are an index of the rise and decline of Thomism throughout the successive

³⁸Thomas Aquinas, p. 252.

³⁹St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Joseph W. Evans and Peter O'Reilly (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), pp. 53, 57, 58.

centuries. John Capreolus, a noted Dominican called Thomas de Vio who is generally known as Cajetan, Franciscus Sylvester de Sylvestris, Francis Suarez, and John of St. Thomas indicate a somewhat sporadic continuity of Thomism. However, as Frederick Copleston warns us, these activities on Thomism "should not be taken to mean that the philosophy of Aquinas enjoyed an undisputed reign in the Catholic seminaries and educational institutions of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. . . . In many ecclesiastical seminaries and educational institutions philosophy came to consist of an emansculated Scholastic Aristotelianism, tinctured with ideas taken from other currents of thought, especially Cartesianism."⁴⁰

It was the decisive action of the Papacy that determined the destiny of Thomism and its circle in the Roman Catholic Church. On many occasions, Pius IX "expressed the need of a return to St. Thomas and the main Scholastic tradition." But it was not until 1879 when Leo XIII asserted the permanent value of the philosophy of Aquinas and urged the Catholics to draw their philosophical and theological inspiration from Aquinas. Copleston states, however, that "It is not strictly true to say that Leo XIII 'inaugurated' the revival of Thomism. What he did was to give impetus to an already existing movement." As Copleston continues to say, "when Leo XIII extolled Thomism he was not trying to put a full-stop to philosophical activity among Catholics; rather was trying to renew it and give it a fresh impetus. And there can be little doubt that as a matter of fact the revival of philosophy among Catholics

⁴⁰Aquinas, pp. 237-38.

has coincided with the revival of Thomism."⁴¹

Leo XIII's proclamation of the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris was unquestionably a strong and infallible impetus to strengthen the position of Aquinas in the Catholic philosophical circle. Leo XIII attempted "to resolve all apparent contradictions between reason and faith, between the striving after temporal ends and the higher ordination to a divine end, by a loftier view co-ordinating both, and thereby to re-establish that harmony between the two which had been achieved in the Summa theologiae."⁴² Thomism has become a kind of "Magna Charta" of the philosophy of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, in 1907, Leo XIII "exhorted the bishops to cling firmly to scholasticism, and charged the General of the Dominicans to see that the Order placed under him should meet the 'arrogant criticism of the moderns' everywhere with the Thomistic doctrine which forms a firm bulwark in the midst of errors."⁴³

The encyclical Aeterni Patris prescribed the idea that "the best way to philosophize is to unite the study of philosophy to obedience to the Christian faith."⁴⁴ This encyclical made it clear that the purpose of philosophy is to come to the defense of faith or religion. "it is the glory of philosophy to be esteemed as the bulwark of faith and the strong defense of religion." Thomism thus showed the best possibility for this crusade to defend the Catholic faith. "Our first and most cherished idea," Leo XIII said, "is that you should all furnish

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 238, 258.

⁴²René Fülöp-Miller, Leo XIII and Our Times, tr. Conrad M. R. Donacina (New York: Longmans, Green, 1937), p. 81.

⁴³Ibid., p. 154.

⁴⁴The Church Speaks to the Modern World, p. 30.

to studious youth a generous and copious supply of those purest streams of wisdom flowing inexhaustibly from the precious fountainhead of the Angelic Doctor." Despite the papal encouragement of Aquinas in the Catholic philosophical circle, Leo XIII specifically mentioned the contributions of other Catholic thinkers in the past such as St. Augustine, St. Anslem, St. Bonaventure, and others.

The encyclical letter Aeterni Patris has a wider implication than its encouragement of the philosophy of Aquinas in the Catholic circle. As Etienne Gilson comments, "In defining the method of Christian philosophy or, rather, the Christian way of philosophizing, Pope Leo XIII was therefore laying down the doctrinal foundation of the social and philosophical order."⁴⁵ The important factor, which cannot be readily dismissed in this encyclical, is that it laid the doctrinal foundation, not only of the philosophical order, but of the Catholic social, political and economic order as well.

Finally, Thomism witnessed its flowering days and ardent followers in this century, seven centuries after it was founded. Every one would agree with Martin D'Arcy when he says that "Thomism has a host of exponents in every part of the world, and . . . never has it been so flourishing since the death of its founder."⁴⁶

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 30, 36, 48.

⁴⁶Thomas Aquinas, p. 258.

CHAPTER VI

THE NATURE OF THOMISM

The philosophy of the mendicant Friar of the Dominican order has finally stretched its triumphant wing into the Catholic philosophical circle, and has become a force that should be recognized in the contemporary world of philosophic systems. It seems true that Thomism has been flourishing in this century for the first time since the death of its founder. Its gallery of ideas and knowledge has undoubtedly added some vivid touches to the modern world. To take the advice of its followers seriously, the philosophy of the thirteenth century has ceased to be a mere relic of the philosophic museum.¹

¹In addition to The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (22 vols.; London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1914-1940), the following works on St. Thomas Aquinas and his philosophy have been taken into consideration here: Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1939), The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1954) and Elements of Christian Philosophy; Martin Grabmann, Thomas Aquinas, tr. Virgil Michel (New York: Longmans, Green, 1928) and The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Nicholas Ashenbrener (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1951); Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, tr. Patrick Cummins (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1950); A. D. Sertillanges, S. Thomas d'Aquin (2 vols.; Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1922); Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Frederic Eckhoff (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1944); A. Whitacre et al., St. Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1925); G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1956); F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955); Martin C. D'Arcy, Thomas Aquinas (Westminster, Md.: Newman Bookshop, 1944); Josef Pieper, The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays, tr. Daniel O'Connor (London: Faber and Faber, n. d.); Gerald Vann, Saint Thomas Aquinas (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1940) and Maurice de Wulf, The System of Thomas Aquinas (New York: Dover Publications, 1959).

The virtue of Thomism is its reconciliation between ratio and fides or what Etienne Gilson calls "the harmony between reason and revelation."² It was an effort to reconcile the pagan philosopher Aristotle with Christ. In its philosophical method, Thomism is Aristotelian. "Thomas Aquinas," writes Etienne Gilson, "was not a pupil of Moses, but of Aristotle, to whom he owed his method, his principles, up to even his all-important notion of the fundamental actuality of being."³ Thomism thus becomes truly "the philosophy of an imperial intellect."⁴ Its intellectual pinnacle is the methodical adoption of the philosophy of Aristotle. In this respect, Thomism as a Christian theology occupies a unique place: As Gilson writes, "The metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas was, and it still remains, a climax in the history of natural theology."⁵ As Aquinas may be compared to Luther or even Augustine, Jacques Maritain may be contrasted to Karl Barth in our time. It is with good reason that Frederick Copleston calls Thomism "a balanced philosophy."⁶

Etienne Gilson concisely describes, in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, the essentials (and the contrast of essentials) of the medieval Christian philosophy. The three positions of the medieval Scholastics are comparable to the contemporary positions of the Christian fideists, the Christian "rationalists" (the Thomists), and those of empirical bent. Essentially we can

²Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, pp. 69-99.

³God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 67.

⁴For the defense of the philosophy of an imperial intellect in modern philosophy, see: Fulton J. Sheen, God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1958).

⁵God and Philosophy, p. 67.

⁶Aquinas, p. 254.

characterize modern systems into these three positions when we talk about the relation between faith and reason, between theology and philosophy.

The essential feature of the philosophy of Aquinas is "a sort of marriage" between reason and revelation. Aquinas reconciled Aristotle with Christ or the pagan philosophy of Aristotle with Christian theology. Aquinas saw essentially no contradiction between theology and philosophy: instead, philosophy could be the effective instrument for the furtherance of faith itself.

However, we must not overlook the fact that Aquinas was a faithful Christian. Josef Pieper deplores the fact that the "silence" of Aquinas has been completely ignored. It is often forgotten that the magnum opus of Aquinas (Summa Theologica) is an unfinished philosophical symphony. He draws attention to the following passage of Aquinas: "Principia essentialia rerum sunt nobis ignota, the essential principles of things are unknown to us."⁷ This is what Pieper calls the "philosophia negativa of St. Thomas": "a philosophical question cannot be answered in fully sufficient form." Moreover, Aquinas "relinquishes neither the Bible nor Augustine (nor, consequently, Plato) for the sake of Aristotle."⁸

Aquinas suddenly stopped writing because his philosophical work appeared to be nothing but "straw."⁹ This was "a hint that history has

⁷The Silence of St. Thomas, p. 93.

⁸Ibid., pp. 93, 106.

⁹Frederick Copleston, Aquinas, p. 10; Martin C. D'Arcy, Thomas Aquinas, pp. 47-48; G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas, pp. 141-43; Josef Pieper, The Silence of St. Thomas, p. 93; and Jacques Maritain, St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 54, 271.

never been able to explain."¹⁰ Aquinas, G. K. Chesterton explains, "had only long afterwards called up Aristotle as an ally; and now in that last nightmare of sophistry, he had for the first time truly realized that some might really wish Christ to go down before Aristotle. He never recovered from the shock." "We may be sure that the great philosopher had entirely forgotten philosophy."¹¹ Therefore, "The Summa, . . . with its thirty-eight treatises, its three thousand articles and ten thousand objections, remained unfinished." "The divine touch had been too profound to permit him to give himself thenceforth to his ordinary works." However, according to Jacques Maritain, Aquinas wrote some works afterwards. He wrote Responsio ad Bernardum and his second commentary on the Canticle of Canticles.¹² This is firm evidence that Aquinas was a faithful Christian; he did not doubt that faith was above reason, as Christ was above Aristotle. If any one misses this point, he seems to miss the whole truth of Aquinas' theology as well of his philosophy. As the saying goes, he who knows this fact, and knows nothing else, knows more about Aquinas than he who knows everything except this fact.¹³

¹⁰G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 141.

¹¹Ibid., p. 142.

¹²St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 54, 271.

¹³When E. E. Schattschneider characterizes the American party system, he singles out the fact of decentralization. And he says: "He who knows this fact, and knows nothing else, knows more about American parties than he who knows everything except this fact." Party Government (New York: Rinehart, 1942), p. 132.

St. Thomas Aquinas, at his death bed, said: "I receive Thee, Price of my redemption, Viaticum of my pilgrimage, for love of Whom I have studied and watched, toiled, preached, and taught. Never have I said anything against Thee; but if I have done so, it is through ignorance, and I do not persist in my opinions, and if I have done anything wrong, I

To understand the essence of Thomism, we must know the simple fact that it was an attempt to reconcile reason with faith or philosophy with theology, revolving around the pagan philosophy of Aristotle and the Christian faith. Thomism was a synthesis of reason and faith that avoided the extreme positions of "the primacy of faith" and of "the primacy of reason." Aquinas had the vision that philosophy based upon the rational faculties of the human mind could be an effective instrument to defend the Christian faith itself. This point was also made clear by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical letter Aeterni Patris. What G. K. Chesterton calls "Christianized Aristotelianism" is Aristotle's philosophy that was baptized by Christ or the Christian faith. Aquinas never sacrificed theological or revealed truths for philosophical principles.

One extreme position in the Middle Ages was held by those theologians who stressed the primacy of faith: "Those theologians according to whom Revelation had been given to men as a substitute for all other knowledge, including science, ethics and metaphysics."¹⁴ This was represented by "the Tertullian family," who recognized "an irreconcilable antagonism between Christianity and philosophy." The pagan philosophy of Greece was the curse for Christianity. This group mercilessly condemned Greek philosophy. Gilson concludes, therefore, that "Had the Middle Ages produced men of this type only, the period would fully deserve the title of Dark Ages which it is commonly given. It would

leave all to the correction of the Roman Church. It is in this obedience to Her that I depart from this life." Jacques Maritain, St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 56.

¹⁴ Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, p. 5.

deserve the name not only from the point of view of science and of philosophy, but from that of theology as well."¹⁵

The second group, who also emphasized the primacy of faith, was more "enlightened" than the Tertullian family. This group is called "the Augustinian family." They made untiring efforts "to blend religious faith with rational speculations." However, for St. Augustine, the safest way to reach truth was not to start from reason in order to find the certitude of faith. On the contrary, the proper method of finding truth is "the way whose starting point is faith and then goes on from Revelation to reason."¹⁶ As we recall, this was the same point that Emil Brunner made in putting the order of revelation first and then reason. The Reformation theology looked for inspiration from St. Augustine not from St. Thomas. While the Tertullian family repudiated the usefulness of reason and philosophy altogether, the Augustinian family started with faith and revelation and then moved to reason and philosophy. Therefore, the revealed truths were "the obligatory starting point of rational knowledge" or philosophy. "Understanding," St. Augustine said, "is the reward of faith. Therefore seek not to understand that thou mayest believe, but believe that thou mayest understand."¹⁷ St. Anselm (eleventh century), and Gioberti (nineteenth century) belong to the Augustinian family. The other extremists were those who maintained the primacy of reason. It was a kind of proto-type of modern rationalism. This group was represented by the Arab

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 8, 15.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 15, 17.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 17, 19.

Aristotelian, Averroes. According to Averroes, as Gilson notes, "the absolute truth was not to be found in any sort of Revelation, but in the writings of Aristotle. . . ." Averroes thought that some agreement between faith and reason was not absolutely impossible. He maintained, however, that "religion and Revelation are nothing but philosophical truth made acceptable to men whose imagination is stronger than their reason." While the Tertullian family condemned philosophy altogether, Averroes' position completely ignored theology which was beyond philosophical truth. Nothing but philosophy affirms absolute truth, which is demonstrable by pure human reason. Although Averroes denied faith and revelation from a philosophical point of view, he did not maintain that religion had no function at all. On the contrary, he held that religion has "a definite social function that could not be fulfilled by anything else, not even philosophy."¹⁸

The second group who came to the support of the primacy of reason was the Latin Averroists. Their position was rather different from that of Averroes himself since they were all Christians. When faith and reason were at odds, they had to believe in "the doctrine of twofold truth."¹⁹ The fundamental position of the Latin Averroists was that: "The conclusions of philosophy are at variance with the teaching of Revelation; let us therefore hold them as the necessary results of philosophical speculation, but, as Christians, let us believe that what

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 39, 43, 50.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 58. Gilson hastens to add that "Philosophically justified as I think it is, such a designation is not an historically correct one. . . . I have not yet been able to find a single medieval philosopher professing the doctrine of the twofold truth."

Revelation says on such matters is true; thus, no contradiction will ever arise between philosophy and theology, or between Revelation and reason."²⁰ In short, medieval rationalism represented by Averroes and the Latin Averroists has the same outlook on modern rationalism especially in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.

The reconciliation between reason and revelation characterizes what Gilson calls "the Thomistic synthesis" or "the harmony of reason and revelation." The philosophical outlook of Aquinas, according to Gilson, was to reject the one-sided view of the Tertullian and the Augustinian views, on the one hand, and Averroes and the Latin Averroists, on the other. The compromise between the two orders (philosophy and theology or reason and revelation) was "to handle philosophical problems as a philosopher and theological problems as a theologian."²¹

Aquinas, therefore, defined the proper nature of religious faith and the rational nature of philosophy, without obfuscating the essential difference between the two. Although they are not water-tight compartments, they are "specifically different kinds of assent." The philosophical assent was rational, whereas the religious assent demands the human will. "Revelation," Gilson writes, "is a self-sufficient and self-contained order of truth, whose ultimate foundation is divine authority alone and not the natural light of reason." Although Aquinas distinguished rational knowledge from revealed truths, all Thomists would agree that he did not separate the former from the latter. Philosophical knowledge has

²⁰Ibid., p. 57.

²¹Ibid., p. 72. See also The Unity of Philosophical Experience, p. 62.

its own distinctive sphere, and faith is not a principle of rational knowledge. Nonetheless, faith is an infallible guide to philosophical knowledge and prevents philosophy from committing errors. But it is reason that becomes a body-guard of faith, not vice versa. Cajetan, John of Saint Thomas, and Jacques Maritain are the "finest specimens" of the third spiritual family or the Thomistic family.²²

It is interesting to note that these three fundamental positions are not unrelated to the different outlooks of modern philosophy and theology. Gilson had a kind of historical continuity in mind when he spoke of "the unity of philosophical experience." The spiritual family of St. Augustine had made headway against Thomistic philosophy and theology in Desiderius Erasmus of "Christian humanism" on the one hand and in the spiritualism of Martin Luther, whose right heir of our time is Karl Barth, on the other hand. It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that Thomism is at war with the spiritualism of St. Augustine. Jacques Maritain, for example, thinks that Aquinas consummated Augustine. "If [Aquinas] fights the too material disciples of Saint Augustine," Maritain writes, "it is not to destroy Saint Augustine but rather to follow and understand him in a more living and more profoundly faithful manner, in a more perfect commerce of spirit."²³ The Averroists' position has been continued through the nominalist movement of William of Ockham and to the modern rationalism of R. Descartes and of Francis Bacon, whose positive outlook is not altogether dissimilar to contemporary empiricism. The compromising position between the Christian fideists

²² Bacon and Revelation in the Middle Ages, pp. 73, 78, 84.

²³ St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 105.

and the radical empiricists is that of the present-day followers of Aquinas. Moreover, as far as natural theology is concerned, we cannot eliminate from this camp such philosophers as Alfred North Whitehead, William Ernest Hocking, Charles Hartshorne and others.

The revolts against medieval Christendom (Roman Catholicism) were those of the Protestant (the Reformation) and the humanist (the Renaissance). Roman Catholicism and the Catholics have liked to call these two by the name of the "heretical" church and the "secularized" society. The revival of Catholic theology and philosophy is essentially the "return from exile." This is why Roman Catholicism has acted "like the mother of two unruly children [the Protestant and the humanist]." ²⁴

The vantage point of Thomism is its capacity to assimilate something new, whether it be scientific or otherwise, without violating its fundamental tenets. As the German Thomist, Hans Meyer, writes, every philosophical system must take into consideration the two basic factors: "the influence of a particular historical era and the basic scientific attitude as it is expressed in established principles and methods." Thomism is the philosophy that can take into account these two factors. He comes to the conclusion, therefore, that "The Thomistic system . . . was so all-embracing and so receptive to anything new that it flourished throughout the continuing forward movement of intellectual progress." ²⁵ Of course, the assimilating capacity of Thomism is due to the simple fact that it is "a balanced philosophy." The Thomist, thus, would like to call Thomism the "perennial philosophy." Josef Pieper

²⁴Walter M. Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 41.

²⁵The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 546, 547.

speaks of the "timeliness" of Aquinas. For him, the attitude of Aquinas is quite relevant to the world of today: the attitude of "the all-inclusive, fearless strength of his affirmation, his generous acceptance of the whole of reality, the trustful magnanimity of his thought."²⁶

Thomism, being a balanced philosophy, should be considered as neither a "conservative" nor antiquated philosophy, according to Fredrick C. Copleston. Copleston rejects the idea that Thomism has the "conservative" outlook in comparison with the two other gigantic currents of modern philosophy: existentialism and empiricism.²⁷ There is a strong indication that Thomism can ride the wave of contemporary existentialism (not the "atheistic" existentialism of, say, Jean-Paul Satre).²⁸ E. L. Mascall, who adopts a Thomistic approach, and Etienne Gilson agree that the true innovation of Aquinas was his recognition of existentiality. "M. Gilson," Mascall comments, "had unconsciously allowed himself to be unduly influenced by the climate of the time [by existentialism]."²⁹ "My only point," Gilson writes, "is that a decisive metaphysical progress

²⁶The Silence of St. Thomas, p. 103.

²⁷See his analysis on these two schools of thought (empiricism and existentialism) in modern philosophy: Contemporary Philosophy.

²⁸See, for example: Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent, tr. Lewis Galatiere and Gerald B. Phelan (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1956) which, as the subtitle suggests, is "an essay on Christian existentialism"; E. L. Mascall, Existence and Analogy, see especially chapter iii, "The Existentialism of St. Thomas," pp. 44-64. Probably the best known Catholic existentialist today is Gabriel Marcel, who wrote The Philosophy of Existence, tr. Manya Harari (London: Harvill Press, 1948) and The Mystery of Being: Vol. I: Reflection and Mystery, tr. G. S. Fraser (London: Harvill Press, 1950) and Vol. II: Faith and Reality, tr. René Hague (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1951).

²⁹Existence and Analogy, p. 45.

or, rather, a true metaphysical revolution was achieved when somebody began to translate all the problems concerning being from the language of essences into that of existences. From its earliest origins, metaphysics had always obscurely aimed at becoming existential; from the time of Saint Thomas Aquinas it has always been so, and to such an extent that metaphysics has regularly lost its very existence every time it has lost its existentiality."³⁰ Therefore it is obvious that one of the essential contributions of Aquinas was, in recognizing the importance of existentiality, his ability to go beyond the essentialism of the past.

Although Meyer recognizes the sublime mission of the perennial philosophy (Thomism) to abandon what is no longer tenable and to accept what appears to be established knowledge, Thomism is rather incapable of assimilating what Frederick Copleston calls "neopositivism."³¹ The antagonistic attitude of a Thomist towards some empiricists lies in the fact that Thomism is a Christian philosophy and theology. Although Jacques Maritain shares no enthusiasm for the Protestant anti-intellectualism (that of Luther and Karl Barth, for example), the Godless philosophy of logical empiricism is as distasteful as atheistic existentialism. It should be remembered once again that Christ was not sacrificed for the pagan philosophy of Aristotle. Instead, Aristotle was merely a methodical instrument that could serve the cause of the Christian faith. Aquinas, of course, distinguished between faith and

³⁰God and Philosophy, p. 67.

³¹For discussion of logical empiricism by Maritain, see pp. 212-18.

knowledge or theology and philosophy. However, as Josef Pieper well stated, "there is no 'philosophy of St. Thomas' that can be presented in complete detachment from his theology. He does not believe in 'pure' philosophy."³²

"Philosophies making no room for religion," Ferrater Mora contends, "are, to be sure, incomplete philosophies."³³ Therefore, the term "secular Thomism" is a contradiction in terms.³⁴ Also, from the viewpoint of the "liberal empiricists" like Charles W. Morris, the empiricist needs not be in opposition to religion. For a Thomist, "the Thomistic view of philosophy would not appeal to the supporters of scientism or logical positivism, but neither would the view of philosophy proper to these schools be in agreement with the philosophical aspirations of all our contemporaries."³⁵ Thus, we must be in general

³²The Silence of St. Thomas, p. 103. In another work, he says: "Theology is always prior to philosophy, and not in a merely temporal sense, but with respect to inner origin and their relationship in that origin. Philosophical enquiry starts with a given interpretation of reality and of the world as a whole; and in that sense, philosophy is intimately connected, not to say, bound to theology. There is no such thing as a philosophy which does not receive its impulse and impetus from a prior and uncritically accepted interpretation of the world as a whole." Leisure the Basis of Culture, tr. Alexander Dru (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), p. 151.

³³Philosophy Today, p. 143.

³⁴The term "secular Thomism" is used by Harry V. Jaffa in his Thomism and Aristotelianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952). He says, Neo-Thomism "might better be described as secular Thomism, because within its ranks are some who accept the authority of Thomas' philosophy but do not necessarily adhere to his theological doctrines" (p. 6).

³⁵Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 18. It must be pointed out that not all Thomists reject the utility of contemporary empiricism and linguistic analysis. Frederick Copleston, for example, says: "reflection on the foundations of [Thomists'] metaphysics in the light

agreement with Walter Cerf's summary of the Proceedings of the Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy. He said that there is an alliance between Catholic philosophy and existentialism, but the Proceedings "contain few examples of Catholic interest in science, and none at all indicating Catholic recognition of modern empiricism."³⁶

Etienne Gilson believes that modern philosophy inflated with scientism is a "philosophical suicide." The Comtean version of positivism is no better than Marxian dialectical materialism. The growth of modern science, according to Gilson, destroyed "the old balance between the human and the physical sciences, to the advantage of the latter," and, in doing so, it destroyed with it the Western creed which expresses "a firm belief in the eminent dignity of man." The default of scientism is analogous to the fact that "the European burnt his old ships before making sure that the new ones would float."³⁷ As scientism is rejected, anthropocentric humanism, not unrelated to scientism, also is replaced by what is called theocentric humanism. In this sense, the Thomist must at least agree with Richard Kroner, when he says:

Christian philosophy was centered in the idea of God. It was therefore always theological or theocentric in principle. God, not the cosmos, was in the foreground of interest; he was the arche of Christian metaphysics. He was regarded as the supreme ground of all knowledge and all existence, of world and of man, of the Ideas and of matter, of virtue and of happiness. How God can be

of modern empiricist criticism and of linguistic analysis might lead Thomists to achieve a greater clarification of, say, the nature of 'metaphysical principles' and of their status in relation to pure tautologies on the one hand and to empirical hypotheses on the other." Aquinas, p. 251.

³⁶Walter Cerf, "The Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy," p. 295.

³⁷The Unity of Philosophical Experience, pp. 266, 277.

comprehended as the supreme principle, how creation can be conceived in speculative fashion, how the relation between God and the Ideas, or between him and the human soul can be understood in terms of logical thought -- all these questions were answered differently by individual thinkers, but the theocentric orientation always remained unvaried."³⁸

It is not altogether true to say that all the Thomists dispensed with the values of scientific theories and modern science. Frederick Copleston notes that the University of Louvain, one of the fountainheads of modern Thomism, has made considerable efforts to keep pace with modern science and scientific theories. In relation to other philosophical positions, not all the Thomists are merely polemical: some have attempted to understand other philosophical systems. Some have even tried to understand epistemology through the eyes of Descartes and Kant.³⁹ Of course, Jacques Maritain would reject the epistemological or metaphysical approach from either a Cartesian or a Kantian starting point.

It is obvious that not all Thomists would agree with one another on all points. Frederick Copleston again suggests that: "Turning to Aquinas' metaphysics we again find considerable differences of attitude among Thomists." Generally, we may classify them either as revisionists or as conservatives. The former, represented by the Thomists at Louvain, look at Thomism in the light of an ever-changing world and life; and the latter, like Jacques Maritain, are those who try to adhere to the spirit and letter of Aquinas as much as possible.

³⁸Speculation and Revelation in the Age of Christian Philosophy, p. 37.

³⁹Frederick Copleston gives the examples of Mercier and Maréchal. Aquinas, pp. 240-55.

However, as Copleston points out, they all "stress metaphysics' independence of changing scientific hypotheses and its connexion with ordinary experience."⁴⁰ As Josef Pieper notes, if Thomism means anything at all, it must mean "nothing more nor less than the teaching of St. Thomas." However, we must risk the danger of committing a kind of "Konsequenzmacherei." Every Thomist would be likely to assert that he alone is a true Thomist. The philosophy of a Thomist might be completely foreign to the philosophy of Aquinas.⁴¹ Therefore, it is quite understandable that Pieper should say that "the term 'Thomism' has many meanings."⁴²

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 241, 246.

⁴¹Josef Pieper, The Silence of St. Thomas, p. 85. He makes this point clear when he compares Tolstoy with a Tolstoyan.

⁴²Ibid., p. 84.

CHAPTER VII

THOMISM AND JACQUES MARITAIN

Catholicism has returned from its exile.¹ "From her long period of exile and disfavor," Walter M. Horton says, "she is now returning, clothed with new authority."² Once again Catholicism is in a position to act like the mother of two unruly children of the Protestantism and the (anthropocentric) humanism of our age. The two most significant innovations of the Catholic Church are the encyclical letters Aeterni Patris (1879) and Rerum Novarum (1891). The former determined the fate of Thomism in the Catholic Church, and the latter determined the Church's outlook for social policies, specifically the relation between capital and labor.³

¹Christopher Dawson and J. F. Burns (eds.), Essays in Order (New York: Macmillan, 1931), p. xvi.

The brief accounts of the revival of Catholic theology are found in Walter M. Horton, "The Revival of Catholic Theology," Contemporary Continental Theology, pp. 41-84 and E. E. Aubrey, "Neo-Thomism," Present Theological Tendencies, pp. 113-50. From a doctrinal point of view, Karl Adam's The Spirit of Catholicism, tr. Dom Justin McCann (Rev. ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1946) is a classic. From a Protestant point of view, Jaroslav Pelikan's The Riddle of Roman Catholicism (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959) has been praised by Catholics as well as Protestants.

²Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 41.

³The best collection of writings on Catholic social and political thought and movements is found in Joseph N. Moody (ed.), Church and Society.

Walter M. Horton calls Jacques Maritain a "lay apostle of Thomism."⁴ Maritain is not a born Catholic; he was converted to Catholicism in 1907 after his soul-searching efforts to find the Absolute.⁵ "Maritain's ability to distinguish between Catholicism and Catholics," Horton notes, "springs in part, no doubt, from the fact that he was not born a Catholic, but became one from conviction."⁶ Although the Bergsonian "anti-intellectualism" (intuitionism) had no ultimate attraction for Maritain, it gave him the favorable disposition towards religion or, like "the pilgrim of absolute Catholicism" of Léon Bloy, "a devouring hunger for the Absolute."⁷ Léon Bloy's influence was the turning point for Maritain, the turning point towards the pilgrimage of the Absolute. However, as Horton notes, "Maritain's pilgrimage of faith did not end when he met Léon Bloy. Bloy convinced his heart; St. Thomas, somewhat later, convinced his head."⁸ Maritain wrote of Bloy later that he "sought the Absolute for Whom he lived a little too much in the personal intimations of his heart and the intuitions of his artistic

⁴Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 48. Christopher Dawson lists the following as leading philosophers and theologians of the Catholic movement: Sertillanges, Maritain, Gilson, Rousselot and Maréchal for the French-speaking world; and Przywara, Wust, Carl Schmitt, Theodor Haecker, von Hildebrand and Grabmann for the German-speaking world. Essays in Order, pp. xvii-xix. Of course, this list can be extended.

⁵The best biographical reference on Maritain is written by his wife, Raïssa Maritain. The two separate works are found in one volume: We Have Been Friends Together and Adventures in Grace, tr. Julie Kernan (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1961).

⁶Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 51.

⁷Karl Pflieger, Wrestlers with Christ, pp. 26, 38.

⁸Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 52.

genius, so that he took too slight account of the universal deliverances of the intellect and reason; and often made his sentiments the starting point in his acquisition of practical knowledge and the basis of unqualified assertions."⁹ Maritain, furthermore, separated from his one-time companion Charles Péguy, who, although sympathetic with the cause of socialism, had nothing but contempt for the "pigsty of modern society" or "a society of swine."¹⁰ "Maritain in conformity with his temperament at one bold leap," Karl Pflieger writes, "jumped over the intermediate stage straight into a life of Catholic practice and replaced Bergson as his teacher by St. Thomas."¹¹

Péguy refused to take the course Maritain advised, simply because Maritain's advice seemed to him "not only unseasonable at the present juncture but no way of escape from the actual difficulty. . . ." While Maritain cut the Gordian knot of his difficulties by the adherence to Thomism, Péguy refused to accept Aquinas by saying: "Don't bother me with your St. Thomas. . . . I would give the entire summa for the Ave Maria and the Salve Regina. The certainty of faith is not attained by arguments. . . . Your Thomas is an algebra in which I find nothing for my soul."¹²

⁹Karl Pflieger, op. cit., pp. 60-61. Pflieger comes to defend Bloy when he says: "Maritain, the neo-Thomist philosopher, is a wise man and is no doubt right. But Maritain is Maritain, and Bloy is Bloy. 'We become nothing, not even a blockhead, not even a swine.' Every man is what he is and Bloy was the man who hungered for the Absolute."

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 83, 88.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 95-96.

¹²Ibid., pp. 96, 99.

No matter what the artist like Charles Péguy felt about Aquinas and the Summa Theologica, Maritain's tempestuous pilgrimage to the Absolute has ended with the discovery of the Catholic faith, first of all, and of St. Thomas Aquinas later. He cast his lot with Catholicism and Thomism for the reconstruction of philosophy and society. For the reconstruction of philosophy, besides his polemics against other philosophic systems, Maritain wrote his Degrees of Knowledge in which he attempted to reconstruct and integrate all types of human knowledge in the Thomistic vein. For the reconstruction of society, no present-day Thomists can excel him. As Frederick C. Copleston says, Maritain "has made a signal contribution" to the application of the Thomistic principles to the social and political problems of our time.¹³ The social and political ideas of Maritain are rooted in Thomism which Maritain regards as a theology and a philosophy. As philosophy cannot be separated from theology in Thomism, Maritain's social and political ideas cannot be separated from the fountainhead of his theology and philosophy in general. Thomism ultimately channels the flow, depth and width of Maritain's social and political ideas. His political conviction is unquestionably on the "liberal" side of French politics. He stands firmly against the "conservative" side of Charles Maurras.¹⁴ In the titanic struggle between

¹³Aquinas (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 249.

¹⁴J. P. Mayer writes that "Jacques Maritain . . . has criticised Maurras's political philosophy This criticism of Maurras's political philosophy is all the more important because Jacques Maritain was himself a 'Maurrassien' before 1926. It is not difficult to understand the links between the agnostic Maurras and French neo-Thomism." Mayer concludes that, "In Maritain, one sees that the liberal tradition of French Catholicism is still alive -- in spite of Charles Maurras." Political Thought in France from the Revolution to the Fourth Republic (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), pp. 94-96. Joseph W. Evans

democracy and totalitarianism, Maritain is an unswerving champion of democracy. It is no mere coincidence that Maritain has inherited the spirit of the "militant democrat" Jules Favre who is his grandfather.

The influence of St. Thomas Aquinas, and therefore Aristotle, on Maritain's political philosophy as well as on his general metaphysical system, is conspicuous. Maritain himself confesses that, "It was after my conversion to Catholicism that I made the acquaintance of St. Thomas. After my 'passionate pilgrimage' among all the doctrines of modern philosophers, in whom I had discovered nothing but disenchantment and splendid uncertainties, I felt, as it were, an illumination of the reason. My vocation as philosopher became clear to me. 'Woe is me should I not thomistize.' . . ." ¹⁵ Professor L. Noël of the University of Louvain remarks that Maritain "discovered Thomism when his philosophic training was already finished, and that under the influence of ideas quite contrary to the Thomistic philosophy. Scholasticism appeared to him as a novelty to which he forthwith became attached with the enthusiasm of a neophyte." ¹⁶

and Leo R. Ward, in their foreword to the political writings of Maritain, say that "Maritain had once shared with Father Humbert Clérissac, his spiritual director, certain sympathies for some of the nationalist and monarchical aspirations of L'Action française. Yet he viewed the condemnation with great interest and with filial respect. Happily, it was the occasion for his serious study of Maurras' doctrines and for his own painstaking work on social and political problems." The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, p. ix. Maritain's own account and condemnation of L'Action française is found in The Things That Are not Caesar's, tr. J. F. Scanlan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930).

¹⁵I Believe, ed. Clifton Fadiman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1939), p. 197.

¹⁶"The Neo-Scholastic Movement in French-Speaking Countries," Present-Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism, ed. John S. Zybura (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1927), p. 245. Charles A. Fecher

Needless to say, Maritain has played an important role in the recent Thomistic revival that accepts Thomism as the "philosophia perennis." For him Thomism is not only a great philosophical system of the past; he presents it as the living philosophical system of our time, nay, all times. Thomism is not "relegated to the limbo of the dead systems."¹⁷ As Gerald B. Phelan writes: "Maritain sees Thomism not merely as a historical thing, a system of thought, vital only in the past and interesting in our age merely as a historical phase of human reflection. . . . Maritain stands for a living, not an archaeological, Thomism." In his philosophy he opposes vehemently "the decadent modern mind," "positivistic empiricism," and the "pseudo-metaphysics of scientism."¹⁸

Maritain accepts Thomism, as Waldemar Gurian says, "because for

also comments: "The philosophy of Jacques Maritain is grounded firmly on that of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas; he has sought to bring that philosophy over into the modern world in the belief that its principles are as valid now as when they were first laid down, and that it can be of help in solving contemporary problems." The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1953), p. ix.

¹⁷Christopher Dawson, Essays in Order, p. xv.

¹⁸Jacques Maritain (London: Sheed and Ward, 1937), p. 31. Phelan further eulogizes: "Maritain's philosophy is deeply rooted in the tradition of Christian culture; his thought is guided by the light of the greatest philosophical mind of all time, St. Thomas Aquinas; and his intellectual efforts are oriented towards progressive development with an energy, at once cautious and daring, which makes for vigorous growth, and keeps the old philosophy forever young. . . . Because Jacques Maritain's thought is full of that holy daring which keeps the perennial philosophy alive and progressive; because his outlook is courageous, confident and modern; because his philosophy is firmly rooted in the traditional Weltanschauung of the Christian world; because his genius reflects the true spirit of the Angelic Doctor, a spirit of reverence for the past, of love of the present and of trust in the future, I regard him as The Philosopher of the Twentieth Century, God-given guide and leader of thought for the age we claim as ours" (pp. 10-11).

him Thomism is, in its substance, the expression of universal truth, able to incorporate the truth of all times and capable of being liberated from purely historical elements and additions." Moreover, "Thomism is for Maritain neither a catalogue of terms, whose meaning and application [are] fixed definitely, nor an encyclopedia which has only to be consulted for the solutions of problems." And in particular, "Maritain's Christian political philosophy, developing after 1926, emphasizes more and more the dignity and the proper ends of nature and temporal history in the line of Thomistic thought. With the rise of totalitarianism, Maritain insisted more and more upon the fundamental values of a democratic philosophy of life and society."¹⁹

Thus Maritain has found the solution of modern human problems in Thomism. Although he emphatically opposes "all attempts to modernize Thomism" and abides by the spirit and letters of Aquinas, he himself has modernized it, and, in doing so, has added new insight into the thirteenth century philosophy of Aquinas which can be applicable to a modern climate. It is not altogether a misnomer to call the contemporary Thomistic movement "Neo-Thomism."²⁰ If we find in this new insight and application

¹⁹"On Maritain's Political Philosophy," Thomist, V (January, 1943), pp. 9, 12.

²⁰We must recognize the fact that Maritain refuses to call himself a "neo-Thomist" (in contrast to a "Thomist"), and he rather prefers to be called a "palco-Thomist." Existence and the Existent, tr. Lewis Galantieri and Gerald B. Phelan (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1956), p. 11. Norah Willis Michener gives the following interview account of Jacques Maritain when the latter gave lectures at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies at Toronto, Canada. On March 21, 1949, Michener asked Maritain: "Do you try to follow St. Thomas Aquinas strictly?" Maritain answered: "Thomism is living, so we must not reject the work of commentators. Cajetan and John of St. Thomas are the most profound and genuine commentators. As far as possible I stick to them, but Thomas himself comes first." Maritain on the Nature of Man in a Christian Democracy (Hull, Canada: Editions "L'Eclair," 1955), p. 123.

of Thomism a profound and discerning originality, it is only in the sense that, in the words of Charles A. Fecher, "Originality lies . . . in an extension and development of traditional forms; in the correction of the tradition where correction is needed; and finally in the discovery of new insights and truths which, owing to the limitations of historical circumstances, the earlier masters of the tradition were incapable of discovering for themselves."²¹ John S. Zybura, in summarizing the role of the "New Scholasticism" in general, writes, "It is heir at once to the best thought of the ancient and of the medieval past; it aims to make this double treasure functional for the present; by a fruitful union of the best in past and present it seeks to prepare the birth of a new and a richer synthesis in the future; it is loyal to the spirit and best traditions of the Philosophia perennis."²² Josef Pieper speaks of the "perennial" character of Thomism, and he says: "Thomas is, in effect, placing himself with the stream of traditional truth nourished by the past; without claiming to give a final solution, he leaves the way open for future quest and discovery as that stream flows onward toward the yet unknown."²³ Thus he warns us to use the term "Thomism" carefully: it is not a usual ism in the philosophic schools of thought. The

²¹The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, p. x. Benedetto Croce is quoted to have said that "The originality of thinkers lies not always in their seeing things that nobody else has ever seen, but often in the stress they give now to this commonplace and now to that." Arthur Livingston, "Introduction," Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, tr. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. x.

²²Present-Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism, p. ix.

²³The Silence of St. Thomas, p. 88.

Thomists would like to maintain that Thomism is the perennial philosophy and at the same time a balanced philosophy.

Although it is not true to say, as Frederick C. Copleston has already pointed out, that Pope Leo XIII "inaugurated" the revival of Thomism, the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris gave the decisive momentum to the fate of Thomism in the Catholic circle. And Thomism more or less became the official philosophy and theology of Roman Catholicism. In dealing with Jacques Maritain as a Catholic philosopher and theologian, we must define the papal authority and the role of a theologian or a philosopher in Roman Catholicism. As philosophy must be distinguished from theology, strictly speaking, Thomism must be equally distinguished from Roman Catholicism as a religion. In principle, a Thomist need not adhere to Catholic theological dogmas. As the Thomists maintain, the truth of philosophy must be determined by its own intrinsic logic, principles and methods. In short, a Thomist as philosopher does not need to accept the authority of the Church and the Pope. Jacques Maritain more than once alludes to the fact that the truth of a philosophy must be determined by its own principles and methods. However, it is equally true that not only theology and philosophy in Thomism are intimately related but also a Catholic theologian and philosopher, by his allegiance to the Catholic faith, cannot go against the ultimate authority of the Bishop of Rome. As it has already been stressed, this does not mean that there could be no diversity in the Catholic philosophical and theological circle. It only points to the fact that the authority of the Pope is infallible on the matters of morals and faith. "This supernatural being of the Church," according to Karl Adam, "expresses itself chiefly in her

most primary creations, in dogma, morals and worship."²⁴ "It is urged," says John Henry Newman, "that, as all religious knowledge rests on moral evidence, not on demonstration, our belief in the Church's infallibility must be of this character."²⁵ "The world of the Church is the word of revelation. That the Church is the infallible oracle of truth is the fundamental dogma of the Catholic religion and 'I believe what the Church proposes to be believed' is an act of real assent, including all particular assents, notional and real; and, while it is possible for unlearned as well as learned, it is imperative on learned as well as unlearned."²⁶ A Catholic philosopher and a theologian must abide by this prescription. The Pope, as the Vicar of God, the successor of St. Peter and the head of the Body of Christ, is infallible. As a matter of fact,

²⁴The Spirit of Catholicism, p. 15. The authority of the Church has mandates to teach and guide the faithful through what is called the magisterium ordinarius on matters of faith, morals, discipline, and administration. In these matters, the Pope is infallible, that is to say, he is preserved from error by God Himself. The doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope was instituted by the canons of the Vatican Council of 1870. "The Pope, when he speaks, ex cathedra, has infallibility by solemn judgment or by the magisterium concerning the truth about morals and faith. The encyclicals demand an assent without reservations and make a formal act of faith obligatory." "Even if the pope himself is a bad man," Anne Fremantle remarks, "what he proclaims as truth to the Church cannot be anything but truthful" The Papal Encyclicals in Their Historical Context, p. 25. The Pope is only infallible when he acts as the head of the Church, and the infallibility does not mean that the Pope cannot sin against morals or faith. G. G. Coulton argues against the doctrine of papal infallibility in Papal Infallibility, a public lecture delivered at the Cambridge University on February 24, 1930. This pamphlet was published by the author himself.

²⁵An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1960), p. 98.

²⁶John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1955), p. 131.

"the pronouncements of the encyclical letters are themselves infallible."²⁷

The role of a Protestant theologian differs from that of a Catholic theologian. It was the infallible authority of Romanism that the Protestant Reformation stood against. Since then there is little room for the "grammar of assent" in Protestantism. Although there is something "Thomistic" about his philosophy, Paul Tillich is truly a Protestant theologian when he asserts that "doubt" is uniquely the "Protestant principle." The concept of the "infallibility" excludes the element of doubt from faith itself. "The concept of the 'infallibility' of a decision by a council or a bishop or a book," Tillich writes, "excludes doubt as an element of faith in those who subject themselves to these authorities."²⁸ Speaking of a theologian's doubt and lack of certainty, Tillich writes that "We considered the theologian as a believer in spite of his doubt and despair, and as a member of the Church, in whose power all theological work is done, in spite of his lack of certainty."²⁹

The Reformation theology of our time, which stresses the notion of Christocentricity and "the Word of God," would imply the rejection of the infallible authority of the Church. Paul Tillich defines "theologians" as those "persons who ask the question of our ultimate concern, the question of God and His manifestation." And the foundation of all

²⁷The Church Speaks to the Modern World, p. 4.

²⁸Dynamics of Faith, p. 28.

²⁹The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 122.

theology is "the Divine Spirit." "To be a theologian," he continues, "means first of all to be able to receive spiritual knowledge."³⁰ Of course, the maxim that "The Bible and the Bible alone is the religion of Protestants" cannot be pushed to its logical absurdity. "Theology," Tillich writes, "does not exist outside the community of those who affirm that Jesus is the Christ, outside the Church, the assembly of God."³¹ C. H. Dodd defines, "The Bible [as] a unity of diverse writings which together are set forth by the Church as a revelation of God in history." It is also claimed that "the Bible could be read, just as it stood, without the guidance of tradition, and with equal authority attaching to all its parts, exposed it to the dangers of a chaotic individualism. Where there was no longer any common standard or perspective, the line was not easily drawn between a just freedom or responsible judgement and the play of arbitrary preference."³²

Despite all these opinions and cautions, the fact still remains that for the Protestants there is no doctrine of "the infallible authority of the Pope." "The basic difference between Catholic and non-Catholic approach to religious truth," the Jesuit theologian Gustave Weigel says, "is that the non-Catholic constructs in the light of his own experience and needs, while the Catholic receives it so that no reconstruction is called for or even in place."³³ This is why, as E. E. Aubrey says,

³⁰Ibid., p. 119.

³¹Ibid., p. 120.

³²The Bible Today (Cambridge: University Press, 1946), pp. 14, 22.

³³"The Significance of Papal Pronouncements," The Papal Encyclicals in Their Historical Context, p. 18. W. A. Visser 'T Hooft

"The Renaissance discovered the individual in culture; and the Reformation emphasized the individual in religion."³⁴

The religious truths for the Catholic are revealed by the Church. The function of the Catholic theologian and philosopher is not to construct religious doctrines but to elucidate or rationally defend the religious dogmas and doctrines advanced by the Church. As Weigel points out, the Catholic faith is a question of development.³⁵ It is the growth of the whole Church, where the theologian plays an important role. Nonetheless, the episcopate alone has the authority to determine the Catholic faith. His authority is infallible on the matter of faith and morals. Weigel describes the function of the Catholic theologian in the whole development of the Catholic faith as follows:

The first manifestations of growth will be in the meditations of the Church's theologians. They will formulate, often quite unconsciously, the living expansion. The theologians do not make the doctrine; they find it. The formulations of the theologians are not the authentic expression of the Church's teaching; only the magisterium can authentically express it. But the theologians are commissioned for their task by the directing magisterium and they work under its constant vigilance. They do more than merely repeat the authentic declarations; they compare them with the other sources of doctrine; they systematize

and J. H. Oldham describe the creed of the Roman Catholic Church as follows: "The Church is one. This implies that its form of government is monarchical, for the papacy is the principle of unity. It is holy, because it is the continuation of the life of Christ, because it represents God's Kingdom on earth, because its teaching, priestly and pastoral ministry mediates the truth, grace and love of Christ, and because the members of the Church are members of the Body of Christ. It is also Catholic or Universal, not merely in principle, but also in actuality. Finally, it is apostolic. All ecclesiastical authority is derived from the apostles, who have transmitted their office to their lawful successors, and were themselves appointed by Jesus Christ." The Church and Its Function in Society (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1937), p. 30.

³⁴Present Theological Tendencies, p. 36.

³⁵For the idea of "development," see John Henry Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.

their findings; they talk the language of their time and are very much under the influence of history. Hence it is that the consensus of the Church's theologians actually is the true echo of the teaching Church, for in the theologians we have the amplification of the authentic message so that it can be heard effectively by audiences gathered in many points of the ecumenical Church. Until the consensus is reached, there will be wranglings among the theologians and the famous odium theologicum will raise its ugly head, but time as the instrument of the Holy Spirit will bring about gradually and quietly the consensus which the magisterium will canonize when there is need to do so.³⁶

The function of the theologians in Roman Catholicism, therefore, is clear: the theologians do not make the doctrine but they are commissioned to find it. Moreover, Pope Pius XII in Humani Generis (1950) made it clear that "when some point hitherto under discussion among theologians is expressly settled by the Pope in such a document [encyclical], everyone should understand that, in the mind and will of the Pontiff, the point at stake should no longer be considered as freely debatable among theologians."³⁷ However, the ultimate authority of the papacy does not seem to deny the initiatives and originalities of the Catholic theologians in so far as they remain within the confines of the dogma of faith. The encyclical letters, for example, by their very nature, are so broad that there always remain room for detailed expositions for the Catholic theologians and philosophers.³⁸

³⁶"The Significance of Papal Pronouncements," The Papal Encyclicals in Their Historical Context, p. 17.

³⁷The Church Speaks to the Modern World, p. 5.

³⁸Maritain, on March 22, 1949, was asked whether, at the peak of his philosophical career, he finds that his philosophy conflicts at any point with his religion. He answered: "No; it is the proper privilege of St. Thomas to make unity and consistence." Norah Willis Michener, op. cit., p. 123.

The encyclical letters are binding upon the Catholic theologians and philosophers as well as laymen. "Christian philosophy" is "the philosophical method recommended by the encyclical Aeterni Patris as the best way to philosophize there is." This encyclical letter, moreover, not only prescribed the "doctrinal foundations" for "Christian philosophy" but also directly laid the practical basis for the Catholic social order. "Far from being an unpractical supplement to the doctrine," Etienne Gilson writes, "the teaching of the Christian philosophy of the Scholastics, especially that of St. Thomas Aquinas, is considered by the Pope a necessary prerequisite to any practical scheme in view of restoring the social order."³⁹

The interpretations of papal encyclicals require the skill of the "qualified Catholic theologians" who have received "a sound theological training." Moreover, "the teaching of the encyclicals," Gilson advises, "should not be made either broader in scope or more narrow than it is. Dealing as it does with a restatement of the Catholic faith as well as with its applications to definite problems, this teaching must be understood as given." And no one should yield to "the temptation of 'improving'" the teachings of the Pope which are manifested in the encyclicals. "Only a Pope has authority to complete the teaching of one of his own encyclicals as well as that of the encyclicals of other Popes, since only a Pope has authority to write and to publish such a document."⁴⁰

The duty and function of the Catholic theologians have hereby become clear, especially in terms of the authority of the Bishop of Rome

³⁹The Church Speaks to the Modern World, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 21.

and the meaning of papal encyclicals. Keeping all these considerations in mind, we can safely proceed to examine Jacques Maritain as one of the foremost theologians and philosophers in Roman Catholicism. It would seem more meaningful to examine Maritain's views and ideas in the broad context of the papal encyclicals concerning the matters of faith and morals, especially his interpretations of St. Thomas Aquinas in the light of the contemporary world and his social and political philosophy which is deeply rooted in Thomism.

Maritain declares that God himself is the "Master of theologians."⁴¹ Theology is rooted in faith; hence, theology presupposes faith. There is no theology without faith. Furthermore, theology is the guide for moral philosophy. The empirical disciplines like politics must be integrated with theology so that they may attain the status perfectus scientiae. Political science which is integrated with theology may be called a "political theology." Thus the most perfect explicative political "science" is a political theology. Political philosophy must comprehend, not just accept, the principles of theology in order to perfect itself. This is a synoptic account of the views that Maritain holds. Maritain's Christian political philosophy is a political theology. Due to the historical exigencies of our time and to the personal interest of Maritain himself, we must at least confess that he is certainly more outspoken than his master St. Thomas Aquinas in the nexus of cultural, social and political matters.

⁴¹An Essay on Christian Philosophy, tr. Edward H. Flannery (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 56.

After writing his Essay on Christian Philosophy,⁴² Maritain was hailed as an impeccable Thomist. While Etienne Gilson distinguished himself as a Thomistic historian of philosophy, Maritain may be called a systematic Thomist. Maritain himself admits that, while Gilson is advancing Thomism from the historical standpoint, he is attempting "to bring together some elements of a solution on the doctrinal level."⁴³ More than once Maritain and Gilson admit their essential agreement in the interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas. From a social and political point of view, Maritain surpasses Gilson. In the Catholic circle, Maritain can be singled out for his contributions of the application of Thomism to contemporary cultural, social and political problems.

As G. K. Chesterton points out, not all Thomists agree with each other on all points. Some passages of Aquinas are still in dispute and subject to controversy.⁴⁴ Nor are the Thomists, as Martin D'Arcy suggests, trying to set the clock back to the Middle Ages by going directly to Aquinas.⁴⁵ Thomism is not a museum piece nor has it only an archeological interest in the modern world. Chesterton extolls the virtues of Orthodoxy.⁴⁶ For the Thomist, Thomism is truly the philosophia

⁴²This work has been continued in his Science and Wisdom, tr. Bernard Wall (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940) and consummated in his Degrees of Knowledge, tr. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959).

⁴³An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 4.

⁴⁴Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 150.

⁴⁵Thomas Aquinas, p. 270. Josef Pieper cites an example of the celebrated discussion between Martin Grabmann and Franz Pelster on essence and existence in 1925. The Silence of St. Thomas, p. 84.

⁴⁶Chesterton, a reputed Catholic literary man, gives one of the best defenses for Orthodoxy in Orthodoxy (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1959).

perennis or "the Everlasting Philosophy."⁴⁷ As Josef Pieper has already pointed out, the perennial philosophy has a "timely" and "timeless" character at the same time.

Maritain says that in dealing with the Thomistic doctrine, it "is not of a medieval Thomism, but of a lasting and present Thomism that I speak."⁴⁸ In his first Thomistic exposition of Christian philosophy, Maritain clearly distinguishes between "the order of classification" (the nature) and "the order of exercise" (the state). The nature of Thomism is everlasting in this sense, but the state of Thomism is essentially its development or growth. Thomism seen from its growth must take into account the development of modern science.

Maritain says that it is for the love of the spirit and the soul that he thomistizes. Some like Charles Peguy thought that the Summa Theologica was a dry piece of algebra. Maritain, however, found a ceaseless inspiration from the writings of Aquinas, Cajetan and John of St. Thomas. But he himself admits that Thomism does not profess to be the "panacea" for the modern ills and to dispense with all intellectual efforts and encourage immobility.

For Maritain, Thomism is truly the perennial philosophy. "There is a Thomist philosophy; there is no neo-Thomist philosophy." "I," Maritain continues, "am not trying to include the past in the present, but to maintain in the now the presence of the eternal." He merely emphasizes the eternal and spiritual principles or norms which are

⁴⁷G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 198.

⁴⁸St. Thomas Aquinas, tr. Joseph W. Evans and Peter O'Reilly (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), p. 15.

embodied in Thomism. "Thomism . . . does not wish to destroy but to purify modern thought, and to integrate everything true that has been discovered since the time of Saint Thomas." Furthermore, "Thomism is neither of the right nor of the left; it is not situated in space, but in the spirit."⁴⁹

Nonetheless, Martin D'Arcy is inclined to believe that "there is a left wing and a right wing of Thomism; there are conservatives and liberals." According to him, the Dominican order represents the conservatives. The Dominicans are reluctant to try out their innovations. "Of one mind with them," says D'Arcy, "are M. Maritain, who has done so much to make the philosophy of St. Thomas better known, and M. Gilson, who, while standing outside all factions, has striven to give the world an authentic interpretation of St. Thomas, based not on his commentators but on his text."⁵⁰

Thomism for Maritain also becomes an answer to the exigencies of our time. "Thomist theology," Maritain says, "also, incorporates the great principles of Christian politics"⁵¹ As Etienne Gilson has stated, there are practical (cultural, social and political) implications in the encyclical letter Aeterni Patris. However, Thomism stands above the "party politics." Strictly speaking, there is no Thomist political party. For Maritain, Thomism has a truly catholic or universal outlook in all respects. "The wisdom of Saint Thomas transcends every

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 18, 19.

⁵⁰Thomas Aquinas, p. 271.

⁵¹St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 20.

particularization. And in this it shares something of Catholicism itself." Thus it is not a particularistic philosophy subject to the limits of time and place. The philosophical and theological wisdom of Aquinas, according to Maritain, is above the "particularization of race and place." The "double catholicity of reason and grace, of the human spirit and the Church" denies even the identification of the religion of Christ with the West, because, in doing so, the very catholicity of the Christian religion itself is denied. As Thomism is the catholic philosophy and theology, Catholicism is the true religion of the world. Moreover, we can safely surmise that the political philosophy based upon Thomism must also be construed as the only true and catholic political philosophy.⁵²

For Maritain, therefore, Catholicism is the true and universal religion, and Thomism is a universal philosophy and a universal theology. Nor does Thomism in the modern world merely wear the garment of the thirteenth century. Thomism for Maritain is "not a medieval mummy to be studied archaeologically, but an armor of the living intelligence and the necessary equipment for the boldest explorations" Thus, Aquinas did not write for the thirteenth century but for our time: "he is a contemporary writer, the most 'present' of all thinkers." The philosophy of Aquinas is "of its very nature a progressive and assimilative philosophy, a missionary philosophy," and, above all, is not "a relic of the Middle Ages."⁵³ However, this "progressive" character of Thomism does not imply that "the value of a metaphysics" should be construed as

⁵²Ibid., pp. 20, 70.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 20, 70, 80, 103.

dependent upon the kaleidoscope of historical exigencies and the paraphernalia of a social structure.

Further, having noted the disruption of the unity of Western culture, Maritain believes that unity should be restored to Western civilization. The unity of a culture, of course, is determined by "a common philosophical structure, a certain metaphysical and moral attitude, a common scale of values." Without a moment of hesitation, Maritain suggests that "the Thomistic synthesis offers us a means par excellence of achieving the unity of Christian culture." Aquinas is "our predestined guide in the reconstruction of Christian culture."⁵⁴

Although it maintains its "vital communication" with the superior wisdom of theology and contemplation, Maritain says, Thomism, as a philosophy, is really independent of the articles of faith: "its principles and structure depend upon experience and reason alone."⁵⁵ "Thomism," Frederick C. Copleston agrees, "is and remains a philosophy. Despite its de facto connexion with Catholicism, it is not part of the Catholic faith. . . ." In other words, "A Catholic philosopher is not committed to Thomism because he is a Catholic."⁵⁶ We must also remember, as Maritain maintains, that Thomism is not only a philosophy but also a theology.

What Frederick C. Copleston has said is true in principle.

However, the fact remains that a large majority of Thomists are Catholics and

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 69, 84, 87.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 21.

⁵⁶Aquinas, p. 239. "Aquinas himself," Copleston says, "distinguished clearly between philosophy and theology, and Thomism has developed as a philosophy which is prepared to stand or fall on its own intrinsic merits or demerits and which appeals to reason, not to faith or to revelation" (p. 252).

vice versa. Thus it is extremely difficult to see how Catholicism and Thomism can be meaningfully separated. When Thomism has been professed to be more or less the official philosophy of the Catholic Church, this problem of separation becomes insurmountable, indeed. There is practically no choice but to conceive Catholicism (religion) and Thomism (philosophy and theology) as two sides of the same coin. The same can be said of Thomism as a theology and as a philosophy. At least from a Catholic point of view, a true Thomist must be a faithful Catholic at the same time.

Maritain considers the humanist Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, and the rationalist Enlightenment as the three great spiritual crises of Western civilization.⁵⁷ He points out that Aquinas was "sent for the salvation of the intellect," and that "objectivity is the first condition of unity" since Thomism contains the two fundamental activities of man: intelligence and love.⁵⁸ In short, Maritain, after having noticed the crises of Western culture, invokes "a resurrection of metaphysics and a new expansion of charity" (based upon Thomism and the Catholic faith), which are the essential preconditions for human unity.⁵⁹ For Maritain, the anti-theological and anti-metaphysical

⁵⁷St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 60. Of course, all Catholic thinkers would agree with Maritain in his generalization. Romano Guardini dramatizes the disorientation of the West, starting with Greece and ending with the "Mass Man" of the modern Western world, in his book: The End of the Modern World: A Search for Orientation, tr. Joseph Theman and Herbert Burke (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956). Also see: Christopher Dawson, Understanding Europe (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952) and Progress and Religion (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1960).

⁵⁸St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 61, 62.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 62.

civilization, like ours inflated with positivism, pseudo-scientific skepticism and subjectivist idealism, pinpoints the fact that there is no "dynamic" factor which demands "a great élan" towards the restoration of metaphysics and ontological values. All the philosophical movements like neo-Hegelianism, pragmatism, phenomenism and Bergsonianism, in the last analysis, are no remedy for humanity. They only represent what Ferrater Mora calls "the anarchy of philosophic systems" and "philosophic pulverization."⁶⁰ Thomism alone, together with the Gospel and the Catholic faith, can rectify and deliver Western culture from chaos created by "aberrant philosophies" and, moreover, "preside architectonically over the elaboration of that new social order, that Christian economy, that Christian politics"⁶¹

Maritain believes that Thomism would re-establish and resuscitate "human intelligence in order with the grace of God." The sanctity of Aquinas is the "sanctity of the intelligence." The true Christian life itself is grounded on intelligence. The cardinal virtue of Thomism, therefore, is its "free conversations with peripateticism" and, moreover, "a wisdom of the natural order" that can freely converse with politics, anthropology, history, art and many other studies.⁶²

The disease of intelligence, Maritain says, denies what is rational, religious and moral in modern society. The sources of this disease of intelligence are what he calls "agnosticism," "naturalism," and "anthropocentric individualism."⁶³ Agnosticism, according to Maritain,

⁶⁰Philosophy Today, pp. 1, 65. Ferrater Mora gives us some fifty different tending schools (isms) of thought today.

⁶¹St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 70.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 87, 94, 120.

⁶³Ibid., p. 91.

really began with the Cartesian reforms, especially with the Cartesian rejection of theology and then metaphysics; naturalism repudiates the supernatural order: the denial of the whole life of grace; and the third and last category, anthropocentric individualism, is a radical disease that claims the self-sufficiency and absolute independency of the atomic cells of individuals. First of all, Maritain suggests, we must get rid of the anti-intellectualism of Martin Luther, which denies and even hates human reason, and of the rationalism of Descartes which denies the supernatural world. Again, Thomism is the only cure for these ills of the modern world.

There are four reasons why Maritain calls Aquinas "the apostle of our times." The first reason is that Aquinas is "the apostle of the intelligence." This was due to the fact that Aquinas was true to the philosophy of Aristotle. The second reason is "the absolutism of truth" in Aquinas: the absolutism achieved by the transcendence of "the First Truth." The First Truth is the first datum of the intellect, depending entirely upon God, from which all other things proceed. The third reason why Aquinas is called the apostle is that Thomism alone can deliver the three errors of Western civilization after the collapse of medieval Christendom: the errors of agnosticism, naturalism and anthropocentric individualism.⁶⁴

The first principles attained from metaphysics or natural theology, according to Maritain, can make the intelligence "ascend even to God" and thus save the intelligence from "the deceptions of agnosticism." It is always worth while remembering, however, that the human intelligence,

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 98.

as important it is, is "on the lowest rung of the ladder of spirits." The affirmation of the naturalistic and anthropocentric image of man is tantamount to the repudiation of the human person, whose essence is related to the spiritual and supernatural world. "Saint Thomas," Maritain writes, "loves God more than the intellect, but he loves the intellect more than all the philosophers have loved it." Aquinas was an Aristotelian; he recognized Aristotle as "the best interpreter of natural reason."⁶⁵ Obviously, however, Aquinas loved God more than he loved Aristotle. The only true reason was reason illuminated by faith; faith is the only guard against philosophical errors which originate from the naked natural faculty of human beings.

Therefore, the fourth and last reason for considering Aquinas as the apostle of our age is that he can preserve and increase "the faith of souls."⁶⁶ Aquinas is "a pillar to the Church," and Thomism alone can "fecundate" the soul. The encyclical letter Aeterni Patris confirmed this fact. Or, shall we say, this encyclical letter made Aquinas a pillar of the Church. As it has been repeatedly made clear, because Thomism and the Catholic faith are intimately related, we must take into account Maritain's assessment concerning this relational problem.⁶⁷

Maritain makes it perfectly clear that: "It is not in religious faith nor in the authority of the Church that Thomist philosophy has its

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 101, 103, 105.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 113.

⁶⁷Maritain gives a detailed historical account of the relation between Thomism and the Catholic Church in St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 119-58.

raison d'être." There is no "Catholic philosophy." Thomism is founded on evidence alone and lives by reason alone." The merit and demerit of Thomism, therefore, must be determined only by its "intrinsic demonstration of the truth." However, according to Maritain, Thomism still remains in "continuity with the superhuman sources without which the human weakens," as philosophy is illuminated and exalted by revealed truths and faith. For this reason, Maritain says that philosophy should be "commissioned by the Papacy." He is emphatic in stating that "it is equally false either to accuse the Catholic Church of imposing on its faithful an 'ideological conformism' in matters of philosophy, or to regard the philosophy of Saint Thomas as something 'indifferent' for a Catholic, and which would propose itself for his consideration in the same manner and under the same conditions as any other philosophical doctrine."⁶⁸

Philosophy, like every scientific pursuit, Maritain insists, is independent of revelation and faith in its own work and in its own principles. It has the right of autonomy in its own natural light of reason and produces its own evidence. He does not suggest, however, that philosophy and theology are "water-tight compartments." He suggests, instead, that philosophy is distinct from faith, but not separated from faith. "Philosophy," Maritain writes, "is nevertheless subject to the magisterium of faith, every enunciation of a philosopher that is destructive of a revealed truth being clearly an error, and reason enlightened by faith along having authority to judge whether such an enunciation of a philosophy . . . is or is not contrary to faith."

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 119, 120, 122.

Faith or revelation, therefore, plays the role of "negative rule in regard to philosophy." It has a right of inspection over the conclusions of philosophy.⁶⁹

In this manner, philosophy is illuminated by faith and theology. Philosophy, in turn, comes to the aid of theology itself. "Theology cannot develop in the human mind without making use of philosophical truths." It is not philosophy, however, that superelevates theology. On the contrary, theology superelevates philosophy and uses it as "an instrument." "When the Church exercises her authority over the philosophical sphere," Maritain writes, "she does this essentially with reference to faith, with reference to revealed truth, the deposit of which it is her mission to guard."⁷⁰

Similarly, the mission of the Church is to guard the natural order and natural law in order to perfect her office. Thus, the Church performs the double function, that is to say, she safeguards not merely the deposit of revelation but also "the natural rectitude of reason itself." Moreover, the Church, in her commitment to the philosophy of Aquinas, does not propose to adhere to this or that particular aspects of truth, but proposes to adhere to "a whole body of doctrine." All in all, Maritain agrees that the Church "has canonized the philosophy of Saint Thomas," that is to say, she has made it an order of Canon Law. The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, in the final analysis, became "the philosophy of the Church," even though she would not impose it on her faithful "in the name of her doctrinal magisterium." It is not a

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 124, 126.

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 124, 125.

dogma.⁷¹

The truths of faith, Maritain affirms, are independent of philosophical truths; they are superior to any philosophical conception since they are derived directly from God. Maritain notes that Christ philosophized nowhere in the Gospel. What we need here, Maritain says, is "common sense" which is "reason in its natural vigor, that spontaneous and naturally right use of the intelligence."⁷² G. K. Chesterton even asserts that "the fact that Thomism is the philosophy of common sense is itself a matter of common sense."⁷³ For Maritain, the Thomist doctrine establishes "demonstratively the conclusions instinctively laid down by common sense," and, moreover, "there is perfect continuity between its principles, even the loftiest and the most subtle, and the primacy evidences of common sense."⁷⁴ Thomism is the philosophy of common sense as well as the philosophy of reason.

For Maritain, there is no doubt that Thomism is "philosophy par excellence in regard to faith and revealed truth, philosophy par excellence in regard to natural reason and common sense."⁷⁵ Thomism is a living philosophy and theology, not cased in the coffin of the thirteenth century. The usefulness of Thomism is untrammelled even by cultural considerations. From the vantage point of Thomism, Maritain

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 124, 145, 150, 151.

⁷²Ibid., p. 147.

⁷³Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 145.

⁷⁴St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 149.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 150.

sails out to solve contemporary theological, philosophical and social problems and to pulsate "the twilight of civilization." Thomism for him is the doctor's prescription for the modern diseases of anti-intellectualism, secularism, and anthropocentric humanism. In short, Maritain wages an immortal battle against a Luther, a Barth, a Bergson, a James, a Nietzsche, a Satre, a Freud, a Rousseau, a Descartes, a Russell, a Dewey as well as a Marx. And yet his battle is discriminative, variant, unequal and, above all, unequivocal. This sweeping battle against the main intellectual currents of the West springs from the distinctive characteristics of Thomism, which, as a theology and a philosophy, provides "intellectualism" and realism on the one hand and the Christian order on the other hand. Thomism is so well described by H. Richard Niebuhr as a "both-and" philosophy and theology.⁷⁶

Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange is quoted to have characterized the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas as "the philosophy of being" in contrast to "the philosophy of becoming" (e. g., phenomenism, Bergsonian philosophy as conceived by Maritain). And the philosophy and metaphysics of Thomism, in addition, "stands in living relationship with reality."⁷⁷ Therefore, where the distinction between the natural and the supernatural orders, between reason and faith, and between philosophy and theology is clearly and precisely drawn and where these two distinct spheres are harmonized and yet arranged in a hierarchic order, we find the characteristics of Thomism. Metaphysics, although it is the highest and loftiest compartment of knowledge, remains a knowledge (of God)

⁷⁶Christ and Culture, p. 129.

⁷⁷Martin Grabmann, The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas, pp. 21, 23.

attained by human reason. However, theology is a divine (above or beyond human reason) knowledge, which is properly called wisdom, and pertains to the realm of revelation.

This seems to be the clue to the understanding of the philosophy of Jacques Maritain. Although the works of Maritain as a Thomist are, strictly speaking, mainly "philosophical" and must be judged as such, they are none the less ultimately theological (that is to say, they are deeply rooted in theology) and theocentric, as philosophy cannot be separated from theology. Thus Maritain's political philosophy must be considered on its "philosophical" grounds. Yet it (in its loftiest form) cannot avoid being a political theology since politics for Maritain is ultimately theocentric and its problems are ultimately resolved on theological grounds. Maritain himself has declared that the true political philosophy is, and cannot avoid being, a political theology.

Dietrich von Hildebrand also distinguishes "Christian ethics" (or moral philosophy) from "moral theology." The former is a purely philosophical exploration and analysis accessible through the light of human reason (lumen naturale) in contrast to moral theology accessible through the light of faith. Nonetheless, he admits that Christian morality essentially presupposes God's existence. Although we do not reduce "all moral obligations to positive divine commandments," Christian moral values "only possess the ultimate reality which justifies the gravity of the moral order, of its majestic obligation, if they are ultimately rooted and embodied in the Absolute Person of God."⁷⁸

⁷⁸Christian Ethics (New York: David McKay, 1952), pp. 453-63.

We seem to come to the important conclusion that we must distinguish method from substance. Christian morality is essentially philosophical in its method, and yet the substance of Christian moral values must resort ultimately to God (or what is theological). The true political philosophy is of necessity a political theology. Therefore, the political philosophy of Jacques Maritain must carry the same theological burdens as Reinhold Niebuhr, Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, Nicolas Berdyaev, and other Christian theologians.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVOLTS OF JACQUES MARITAIN

Cultural and social reconstruction must begin with its philosophical foundation. Maritain, therefore, proposes to reconstruct "a new Christendom" and "a new Democracy" based upon the "intellectual and spiritual revival," which Thomism alone can offer.¹ He proposes to do this from the position of a Thomist, not a "neo-Thomist." "All in all," Maritain remarks, "I would rather be a paleo-Thomist than a neo-Thomist."²

Maritain's philosophy of culture is truly "intellectual" and "spiritual." His is spiritual in that he rejects "anthropocentric humanism" such as Marxism and the ideological doctrines contained in Cartesianism. It is intellectual in that Maritain rejects "anti-humanist irrationalism." He rejects as well what he calls "the gospel of the hatred of reason" or "a tidal wave of irrationality" which is at once the antithesis of rationalism. For Maritain, this tidal irrational wave has begun with Martin Luther and continued in Rousseau. Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Barth have continued to ride over the irrational wave. For him the Barthian position is "a reactive and archaic position,"

¹Scholasticism and Politics, tr. Mortimer J. Adler (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1960), pp. 7-8.

²Existence and the Existent, p. 11.

which is, in fact, "a return to primitive Reformation." Rationalism and irrationalism are not totally unrelated. According to Maritain, "The irrational tidal wave is in reality the tragic wheel of rationalistic humanism." The former has its root in reaction to the latter. Thus Maritain proposes to reconstruct a philosophy of culture and an integral humanism, which is derived from Thomism. Thomism is the answer to the reconstruction of modern philosophy and a philosophy of culture.³

The syncretistic character of Thomism provides a powerful weapon with which to attack the main intellectual currents of the West since the time of the disruption of medieval Christendom, on the one hand, and it has an intellectual and spiritual force, on the other hand. Thomism for the Thomists is a kind of apocalypse of modern philosophy. Fulton J. Sheen, a popularizer of Thomism in the contemporary world, suggests the reason why Thomism alone can fulfill "the ideals of modern philosophy."⁴ The syncretistic character of Thomism would include its rationality (intellectual), spirituality (Christian), realism and a neatly-constructed hierarchy of being and knowledge or what Sheen calls "a great pyramid."⁵

Thomism, within the Christian camp of philosophy and theology, belongs to the rational wing. It is an "intellectualist" philosophy in

³Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 7-19.

⁴According to Sheen, Thomism can fulfill "the ideals of modern philosophy" in the following three aspects: (1) the expression of life itself, (2) the expression of life in a continuous and progressive manner, and (3) life as a process of unification. God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy, pp. 82-108.

⁵Ibid., p. 106.

contrast to the Protestant Reformation theology of "anti-intellectualism" of Luther and Barth of our time. The Thomistic doctrine, Maritain maintains, has "two authentic sources: experience and intelligence."⁶ The intellectualist philosophy is at once a tool that the Thomist employs to criticize the "irrationalist" or "anti-intellectualist" philosophy.⁷ At the same time, the theocentric (Christian) character of Thomism is a tool that is used against the anthropocentric philosophies such as Cartesianism and Marxism.

Maritain's philosophical outlook as a Thomist has two essential features: one is critical and polemical and the other is creative and constructive. The latter is used for his aspiration to resuscitate modern philosophy and culture; the former is an exercise in Thomism. These two facets in Maritain, of course, go hand in hand. Although the critical feature of Maritain's philosophy should not be neglected, more important is his constructive side. Maritain himself affirms that "Thomistic philosophy should [not] limit itself to a defensive and critical function. On the contrary, [he believes] that its possibilities of invention and of progressive synthesis are inexhaustible"⁸ The philosophical revolts of Jacques Maritain are a few critical exercises for him in Thomism concerning the main intellectual and philosophical trends of our time. Maritain is critical of anti-intellectualism,

⁶Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, tr. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 16.

⁷Fulton J. Sheen provides one of the best Thomistic attacks on contemporary "anti-intellectualism." See op. cit., especially pp. 71-81.

⁸Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, p. 20.

rationalism, logical empiricism and Marxian dialectic materialism.

Anti-intellectualism or irrationalism, a foe to Thomism, is represented by Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Martin Luther, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Maritain has been particularly concerned with the anti-intellectualism of Bergson. His criticisms of Bergsonian philosophy, moreover, constitutes his first exercise in Thomism.

Bergson, a one-time teacher of Maritain at the Sorbonne, is undoubtedly one of the "anti-intellectual" giants of the twentieth century, to whom Maritain has never ceased to pay all due respect and gratitude. What Maritain is questioning, however, is "the salutary conflict . . . between Bergsonian thought and that of Thomas Aquinas." In the soul-searching efforts in philosophy, Maritain admits the fact that he was already "a Thomist without being aware of it." And when he became acquainted with the Summa Theologica, "its luminous flood was to find no opposing obstacles" in him.⁹

Although he found no "revelation of a new metaphysics" in Bergson's lectures, Maritain saw the enlightened path in Bergsonian philosophy which presented "an unforgettable emphasis" and "lively reaction" against "the pseudo-metaphysics of scientism" and "anti-metaphysical science," all of which awakened in him "a desire for metaphysics." In Bergson's philosophy, Maritain found the path for the absolute and the rejection of scientific relativism. Although he has become critical of certain aspects of Bergson's irrationalist or

⁹Ibid., pp. 12, 17.

intuitionist philosophy and metaphysics from a Thomistic point of view, Maritain humbly bows to Bergson when he says: "Bergson did not desire to erect a whole system of metaphysics, his metaphysics is nevertheless one of the most profound, most penetrating, and most audacious of our time. The critical discussion thereof I have endeavoured to conduct . . . is in homage to his greatness." He admits the fact that "The Bergsonian doctrine opens up a new era in the history of knowledge, Bergsonian philosophy renews human thought."¹⁰ Maritain's recognition of Bergson's greatness does not, of course, imply the absence of criticism. His first book, that is, a polemic against the Bergsonian doctrine, by his own admission, is somewhat a landmark of a new movement (Thomism) in the history of ideas in twentieth-century France.¹¹

For Maritain, there was no hesitation in his choice between Bergson's "creative evolution" and Aquinas' "hierarchy of growing perfections" or between the philosophy of the "élan vital" that flows in the ever-changing stream of "becoming" and the philosophy of "the intellect" that is "capable of attaining being."¹²

If one is able to criticize Bergson and his philosophy, then it goes without saying that he must criticize William James and

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 278, 304, 324. Maritain discovers the "two Bergsonisms."¹¹ One Bergsonism is what he calls "a Bergsonism of fact" of which he is critical, and the other is "a Bergsonism of intention" which, according to him, is oriented toward Thomist wisdom. They are not absolutely incompatible, however different in meaning. "The first tends to tear down what the second desires to build up" (pp. 238, 344). The first part (Bergsonism of fact) and the second part (Bergsonism of intention) are contained in pp. 65-281 and 285-345 respectively.

¹¹The first critical studies of Maritain in Bergson's philosophy appeared in 1913.

¹²Ibid., p. 330.

pragmatism on somewhat the same grounds.¹³ On the occasion of the publication of Bergson's Creative Evolution (1907),¹⁴ James remarked that "it inflicts an irremediable death-wound upon Intellectualism." For James, the Russo-Japanese War and the advent of Bergson's publication were "the two great modern turning points in history and thought." James wrote to Bergson, "I feel that at bottom you and I are fighting the same fight, you a commander, and I in the ranks. . . ."¹⁵ Thus, it seems that the father of pragmatism cast his lot and energy with Bergson in the fight against intellectualism. As regards James, Etienne Gilson remarks that "I still want to know if my religious experience is an experience of God, or an experience of myself."¹⁶

Maritain uses the Thomistic notions of the "analogy of being" and "the intellect" as the main weapons for the battle against the irrationalist philosophy of Bergson. The method of Bergson's philosophy of life, intuition, becoming (change in contrast to being), or the "élan vital" has no place in Thomism. For Bergson, "the usual error of a sheer

¹³Maritain says that pragmatism is "a particularly morbid phenomenon in Western civilisation," because it takes a negative attitude toward wisdom and thus annihilates all speculative values. Science and Wisdom, p. 72.

¹⁴Tr. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Modern Library, 1944).

¹⁵As quoted in Fulton J. Sheen, op. cit., p. 263 from letters of William James. Bergson's appraisal of pragmatism is found in "On the Pragmatism of William James: Truth and Reality," The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 209-19.

¹⁶Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, p. 97. This comment of Gilson was made in reference to William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Modern Library, 1929) given as Gifford lectures.

intellectualism" is intolerable.¹⁷ Intellectualism is "only in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead." Not the intellect but "instinct is molded on the very form of life." "The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life."¹⁸ Thus, for Bergson, intuition and instinct not the intellect play the vital role in the life force.

As Maritain notes, for Bergson, "life is essentially a creative dynamism." In the metaphysics of the "élan vital" the role of the intellect is discounted; the overflow of intuition and instinct are the very pulsation of life itself. Life is not something static; the metaphysics of life is "becoming" (change). "Philosophy," Maritain writes, "is the deepening of becoming in general the true evolutionism, and hence the true continuation of science." The notion of "duration" is a vital correlative with that of intuition. "Metaphysics consists in 'seeing in time a progressive growth of the absolute'." And "time is creator." Thus, Maritain remarks that "the intuition in duration" is the fundamental notion for Bergson; "the irrationalism of the Bergsonian philosophy" is secondary, not primary. In the everlasting stream of life, the notion of "becoming" becomes an important idea. "If change is not everything, it is nothing; it is not only real, but constitutive of the reality, it is the very substance of things."¹⁹ Thus, while Arthur Schopenhauer found nothing in Darwinian evolutionism but the gloomy picture of the survival of the fittest in nature, Bergson saw the enlightened idea of

¹⁷The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, tr. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton (New York: Henry Holt, 1935), p. 269.

¹⁸Creative Evolution, p. 182.

¹⁹Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, pp. 312, 318, 330.

the life force in the Spencerian version of evolutionism.

The Bergsonian philosophy of anti-intellectualism and irrationalism is untenable to the Thomistic philosophy of being and the intellect. Maritain, therefore, has an impulsive urge to criticize the philosophy of Bergson, which drove out "being" from philosophy and replaced it with "becoming." "Bergsonian philosophy . . . by the very fact that it tries to do without being, is logically incapable of establishing an absolute and total, real and essential distinction between God and things [or the world]." "The doctrine of analogy . . . can have no place in an anti-intellectualist philosophy." The philosophy of Bergson dispossesses of the natural faculty of the human mind (or the intellect). "Bergsonian philosophy," Maritain states, "offends intelligence and ruins the principles of reason."²⁰ In short, the philosophy of the "élan vital" is the metaphysical purge of the analogy of being and the intellect without which there is no essential and real distinction between God and the world.

Maritain contends that Bergsonian philosophy is not the perennial philosophy. It is merely the "philosophy of a moment." Although there is some virtue in Bergsonian philosophy in that it victoriously attacks "agnosticism, Kantianism, and the silly, narrow positivism which reigned unchallenged" and it drove out "the darkness of official atheism." It has tackled "the philosophical problem in terms of mechanicism, the problem of the world in terms of Spencerian evolutionism, the problem of the soul in terms of psycho-physical parallelism, the problem of freedom in terms of associationist psychology. And in order to refute these errors it has chosen to abandon being and the intellect. But being is

²⁰Ibid., pp. 196, 280.

the only thing that endures."²¹ Becoming or change is temporary and momentary; being alone is a perennial category. The fault of Bergsonian philosophy is to be found in its "ontological gap."

For Bergson, the true morality and religion spring from creative dynamism. He distinguishes dynamic morality and religion from static morality and religion, on the one hand, and the open society from closed society, on the other. The dynamic morality and religion are associated with the vital force of the spirit (or mysticism), while the static morality and religion are related to the pressure of social mechanisms. The former are "supra-rational" and the latter are "infra-rational." The closed society is "that whose members hold together but care nothing for the rest of humanity." On the other hand, the open society is "the society which is deemed in principle to embrace all humanity." Democracy has its proper place in the open society (associated with the dynamic morality and religion). For Bergson, the formula for democratic society would be the antithesis of "authority, hierarchy, immobility."²² Democracy for him is "evangelical in essence and . . . its motive power is love." The origins of democracy for Bergson could be found in Rousseau and Kant in their sentiments, philosophy and religion.

For Bergson, there is no doubt that Christianity provides a dynamic morality and a dynamic religion. Moreover, the true Christian society must be construed as an open society. Maritain also comments that Bergson recognized "the unique value and the transcendence of the fact of Christianity." In comparison to Greek mysticism, Oriental

²¹Ibid., p. 280.

²²The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, pp. 266, 267, 282.

mysticism, and the Prophets of Israel, "Christian mysticism alone has reached real achievement." Maritain praises Bergson in the latter's rediscovery of "the great philosophic tradition of humanity." However, the fact remains that the error in Bergson's concept of morality and religion springs from his anti-intellectualism (the disregard for the intellect and being). Thus, Bergson's philosophy leaves out "many essential truths."²³

The philosophy of being and the philosophy of becoming for Maritain are, by their nature, equally "cosmic." But the former is "cosmic rational" and the latter is "cosmic irrational." From a Thomistic point of view, Bergson's major treatise on morality, in the final analysis, "retains all of morals except morality itself." It disregards "the strictly rational and human content of ethics" although it contains everything dynamic and enlightened.²⁴ Etienne Gilson confesses that he follows Bergson "in his description of mystical intuition as a source of religious life." But he is "still wondering what the nature of that intuition actually is. Is it a self-sufficient intuition of an object which may also be the object of religious faith, or is it an experience in faith and through faith of the God in whom we believe?"²⁵

With the three reformers of Luther (theology), Descartes (philosophy) and Rousseau (morality), Jacques Maritain finds "the birth-places of the modern world." If Maritain is capable of attacking Luther, the founder of Protestantism, then he should criticize, on the same grounds, the Protestant fideists including Kierkegaard, Barth and

²³Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism, pp. 326, 328, 330.

²⁴Ibid., p. 334.

²⁵Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, p. 97.

Niebuhr. For Maritain, the civilization based upon Luther's doctrine would be "a homicidal civilization."²⁶ Although Maritain's comments on Bergson's philosophy were an admixture of criticism and admiration, there is no room to admire any of the three reformers who are guilty of the original sins of modern philosophy and society.

From an "intellectualist" point of view, Maritain, in regard to Luther, can find nothing worthy in "an inverted Pharisee" and "a runaway victim of scruples." The Protestant Reformation for Maritain was "the anti-Christian revolution." It was an "immense disaster for humanity," which was "only the effect of an interior trial which turned out badly in a religious [person] who lacked humility." The Lutheran notion of the salvation by faith alone, according to Maritain, has even misunderstood St. Augustine. For Maritain, Luther is "an enemy of philosophy," a pessimist, and a "fallen monk," who had everything -- kindness, generosity, tenderness, pride, and vanity -- but the "force of intellect." Luther studied Scholasticism imperfectly and hastily, and "he had derived nothing but an arsenal of false ideas and vague theological notions, and a disconcerting skill in specious argument."²⁷ The idea of grace for Luther, Maritain believes, was merely the discharge of Luther's philosophy of feeling and sensation (especially concupiscence).

The Protestant Reformation, therefore, "promises rest to the reason only in contradiction, it sets a universal war within us. It has inflamed everything, and healed nothing. It leaves us hopeless in face of the great problems, which Christ and His Doctors solved for redeemed

²⁶Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), pp. 14, 21.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 5-6, 10, 11, 13.

humanity so long as it was faithful, problems which, nearly four centuries ago, once more began to rack the human heart like angelic instruments of torture."²⁸

There are two aspects of the anti-intellectualism of Luther. One is Luther's "egocentrism" (not mere egoism but "a metaphysical egoism"). "Luther's doctrine," Maritain comments, "is itself only a universalization of his self, a projection of his self into the world of eternal truths." The other is that Luther was "ruled by his affective and appetitive faculties." Luther was "a Man of Will only." He was "the first great Romantic" with "the absolute predominance of Feeling and Appetite." Luther was "fed on instinct and feeling, not on intelligence." Whereas "Rousseau dreams . . . Luther acts." Whereas the former combined optimism and anti-intellectualism, the latter combined pessimism and anti-intellectualism. According to Maritain, Luther and Rousseau did not free true human personality but led it astray (led it to the animal instinct). Therefore, the greatness of Luther is "material greatness, quantitative greatness, animal greatness" but not "truly human greatness."²⁹

For Maritain, Luther's egocentricism is "a dogmatic error," "a false doctrinal view," and "a deviation of the intelligence." Thus, the anti-intellectualist doctrine of Luther was derived, as Maritain quotes from Garrigou-Lagrange, from "the egoistical life of the passions." Luther's doctrine of feeling and instinct for Maritain is the confusion or lack of distinction between personality and individuality. Individuality, which Luther represents, is not the life of reason and liberty

²⁸Ibid., p. 50.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 14, 15, 27, 28, 30, 35.

but the enslaving life of events and the senses. Individuality, in contrast to personality, is "common to man and beast, to plant, microbe, and atom." Individuality is "a misunderstanding," "a blunder," and "the degradation of true personality."³⁰

From Maritain's point of view, the distinction between personality and individuality, which is a metaphysical principle, is of cardinal importance. This metaphysical principle is the fountainhead of the solution of many social problems. "This distinction between the individual and the person when applied to the relations between man and city," Maritain writes, "contains, in the realm of metaphysical principles, the solution of many social problems." The rejection of reason for Maritain is tantamount to the rejection of personality in the affirmation of individuality alone. The individualism that undermines human reason culminates in "the monarchic tyranny of a Hobbes," "the democratic tyranny of a Rousseau," or in "the God-State of a Hegel."³¹

The anti-intellectualism of Luther, Maritain says, was "helped by the Occamist and nominalist training in philosophy." For Luther, all speculative knowledge (in contrast to faith) was "a snare." The Scholastic theology was "an abominable scandal." Luther said that "Reason is contrary to faith."³² For him, Aristotle was "the godless bulwark of the papists," and St. Thomas Aquinas "never understood a chapter of the Gospel or Aristotle."³³ Luther, therefore, was attacking philosophy

³⁰Ibid., pp. 15, 19, 24.

³¹Ibid., pp. 22, 23.

³²Ibid., pp. 30, 33-34.

³³Walter Kaufmann, in his criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas, made the comment that St. Thomas Aquinas had said many things that Aristotle

itself. To learn philosophy for Luther was just like learning "witchcraft."³⁴ Luther completely "delivered man from the intelligence," and paved his way to anti-intellectualism and voluntarism. As a voluntarist, Luther became the father of German romantic philosophy from Fichte to Nietzsche. Arthur Schopenhauer, for example, was a voluntarist who stressed the idea of the human will, and he said that reason was feminine, unproductive and non-discursive.³⁵

Maritain notes, further, that "Luther's contempt for reason is, moreover, in harmony with his general doctrine about human nature and original sin."³⁶ Luther, therefore, is not unrelated to the romantic movement in his stress on the primacy of the will and the disrespect for reason and intelligence. Maritain notes that the voluntarism and pessimism go hand in hand, and the German romantics inherited the Lutheran doctrines. Be that as it may, was it not the romantic movement, the revolt against the tyranny of reason, which almost buried the rationalism of the Enlightenment? E. E. Aubrey points out, "this nineteenth century scholastic revival took place under the influence of the Romantic

never said and, moreover, he had said things that the Scripture never said. Critique of Religion and Philosophy, p. 144.

³⁴Three Reformers, p. 30.

³⁵See his The World as Will and Representation, tr. E. F. J. Payne (2 vols.; Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958). This work is undoubtedly the opus magnum of Schopenhauer, but, for the present discussion, more important is his book: On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and on the Will in Nature (London: G. Bell, 1910). Reason for Schopenhauer has no material but only formal content. Thus, what is reasonable and rational is synonymous with being consistent and logical.

³⁶Three Reformers, p. 33.

Movement which, in its protest against the rationalism of the Enlightenment, gave new force, on the one hand, to the appreciation of historical tradition, and on the other hand to intuitive faith."³⁷ It seems that the history of ideas has a strange tincture of the Hegelian dialectic: the thesis of one doctrine seems to spin out its own antithesis or the reaction of an opposite doctrine.

The philosophy of feeling and appetite for Maritain is "a deformation of the real." As a Thomistic intellectualist, Maritain extolls "the primacy which Catholic theology grants to contemplation." Moreover, the human will would be more living "as it roots itself more deeply in the spirituality of the intelligence." The intelligence is the "absolute queen" in the speculative order and the practical order. The intelligence alone is the yardstick for the proximate rule of human action. Thus, anti-intellectualism is tantamount to the denial of social order itself. As Maritain says, "every interior act of the soul which involves order and government belongs to reason." Maritain concludes:

. . . the Thomist doctrine of the intelligence and the will shows us why all philosophy based on the absolute superiority of will or feeling, that is, of faculty occupied essentially and exclusively with what affects the subject, will tend naturally to subjectivism; why, at the same time, it will cause the will to fall from its own order and will pass inevitably into the service of the lower affective powers and the instinct, for the metaphysical nobility and the spirituality of the will come only from its being an appetite rooted in the intelligence; why finally, such a philosophy, if it captures a part of humanity, means for it a series of disasters, simply because it asks light and guidance from a power in itself blind. In the beginning was Action: the motto which the Germanic Faust is so proud is written on the standard of death.³⁸

³⁷Present Theological Tendencies, p. 116.

³⁸Three Reformers, pp. 28, 35, 39, 44.

For Maritain, the reconciliation between intelligence and will has never been achieved in modern philosophy, and the conflict between these two "spiritual faculties" still occupies the minds of our age. With the recognition of this fact, Maritain seems to be all out for a possible reconciliation. Of course, for Maritain, the resuscitation of reason is the first task in the age of anti-intellectualism.

For Maritain, Luther came to the conclusion that "concupiscence cannot be conquered," and he identified it with original sin. Sigmund Freud, in Maritain's opinion, made a science of concupiscence (the Freudian theory of the libido).³⁹ The theory of the libido is a kind of theological notion of "concupiscence." In a sense, Luther, before he was born, became the first victim of Freud. Freud, for Maritain, is "an investigator of genius" and "an admirably penetrating psychologist," from a point of view of the psychoanalytic method and psychology. But Freud is "like a man obsessed," from a standpoint of philosophy. Maritain violently disagrees with a Freudian "radical empiricism and an erroneous metaphysics." In his opinion, Bergsonian "philosophical" irrationalism and even the rational scientism of Berthelot are much nobler than Freudian "psychological" irrationalism.⁴⁰

³⁹"Freudianism and Psychoanalysis: A Thomist View," Freud and the 20th Century, ed. Benjamin Nelson (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 247.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 231, 249. It should be remembered that Sigmund Freud had no favorable opinion concerning the thing called religion. He had a kind of Nietzschean view of religion. Religion for Freud was a kind of the need for protection against the consequences of human weakness or helplessness. It was a kind of infantile helplessness aroused by the need for protection. For him, religious ideas "are illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most insistent wishes of mankind; the secret of their strength is the strength of these wishes." The Future of an Illusion, tr. W. D. Robson-Scott (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1957), p. 51.

Freudian psychology, from the philosophical standpoint of Maritain, is abominable because the unconscious of Freud is nothing but the "six notes" of being "repressed, active, bestial, infantile, alogical and sexual."⁴¹ Therefore, "Freud's larval philosophy" denudes human nature and shows only its ugliness, and it is a radical denial of spirituality and freedom. Freud's philosophy of pure human bestiality makes the life of reason and spirit absolutely naked, and brings man down to the animal level. Maritain writes that "there are typical differences between the instincts as they are to be found in man and the instincts as they are found in animals lacking reason. Instincts have a far greater relative indetermination in man than in animals and require to receive their final regulation at the hands of reason."⁴²

"In spite of its extreme diversity," Thomas Ernest Hulme writes, "all philosophy since the Renaissance is at bottom the same philosophy. The family resemblance is much greater than is generally supposed. The obvious diversity is only that of the various species of the same genus."⁴³ Although Maritain considers it absurd to maintain that the Protestant Reformation, the Renaissance, the Cartesian Revolution, the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the ideas of Rousseau as a unilinear series terminating in the revelation of the French Revolution, it is equally fallacious, despite their differences and oppositions, to refuse to see "the final convergence" of these movements.⁴⁴ Thus, for example, the

⁴¹"Freudianism and Psychoanalysis: A Thomist View," p. 252.

⁴²Ibid., p. 250.

⁴³Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Herbert Read (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1924), p. 12.

⁴⁴Three Reformers, p. 95.

anti-intellectualism of Luther is not totally unrelated to Rousseau's irrationalism. While Hulme is looking at it from the standpoint of pure philosophy, Maritain here conceives essentially of the Weltanschauungen of the great chain of these converging movements.

For Maritain, Rousseau is "the father of modernism," a useless dreamer, an anti-intellectualist, an optimist, "a stupendous perverter," "paranoiac and genius, poet and madman."⁴⁵ Anti-intellectualism (the primacy of feeling and sentiments), as in Luther, and the perverter of Christianity (not unrelated to Luther from a Catholic point of view) are Maritain's main charges against Rousseau.⁴⁶ Thus, despite the vast

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 118, 121, 157. It is interesting to observe that Karl Barth is somewhat sympathetic with Rousseau in his Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl, tr. Brian Cozens (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 58-117. Barth says that any one who understands Rousseau merely as "the dreamer . . . the idler, the subjectivist, the barren critic of civilization, the author of a voluminous treatise on education who consigned his five illegitimate children to the Foundlings' Home without ever seeing or wishing to see them again, the author of the Contrat Social who had not the faintest notion of how to fit himself to be a citizen or a member of any society . . . is in a position to claim that he has indeed understood the eighteenth century perfectly. But he has completely failed to understand Rousseau" (p. 59). "Rousseau was already a man of the new era, in eighteenth-century garb" (p. 60).

⁴⁶Rousseau's view on the role of religion in a civil society is found in his Social Contract in The Social Contract and Discourses, tr. G. D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1950), chapter viii, "Civil Religion," pp. 129-41. For the romantic mind of Rousseau, the infallible voice of the pure nature, uncontaminated by the divine will sounded like a piece of music to his ears. In this spirit, he wrote the educational treatise of Émile and the political treatise of Social Contract in which the volonté générale became a political myth that contains the germ of both democracy and totalitarianism. As Karl Barth said, Social Contract has become the "political ogre."

For Rousseau, the state needs a religion to exalt the morality of its citizens. However, there was no doubt in his mind that Christianity is not suitable for it. Religion and politics, prior to the appearance of Christianity, went hand in hand. Through the powerful exercises of the authority by the Christian Church, Christianity for Rousseau has been more harmful than beneficial to the state. Rousseau distinguishes three kinds of religion: human religion, national religion

difference of manners and conditions between Rousseau's optimism (the belief in the goodness of human nature as portrayed in Émile) and Luther's pessimism (original sin), in Maritain's view, there is a spiritual filiation between these two men. While Luther worked in the evangelical realm (religion and theology), Rousseau worked in the sphere of morality. Maritain does not deny, however, that reason plays a role in the anti-intellectualist and romanticist mentality like Rousseau. On the contrary, it "serves passion, and then it displays a prodigious talent for sophistry."⁴⁷

For Maritain, Rousseau is "pompous with virtue, censor of the vices of his age," and, above all, he had the false sense of sincerity. Rousseau was a hypocrite and, moreover, a utopian dreamer. He lacked the "act of practical reason." His "heart is still tainted and putrescent, thoroughly rotten with sensual self-love and self-complacency." Not unlike Luther, Rousseau, who was imbued with "the endless inclinations of material individuality," has completely broken "the unity of spiritual self." "Rousseau's man is Descartes's angel acting like a beast."

and priestly religion. He rejects Roman Catholicism (the priestly religion); he has a favorable opinion concerning the Christianity of the Gospel, which is the "holy, sublime and true religion." It is "the pure and simple religion of the Gospel." No wonder Karl Barth is more sympathetic toward Rousseau. National religion is a state religion, the dogma and cult prescribed by the law for the benefit of state morality. Rousseau favors a "civil profession of faith" to foster civil morality in the state. He thinks that every honest citizen should "renounce the Roman Catholic Church." He also rejects the Hobbesian formula of the relation between state and church, because the priestly interest of Christianity will eventually and always prevail in the Hobbesian Leviathan. In short, Rousseau holds that no state has ever been founded without religion. As for Christianity, it has weakened, rather than strengthened, the authority of the body politic.

⁴⁷Three Reformers, pp. 95, 96.

For Maritain, Rousseau as "a reformer of morality" is a sheer mockery. There is no moral virtue without the "supreme act of rational command."⁴⁸ As the morality of Rousseau is a false morality, Maritain is of the opinion that the whole eighteenth century, which bore the authentic imprints of Rousseauan virtue had no true morality. It was a halo of Rousseau's false morality.

Therefore, Rousseau's optimistic anti-intellectualism is under attack. Rousseau is "the finest specimen of naturalist mysticism of feeling." He aimed not "at our heads, but a little below our hearts." "Jean-Jacques, like Luther, is a very perfect and unalloyed specimen of anti-intellectualist religious thought."⁴⁹

Rousseauan optimism and perversion go together with his anti-intellectualism. Rousseau's "perpetual postulate" of the optimistic conception of man, in the opinion of Maritain, is "a flagrant absurdity." Therefore, his Émile was "a romantic piece of mechanism, and idle dream."⁵⁰ "The rich ideological forest of the Contrat Social" is a sheer

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 99-100, 102, 104.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 112, 150.

⁵⁰The optimism of Rousseau should not be over-stressed. Karl Barth thinks that there are two Rousseaus. One Rousseau is optimistic and the other is pessimistic. Pessimistic Rousseau begins with the disastrous incidents followed by the publication of Émile. Christopher de Beaumont, Archbishop of Paris, issued a pastoral letter which condemned Émile. The Parliamentary Court of Justice in Paris publicly burned the book on June 11, 1762. His Protestant native city, Geneva, also went against Rousseau. "These events," Barth writes, "were a turning-point in Rousseau's inner life. From then dates the decline in his inward frame of mind and attitude which threw him on to the defensive, breeding pessimism, misanthropy and even persecution mania." Karl Barth speaks of the "role of the righteous sufferer" in reference to Rousseau, and Rousseau has "a kind of Christ-character." He definitely supports Rousseau rather than the Archbishop of Paris (de Beaumont) who was "in favour of human reason" over revelation, and prefers Rousseau to the theologians of Geneva who favored "their rational orthodoxy." Protestant Thought, pp. 89-91.

farce. The natural goodness of man is a logical consequence of Rousseau's confused conception of nature itself. Maritain states that Rousseau "locks into a single equivocal pseudo-concept the 'nature' of the metaphysicians and the 'nature' of the empiricists."⁵¹ Rousseau's assertion that "man is born free"⁵² appears to Maritain to mean no more than that man is "a savage in a wood." Moreover, the general will is a "fraudulent mysticism" or "the myth of political pantheism."⁵³ For Maritain, this mysticism of the general will is associated with perfunctory reason and rationality, but it is really "the mysticism of sentiment and passion" which Maritain discovers in Émile as well.

Nor does Maritain deny that Rousseau had a religious disposition. Rousseau's Catholicism (for twenty-five years) was an outward and visible show filled with "greedy sensuality." His naturalism was "the finest religious dispositions without supernatural life." Thus, the religion of Rousseau was the perversion of the Gospel and Christianity. "Jean-Jacques," Maritain writes, "has perverted the Gospel by tearing it from the supernatural order and transporting certain fundamental aspects of Christianity into the sphere of simple nature. One absolute essential Christianity is the supernatural quality of grace. Remove that supernatural quality, and Christianity goes bad." Thus, the cardinal sin of

⁵¹Three Reformers, p. 128.

⁵²To complete the sentence, Rousseau said: "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains." The Social Contract and Discourses, p. 3.

⁵³Three Reformers, p. 134.

Rousseau, for Maritain, is his "naturalization of Christianity."

Rousseau is truly, as Maritain describes him, "nature's saint." If Rousseauan romanticism prepared the Catholic renaissance of the time of Chateaubriand, it was merely an accident. According to Maritain, Rousseau was not recalling the Christian truths but debased and perverted them. His naturalism and optimism that nursed "a purely natural paradise of happiness and goodness" were the perversion of Christianity. Maritain says, "It was Jean-Jacques who completed that amazing performance, which Luther began, of inventing a Christianity separate from the Church of Christ: it was he who complete the naturalization of the Gospel." "Rousseauism is a radical naturalistic corruption of Christian feeling."⁵⁴ For Maritain, Christianity without the Church is inconceivable, and, above all, Rousseau's optimistic conception of man demolishes the Christian notions of original sin and redemption.

Rousseauan optimism and naturalism may drastically differ from Lutheran pessimism, but, for Maritain, Luther and Rousseau together perverted Christianity when they separated the Church from Christ. Moreover, their anti-intellectualist religious thoughts are a sort of parallelism.

However, Maritain himself realizes that the optimism of Rousseau was attracted to "the opposite and not less erroneous direction" of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Thus, Rousseauism lies in the junction of Luther's pessimism and the optimism of the Enlightenment on the one hand and of Luther's anti-intellectualism and the rationalism

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 142, 147.

of the Age of Reason on the other. Now, we must consider Maritain's criticisms of the antithesis of anti-intellectualism: Cartesian rationalism.

René Descartes is a dominant figure in the history of philosophy. He is rightly regarded as the "father of modern philosophy." Maritain is concerned with Cartesianism because it contains the germ of errors of modern philosophy and, moreover, of modern technological, materialistic, and scientific civilization. He is not exclusively attacking Cartesian rationalism. It is the excessiveness or "superelevation" of rationalism that is under the fire of criticism. "It would be suicidal to blame reason," Maritain admits. It is the rationalism that refuses the guidance of the highest and loftiest knowledge and reality (theology and God).

Nor does Maritain attempt to demolish the whole structure of Cartesian philosophy. He openly recognizes the Cartesian contributions to the development of modern physical sciences. It is important to note, moreover, that Maritain is not concerned with the philosopher as much as Cartesian philosophy, its doctrines and its isms. As Maritain says, ". . . what I have criticized is less Descartes than the Cartesian spirit. I mean, that which the ideas set down by Descartes in modern thought, in virtue of their internal logic, and taking into account historical contingencies, would necessarily engender of themselves."⁵⁵ However, it would seem advisable to recognize the fact that the logical correlation and continuity of philosophical doctrines must not be confused with historical contingencies. For instance, Russian Communism presupposes Marxism. Yet to push this presupposition too far is a kind of mono-causal

⁵⁵The Dream of Descartes, p. 185.

explanation of ideological (or philosophical) continuity at the expense of historical contingencies.

The Thomistic tools of the graded order of being (analogy of being), the pyramid of knowledge and realism open the way to the criticism of Cartesianism. Others like Bergson, Luther, Freud and Rousseau have been criticized by Maritain for their lack of "intellectualism." The case of Cartesianism is rather different. Descartes is criticized, not because of his anti-intellectualism, but rather because of his excessive rationalism which looks like a blasphemy to the Thomist. From an anti-intellectualist point of view, we must admit that Maritain has something in common with Descartes. But Descartes has nothing in common with the anti-intellectualists.

Descartes, although he retained "much of scholasticism,"⁵⁶ built a new philosophical edifice. Maritain admits that there is a material but not formal continuity between Scholasticism and Cartesianism.⁵⁷ Descartes is somewhat under criticism from both contemporary scientific empiricists and Thomists precisely because Cartesianism lies in the juncture of modern scientific philosophy and medieval Scholasticism. Thus, Bertrand Russell sees in Descartes a still unresolved dualism between contemporary science and Scholasticism.⁵⁸ Cartesianism for a Thomist is too un-Scholastic.

It must be made clear at the outset that the kernel of Cartesianism is the cogito ergo sum (usually called just the cogito): "I think,

⁵⁶Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), p. 557.

⁵⁷The Dream of Descartes, p. 34.

⁵⁸Op. cit., p. 557.

therefore I am." The method by which Descartes arrived at the cogito is known as "Cartesian doubt." Doubt is the core of the Cartesian philosophical method.⁵⁹ In the notions of the cogito and doubt, there lie the seeds of rationalism, subjectivism, idealism and even skepticism. The term "I" stands for my perceiving mind rather than other minds (subjectivism); the whole sentence ("I think, therefore I am") is the expression of rationalism and leads to idealism. The term "doubt" is the possible seed of skepticism. However, a philosophical attitude of the perceiving mind must be distinguished from skepticism as a philosophical method. From the latter point of view, Descartes may be called a "skeptic." However, from the former point of view, he is far from being a skeptic. "Doubt" here becomes a certitude. Maritain even calls Cartesianism a "dogmatism."

The Cartesian Reformation, according to Maritain, is "the great French sin" in the history of modern thought, as the Lutheran Reformation is "the great German sin."⁶⁰ Descartes is criticized by Maritain because of his absolute intellectualism, mathematicism, idealism and rationalistic naturalism. For Maritain, "the original sin of modern philosophy" began with the Cartesian philosophy.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 563-64.

⁶⁰Three Reformers, p. 86. It is interesting to note the conclusion reached by Norman J. Wells concerning the relation between Descartes and the Scholastics. He says that ". . . Descartes' adversary is not St. Thomas for . . . St. Thomas' authentic position was not known to Descartes. . . . Rather, Descartes' adversary or adversaries, i. e., the theologians who maintain the position Descartes attacks, are certain Thomistae and the tradition they exemplify." "Descartes and the Scholastics Briefly Revisited," New Scholasticism, XXXV (April, 1961), pp. 172-190.

In contrast to the Thomistic hierarchy of knowledge in which the method of one type of knowledge cannot be substituted for another, the original sin of Descartes, for Maritain, is the separation of philosophical wisdom from theological wisdom; that is to say, Descartes denied the possibility of theology as a way of knowledge.⁶¹

Maritain regards "intuitiveness" (as to its mode), "innateness" (as to its origin) and "independency" of things (as to its nature) as the "three great notes of angelic knowledge."⁶² Cartesianism also has these three characteristics. Thus, it has an angelism on a Thomistic scale, and is a blasphemy, indeed. The sole authentic and legitimate archetype of knowledge for Descartes, in Maritain's view, is a kind of "angelic knowledge." For Maritain, understanding is reduced to "intuition" (intuitus) in Cartesianism. The Cartesian "innatism," according to Maritain, meant to be autonomous and self-sufficing (with no illumination from the highest knowledge). In Cartesianism, the intelligence is reduced to "simple perception," and its rationalism disowns even reason itself. For Maritain, the (Thomistic) angelic intellect, however, is not a Cartesian type; it is not made of "faked-up intuitions." It is infallible and genuinely intuitive. Thus, the fault of Cartesianism is not lack of intellect, but, rather, it tries to elevate human intellect to the superhuman (angelic) level. "It is thus," Maritain remarks,

⁶¹Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom, pp. 28-29. For Maritain, Averroes also separated philosophical wisdom from theological wisdom. Thus, Averroes is the forerunner of Descartes. According to Maritain, Kant also continued the sin of separatism. "Just as Descartes separated philosophy from theology, so Kant separated science from metaphysics. As Descartes denied the possibility of theology as a science, so Kant denied the possibility of metaphysics as a science" (p. 30).

⁶²Three Reformers, p. 4; The Dream of Descartes, p. 49.

"that the angelic cognition, depending solely on the knowledge of God, is independent of objects, from which it does not draw ideas, and which are not its formal rule" Rational cognition is for Descartes "a sort of natural revelation." In short, Cartesianism is "a usurpation of the angelic privileges."⁶³

Moreover, the absolute intellectualism of Descartes is based upon what is mathematical. Cartesian rationalism contains in embryo "the intuition of the scientia mirabilis" (the "admirable science").⁶⁴ Thus, there is in Descartes a radical change in the very notion of intelligibility: "to be intelligible is to be capable of mathematical reconstruction."⁶⁵ For Maritain, this is "the idea of mathematical Gnosis." When "Mathematics becomes the Queen of Sciences," Cartesian dogmatism, in Maritain's opinion, does injustice to reality. With the advent of Newtonian physics, there is a new seed in the Cartesian admirable science for the rise of modern scientism. When the admirable science is elevated to the angelic level, there is "a kind of collusion between what is human knowledge and what is revelation."⁶⁶ When mathematics in Descartes becomes the sole measurement of intelligibility, the mathematics of phenomena is rated above theology and science above wisdom on a Thomistic scale. Moreover, philosophy is at once conceived

⁶³Three Reformers, pp. 67, 68, 77.

⁶⁴The Dream of Descartes, p. 27.

⁶⁵Three Reformers, p. 73.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 68; The Dream of Descartes, p. 27.

in the pattern of theology or "the angelism of Cartesian philosophy."

The cardinal mistake of Cartesianism, for Maritain, is the cogito, which contains both idealism and rationalism. Pure thought, independent of objects or things, is self-sufficing and autonomous. Cartesian rationalism is a "quasi-Platonic attempt to reduce demonstration to the transcendental unity of a non-discursive intellection," which differs from the classical notion of reason found in Aristotle and the Scholastics.⁶⁷ Hereby, according to Maritain, "human reason reaches its full spiritual measure in Descartes." This rationalistic idealism becomes "the original sin of modern philosophy." "Cartesian reason practised Kantian apriorism before it was named."⁶⁸

Cartesian idealism falls flat when it confronts the realism of St. Thomas Aquinas. When human reason attempts to attain the status of angelic intellect, Descartes is charged with conspiracy of the hierarchy of being and knowledge. And, at the same time, there is the conspiracy of agnosticism. "Cartesian dogmatism after a long flight," Maritain says, "will have become agnosticism when it falls to earth."⁶⁹

It seems that a more serious charge against Cartesianism is not its usurpation of angelic privileges (its rationalistic naturalism) but its lack of realism. The charges against the superhumanly elevated Cartesian rationalism, of course, must be based upon a particular scale of Thomism. That is to say, Cartesianism is here weighed on a particular scale. However, for the criticism of lack of realism in Cartesianism,

⁶⁷The Dream of Descartes, p. 24.

⁶⁸Three Reformers, pp. 70, 76.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 77.

modern scientific empiricists are at once in agreement with Thomists even if for different reasons. As Bertrand Russell has already remarked, Cartesian philosophy does not resolve the dualistic problem between modern science and Scholasticism. Descartes, therefore, for a modern empiricist, still retains the "metaphysical" element of medieval Scholasticism. A. J. Ayer remarks that "an error of Descartes" was the idea that "his mind was a substance which was wholly independent of anything physical." This is not only a meaningless (empirically unverifiable) "metaphysical" assertion but also unrealistic. "The proposition that mind and matter are completely independent," Ayer writes, "is one which we have good empirical grounds for disbelieving, and one which no a priori argument could possibly serve to prove."⁷⁰

From the point of view of the Thomistic pyramid of knowledge, Cartesianism commits a fatal separatism, the separation between what is modern and what is ancient, between the soul and the body, between faith and reason, between metaphysics and science and between knowledge and love.⁷¹ "St. Thomas brings together, Descartes cleaves and separates, and this in the most violently dogmatic way."⁷²

In the final analysis, of most significance is the practical considerations of Cartesian ideological elements, that is, the cultural significance of Cartesianism as Maritain conceives it. For Maritain, there are three possibilities of Cartesianism concerning its cultural implications: idealism (the connection between thought and being),

⁷⁰Language, Truth and Logic (2d ed.; London: V. Gollancz, 1946), p. 142.

⁷¹Three Reformers, p. 82.

⁷²The Dream of Descartes, p. 166.

rationalism (the intellectual hierarchies and the meaning of knowledge) and dualism (the conception of man). Cartesian idealism holds that ideas are things or objects that can be attained by (pure) thought alone and, in turn, ideas are the immediate objects of thought itself. The cultural significance of Cartesian idealism, according to Maritain, is "a sort of anthropocentric optimism of thought."⁷³ Thus, this is not unrelated to Rousseauan optimism and anthropocentric naturalism. The difference between the two, however, is obvious: Cartesian optimism is based upon reason and thought, whereas Rousseauan optimism is one which is grounded in sentiment and feeling.

The cultural significance of Cartesian rationalism, according to Maritain, has an impact on contemporary Western civilization. Cartesian rationalism is a kind of "anthropocentric naturalism of wisdom" from which inevitably ensue the doctrines of progress and the salvation of humanity by reason and science alone. The spiritualism of science in Descartes, however, looks to the Thomistic eyes like "an autophagous spiritual, psychological childishness and metaphysical humbug." Man must become spiritualized only by joining, not with the spiritualism of science, but with "a spiritual and eternal living One." "There is only one spiritual life which does not mislead -- that which the Holy Spirit bestows." Therefore, from the standpoint of a Thomist, "rationalism is the death of spirituality."⁷⁴

Rationalism is the antithesis of anti-reason; nevertheless, it is not unrelated to the anti-intellectualism of our time. "Many of our

⁷³Ibid., pp. 160-69.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 178, 179.

contemporaries," Maritain writes, "will seek nourishment for their souls in anti-reason, and below reason, nourishment which should be sought only above reason. And to have led so many reasoning animals around to a hatred of reason is another of rationalism's misdeeds."⁷⁵

The third and last cultural significance of Cartesianism is its dualism. For Maritain, it is "an anthropocentric angelism and materialism of civilization." It is an anthropocentric angelism because it elevates human reason and intellect to the level of angels. Moreover, the "admirable science" is raised to the level of theology itself. Thus, the spiritualism of reason is an affirmation of the fact that man becomes the "master of his nature by imposing the law of reason alone" at the expense of theology and the supernatural. Rationalism for Maritain crowns "an entirely different morality" which is exclusively materialistic and technological. For Maritain, technological civilization is a logical consequence of science exalted in Cartesianism. In Cartesianism, man is "a consumer crowned by science." Maritain believes that "this is the final gift, the twentieth century gift of the Cartesian reform."⁷⁶ Technique and mechanics are exalted, and they become the goal of humanity. As a result, for Maritain, the true idea of humanity is literally lost.

Maritain has noted the cultural implications which were translated from the philosophical doctrines of Cartesianism. Here it is not the intrinsically philosophical discrepancies of Cartesianism that Maritain has criticized. Of more significance are the cultural

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 179.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 182-83.

implications themselves which can be translated from Cartesian idealism, rationalism and dualism. The cardinal error, from a cultural point of view, is the "anthropocentric" conception of Descartes. Therefore, the philosophical revolt of Maritain here is the war against the Cartesian anthropotheistic conception.⁷⁷ When contemporary European civilization is regarded as the product of the mistaken conceptions of Descartes and when we discover the traces of the Cartesian doctrines (ideological elements) in our civilization, then Descartes and his philosophy can no longer remain a "dream." We might consider them as the actualization of "the dream of Descartes." We should once again ask if contemporary philosophy and civilization are the apocalypse of the Cartesian Reformation.

In the contemporary circle of philosophy, no serious philosopher can ignore the importance of the philosophical school called "logical empiricism."⁷⁸ Nor does Maritain neglect this school.⁷⁹

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 186.

⁷⁸The best brief account of logical empiricism is found in Herbert Feigl, "Logical Empiricism," Readings in Philosophical Analysis, pp. 3-26. From an American point of view, Ernest Nagel made an early assessment of European logical positivism in "Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe," Logic without Metaphysics, pp. 191-246. From a historical point of view, the best essay on logical empiricism is probably Joergen Joergensen, The Development of Logical Empiricism ("International Encyclopedia of Unified Science," Vol. II, No. 9; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951). See also an earlier essay: George de Santillana and Edgar Zilsel, The Development of Rationalism and Empiricism ("International Encyclopedia of Unified Science," Vol. II, No. 8; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).

⁷⁹See his account of logical empiricism in Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 27-43.

According to Maritain, the spirit of logical empiricism is not entirely unrelated to the rationalism of Descartes. As a matter of fact, Maritain regards logical empiricism as an offspring of Cartesian philosophy.

Jacques Maritain, from the standpoint of Thomistic epistemology, looks at "logical empiricism" and criticizes it.⁸⁰ He mentions Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Otto Neurath and Hans Reichenbach as the chief representatives of the "Vienna Circle."⁸¹ The Vienna Circle (Wiener Kreis)⁸² was officially formed primarily of a small group of scientists by profession headed by Moritz Schlick in 1929. It would be an extremely one-sided view to say, as the poet T. S. Eliot does, that "logical positivism is the most conspicuous object of censure. Certainly, logical positivism is not a very nourishing diet for more than the small minority which has been conditioned to it," and it is in our age "the counterpart of surrealism."⁸³ Etienne Gilson is far more modest

⁸⁰ It would be mistaken if we identify the "Vienna Circle" with what is nowadays called "logical empiricism." For instance, strictly speaking, Hans Reichenbach is not associated with the Vienna Circle, but with the "Berlin Group."

⁸¹ The long list of logical empiricists is found in Joergen Joergensen, op. cit.

⁸² An authoritative account of the development of the Vienna Circle is found in Victor Kraft, The Vienna Circle, tr. Arthur Pap (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953).

⁸³ "Introduction," Josef Pieper, Leisure the Basis of Culture, tr. Alexander Dru (London: Faber and Faber, 1952), pp. 11-12.

when he says: "The Thomistic view of philosophy would not appeal to the supporters of scientism or logical positivism, but neither would the view of philosophy proper to these schools be in agreement with the philosophical aspirations of all our contemporaries."⁸⁴

Maritain criticizes the Vienna Circle for its "bad conceptualization," for "a delusive purism," and for its "positivist superstition" in an "enigmatic and 'blind' fashion." He admits, however, that there is "something heroic" about logical empiricism in its "merciless struggle against language."⁸⁵ Joergen Joergensen defines logical empiricism and its purposes as "an expression of a need for clarification of the foundations and meaning of knowledge rather than of a need for justification of a preconceived view; . . . it is more interested in co-operation among philosophers and between philosophers and investigators in the special sciences than in the advancement of more or less striking individual opinions."⁸⁶ Many logical empiricists are "philosophers of science," strictly speaking. As regards their cooperative efforts for philosophical investigation, they are as a group as solid as the group of Catholic philosophers.

Maritain thinks that logical empiricism, so far as it stresses mathematical links and linguistic analysis, is excellent. In regard to the notion of logical meaning and the notion of signs, Maritain has no objections to the works of logical empiricists. And their standard of "intersubjectivation" is warmly welcome.⁸⁷ However, Maritain objects

⁸⁴Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 18.

⁸⁵Scholasticism and Politics, p. 39.

⁸⁶Op. cit., p. 1.

⁸⁷Maritain himself explicates the theory of signs. See his

to the limits of the "fixed rules of signification," logical empiricists' stress on "a simple tautological process" and to their "method of (experimental) verification."⁸⁸ Maritain criticizes logical empiricism for its neglect of "the intellect" in knowledge. T. S. Eliot is also critical of logical empiricism for its "method of philosophizing without insight and wisdom."⁸⁹ For Maritain, the intellect in logical empiricism "remains outside the quarters where the work is being directly accomplished,

"Language and the Theory of Sign," Language: An Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 86-101 and chapter xi, "Sign and Symbol," Redeeming the Time, tr. Harry Lorin Binsse (London: G. Bles, 1943), pp. 191-224.

In reference to "neo-realism" (G. E. Moore and his associates), T. E. Hulme said: "When I had seen in these further subjects, the possibility of the rationalist, non-empirical method, I began to see that it was this method which formed the basis of the writing on logic and ethics which I had before found incomprehensible." Here the rationalist, non-empirical method is meant to be a kind of method in geometry. Speculations, p. 42.

⁸⁸ A similar view is shown by T. E. Hulme who wrote that "(1) the Naturalists refused to recognise metaphysical knowledge because (2) They themselves were under the influence of an unconscious metaphysic which consisted in (3) Taking physical science as the only possible type of real knowledge." Op. cit., p. 21.

The original view of Schlick's theory of meaning and verification and radical physicalist theory have been considerably modified. See Schlick's original view in "Meaning and Verification," Readings in Philosophical Analysis, pp. 146-70. Some modified views may be found in the following: Hans Reichenbach, "The Verifiability Theory of Meaning," Readings in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 93-102; Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," Readings in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 47-92; Bertrand Russell, "Logical Positivism," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, IV (Janvier, 1950), pp. 3-19 and An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (New York: W. W. Norton, 1940); C. G. Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, IV (Janvier, 1950), pp. 41-63.

⁸⁹ "Introduction," Josef Pieper, Leisure the Basis of Culture, p. 12.

and is forbidden to enter."⁹⁰ Therefore, the positivist conception of knowledge or his epistemology is "a philosophical error." The truth of knowledge, according to Maritain, cannot be dependent simply on the fixed rules of signification and a simple mathematical and tautological process.

Maritain sees "two ways of analysing the world of sensible reality and of constructing the concepts relevant" to knowledge in general and the sciences of nature. One is "empiriological analysis," and the other is "ontological analysis." The "barbarism" of logical empiricism, in Maritain's opinion, is its "deontologization" of knowledge. That is to say, logical empiricism completely ignores the second way of analyzing the world of sensible reality. We should immediately recall the fact that Maritain has already criticized Cartesianism on the Thomistic grounds of the analogy of being. "Science," Maritain writes, "tends to construct definitions, not by essential ontological characters, but by a certain number of physical operations to be performed under fully determined conditions." For Maritain, the Vienna Circle ignores the foundation of empiriological sciences; that is to say, it ignores the entia realia (the real entities) and the ens rationis (ideal entity or being made in the mind).⁹¹ The ens rationis, Maritain holds, is a kind of unifying factor for the integration of both empiriological analysis and ontological analysis of the world of sensible reality. From the standpoint of logical empiricism, the Thomistic notion of "the real entities" and "being made in the mind" is an empirically meaningless (metaphysical) category. Any "ontological" categories, as a matter of

⁹⁰Scholasticism and Politics, p. 38.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 39, 41, 42.

fact, are meaningless.

Furthermore, the main defect of the Vienna Circle for Maritain is its particularized conceptualization of knowledge, which he has called "a delusive purism."⁹² The real cause of this defect is that the scientists attempt to become "philosophers." "The misfortune of the Veinnese," Maritain writes, "is that they are philosophers." The result is their inevitable limitations for the conceptualization of knowledge. For Maritain, their philosophical spirit, with a critical revision, is derived from empiricism, nominalism and, above all, logistics. Moreover, they are "good disciples of Descartes." As a result, logical empiricists suffer from "many specifically modern prejudices and ignorances." They only know, in Maritain's opinion, "one science, the science of phenomena, the science of the laboratory." Thus they reach the truth in a blind fashion. "The essential error is," Maritain writes, ". . . to confuse that which is true (with certain restrictions) of the science of phenomena, and that which is true of all science and of all knowledge in general, of all scientific knowing. It is to apply universally to all human knowledge that which is valid only in one of its particular spheres." The error of logical empiricism, according to Maritain, is its narrow criterion of truth (the criterion of "meaning") based upon "scientific" foundations, which require the intersubjective character in accordance with the fixed rules of meaning and verification. Maritain contends, therefore, that "if the meaning of a judgment consists in its method of (experimental) verification [and] . . . if any judgment which cannot be

⁹²Ralph Barton Perry also notes that the denial of the verifiability of moral judgments in logical positivism is due to its particularized conception of what constitutes knowledge. Realms of Value, p. 120.

thus verified is devoid of meaning, then this school's own theory has no meaning, because it is incapable of being verified in this manner. It is incapable, even in principle, of space-time verifications."⁹³

Since logical empiricism has its own distinctive criterion of meaningfulness, the term "science," from a Thomistic point of view, is restricted to "the science of phenomena" or what is observable. For Maritain, therefore, logical empiricism looks at knowledge from "a univocist" point of view. That is to say, the scientific criterion of truth is the only standard of measuring the truth of knowledge. Maritain quotes Aquinas who said: "It is a sin against intelligence to want to proceed in an identical manner in the typically different domains -- physical, mathematical and metaphysical -- of speculative knowledge."⁹⁴ On the other hand, logical empiricists would maintain that they are only asking for the factual validity and adequacy of knowledge. "The recommendation to use scientific method," Ernest Nagel contends, "is the recommendation of a way for deciding issues of factual validity and adequacy; it is not the recommendation of an exclusive way in which the universe may be confronted and experienced."⁹⁵

For Maritain, logical empiricism, as well as dialectic materialism, appears to be a form of scientism. The scientific theory of the Vienna Circle is "of endogenous origin," whereas the Marxist theory of science is "of exogenous origin."⁹⁶ Perhaps the materialism and rationalism of Marx would not be unrelated to Cartesianism through the

⁹³Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 42, 43, 44, 45.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 46.

⁹⁵Logic without Metaphysics, p. 382.

⁹⁶Scholasticism and Politics, p. 48.

rationalism of Hegel and the materialism of Feuerbach. However, we should not push to a reductio ad absurdum the alleged scientism of dialectic materialism and logical empiricism.

Maritain takes the side of neo-positivism rather than that of Marxism on the matter of religion. While the epistemology of neo-positivism leaves its door open to religious spheres, Marxism keeps its door shut. However, Maritain is of the opinion that, in terms of speculative philosophy and metaphysics, they are both philosophia negativa. Moreover, Maritain notes, the Vienna Circle would appear as the useless kind of "bourgeois" philosophy to Marxists; in turn, Marxist epistemology would appear to logical empiricists to be the worst kind of metaphysics.

Dialectical materialism for Maritain is really a "dialectical trickery." It is an illusory, negative kind of scientific theory: the Marxist theory of science, in short, is "a destruction of science." As many philosophers would agree, Maritain believes that Marx really inverted Hegel. Somewhat mistakenly (since Maritain is an Aristotelian rather than a Platonist), however, Maritain makes an analogy between Marx-Hegel and Aristotle-Plato: "In a sense, Marx is, in relation to Hegel, what Aristotle is in relation to Plato; he has brought Hegelian dialectic down from heaven to earth. As a result it has become the more pernicious."⁹⁷ Would Maritain also be willing to grant that Aristotle brought Plato down

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 51.

from heaven to earth and Aristotelianism has become the more pernicious theory of epistemology?

Maritain is at least sympathetic with Marxist's "courage of systematic unity" and, moreover, with "its aversion for idealism [and] its affirmation of the reality of the external world [which] do not displease a Thomist." The two mistaken traits of Marxist epistemology, in Maritain's opinion, are "practicalism" and "dialecticism." On these two counts, Marxist theory of science is destructive. In regard to practicalism, the Marxists stress the application of knowledge to action to the exclusion of "the irreducible speculative value of science." To produce "a usable theory of knowledge" is the goal of Marxist epistemology. It ignores the notion of "speculation" and, thus, deprives empiriological sciences of their "speculative nature." Maritain says: "it makes knowledge itself consist in an activity exercised on things, in an activity of work and domination of matter, and of transformation of the world."⁹⁸

No one more staunchly defends, from a Thomistic point of view, the vitality of speculation and contemplation than does Josef Pieper. Although "leisure" differs from contemplation, he writes that "Leisure . . . is a mental and spiritual attitude -- it is not simply the result of external factors, it is not the inevitable result of spare time, a holiday, a week-end or a vacation. It is, in the first place, an attitude of mind, a condition of the soul, and as such utterly contrary to the ideal of 'worker' in each and every one of the three aspects under

⁹⁸Ibid., pp. 48, 49.

which it was analysed: work as activity, as toil, as a social function." Leisure, moreover, is "a form of silence," which is necessary to the apprehension of reality. In short, like contemplation, it is "of higher order than the vita activa." And "one of the foundations of Western culture is leisure."⁹⁹ Therefore, the notion of contemplation or speculation is the basis by which a Thomist may criticize the practicalism and activism of Marxian epistemology.

For Maritain, Marxian "dialecticism" destroys the essence of science. He has no objection to the correct notion and usage of dialectic "either in its ancient sense as a logic, of the dialectic of the concrete, conceived as an historical development due to the internal logic of a principle, or of an idea, in action in the human concrete." However, the confusion of Marxist epistemology is that of the theory of knowledge and history. Marxism has confused the theory of knowledge (or science) with the history of science. Historicism (or dialecticism) simply points to the fact that "science as a specific energy of truth, as a specific vitality of intelligence, has vanished, has been annihilated in the illusion of historical explanation."¹⁰⁰

Maritain's epistemological charges against the "practicalism" and "dialecticism" of Marxism might be called his methodical arguments. However, there seems to be a more serious substantial argument against Marxism. Marxism is a materialism and an economic theory. The Hegelian dialectic has served as a methodical instrument for materialism, the substance of which has been derived from Marx's interpretation

⁹⁹Leisure the Basis of Culture, pp. 25, 51-52, 56.

¹⁰⁰Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 51, 52.

of Ludwig Feuerbach. Maritain, at once in agreement with other Christian theologians, considers the substance of Marxism as a form of materialism. Thus, from a Christian point of view, Marxism becomes the antithesis of Christianity: atheism. Marxian materialism implies "an absolutely atheistic position."¹⁰¹ The absolute materialistic conception of reality and history, therefore, has no room for the Christian notion of transcendence.

The combination of Marxism and Communism really completes "a religion of atheism." Strictly speaking, Maritain seems to distinguish Marxism from Communism. Marxism (or dialectic materialism) is the dogma of the religion of atheism, and Communism as a rule of life is its social and ethical expression.¹⁰² Communism conceived as such really becomes a problem of "the philosophy of culture." As Communism or Marxism becomes a religious problem to all Christian thinkers and theologians, so does it to Jacques Maritain. Maritain says that "Communism is so profoundly, so substantially a religion -- an earthly one -- that the communist does not know that it is a religion."¹⁰³

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁰²True Humanism, p. 28. Waldemar Gurian, a Catholic political theorist, regards Communism as "a political religion." He writes: ". . . its political religion contains many elements characteristic of modern secularistic society: belief in the decisive importance of technical progress, the assumption that economic organizations and psychological manipulations are almighty, the concentration upon work and activity in this world. . . . Bolshevism and communism can only be overcome if they are understood as the ultimate products of the various forms of secularism taken seriously and so reaching its ultimate consequences. Technical and military means are necessary in order to contain and drive back the USSR, but only if their limits are realized can they be truly efficient, can they achieve a final victory." The Soviet Union: Background, Ideology, Reality (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951), pp. 14-15.

¹⁰³True Humanism, p. 31.

Maritain, like Nicolas Berdyaev, regards Marxism as a messianic ideology. For him, Marxism is a kind of messianism which is at once Jewish and Hegelian.¹⁰⁴ Mircea Eliade, from a religious point of view, most clearly explains the myth of Marx himself enriched by "a whole Judaeo-Christian messianic ideology." The Marxian myth symbolizes, "on the one hand, the prophetic role and soteriological function that [Marx] attributes to the proletariat; on the other, the final battle between Good and Evil, which is easily comparable to the apocalyptic battle between Christ and Antichrist, followed by the total victory of the former. It is even significant that Marx takes over for his own purposes the Judaeo-Christian eschatological hope of an absolute end to history"¹⁰⁵

For Maritain, "Communism is the final state of anthropocentric rationalism." Like other Christian thinkers, Maritain believes that Communism "sets itself against Christianity by pretending to substitute for the universalism of the Mystic Body of Christ its own earthly universalism."¹⁰⁶ It is true that Maritain looks at Marxism and Communism as a religion of Anti-Christ. However, he assesses the problem of Communism more realistically when he says: "the social problem of the emancipation of the proletariat has in fact the priority over the metaphysical and religious problem, the class war over the anti-religious war" For Maritain, Communism is a "communion in economic activity," which inevitably creates "the titanism of industry." As Emil Brunner would certainly agree, he says that Communism "transforms Christian

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁰⁵The Sacred and the Profane, pp. 206-207.

¹⁰⁶Scholasticism and Politics, p. 27.

communion into an entirely temporal and despotic communism."¹⁰⁷

Maritain's philosophical revolts against the main intellectual currents of the modern world have been exercises in Thomism. His critical philosophy does logically precede his creative and constructive philosophy. It serves the function of cleansing "erroneous" philosophical and ideological systems, and, in doing so, lays the ground for a new philosophical and ideological system which embodies the true spirit of Thomism. For Maritain, Thomism is the universal standard by which other philosophical doctrines and their ideological implications on contemporary civilization can be weighed. Although the philosophical revolts of Maritain are primarily of epistemological interest, we cannot neglect their cultural implications since philosophical doctrines themselves imply cultural significance.

From a cultural point of view, Maritain's critical appraisals are the first steps towards the Thomistic reconstruction of contemporary civilization. This, of course, does not violate the "speculative" worthiness of Maritain's theological and philosophical thinking which he so vehemently emphasizes. It merely strengthens the view that he is a systematical philosopher of culture as well as a theologian-philosopher. Maritain firmly believes that all philosophical doctrines have profound cultural implication, and the malady of culture is, at bottom, that of philosophy. We must not, however, push to the furthest logical conclusion the relation between (speculative) philosophy and (practical) culture. When we do so in a dogmatic and deterministic way, then we become the victims of confusion between what is philosophically necessary

¹⁰⁷Ibid. See also Emil Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, p. 405.

and what is historically contingent.

Maritain himself has already made it clear that it is absurd to assert that there is a certain "unilinear" pattern in the Lutheran Reformation, the Renaissance, the Cartesian Reformation, the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the Rousseauism. He does not deny, however, that there is a sort of convergence of these movements into a certain pattern. He makes it rather clear that these movements, in fact, have converged into modern Western culture. The disease of contemporary civilization is at bottom the derivative of these movements. Maritain does not hesitate to assert that, for instance, Communism is "the final state" of naturalistic and anthropocentric rationalism, which simply implies that there is a causal relationship between Communism and the very movements of the Cartesian Reformation, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the Rousseauism. Then, would not Maritain have in fact committed the mistake he has rejected as absurd? Perhaps we should take more seriously what H. A. L. Fischer has said: "One intellectual excitement has . . . been denied me. Man wiser and more learned than I have discovered in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can see only one emergency following another as wave follows wave, only one great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalizations, only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognize . . . the play of the contingent and the unforeseen."¹⁰⁸

For Maritain, social and political reconstruction must begin

¹⁰⁸As quoted in Franklin M. Fisher, "On the Analysis of History and the Interdependence of the Social Sciences," Philosophy of Science, XXVII (April, 1960), p. 147.

with philosophical reconstruction. Thomism alone is a kind of tabula rasa in which we forget the mistakes of the past as well as the present and therefore begin with a fresh start in the philosophical and cultural reconstruction of the modern world. The syncretistic character of Thomism has served as an indispensable tool for the criticisms of main philosophical currents. Thomistic intellectualism has been used to criticize the anti-intellectualism of Bergson, Luther, Freud and Rousseau. We might as well be able to apply this tool to reject the romantic and "irrational man"¹⁰⁹ portrayed by one of the main philosophical currents of our time, that is, existentialism. "No emotion," C. S. Lewis says, "is, in itself, a judgment: in that sense all emotions and sentiments are alogical. But they can be reasonable or unreasonable as they conform to Reason or fail to conform. The heart never takes the place of the head: but it can, and should, obey it."¹¹⁰ The Christian (theocentric) character of Thomism, which refuses to separate the human philosophos from the divine sophos, and Thomistic realism have found the defects of the naturalistic irrationalism of Rousseau as well as of the Cartesian naturalistic rationalism and the Marxian anthropocentric rationalism, into which all the previously mistaken views have converged.

Maritain uses Thomism for the recovery of intellectualism which is so vulnerable in our age and for the reconstruction of "theocentric humanism." For him, Thomism thus becomes the Philosophy (at once speculative and practical) of the twentieth century. St. Thomas Aquinas speaks directly for our age, not for the thirteenth century.

¹⁰⁹William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1958).

¹¹⁰The Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 12.

SECTION III

THE FOUNDATION OF JACQUES MARITAIN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER IX

THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF MARITAIN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Jacques Maritain is impeccably a Thomist; he refused to be called a "neo-Thomist," not because he desires to turn the clock of history back to the thirteenth century, but because he is of the firm belief that Thomism is a living philosophy and a living theology. St. Thomas Aquinas speaks directly to the world of the twentieth century. As it has already been shown, the intellectualism inherited from the classical philosophy of Aristotle and the Christian character of St. Thomas Aquinas have been the fountainhead of Thomistic criticisms of modern philosophy and culture. This aspect we called the "critical" philosophy of Maritain. Now we must turn to the constructive side of his philosophy.

At the outset, it is of utmost importance for us to realize that Maritain's whole system strives at unity and is integrative. In the specifically and hierarchically distinct degrees of knowledge (speculative and practical), all types of knowledge and wisdom converge to the final point of the Christian idea of God. Theology, therefore, is of its nature speculative and practical at once. In the speculative order of knowledge, the lower levels of physical sciences, mathematical sciences,

metaphysics and theology (science that is human and rational) converge to the highest and loftiest summit of the wisdom of God himself (infused wisdom). And in the practical order of knowledge, the lower strata converge to the self-same final summit of the infused wisdom of God. God is the source of speculative knowledge and practical knowledge.

Moreover, this hierarchy of knowledge is "a double movement in the Christian universe."¹ The first of the two-way traffic can be looked at from a divine point of view downward (from the law of the Incarnation to the lowest level of physics). And the second way in which the same traffic can be looked at is from a human point of view to the infused wisdom of God. In short, it is "a twofold continuous movement of the descent of God to man and the ascent of man to God." The allowance of the ascent of man to God makes Maritain's system as well as Thomism in general different from orthodox Protestantism. On the other hand, Maritain also rejects the humanist position because "as soon as man came to believe that the second movement was the first," he retreated to the abysmal mistakes of anthropocentric humanism (anthropocentric knowledge and culture). "Man forgot," Maritain writes, "that God has the first initiative always in the order of the good, and forgot that the descending movement of divine plenitude in us is primary in relation to our movement of ascent. He sought to treat this second movement as primary, and himself to take the first initiative in the line of goodness. Thus the movement of ascent was necessarily separated from the movement of grace. That is why the age in question was an age of dualism, of schism, of division, an age of

¹Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom, tr. Bernard Wall (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 18.

anthropocentric humanism cut off from the Incarnation; an age in which science finally carried the day against wisdom, and the effort of progress turned to the destruction of human values." However, it should be remembered that Maritain does not reject humanism per se. He is merely warning against the wrong kind of humanism, that is, anthropocentric humanism which, as we have noted, has developed from the Renaissance, Cartesianism, the philosophy of Illumination and Rousseauism. Thus, Maritain says: "the radical vice of anthropocentric humanism was that of being anthropocentric, not of being humanism." "It is that the creature should be truly respected in his contact with God and because he holds everything of God. Humanism, yes, but a theocentric humanism, an integral humanism, the humanism of the Incarnation."²

In the ordered pyramid of knowledge, however, this does not imply that there is no essential distinction between one form of knowledge and another. True though it may be that all types of knowledge must follow the hierarchic law of governance, each of them maintains its own distinct autonomy which cannot be substituted for another. Therefore, the pyramid of knowledge is not a monolithic nomism but a pluralistic order. Philosophy, for instance, has a method and object of its own that are distinct from, and non-substitutable for, theology. Philosophy is integrated into theology, but philosophy in its own sphere is "both autonomous and infra-valent."³ In short, the lower forms of knowledge occupy "infra-positions" to the higher forms of knowledge, but they have, at the same time, their own spheres of autonomy.

² Ibid., pp. 74-75, 78.

³ Ibid., p. 102.

It has become clear now why, in the integrative system of Maritain, we cannot separate one form of knowledge from the rest. Nor can political philosophy be separated from the rest of knowledge. Therefore, the true political philosophy and political science are at once political theology. If we separate them, we violate the very Thomistic principle that governs the hierarchy of knowledge. In education, Maritain emphasizes the prerequisite background in the degrees of knowledge. Therefore, the quadrivium of knowledge in education comprises first, mathematics; second, physics and the natural sciences; third, philosophy (the philosophy of nature, metaphysics and the theory of knowledge); fourth, ethics and political and social philosophy (and connected studies).⁴

This is why we cannot chop off one part (e. g., political philosophy) of Maritain's system from its whole and root. In doing so, we not only do injustice to his system but we also lose the possibility of adequately understanding his system. We must come to grips with the foundation or root of his political philosophy, and relate his political philosophy to other degrees of knowledge, especially in the practical order to which it belongs. His political philosophy is directly related to the philosophy of history, moral philosophy and moral theology, and it is also related rather indirectly to the various branches of the speculative order. In Thomism, the speculative (contemplative) value of knowledge is fully recognized. This is the basis of Maritain's criticism of pragmatism and Marxism. He believes that the former is sold to the "cash value" of knowledge, and the latter is solely concerned with the application of knowledge to action.

Maritain himself explains why we must climb the summit (the foundation) of the hierarchy of knowledge and wisdom (theological wisdom and infused wisdom of grace) when he says: "All other more visible orders, social, political and economic, important though they may be in their place, are secondary to it and even depend on it."⁵ This is also the reason why Maritain admires Pascal more than he does Machiavelli or Hobbes. "Much more profound than Machiavelli or Hobbes," he writes, "it is by the flame of a metaphysical and religious conception of man, at once high and passionate, that Pascal illuminates his political ideas."⁶ In reference to the political ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, Yves R. Simon says that "the most enlightening teaching of St. Thomas is not found in any of his political writings, but in the psychological, ethical, metaphysical and theological treatises where he develops, with great thoroughness and unmatched accuracy, his sublime theory of liberty."⁷ The same is true in Maritain's case. In connection with our immediate concern of social and political philosophy, Etienne Gilson comments that "Thomas Aquinas has left us certain principles applicable to the solution of social and political problems, but he himself has derived these fundamental notions from the principles of his own philosophy and theology."⁸ Maritain, partially because of the urgency of our time, has been more

⁵Science and Wisdom, p. 19.

⁶Redeeming the Time, tr. Harry Lorin Binsse (London: G. Bles, 1943), p. 29.

⁷"Thomism and Democracy," Science, Philosophy and Religion: Second Symposium, p. 272.

⁸Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 262.

pre-eminently concerned than his master with the solution for cultural, social, political and economic problems. Without knowing the philosophical and theological foundation of Maritain's political philosophy, we are likely to walk the blind alley of his political philosophy.

As the various degrees of knowledge are distinguished but not separated from each other, the relationship between the supernatural and the natural, between faith and reason and between theology and philosophy holds the same truth. In the natural order, reason and philosophy have autonomous spheres of their own and are not merely subjugating themselves to the supernatural world, faith and theology. Thus Maritain does not have to maintain, as Rudolf Bultmann does, that the Christian faith is a kind of "withdrawal from the world" which transcends the world of the true (i. e., the knowledge of God), of the good (i. e., political morality) and the beautiful. He does not have to insist that "every phenomenon of history is ambiguous" simply because it is separated from God and does not reveal God's will in itself.⁹ For Maritain, the world or the entire order of nature has the sphere of its own, distinct from the supernatural world. Therefore, "the natural end of the world, though it is not the absolutely supreme end, is, nevertheless, a real end; it is not a mere means. This is a point which is, in my opinion, quite important for the philosopher of history, or of culture in general."¹⁰ The political and social order is a natural development, which is founded upon the demands

⁹ Rudolf Bultmann, Essays: Philosophical and Theological, tr. James C. G. Greig (London: SCM Press, 1955), pp. 105, 153.

¹⁰ Jacques Maritain, On the Philosophy of History, ed. Joseph W. Evans (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), p. 131.

of the order of nature and in which "certain requirements of natural law [come] to the fore."

However, we cannot stand in a sort of half-way position in understanding Maritain's whole system. As philosophy is superelevated by theology, so the natural order is illuminated by the supernatural order. The philosophy of history belongs to moral philosophy, and not to the theology of history which is centered upon the Kingdom of God and the history of salvation. However, Maritain makes it absolutely clear that "the philosophy of history is an outstanding example of the necessity for a true philosophy of man, an integrally valid moral philosophy, to have the philosopher illumine the knowledge of the natural order with the light of a more elevated knowledge received from theology, while he uses the method proper to philosophy and advances with steps, so to speak, of philosophy, not of theology." In this sense, it is clear that we must speak of the philosophical and theological foundation of Maritain's political philosophy. There is no doubt that political philosophy, conceptually speaking, pertains to the order of nature. But it can never be separated from (political) theology. It is precisely because of this separatism that Maritain criticizes Cartesianism and Kantianism, and there lies the pitfall of anthropocentric humanism.

The world or the entire order of nature, in actual fact, is in "vital connection with the universe of the Kingdom of God." It is closely linked with the supernatural end and virtues. "The world," Maritain says, "is not in a state of pure nature but is vitally and organically related to the Kingdom of God -- the actual natural end of the world is this natural end superelevated." Although, in the political

and social order, certain requirements of natural law come to the fore, "in actual fact it is only under the action of the Gospel leaven, and by virtue of the Christian inspiration making its way in the depths of secular consciousness, that the natural development in question [takes] place." It is true that the natural end of the world is a relatively ultimate end (a real end but not a means). But "only the supernatural end is the absolutely ultimate end."¹¹ This is the center of Maritain's thought and the (theological) foundation of his political philosophy. A political philosophy is a genuine possibility, but the only true political philosophy must become at once political theology. All in all, Jacques Maritain is truly a Christian political philosopher (a political theologian).

Before we plunge into the ordered hierarchy of knowledge, we must consider the relationship between philosophy and theology. As we have noted, Thomism is a philosophy and a theology. From the standpoint of the history of philosophy, Thomism is essentially a combination of the pagan philosophy of Aristotle and Christian theology. The nature of Thomism, according to the followers of Aquinas, is the harmony of synthesis of philosophy and theology (reason and revelation). As we have previously noted, this is the essence of Thomism and thus the whole system of Jacques Maritain.

Maritain once said that "The more I think about this problem of Christian philosophy the more it appears a central point of history of our time since the Renaissance: and probably as the central point of

¹¹Ibid., pp. 40, 116, 130, 131.

the history of the age to come."¹² In discussing the meaning of Christian philosophy, we must distinguish the nature of philosophy from its state.¹³ That is to say, we must distinguish what Maritain calls "the order of specification" from "the order of exercise." In its nature and essence philosophy is entirely dependent upon rational reason and rational evidence alone. The philosophic domain is within the sole natural or rational faculties of the human mind. Philosophy is the affirmation of what is rational and natural. In this sense, Maritain as well as Aquinas is truly an Aristotelian. Here philosophy can even be addressed to "non-believers" (non-Christian philosophers). The designation "Christian" which we apply to philosophy does not refer to what is in its philosophic essence or nature.

Philosophy is by its nature "the perfect achievement of reason, perfectum opus rationis."¹⁴ Therefore, philosophical wisdom is attainable through the purely natural and rational faculties of the human mind. It is "independent of the Christian faith as to its object, its principles and its methods."¹⁵ In the sense of habitus or state (the order of exercise) alone, we can talk about "Christian philosophy," "pre-Christian philosophy," or "non-Christian philosophy." When we speak of the philosophy we are concerned with philosophy in the Christian state. Here Christian philosophy must take into account the higher wisdom,

¹² An Essay on Christian Philosophy, tr. Edward H. Flannery (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. viii.

¹³ Ibid., p. 13; Science and Wisdom, p. 79.

¹⁴ An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 14.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 15.

mystical wisdom and theological wisdom. Philosophy is illuminated or superelevated by the higher wisdom as well as the Christian faith. In the Christian state, there is "a certain synergic and vital union of philosophy with faith and theology."¹⁶ Theology is rooted in faith. Christian philosophy cannot repudiate the value of the Christian faith. A separated philosophy is simply untenable. Maritain, therefore, distinguishes St. Thomas Aquinas from Aristotle in that "It may be said that by the very fact that he is a Christian, [philosophy] takes on an added value and import compared with the views of an Aristotle, who had no idea of an order of revelation."¹⁷

In regard to the distinction between philosophic nature (specification) and state (exercise), we must note a "dissymmetry" between the speculative order and the practical order. So far we have been concerned with the former. In the speculative order, we have noted that the opus philosophicum is entirely independent of regulation by the higher wisdom. The case of speculative philosophy is "Christian only by reason of its state." The case of practical philosophy is rather different. It is "Christian both by reason of its state and by reason of its object." "In the practical order it [philosophy] ceases to be fully autonomous, its objective structure calls for positive regulations from a superior source."¹⁸ In political philosophy, which belongs to the practical order, there is an additional import. In Christian political philosophy, there is no adequate political philosophy except political theology. That is

¹⁶ Science and Wisdom, p. 81.

¹⁷ An Essay on Christian Philosophy, pp. 15-16.

¹⁸ Science and Wisdom, p. 100.

to say, the true political philosophy is, and must be, illuminated by the higher wisdom, theological wisdom and infused wisdom (or the wisdom of grace).

Here we must avoid lumping philosophy and theology together on the one hand and separating them on the other. Nonetheless, ". . . faith guides or orientates philosophy, veluti stella rectrix, without thereby violating its autonomy; for it is always in keeping with its own proper laws and principles and by virtue of rational norms alone that philosophy judges things." Theology (natural theology) is also rational and human. "Rooted in faith," Maritain writes, "[theology] conducts its reasoning on the authority of the revealed word and proceeds ex causa prima; its object is the revealed datum itself, which it seeks to elucidate rationally." Theology deals with the divinely revealed truth: in theology "judgments are resolved, thanks to faith, in the light of divine revelation and finally in the increate light." This is the reason why theology enjoys its supreme unity. It is at once a speculative and a practical science.¹⁹

For Maritain, theological wisdom is "a wisdom of faith and reason, of faith making use of reason. It is natural in the sense that it proceeds according to human logic and . . . to the labour and equipment of reason; it is supernatural in its roots because it exists and lives only through faith."²⁰ However, philosophy is not the handmaiden of theology or "philosophia ancilla theologiae," which, according to Maritain, was used by St. Peter Damiani to silence philosophy. For Maritain, philosophy is placed in the service of theology when, and only when, in its

¹⁹ An Essay on Christian Philosophy, pp. 29, 34, 72.

²⁰ Science and Wisdom, p. 23.

own workings theology employs philosophy as an instrument of truth in order to establish conclusions which are not philosophic but theological."²¹ Philosophy, thus, can serve theology. The relation between philosophy and theology is somewhat analogous to that of servant and master but not to that of slave and master. "We should recognise the subordination [instead of subordination, Maritain prefers to use the terms "infra-valence" and "infraposition"] of philosophy to the superior orders of wisdom; and it demands that, in face of these orders of wisdom, we shall maintain and affirm the specific character, and the autonomous existence of philosophy in its own right and method."²² In short, philosophy certainly serves theology, but when it is engaged in its own pursuits it is a free agent. "Thomistic philosophy," writes Maritain, "completely distinct in itself from theology, and dwelling, as it always must, both in its own home and in that of theology (where it is better off than in its own), has still many tasks, arrangements, and reclassification of materials to attend to before it can finally take up residence in its own quarters -- without breaking off its vital relations with theology in the process. Even though these quarters cannot boast of the spacious chambers and lofty ceilings of theology's imposing mansion, it has withal the duty not to neglect them."²³

The distinction between philosophy and theology would lead to the affirmation of an autonomous moral philosophy and an autonomous political philosophy that is distinct from moral theology. Speaking from the

²¹An Essay on Christian Philosophy, pp. 34, 35.

²²Science and Wisdom, p. 101.

²³An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 37.

nature (specification) of philosophy, there is room for a "secular" philosophy. The logic of subalternation, infraposition, or infravalence seems to have tremendous cultural and political implications in Maritain's thought. "Theology has jurisdiction over the whole human world and it may even seem especially important to-day that it should extend its view to matters of ethnology, politics, and sociology as well as the interpretation of profane history."²⁴ Although there is a genuine political philosophy or a moral philosophy which is distinct from moral theology, Maritain's thought consummates in Christian theology by this logic of infraposition and infravalence. Hence, the philosophical aspects of his system must be brought to judgment before "the superior tribunal of theological wisdom."

No doubt, the natural human end is in itself a real end, not merely a means. However, it becomes truly a real end when it is illuminated by the absolutely real end of the supernatural. Political philosophy is in itself an autonomous practical philosophy, but it must be illumined by moral theology in order to attain its true character of practical philosophy. "The christian philosopher," Maritain writes, "will deal with it [the relation of the church and mankind] by moving from humanity to the church: the theologian by moving from the church to humanity. For the latter the central problem is the mystical body of Christ: for the former that of the world and its meaning."²⁵

In the light of Thomism, therefore, it is not too difficult to

²⁴Science and Wisdom, pp. 120, 121.

²⁵Ibid., p. 123.

understand the foundation of Maritain's political philosophy. For Maritain, "political philosophy deals with societies demanded by the very nature of man." In this respect, "the decisive influence of Aristotle is obvious, hardly surprising for a disciple of St. Thomas Aquinas." Human nature, as it is considered existentially, postulates the fact that man is not only a physical entity but also a moral and spiritual being. Moreover, there is no natural human nature. Man, when he is considered existentially, is sinful and thus demands redemption. "All politics," therefore, "is based on specific images of man and on specific views of the ultimate end of human life."²⁶ Thus ethical considerations are paramount in Maritain's political thinking. "Politics," he says, "is a branch of Ethics," though it is a "branch specifically distinct from the other branches of the same generic stock." In other words, political philosophy may be distinct from moral philosophy and moral theology in the practical order, but it is none the less subalternated to moral philosophy and moral theology. He states again, "Politics is essentially ethical, and Ethics is essentially realistic, not in the sense of any Realpolitick, but in the sense of a real common good." But this earthly common good of politics is a relatively ultimate end of man.²⁷ It is clear that, for Maritain, there is moral philosophy above political philosophy and moral theology above moral philosophy in the practical order. The practical order must be distinguished from the speculative order, although both hierarchies culminate in theological wisdom and infused wisdom. And yet, "His political, practical philosophy

²⁶Waldemar Gurian, "On Maritain's Political Philosophy," Thomist, V (January, 1943), pp. 10, 12 (*italics added*).

²⁷"The End of Machiavellianism," Review of Politics, IV (January, 1942), pp. 28, 29-30.

retains always a speculative character and its interest in concrete events remains a moral and spiritual one.²⁸

Although Maritain maintains the superiority of theology based on faith and beatitude above all types of knowledge, his method of philosophical investigation is speculative and rational. Maritain "does not seek to be a political scientist, but remains always a political philosopher";²⁹ more prominently, he remains a metaphysician and theologian rather than a political theorist. And yet his philosophy, for that reason, is all the more valuable for the political scientist and theorist. Although political philosophy or political theology is properly a practical order, it is necessary for us to understand the speculative side of his system.

Maritain's treatise on "critical realism," The Degrees of Knowledge, based on "the Aristotelian-Thomist conception of knowledge," is clearly his opus magnum.³⁰ Yves R. Simon, probably the most distinguished disciple of Maritain, remarks that "no Thomist has ever written a more authentically Thomistic book than the Degrees of Knowledge."³¹ Throughout his writings Maritain has devoted far more space to the theory of knowledge than his Scholastic predecessors. In formulating his critical

²⁸Waldemar Gurian, "On Maritain's Political Philosophy," pp. 19, 20.

²⁹Ibid., p. 20.

³⁰There are two translations of Distinguer pour unir, ou Les degres du savoir (The Degrees of Knowledge), the first by Bernard Wall and Margot R. Adamson (1938), and the second newly translated (1959) under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan from the fourth French edition. The latter is a far better translation and is used here for all quotations and references.

³¹"Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences," Thomist, V (January, 1943), p. 102.

realism, Maritain criticizes modern epistemologists and remarks that "an exclusively reflexive philosophy judges not about what is, but about the idea of what is and the idea of the idea, and of the idea of the idea of the idea of what is. And it does so in a tone that is all the more superior, the more it fails to lay hands on the real and avoids the risk of scraping the skin off them; whereas the courage that properly belongs to the philosophy of nature, as well as to metaphysics, is to face up to extramental realities, to lay hands on things, to judge about what is." In another passage he criticizes the idealists: "It is absurd to demand that philosophical thought begin, even before it knows anything validly, by proving that it can know (for it could only do so if it did know). It is absurd to suppose at the very start that anything which cannot help but be judged true by the mind can, as a result of some evil genius, not be true, so that then that self-same mind might be asked to show that, as a matter of fact, it is not so. It is absurd to admit that the mind could only attain phenomenal objects and then ask it to prove that such objects are extramental realities." Accordingly, Maritain takes the position of a realist in the recognition of extramental realities independent of human thought and ideas.³²

For Maritain the act of knowing presupposes an ontological order. In other words, "Inasmuch as the intellect primarily bears neither on itself, nor on the ego, but on being, then the very first evidence . . . the evidence that is first in itself for the intellect, is that of the principle of identity 'discovered' in the intellectual apprehension of being or the real." Referring to "the relation between the soul that

³²The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 74, 84-85.

knows and the thing known," Maritain says, "There is a secret, mysterious and holy substance in this great machinery of logic that no treatment can change -- the essence or nature, the inmost ontological depth of the thing, made present to the mind through the idea." He emphasizes that "this distinction between the mode of existing of the thing and the thing itself, or its nature, is of capital importance in the theory of knowledge." And "in the act of knowing, the thing (in the very measure in which it is known) and mind are not only joined, they are strictly one." This notion of one-ness is the mode of the definition of truth for Maritain as it is for St. Thomas Aquinas. The definition of truth, according to Aquinas is the "adequation or conformity between intellect and thing." And Maritain adds that "conformity is established between the being possessed by the thing and the being affirmed by the mind.³³

Since truth is grasped in relation to existence, a new problem of "thing" and "object" arises. The misunderstanding of this fundamental problem, according to Maritain, confuses "the noetic of so many modern authors." He insists that "being (the being enveloped in sensible things) is the first object attained by our intellect." The notion of being is simply "what exists or can exist." And intellect can perceive only what exists or can exist in the thing in itself "without positing extramental being." This notion is what Maritain calls "the principle of identity." Thus, "that apprehension of being is absolutely first and is implied in all other intellectual apprehensions." Furthermore, he insists that, "In God alone are subject and object identified. He knows Himself exhaustively and all things in Himself, because His act of knowledge is His very infinite essence." Because God is infinite,

³³Ibid., pp. 77, 87, 88.

"existence and knowledge" are purely and absolutely the same thing.

"There is no distinction, not even a virtual distinction, between esse divinum and intelligere divinum. His existence is His own very act of understanding."³⁴

Maritain believes, therefore, that the capital error of the idealists (Descartes in particular) was separation of "the object and the thing." However, this does not mean that the object and the thing cannot be distinguished. On the contrary, Maritain says, "If, with Aristotle and St. Thomas, thing and object are distinguished in this fashion but not separated, and if, while maintaining their unity, allowance is made for what comes from the thing and for what comes from the mind in knowing, then it is clear that . . . the mind draws forth . . . the universe of intelligibility or of human knowledge. And that universe is, on the one hand, detached from the universe of existence, in order that it may be known. It is, on the other hand, identified with it, in order that it may itself subsist."³⁵

In short, Maritain analyzes the disease of the modern mind in terms of his notion of critical realism; condemns modern philosophers for having disclaimed totally the proper function of the intellect and human reason; and maintains that "human reason is in a position to survey the whole vast field of its activity." In order to cure the disease of the modern mind, Maritain proposes that, in the words of Gerald B. Phelan, "The scope of human knowledge must first be clearly defined and accurately mapped; the aims and purposes of man's thought determined;

³⁴Ibid., pp. 94, 110, 113.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 128, 130-31.

the various degrees and sorts of knowledge distinguished and their respective values estimated; order must be restored to the intellectual as well as the practical life, and the hierarchy of knowledge re-established."³⁶ Therefore, it becomes of utmost importance to fix the proper place for each branch of human knowledge and to determine its relationships to each of the other branches.³⁷

Agreeing with Etienne Gilson that, "First one must extricate himself from the obsession that epistemology is the primary condition of philosophy," Maritain says, "an authentic critique of knowledge, recognizing as it does that it is foolish to regard the retracing of its own footprints as the first step along its path, does not pretend to be a prerequired condition of philosophy. . . . [A] critique of knowledge presupposes a long effort of knowing, knowing which is not only spontaneous but scientific, too, and not only scientific (in the modern meaning of the word 'science', but philosophical, psychological, logical and metaphysical knowledge as well." Maritain, like Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, thinks that the critique of knowledge does not come at the beginning of metaphysics, but rather it "forms part of metaphysical knowledge which is the highest wisdom in the natural order." Thus, "Critique of knowledge or epistemology does not exist as a discipline distinct from metaphysics. To give it a separate existence is to set a third term between realism and idealism, between yes and no. And that

³⁶ Jacques Maritain (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), p. 20.

³⁷ W. O. Martin remarks that "Maritain has established himself as a contemporary master of the subject of the order of knowledge." The Order and Integration of Knowledge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957), p. 302.

is the whole claim of those moderns with their unthinkable notion of a 'pure phenomenon' which empties the very concept of being, the most general of all our concepts, of all things."³⁸

³⁸The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 79, 80.

CHAPTER X

THE SPECULATIVE ORDER

Jacques Maritain is truly a master of the integration of all human knowledge. He strives for unity which, according to him, is not equilibrium or balance. All types of human knowledge meet and join together at the summit of theological wisdom and infused wisdom. As it has already been noted, the flow of knowledge between the summit and the bottom is a two-way traffic: the first is from the summit to the bottom (from a divine point of view) and the second is from the bottom to the top (from a human point of view). The first is primary and the second, though important and autonomous in its own right, is secondary.

"Western civilisation," Maritain writes, "may well be aware of the several precious gifts belonging to the spiritual order that it has given to the community of mankind. One of these gifts is the pure sense of speculative truth."¹ This is the speculative domain in contrast to the practical. In both domains, Maritain's whole system comprises the ordering of knowledge, theology, metaphysics, philosophy, logic, the philosophy of nature on the one hand and moral philosophy, the philosophy of culture, the philosophy of history, political philosophy

¹Science and Wisdom, p. 70.

and the philosophy of art on the other hand.² These tributaries of knowledge converge to the highest and loftiest wisdom, which is the governing body of all types of knowledge. Thus, what we might call the "law of governance" of a higher order over a lower order is from up, downward, although each type has a kind of autonomous status of its own.

Jacques Maritain, like his predecessors Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, divides the whole range and scope of human knowledge into two realms: the "speculative" and the "practical."³ The difference between these two realms of knowledge arises from the purposes or aims, the ends which they pursue. Speculative knowledge is by definition oriented toward contemplation or thought, whereas practical knowledge is oriented toward action. In other words, speculative knowledge is knowledge of truth for the sake of truth; practical knowledge is knowledge for the sake of doing (as in ethics or moral philosophy) and of making (as in art or the philosophy of art). Thus the practical intellect is the guide in art and human conduct; the speculative intellect is the guide in wisdom and science, or philosophy. This distinction is derived from

² Among the numerous works of Maritain, the following are the most representative: The Degrees of Knowledge; Science and Wisdom; An Essay on Christian Philosophy; Approaches to God, tr. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954); A Preface to Metaphysics (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939); An Introduction to Philosophy, tr. E. I. Watkin (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955); An Introduction to Logic, tr. Imelda Choquette (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937); Philosophy of Nature, tr. Imelda C. Byrne (New York: Philosophical Library, 1951); True Humanism, tr. Margot Adamson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938); On the Philosophy of History; Scholasticism and Politics; Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); and The Philosophy of Art, tr. John O'Connor (London: B. Humphries, 1923).

³ See Appendix I.

the classical tradition. Greek wisdom, Maritain comments, "discerned with sureness the fundamental distinction between speculative philosophy and practical philosophy, the object and nature of metaphysics, physics and logic, the hierarchy of the sciences and the subordination of the special sciences to the simplest and most universal science, the science which is the most highly speculative and the most disinterested, which has to do with being as such and with the causes of being." In Thomism, Greek wisdom is superimposed by Christian theology. The former begins with things, visible reality and works upward, whereas the latter starts out with the law of the Incarnation and illuminates downward. In the latter sense alone, the unity of knowledge is accomplished. "If the ancient world," Maritain writes, "appears as the world of a competition of wisdoms, the christian world will appear to us as the world of synthesis and of the hierarchy of wisdoms."⁴ At the summit of the great pyramid, there lies the loftiest peak of theology, which is at once speculative and practical in its nature.

The term "knowledge," as Maritain uses it, has three different meanings. The first meaning is most comprehensive; "it means knowing in a firm and stable way." Since it is human or rational wisdom, it is not exhaustive (for instance, there is infused wisdom above it on the highest plane). But it none the less is capable of intellectual perfection, in its own right, for the attainment of truth. Secondly, the term "knowledge" is used in an intermediary sense. It is used in contradistinction to the highest form of understanding. It therefore means "science" in opposition to "wisdom." "Wisdom," Maritain defines, "is

⁴ Science and Wisdom, pp. 12, 18-19.

knowledge through the highest sources and in the deepest and simplest sense."⁵ Knowledge in the second sense (science) means "knowing in detail and by proximate or apparent causes."⁶ In turn, science is defined as, "in its widest meaning, synonymous with knowledge; in the narrow sense, a particular discipline with its own proper object and formal reason; more precisely, an organically constituted body of evident, certain, and necessary truths. A science is true if it is adequate to its object and can resolve its conclusions in evident principles."⁷ The third meaning does not bear any significance here. It is used in an inferior way; it is not used in the framework of philosophia perennis but only in the common speech of men. In this sense, knowledge does not convey the true mode of understanding. It is truly used in opposition to wisdom. In short, the term "knowledge" can be used, in its widest sense, to include wisdom and science; and it can be used, in its narrowest sense, in place of science in contradistinction to wisdom.

Speculative knowledge presupposes "abstraction by intellect." This notion of speculative intelligibility is linked to non-materiality. Maritain holds that, "It is therefore by the diverse modes or degrees in which the objects of thought discovered in things by the operations of the intellect are freed from matter that it becomes possible to establish the essential divisions of science." Science in general deals with "the necessities immanent in nature, with the universal essence realized in individuals in the concrete and sensible world." The

⁵Ibid., pp. 4-5; An Essay in Christian Philosophy, p. 113.

⁶Science and Wisdom, p. 5.

⁷An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 114.

essential divisions of science are based upon the various degrees of intelligibility of the objects of knowledge.⁸

Maritain follows St. Thomas Aquinas in distinguishing three kinds of wisdom in the hierarchic order of knowledge: infused wisdom or the wisdom of grace, theological wisdom and metaphysical wisdom. They are distinguished on the basis of their "objective light" and their "formal object." In terms of objective light, the first (infused wisdom) has "the kinship of love with the supernatural." It attains God in a superhuman way. "It is a wisdom of love and of union. As its principles theologians enumerate faith and charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit acting under God's actual inspiration and illumination." It is sovereign and, therefore, "it can make use of everything. It may use the treasures of the imagination and of creative intuition, and the stammerings of poetry: and then it sings with David. Or it may make use of the ideas and treasures of the intelligence and the stammerings of the philosophers: and then it teaches with St. Augustine."⁹

Theological wisdom is the second form of wisdom. "Its special light is the communication of the knowledge which God has of Himself, which is made to us by revelation [not by love as in infused wisdom], and which offers to unfold its content to the effort of our intellect." Thus, the method for theological wisdom is human, discursive, or rational. It is a wisdom of faith that makes use of human reason and logic. The third form of wisdom is metaphysical wisdom, which will be discussed in detail later. It has for its special light "the intelligibility of

⁸Ibid., p. 43.

⁹Science and Wisdom, pp. 22, 23.

Being."¹⁰ In accordance with the "law of governance" the wisdom of grace is above theological wisdom and theological wisdom, above metaphysical wisdom. Infused wisdom and theological wisdom belong aright to the supernatural, whereas metaphysical wisdom belongs to the natural order in which it is the queen.

In the world of nature (in the speculative order), there are essentially three degrees of abstraction. They are Physica, the knowledge of sensible nature (the sensible real), which is the first and lowest degree of abstraction; Mathematica, the knowledge of quantity as such (the preter real), which is the second degree of abstraction; and Metaphysica, the knowledge of what is beyond sensible nature (the trans-sensible), or being as being, which is the third and the highest degree of abstraction in the natural order.¹¹ "The division of the three orders of abstraction," Maritain writes, "is an analogical division. The three orders are not part of the same genus: they constitute fundamentally different genera."¹²

Physica, the lowest degree of abstraction, is represented by physics itself. It is divided by Maritain into two distinct sciences: the science of affirmation (primarily inductive science of sensible nature) and the science of corporeal being. He defines science in the strict sense of the term: "Science . . . considers only the intelligible necessities immersed in the reality of this world of existence. Each of our typical knowledges considers in it one, and only one, universe of

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 23-24.

¹¹ The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 35-38; Science and Wisdom, p. 38. See Appendixes II and III.

¹² Science and Wisdom, p. 38.

intelligible necessities, while if there is a supreme knowledge, a knowledge-in-chief, a knowledge of first principles, it will consider all these different universes together, not in such a way as to replace the particular knowledge that concerns itself with each of them, but in order to know that knowledge itself, to defend and justify its principles, and thus to establish unity."¹³

The second degree of abstraction is Mathematica. Following the dictum that "every higher discipline is regulative with respect to its inferiors," the law of governance, mathematics governs the lower world of empirical sciences, the first degree of abstraction. Though mathematics is materially inductive like other empirical sciences, it is formally "a deductive science, a science of the propter quid." Mathematics "will tend to rule the lower sections of knowing, if not to encroach upon metaphysics itself."¹⁴

In concluding our discussion of the worlds of Physica and Mathematica, we should emphasize again Maritain's insistence upon seeking a unity in speculative knowledge and upon finding a formula to distinguish but not to separate all types of knowledge. In this spirit he stresses the knowledge accumulated by modern science, though science itself culminates in metaphysics. In recognizing the important developments which have occurred in modern science, he declares, "it seems that a true philosophy of the progress of the physical and mathematical sciences in the course of modern times, precisely because it is its duty to set forth by critical reflection the spiritual values with which that

¹³The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 136.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 41.

progress is pregnant, must recognize in it the sign, not of a restriction and impoverishment, but of an improvement and growth within the organic structure and differentiation of thought. It must therefore, on the one hand, reveal the essential compatibility of this mathematical and empiriometrical progress with the knowledge of the ontological type which is proper to philosophy. On the other hand, it must respect the nature of the Experimental Sciences. . . ."15 Although formally the mathematical and empirical types of knowledge have some connection with higher types, each lower type, each individual science, maintains an autonomy in regard to its particular sphere of knowledge, and this individual autonomy within the whole universe of knowledge in turn contributes to a widening of the scientific field.

Below metaphysics and above science of the empiriological type there exists another type of knowledge -- the philosophy of nature. "The philosophy of nature," Maritain explains, "knows the same world as the empiriological science, the world of change and movement, of sensible and material nature; but the resolution of concepts is made here in intelligible being, not in the observable and measurable as such."16 If the philosophy of nature is related to political philosophy at all, it is because man is related to nature itself.

The conflict between philosophy and science is the core of the problem of the philosophy of nature. Metaphysics actually lies halfway between the philosophy of nature and the highest and loftiest spiritual wisdom of the Divine Spirit. Thus metaphysics, because of its superior

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 200-201.

¹⁶ Scholasticism and Politics, p. 54.

position to the philosophy of nature, rules the philosophy of nature as well as the lowest level of abstraction of physical sciences. "Metaphysics is more perfectly speculative than the philosophy of nature and the sciences of phenomena."¹⁷ However, we must distinguish the philosophy of nature, which is a type of ontological knowledge, from the sciences of the observable phenomena. Besides, the sciences of phenomena know the order of nature in an unsatisfactory way without the aid of a higher knowledge. Therefore, "they require to be completed by another knowledge of the same sensible universe, which will be an ontological knowledge -- in truth, a philosophy of nature." The philosophy of nature, due to the fact that it is a higher type of ontological knowledge (philosophical), rules the lower sectors of the sciences of empiriological type. In the first and lowest order of abstraction or intelligibility, everything is resolved in the observable; however, in the ontological type of intelligibility, everything is resolved primarily in intelligible being as such. "Thus the object of natural philosophy does not lie in the detailed phenomena of sensible things but in intelligible being itself as mutable. . . ." In short, "Bringing with it the light of philosophical illumination, the philosophy of nature liberates in the scientific universe an intelligibility which the sciences themselves cannot provide. It discloses in sensible reality, known in so far as mutable, analogical traces of deeper realities and truths which are the proper object of metaphysics."¹⁸

The philosophy of nature, therefore, occupies a unique position in the hierarchy of speculative knowledge. It is "the battleground of

¹⁷Science and Wisdom, p. 71.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 52, 61, 68.

science and philosophy" because it occupies an intermediary position between metaphysics and empiriological science. Maritain holds that "the proper object of the philosophy of nature does not extend to that specific diversity of bodies, nor to the whole multitude of their phenomena, and is constituted only by transcendental being as determined and particularized in the corporeal, mobile and sensible worlds." Therefore, "the philosophy of nature is in a certain continuity with metaphysics, in spite of the essential difference separating them," and it is thus superior to mathematics. Furthermore, it must be noted that, "Philosophy does indeed provide a deductive science of corporeal being, but that it is incapable of providing a deductive science of the phenomena of nature."¹⁹

If one wants to understand "the epistemological conditions and characteristics of the Philosophy of Nature," one must realize that the philosophy of nature, "however obscured by sensible matter . . . belongs to an ontological type of explanation, wherein the natural movement of the speculative intellect finds full play. It does not cling to empirical conditions, but to reasons of being and to causes properly so called. It aims to discover the essence of things."²⁰ Proceeding from an analytic-synthetic method as in philosophy proper,²¹ the philosophy

¹⁹The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 38.

²⁰Ibid., p. 175.

²¹According to Maritain, philosophy proper uses an analytico-synthetic method. "The analytic method, which predominates in the natural sciences and is inductive, proceeds from the observation of facts to the formulation of the laws governing them; the synthetic method, which is dominant in speculative science and is deductive, goes from the general to the particular, from first principles to specific applications, from the simple to the complex." An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 109.

of nature "depends on experience much more stringently than Metaphysics and must be able to carry its judgments right down to sense verification. Nevertheless, it is a deductive science, assigning reasons and intelligible necessities in proportion as it ascertains the intrinsic constitutive or the 'quiddity' of its objects." In this way, the philosophy of nature "participates in some way in the light of metaphysics, even as our soul participates in some way in the nature of pure spirits. The specifying object of the Philosophy of Nature is the ontological mutability and the formalities in which the mind can discern a difference of being (corporeity, quantity, motion, life animality, etc.) within corporeal natures taken as such. And this suffices to assure its distinction and autonomy in regard to the experimental sciences."²²

Metaphysica is the highest degree of abstraction or intelligibility in the order of nature. Metaphysics itself is not without relation to a practical philosophy. It is "somewhat indirectly" related to a practical philosophy, since man is part of the universe and the world of human action is linked with this universe. As theology (as a rational defense of divine revelation) should defend its principles and the faith against the adversaries of faith, the task of metaphysics, "as supreme science of the natural order," is to defend "the real value of reason and of its principles against the skeptics. . . ."²³

"Since metaphysics considers the highest reasons for being, it will, as a result, be the regulating science par excellence, scientia reatrix." In the speculative order it occupies "the supreme and

²²The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 175, 178.

²³An Essay on Christian Philosophy, pp. 41, 56.

master-form of knowledge." It is primarily in the domain of what Maritain calls wisdom, differing from science in the latter's strict sense. As we recall, there are three forms of wisdom: the highest form of wisdom, infused wisdom; theological wisdom; and the lowest form of wisdom, metaphysical wisdom. And yet metaphysics is a form of science in Maritain's wider definition of the term. Science in the wider sense is wisdom which "knows things through first causes and the highest reasons for being," and in its narrow sense is that which "knows things through second causes or proximate principles." Then, "Metaphysical wisdom is at the purest degree of abstraction because it is farthest removed from the senses; it opens out onto the immaterial, onto a world of realities which exist or can exist separately from matter." Maritain maintains, therefore, that it is of necessity and by its nature "the lot of all human science," and that it "sets us down in the midst of the eternal and the absolute." Thus, "Metaphysics is not a means; it is an end, a fruit, a good at once self-justifying and delightful, a knowledge for the free man, the freest and naturally most regal knowledge, the door to the leisure of that great speculative activity in which intellect alone can breath, set, as it is, on the very peak of causes."²⁴ Again, he writes that, "It has for its own special light the intelligibility of Being in its pure state (i. e., without interior reference to a construction in the imagination or a sense experience) at the highest degree of abstractive intuition . . . Being in its own proper mystery, ens secundum quod ens."²⁵ Metaphysics is thus not only the highest of the three

²⁴The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 5, 41, 46.

²⁵Science and Wisdom, p. 24.

degrees of abstraction, but also philosophy "in the strictest and most correct sense of the term." Metaphysics is a science of being qua being:

The object of metaphysics is not in the least the world of the universal known in the most general and therefore least determined fashion. In other words, it is not the generic classes of the things of nature. It is an entirely other world, the world of the super-universal, the world of transcendental objects which, disengaged as such, do not demand, as genera do, to be completed by progressive differentiations coming as from outside, but offer a field of intelligibility which has in itself its own ultimate determinations. And those objects can be realized outside the whole order of the genera and differentiations of the world of experience. That is why metaphysics is a perfect knowledge, a true science.²⁶

Though the proper object of metaphysics is not God (as in theology or "natural theology" which is part of metaphysics itself), "a wholly immaterial subsistence is an object of metaphysics."²⁷ Metaphysics is distinguished from theology according to its specific object and light in which the matter is studied as to its mode. The metaphysician approaches his subject from the standpoint of being as being, even if he must realize the fact that God is the first cause. The theologian, on the other hand, approaches his subject in the light of the Divine Being and its communication to us.²⁸

However, of cardinal importance is the fact that "the field of metaphysical wisdom itself comprises the reflexive knowledge of the relation of thought to being (critique), the knowledge of being as being (ontology in the strict sense), the knowledge of pure spirits and the

²⁶The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 5, 41, 46.

²⁷Ibid., p. 218.

²⁸Science and Wisdom, pp. 104-105.

knowledge of God according as these knowledges are accessible to reason alone (pneumatology and natural theology). . . ." For Maritain, metaphysics occupies the highest rung on the ladder of human knowledge in the natural order, since it contributes to the understanding of God and to the explanation of all being. If "metaphysics descends to the actual existence of things in time, and rises to the actual existence of things outside time, it is not only because actual existence is the sign par excellence of the intrinsic possibility of existence, but also and especially because existence itself is . . . the seal of all perfection, and cannot remain outside the field of the highest knowledge of being."²⁹

The relationship between philosophy and science deserves attention. Maritain conceives of science as the study that "proceeds from the visible to the visible" and "from the observable to the observable," whereas philosophy "proceeds from the visible to the invisible, [that is] to what is of itself outside the order of sensible observation (for the simple reason that the principles which [the philosopher] reaches are in themselves pure object of understanding and not object of sensible apprehension or imaginative representation. Here is a world unimaginable by nature or 'negatively')." "

Since they have utterly different formal objects, other principles of explanation, diverse conceptual instruments, and, on the part of the knowing subject himself, quite distinct intellectual virtues or discriminating lights, the domain proper to philosophy and the domain proper to the sciences do not overlap. No explanation in the scientific order will ever be able to displace or replace an explanation belonging to the philosophical order, and vice versa.

Thus "the sciences do not depend on philosophy for their intrinsic development." Maritain maintains further that the sciences are dependent

²⁹The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 218.

in principle (formally), and only in principle, on philosophy.

Accordingly, he writes:

Truth to tell, scientific explanations do not reveal the very being of things. Since they explain only proximate causes or even that kind of formal cause which is the conformity of phenomena to mathematical law (and such more-or-less arbitrarily constructed entities fashioned as a support for this type of law), they can never satisfy the mind. For the mind will always, and necessarily, raise questions of a higher order and strive to penetrate into the purely intelligible.

From this point of view, we can say there is a certain dependence of the sciences on philosophy. Inasmuch as they seek the raison d'être and yet reveal it only imperfectly, the sciences themselves inspire the mind with a desire for philosophy and look for support to a higher knowledge.

Moreover, the scientist as a human being poses "stable ontological nuclei" or "substantial x's, that serve to support phenomena." Maritain points out here that the sciences by themselves are insufficient to explain the principle of causality (metaphysical causality), and that they must, therefore, presuppose the first principles; otherwise, "an infinite regress in this order clearly renders all demonstration impossible." Thus, "it is philosophy that determines the nature of the primary objects the sciences work on and, consequently, their own very nature, value and limits. For example, philosophy, not mathematics, will tell us whether or not irrational numbers and transfinite numbers are real beings or beings of reason. . . ." Philosophy also "assigns the order reigning among the sciences: sapientis est ordinare." And philosophy, being superior to the sciences, is independent of them. Although there is no formal dependence of philosophy upon the sciences, Maritain maintains that the history of philosophy shows unequivocally that "there is, to be sure, a great MATERIAL dependence of philosophy on the sciences." And yet, he declares, "To imagine that philosophical doctrines have to be changed with every scientific revolution would be as absurd as to

think that the soul is transformed with every change of diet."³⁰

It is "also an illusion to believe that by appealing to scientific facts without first illuminating them by a higher light, any philosophical debate -- the debate about hylomorphism, for instance -- may be settled."³¹

Maritain's acceptance of Thomism fundamentally presupposes a belief in the immutability of philosophical principles. Thus if he accepted a hypothesis that philosophical principles themselves change because of the discovery of new scientific principles and laws, there would be no valid ground whatsoever for accepting Thomism in the present age. Thomism would become merely a museum piece in the history of philosophy. Since modern science has modified not only the tone but also the basic trend in the method of inquiring into the philosophical principles and problems in question, there seems to be an unbridgeable chasm between scientific philosophy and Thomism, especially "the philosophy of science" and the Thomistic philosophy of nature.³²

³⁰Ibid., pp.47-50.

³¹Philosophical facts may be distinguished from scientific facts. A philosophical fact is "the fact that something exists, the fact that a multitude exists, that change and becoming exist, that knowledge and thought exist, that desire exists." Ibid., pp. 57, 58.

³²For instance, compare any work of Jacques Maritain with, say, Hans Reichenbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957). Henry Margenau, a physicist and philosopher of science, stresses the fact that "ultimately sociology, ethics, politics, and even religion are infected by the germ that is born when a truly great discovery in pure science is made." Recognizing "the cultural lag between scientific discovery and its philosophic understanding," he ventures to surmise "the features of the coming philosophy, which will be a true transcription of the ideal resources, attitudes, and commitments of present science." "Perspectives of Science," Key Reporter, XXV (Autumn, 1959), pp. 2,3,8.

Be that as it may, Maritain holds that the Thomistic principles of philosophy not only purify concepts of the nature of philosophy after "three centuries of neglect and misunderstanding" (probably since the Cartesian revolution), but also guard against "both a lazy separatism and a facile concordism and re-establish a vital bond between [philosophy and experimental science] without upsetting the distinctions and hierarchies which are essential to the universe of knowing." He continues, "In determining the nature and true value of physico-mathematical science, the place, role and extent of its explanations, not only does metaphysics keep the system of our cognitions in order, but it renders mathematical physics the essential service of protecting it against distortions that would be almost inevitable without it; above all, against the harmful illusion that leads it to regard itself as a philosophy of nature and to believe that things begin to exist only when they are measured by our instruments."

For Maritain, Thomism alone can save philosophy from the mistakes of the past as well as of the present since the time of Descartes. Thus he writes confidently that, "One is right in holding that Thomistic philosophy is, more than any other philosophy, in a position to provide the sciences with metaphysical frameworks within which they may deploy their own necessities unhampered and suffer no violence. This is so not only because Thomistic philosophy is essentially realistic and gives a critical justification for the extramental reality of things and the value of our powers of knowing . . . but also because it guarantees the autonomy and specific character of each and because its metaphysical explanation of the real have as their necessary consequence no systematic

deformation tyrannically imposed on experience."³³

Although in metaphysics Maritain establishes a unity of the speculative order of knowledge in the world of nature, his philosophical system continues and terminates finally in theology. It is in this respect that he is a theologian as well as a philosopher following the footstep of his master, St. Thomas Aquinas. He is a philosopher-theologian. Martin Grabmann says that, "for Thomas, theology is not merely science and the highest of all the sciences, but rather wisdom -- sapientia divina."³⁴ Theology thus considered, moreover, has profound implications in man's practical life. "Since St. Thomas elevates the science of theology to wisdom, he thereby gives it an eminent ethical significance, stressing the intimate, mutual relation between theology and life. For this reason Thomas frequently emphasizes the importance of supernatural ethical purity and sanctity for a theological knowledge."³⁵

For Maritain, theological wisdom and infused wisdom vivify metaphysical wisdom, just as metaphysical wisdom vivifies the lower levels or strata of knowledge including the philosophy of nature, mathematical sciences and physical sciences.³⁶ Maritain points out that "metaphysics suffers not only from the common necessity of abstraction and discourse; it also suffers a weakness proper to itself. It is a natural theology; its object is, above all, the Cause of causes." However, "metaphysics makes God known to us only by analogy, known, . . . not in those things

³³The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 60, 64, 66.

³⁴The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 29.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Science and Wisdom, p. 86.

which are His very own, but in the commonness of transcendental perfections which exist at once in Him and in things -- though in infinitely different modes." At the summit of metaphysical inquiry there is the higher wisdom of natural theology, the knowledge of God, which is the last and the highest department of metaphysics. "Our knowledge of God does not proceed merely from ananoetic intellection or intellection by analogy. It is necessary to add that this analogy is uncontainig, uncircumscriptive." Thus, "All the divine perfections are strictly identified in God. When [Maritain says] being of God, the word continues to signify being and does not signify, does not present to [his] mind, goodness of knowledge, and yet the being of God is His knowledge and His goodness, His mercy and His justice." Therefore, God is "simple, one, good, omniscient, all-powerful, free. . . ."37

Furthermore, Maritain maintains that there is a higher type of theology, apophatic theology which "knows God by the way of negation and non-knowing," above cataphatic (or natural) theology which "proceeds by way of affirmation and of science." He says: "Apophatic theology, or theology by way of non-knowing, is not a pure and simple ignorance, but an ignorance which knows, for that is its proper mystery. . . . It is one of the ways of metaphysical knowledge or ordinary theology, and indeed its most exalted moment." It is rightly called "mystical theology," it is theology, in a usual understanding of the term, that is understood by faith or mystical contemplation. Maritain explains, "in the metaphysical knowledge of God, it is from the heart of the intelligible that our intellect, having discovered the ananoetic value of

³⁷The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 6, 226, 227, 229.

being and of objects which belong to the transcendental order, rises, thanks to them, to the divine analogate. On the contrary, in the knowledge of faith it is from the very heart of the divine transintelligible, from the very heart of the deity that the whole process of knowledge starts out, in order to return thither. That is to say, from this source, through the free generosity of God, derives the choice of objects and of concepts in the intelligible universe which falls under our senses, which God alone knows to be analogical signs of what is hidden in Him, and of which He makes use in order to speak of Himself to us in our own language."³⁸

Finally, there is still a higher point beyond mystical experience. This is what Maritain calls "the Beatific Vision." He says "Faith, a substitute for vision here below, and a beginning of eternal life, knows this selfsame object WITHOUT SEEING IT, giving, as it does, even in obscurity, an infallible adherence to what first Truth has revealed of itself." However, "the Beatific Vision knows Him BY and IN His very essence, sicut in se est, according to what He is in Himself, in a way proportionate to what He is, without mediation of any creature or concept." According to Maritain, there is a capital difference in the uses of analogy in the realm of faith and in the realm of metaphysics. "In the case of metaphysics, analogy constitutes the very form and rule of knowledge. God is not attained in virtue of His incommunicable nature and selfhood . . . but only according to that which is shown in His reflections . . . and in the analogical participations which things proportionate to our reason offer us of Him." Namely, 'metaphysics is poised at the summit of the created world, and from that

³⁸Ibid., pp. 236, 237.

vantage point, it looks upon the inaccessible entrance towards which all created perfections converge -- but without seeing Him in Himself. Faith is installed in that very entrance itself, at the very heart of the Uncreated, but God has closed its eyes to Himself. And it is through the images of creatures which it remembers having seen here below that it describes His mystery. Deity as such is achieved, but without being seen and without any apprehension except by the analogies that God chooses in the created thing to instruct us about it."³⁹ Finally, the Beatific Vision is enjoyed only by "the blessed in heaven."⁴⁰

From the standpoint of this essay, the relation between theology and philosophy is extremely important. As it has already been noted, theology and philosophy are intimately related, although they are distinguished from one another. As the lower form of knowledge (or wisdom) aspires to the higher form, philosophy aspires to theology. "Theology is quite a different thing from a simple application of philosophy to matters of revelation: that would be a monstrous conception; it would submit revealed data to a purely human light and subordinate theological wisdom to philosophy." This is the scandal of anthropocentric humanism. Instead, theology is "an elucidation of revealed data by faith vitally linked with reason, advancing in step with reason and arming itself with philosophy." Thus "philosophy, far from subordinating theology to itself, is properly the 'servant' of theology in the immanent use theology makes of it. Theology is free as regards philosophical doctrines.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 241-42, 249, 251.

⁴⁰Charles A. Fecher, The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, p. 111.

It is theology that chooses among these doctrines the one that will in its hands be the best instrument of truth."⁴¹ Maritain writes elsewhere that "the premisses of philosophy, however, are independent of theology, being those primary truths which are self-evident to the understanding, whereas the premisses of theology are the truth revealed by God. . . . It is therefore plain that philosophy and theology are entirely distinct. But if philosophy and theology are entirely distinct, they are not therefore unrelated, and although philosophy is of all the human sciences pre-eminently the free science, in the sense that it proceeds by means of premisses and laws which depend on no science superior to itself, its freedom -- that is, its freedom to err -- is limited in so far as it is subject to theology, which controls it externally."⁴² In regard to the problems which are concerned with the destiny of man and with the conduct of the universe, metaphysics, like other sciences, is resolved in an unsatisfactory way if it is not illuminated or super-elevated by a higher type of wisdom. We should remember moreover, the law of the hierarchy of knowledge and wisdom: "the lower . . . always tends to the higher and seeks to make contact with it: supremum infimi attingit ad infimum supremi."

Metaphysical wisdom is strengthened by supernatural faith and by theology in the search for truth. Thus Maritain concludes: "now if the lights of faith and speculative theology bring home to the philosopher with greater force, perfection, and certitude his act of purely rational

⁴¹The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 252-53.

⁴²An Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 95-96.

adherence to the object of philosophical knowledge, such as the existence of the first transcendent cause, and even to the first principles of reason, for how much greater reason ought the light of wisdom par excellence, mystical experience of the things divine, aid and purify the philosophical intellect."⁴³

It is the speculative order of knowledge, then, that man's intellect through abstraction finds knowledge for its own sake, truth for the sake of truth. The speculative order contains three degrees of intelligibility in the order of nature: Physica wherein empirical knowledge of the sensible world is resolved in sensible being; Mathematica wherein empirical knowledge of the sensible world is resolved in quantity as such; and Metaphysica wherein human knowledge is resolved in being as being. In metaphysics man's natural knowledge as such attains its highest summit of the great pyramid; from metaphysics it reaches out toward knowledge of pure being revealed through analogy in cataphatic theology, through faith or mystical contemplation in apophatic theology, and finally "the sight of God face to face as He is" in the Beatific Vision. Metaphysics, the queen of natural knowledge in the practical order, however, must of its very nature be superelevated by theology. In the hierarchy of knowledge Maritain distinguishes the various strata, but he does not separate them from one another; through the logic or law of subalternation (infraposition or infravalence) each field of knowledge, a higher form regulates a lower form of knowledge without violating the latter's autonomy in the proper sphere of its own. Thus, physical science and mathematical sciences are subalternated to

⁴³The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 284, 286.

metaphysics, and philosophy and metaphysics to theology.⁴⁴ We must look at Maritain's whole system from the vantage point of unity; that is to say, no one part may be considered wholly apart from the rest. And his political philosophy does not stand alone without reference to the whole and integrative system. This is the reason why, although political philosophy belongs to the practical order, we cannot and should not ignore the different genus of the speculative order. Moreover, theology is the unifying element in Maritain's integrative system. Theology is thus at once both speculative and practical. Without reference to theology or without being integrated into theology, political philosophy is illegitimatized or de-philosophized.

⁴⁴See p. 253 infra.

CHAPTER XI

THE PRACTICAL ORDER

If to philosophize is essentially human, that is, living a truly human life, as Josef Pieper thinks it is, then philosophizing must not be restricted to contemplation or pure speculation. It must also be practical as well as speculative. When the art of philosophizing is to come to grips with the whole of reality, the practical order is an integral part of that whole. Moreover, from a cultural and political point of view, the practical order is our immediate concern, whereas the speculative order is somewhat indirectly related to human action since, for instance, man lives in the world of nature. Here we are concerned with knowledge not for the sake of knowledge but for the sake of action and the act of making. Human conduct is of supreme interest in the practical order, in which the practical reason is much more important than the speculative reason. As physical science, mathematical science, the philosophy of nature and metaphysics meet and join together at the loftiest summit of theology, so social and political philosophy, the philosophy of history and moral philosophy in general must converge to the self-same summit of theology.

All the speculative and the practical sciences must take theology into account. Theology is the highest knowledge of all, supremely and formally, which is at once speculative and practical. It encompasses

all. All must be considered in the light of theological truths. If science is divided into "infinite" and "finite," then the infinite science is theology and the rest are finite sciences. Theology, which is infinite, has no division of what is speculative and practical.¹

However, Maritain maintains that "if the superior forms of wisdom (theology and the wisdom of grace) by virtue of their very superiority are at the same time speculative and practical, they are first of all and principally speculative."² Theology is more speculative than practical, because "not only is theology 'chiefly concerned with divine things rather than with human acts,' but even when treating of these latter, that is to say in its practical part, it does so on account of the perfect contemplation of God. . . ." However, moral philosophy itself cannot be said to be more speculative than practical, "because it constitutes exactly that practical part of finite knowledge which stands in contradistinction to its speculative part."³

One science (knowledge) can be subalternated to another on the basis of the following three categories: "its end, its principles (only), or its subject (and its principles)." The first category does not coincide with the second and the third categories. However, there is a connection between the second and the third categories: "Whenever there is subalternation as to subject there is always subalternation as to principles; but it is possible to have subalternation as to principles without subalternation as to subject."⁴ The relation between physics

¹An Essay on Christian Philosophy, pp. 75-76.

²Science and Wisdom, p. 71.

³An Essay on Christian Philosophy, pp. 79, 80.

⁴Ibid., p. 83.

and mathematics would be an instance of the former; and the relation of mathematics to philosophy would represent the latter case. The same holds true in the case of the relation between moral philosophy adequately considered and (moral) theology. That is to say, moral philosophy adequately considered is subalternated by reason of principles only without being subalternated as to subject.

Moral philosophy, adequately considered, obtains its idea of man's last end (the supernatural end) from theology alone. Theology and faith are "essentially and specifically orientated toward the beatific vision," whereas, in contrast, moral philosophy adequately considered is "orientated toward natural and terrestrial evidence." (Moral) philosophy, however, does not need (moral) theology as physics needs mathematics to resolve its principles. "Philosophy resolves its conclusions in naturally evident first principles by its own powers." Philosophy needs theology for perfection and completion. Moral philosophy, because it is subalternated to theology, is "the beneficiary of a complement or fulfilment, a superelevation that is supernatural in origin." Thus, it is "indirectly attached to a supernatural root." In turn, moral philosophy adequately considered is "employed in a ministerial way by the superior light of faith." The moral philosopher leaves the matters concerning faith to the theologian. He is, however, "completed and illumined by faith." "Without faith there could no more be a moral philosophy adequately considered than there could be a theology."⁵

Therefore, a moral philosophy as well as a theology must

⁵Ibid., pp. 88, 90, 91, 95.

presuppose faith itself. It is not necessary for a moral philosopher to possess "the science of the theologian," but he must comprehend (not merely accept) it in order to perfect his moral philosophy. Moral philosophy, because it is subalternated to theology, cannot encroach upon theological truths, which comprise primarily "the Scriptures and the Conciliary and Patristic Tradition, and only in a secondary and instrumental way the pronouncements of the philosophers."⁶

The positive and empirical fields of research, as in politics, economics, anthropology, sociology and the like, are not constituted as "completely and genuinely explicative 'sciences' unless integrated with theology," Therefore, "Only a theological anthropology or a political theology would merit the name of ethical science or political science strictly speaking." However, since the distinction between theology and philosophy exists, these disciplines can also be integrated with moral philosophy. "As there ought to be a theological anthropology and a political theology, so too there ought to be a philosophic anthropology and a political philosophy."⁷

Philosophy -- cultural, social, political, or moral -- cannot be pure philosophy. It is "only imperfectly autonomous" and, thus, must be subalternated to theology to attain its truly perfect status. The same holds true in the studies of "ethnology, sociology, politics, pedagogics, the philosophy of profane history, as it is [in the studies of] the history of religions and comparative mysticism."⁸

⁶Ibid., p. 97.

⁷Ibid., p. 99.

⁸Science and Wisdom, p. 71.

In Maritain's system, theology has not abandoned what is human and natural. In fact theology provides the basis for what is human and natural. To become truly human means to become theological. Maritain's theological ventures into the mundane natural world, from a political point of view, are what distinguish him from, say, the crisis theology of Karl Barth. In this sense, Karl Barth and Jacques Maritain represent the antipodes of the Christian attitude towards civilization and politics. As Maritain himself often notes, the theology of a Karl Barth is one of an "anti-humanist." Of course, Maritain condemns anthropocentric humanism, not because it is "humanism," but because it is "anthropocentric." "A position essentially anti-humanist," Maritain comments, "would be an absolute condemnation of culture and civilization. The ultra-Calvinism of the theology of a Karl Barth is perhaps such a tendency. But this absolute condemnation of things human is Manichean, not Christian, and incompatible with the central dogma of Christianity, the mystery of the Incarnation."⁹ We are not competent here to judge the theological truth expressed by a Karl Barth and a Jacques Maritain. From the cultural and political standpoint, the latter is far more realistic than the former. The following passages explain the fact that Maritain remains Christian and, at the same time, is concerned with the mundane natural world. He even said that "it is not good to despise the creature of flesh and blood."¹⁰ Having condemned the "misfortune" of modern history under the banner of rationalism and division rather than of Christianity and unity, Maritain writes:

⁹ Some Reflections on Culture and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 2.

¹⁰ Science and Wisdom, p. 11.

Their adventure in philosophy is not without relation to the political adventure of modern states, which have managed to differentiate themselves in their proper order but under the banner of Gallicanism or Josephism or anti-religion. So that, mutatis mutandis, problems of the lay-Christian state have their resemblance in problems of profane christian wisdom. In both cases the struggle is between the notion of infravalent end and the notion of means: or, more exactly between the conception of the temporal as an order of means and ends with its own last end infravalent and subordinated with regard to the ultimate supernatural end, and the conception of the temporal as a mere stage in the order of the ultimate supernatural end.¹¹

This is the matter that concerns us in Maritain's philosophy of culture, which will be discussed later. Now we should go on with the practical order itself.

Along with the speculative order, distinguishable from but not separable from the speculative order, there exists in Jacques Maritain's system the practical order of knowledge.¹² In the hierarchy of practical knowledge we are directly concerned with knowledge for the sake of acting, while the speculative order is concerned with knowledge for the sake of knowing. Speculative philosophy (knowledge) and practical philosophy (knowledge) are "different in type." "The first," Maritain writes, "is lifted up towards the Timeless by the three moments of abstractive vision . . . the second redescends towards time according to a continuous flux of thought which, after a process in which the speculative still merges with the practical -- which is practical philosophy itself -- terminates at the last in a purely practical proceeding -- which is the judgment of prudence."¹³ Thus, prudence is the immediate guide for

¹¹ Ibid., p. 128.

¹² See Appendix I.

¹³ Science and Wisdom, p. 108.

directing moral action. Practical knowledge, as the regulator of action, is the virtue of prudence.

Practical knowledge is divided into "speculatively practical knowledge" and "practically practical knowledge." Maritain explains that "speculatively practical knowledge (which is practical philosophy) proceeds according to a general mode of organisation or (one may say) a strategy of knowledge; and practically practical philosophy proceeds according to a mode of conceptualising of the object and (one may say) of equipment of knowledge different in type from the strategy and equipment of speculative knowledge."¹⁴ Practical knowledge or philosophy, thus, is concerned with man and his existence in the concrete and historical movement. It is concerned with concrete human acts here and now. It is clear here that the philosophy of history rightly belongs to the practical order. It is also obvious in practical knowledge that man and his existence existentially considered (not his pure nature but his "fallen" nature) must have the supernatural end in view. The whole order of practical knowledge is subalternated to theology.

"Speculatively-practical knowledge and practically-practical knowledge," Maritain explains, "differ from one another by the mode of defining and conceptualising, and their respective typical ways of constructing concepts." Though the cardinal distinction between the speculative order and the practical order lies in the ends they pursue, the difference between speculatively practical knowledge and practically practical knowledge lies in the fact that "in the speculatively-practical sciences, the concepts preserve their naked value of abstraction and

¹⁴Ibid.

intelligibility: while in the practically-practical science they incorporate a train of concrete overtones that tune in with the dynamic currents through which action comes into existence." In other words, speculatively practical knowledge is "more speculative and more abstract," whereas practically practical knowledge is "more practical and more concrete."¹⁵

The speculative order considers the world of existence, that is, the universe of physical sciences, mathematical sciences and of metaphysics, whereas the practical order, though it considers the world of existence, finds its end in human action and conduct. The practical order "seeks to know, no longer for the sake of knowing but for the sake of acting; it seeks to acquire, respecting an object which is something practical (an act to be done), a science which proceeds in a practical manner in regard to its own finalities and the conditions of the object, but nevertheless remains speculative or explanatory in mode in regard to the general or fundamental cognitional equipment, and considers the universe of action and operative values from the point of view of its raison d'être and the intelligible structures immanent in it."

It is important that Maritain does not maintain that there is a separation of knowing and acting. The practical order of knowledge does not simply stop at the point of knowing for the sake of knowing, but it extends to and includes acting. Therefore, knowing in the practical order has a utilitarian value for human action and conduct. Maritain observes that, although practical philosophy has nothing to do with the degree of abstraction which is the characteristic of speculative philosophy, still "it cuts right through the whole field of knowledge,

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 138, 139, 142.

from the metaphysical heavens from which it is suspended, to the world of experience, on which it must needs rest." it is pointed out further by Maritain that "ends play the role of principles," and that, differing from the philosophy of Kant, "practical philosophy is not limited to prescribing. . . . It is a science, it knows. But it does not completely and truly know its object, which is something to be done, unless it knows how it should be done." Thus it "is not knowledge of simple observation. It is also, and essentially, a regulative science, a normative science." In this respect, Maritain invariably suggests that "it gathers into a scientific system all the knowledge necessary to regulate action from afar, that is, all the rules for action which the intellect can discern by adapting to practical use an equipment and a mode of discerning the true which is typically speculative." Ethics (moral philosophy), politics (political philosophy) and economics, all of which are the sciences of human behavior, verify this principle.

"Although there are two perfectly distinct types of philosophical science corresponding to the speculative order and the practical order," Maritain characteristically does not fail to integrate these two distinct orders into a higher knowledge (wisdom). In accordance with the law of the hierarchy of all human knowledge, "theological science . . . because of its eminence, includes within its unity both the speculative and the practical order."¹⁶ The nature of theology is explained as follows: "If we take the word 'theology' in the very general sense of sacred doctrine [sacra doctrina as Aquinas calls it] -- including the whole organism of our knowledge of the mysteries, faith itself, the

¹⁶The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 311-13, 317.

theological discursus and the gifts of knowledge, understanding and wisdom -- then the practical science we are discussing here is evidently a part of theology thus understood." Moreover, the fact that "one and the same theology has a speculative side and a practical side . . . is the privilege of theology, due to its eminence and the unity it derives from its association with divine light and uncreated science."¹⁷ Thus the practical order, like the speculative order, must accept its guidance from theology; "the practical part of theology [is in a position] to regulate our actions from above."¹⁸

Political philosophy is an integral part of moral philosophy. The universe of human action is the proper object of a practical philosophy, e. g., political philosophy. Speculative philosophy is called Christian only because of its state (not nature). However, practical philosophy must be considered Christian because of its state and also because of its object. Maritain explains that practical philosophy is "in a relationship to theology of subalternation and not only of infra-position. Because here the object -- human acts -- is taken in its actual existence and as needing direction in its concrete movement towards its concrete ends."¹⁹ As the relation between philosophy and theology in the speculative order is of cardinal importance in Maritain's whole system, the relation between moral philosophy and (moral) theology is of more significance since moral philosophy is concerned with human action or with man existentially considered.

¹⁷ Science and Wisdom, p. 140.

¹⁸ The Degrees of Knowledge, p. 313.

¹⁹ Science and Wisdom, p. 117.

As in the speculative order, moral philosophy is distinguished from theology although it is not entirely separated. For Maritain, moral philosophy must rightly be subalternated to (moral) theology. By distinguishing philosophy from theology here, two things are accomplished: first, philosophy is not just subjugated to theology and second, the idea of theology is elevated. "Just as grace does not suppress nature, so theology suppresses nothing that duly belongs to philosophy." However, the moral philosopher must turn to theology for enlightenment. "Just as theology continues to exist in heaven below the beatific vision, to which it is subalternated without being suppressed, similarly on earth below theology in its practical and moral function there ought to exist an adequately conceived moral philosophy subalternated to theology though not suppressed by it -- an enlarged or uplifted philosophy of human acts."²⁰

It is true that theological truths are indispensable to the full consideration of ethics (moral philosophy) and the object of morals must take into account these theological truths to reach its perfect status. But Maritain warns us that this does not imply a kind of "theological imperialism" over morals and moral philosophy. We must avoid the misconception that "there exists no moral or practical philosophy but only moral theology; and that thus theology may claim for itself alone and in an exclusive way the whole field of human action." Thus, first, there is "moral theology" and, second, below it, there is "moral philosophy adequately considered," that is to say, moral philosophy that is subalternated to theology. Maritain explains that moral philosophy

²⁰An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 74.

adequately considered "is moral philosophy taken as constituting purely and simply (simpliciter) a true moral science, in a state which makes the mind of itself adequate to or in conformity with its object, that is to say, human action."²¹

The above consideration concerning the relation between moral theology and moral philosophy, by Maritain's own admission, is "of extreme importance both in relation to the hierarchies of knowledge, and in relation to the cultural order itself."²² The cultural implication of this relation is of immediate concern in this essay. This is the reason why we must speak of the philosophical and theological foundation of Maritain's political philosophy.

Moral theology, as well as moral philosophy, is "a form of knowledge." However, the former is rooted in heaven and the latter is rooted on earth although both cover the same material field of the natural and supernatural mystery of human conduct. Practical philosophy adequately considered and moral theology, Maritain writes, "can cover the same field and have the same object, human acts, and still remain two specifically distinct forms of knowledge by reason of the formal determinant sub quo."²³ In moral philosophy, things are seen from a human point of view (that is, from below), whereas moral theology looks at things from above, that is to say, from a divine point of view. Moral philosophy, moreover, has its own distinct function and exercise in the natural world, which "theological or sacred wisdom cannot

²¹Science and Wisdom, pp. 109, 110.

²²Ibid., p. 110.

²³An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 67; Science and Wisdom, p. 112.

exercise in its place."²⁴

As theology is not "a simple application of philosophy to revealed data" and thus completely distinct from philosophy, moral theology is in "no sense simply moral philosophy enriched by the data of faith. Nor is it moral philosophy as enlightened and elevated by faith." On the contrary, it transcends all philosophy and knowledge that can be known through natural light and human reason. However, moral theology never repudiates the existence of a moral philosophy itself. Philosophical knowledge has its own right to judge things in its own (natural) light. Moral philosophy is "the style of reason" and its principles are those of "practical reason," while moral theology derives its own light from the "lumen divinum." Since moral theology and moral philosophy (adequately considered) are distinct, "moral philosophy will not contain a treatise on the infused virtues, or on original sin and grace, or on mortal sin and venial sin, [while] moral theology will not contain a treatise on political science pure and simple nor will it undertake a study of the cultural connexions of the Greek and Buddhist worlds, or the influence of class and nation on the temporal welfare of modern states." For Maritain, "political science pure and simple" means politics which is dealt with politically or politics "from the point of view of the ordering of man towards temporal and political life." However, if a theologian writes a treatise concerning politics, then he will not write it from the point of view of the ordering of man towards temporal and political life, but rather "from the point of view of the ordering of man to spiritual and supernatural good." Political science will not be

²⁴Science and Wisdom, p. 112.

dealt with politically, but theologically. Thus, "the treatise will be theologico-political." This does not imply that a theologian cannot deal with the details of politics. On the contrary, "Such a treatise is not bound to remain in the heights: it can descend to the lowest details: but it will always be concerned with details considered from its own formal viewpoint."²⁵ This is the clue that Maritain himself, at his loftiest moment of political thought, is a political theologian. His political treatises, at their loftiest summit, are theologico-political. However, we will do him an injustice if we repudiate him for writing politically and philosophically.

Moral theology and moral philosophy adequately considered are "two worlds of different kinds" as nature and grace are, not because they deal with different objects but because the former considers human conduct "according to the ordination of man's life to the supernatural end which is the perfect knowledge of God" and the latter deals with the life of man ordered to a natural and temporal end.²⁶ However, we should not have any illusions about the fact that moral philosophy must be subject to the superior tribunal of moral theology. As the natural and temporal end of man must be illumined by the last and supernatural end, moral philosophy must be elevated and completed by the light of moral theology.

In Christian ethics or "moral philosophy adequately considered." we cannot ignore the notion of human nature. Indeed, it is one of the fundamental bases, if not the only basis, of Christian moral philosophy.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 113, 117.

²⁶Ibid., p. 119.

A practical philosophy, e. g., political philosophy, deals with the universe of human conduct and things. Thus, it must take into consideration human nature. "Man," Maritain writes, "is not in a state of pure nature, he is fallen and redeemed."²⁷ This is what Maritain calls "man existentially considered." Moral philosophy or ethics, which deals with all the aspects of human action and things, must account for man existentially, that is to say, the fallen and redeemed man but not in his pure state which is of course inadequate if not impossible. The same holds true in politics, economics, practical psychology, sociology, and individual morality, all of which belong to the domain of moral philosophy.

Maritain, however, speaks of the possibility of "all purely natural ethics." There is no natural man, existentially speaking: that is to say, all men are sinful and demand redemption. Purely natural man is only "the realm of simple possibility." Thus, a purely natural ethics falls outside "the province of moral science." Maritain gives Aristotle as an example of the possibility of formulating a purely natural ethics. Moreover, a purely natural ethics really lacks two things: "the knowledge of the true ultimate end to which man is actually ordained, and the knowledge of the integral conditions of man's actual existence."²⁸ Accordingly, a purely natural law does not exist.

The fallen nature of man, even if rescued by grace, still is "wounded" or "impaired" (as J. Messner puts it). There is only one science of human conduct in gradu scientiae practicae: "it is that one which takes into account at once the essence and the state, the order

²⁷An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 39.

²⁸Ibid., p. 63.

of nature and the order of grace." Therefore, for Maritain, the Aristotelian ethics that discounts the order of grace is "too deficient."²⁹ This is "practical philosophy inadequately considered." The Christian moral science, which accounts for the fallen and redeemed nature of man, is the only moral science adequately considered. "Of itself [ethics] has to do with theology, either to become integrated with or at least subalternated to theology." Ethics, when adequately considered, must be integrated with or subalternated to theology if we take into account the existential conditions of man. Moral theology is at once a unity. When man is considered factually and existentially, then the only true last end is the supernatural end.

In moral philosophy we must take into consideration the notion of prudence. It occupies a distinct place in the moral conduct of man in the practical order. "Prudence," Maritain writes, "is clearly a habitus specifically distinct from either speculatively or practically practical moral science, since an ignorant man can be prudent in his personal conduct and since, strictly speaking, prudence (like the other moral virtues) supposes only the first naturally known principles of practical reason and information derived from experience." Prudence is also characterized by that "which immediately governs the act to be done . . . by a judgment and command appropriate to the absolute individualization of the concrete case."³⁰ Maritain explains that prudence, which is of the Holy Ghost, comes to us "from reason illumined by faith."³¹

²⁹Ibid., p. 64.

³⁰The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 462, 463.

³¹An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 67.

Moreover, prudence is needed in moral science to attain certitude: "strictly moral science supposes prudence (and therefore the other moral virtues), if not in respect to the experimental material and partial truths it can gather up, at least for its complete truth and scientific certitude." Therefore, for instance, "St. John of the Cross and St. Alphonsus were able to produce absolutely sure practical doctrine only because they were not only learned but prudent and experienced."³² "All moral science," Maritain declares, "is continued and completed by prudence."

Maritain divides prudence into "acquired" and "infused" prudence. Moral philosophy adequately considered is continued and completed by acquired prudence, whereas moral theology is continued and completed by infused prudence. Acquired prudence is "a state of grace in the soul of man where it is joined with charity and superelevated by its conjunction with infused prudence." As man searches for the ultimate end (a supernatural one) and the temporal end (a natural one), infused prudence appertains to the former and acquired prudence to the latter. "As grace does not destroy nature, nor supernatural life destroy 'civil' life, when the soul has acquired the natural moral virtues [prudence], these natural moral virtues co-exist in the just soul with infused virtues. This point is of capital importance for Christian ethics." This co-existence of moral virtues (of acquired and infused prudence) forms "a vital and synergic union" in the moral life of man. Here again is a distinction similar to that which exists between moral philosophy and moral theology. It is the distinction between the temporal

³²The Degrees of Knowledge, pp. 462, 463.

and the spiritual, between the kingdom of God and the social world, between nature and grace. Thus the acquired moral virtues which adjust human action and conduct to the temporal ends of man are illuminated and exalted by reference to the infused moral virtues. In an attempt to fuse the two (acquired moral virtues and infused moral virtues), Maritain warns us against "a tendency to treat temporal things or things of 'civil life' -- especially of politics and social life -- viewed separately and without sufficient reference to the light of theology -- as if man lived in a state of pure nature and as if our Saviour had never come."

In the philosophical system of Maritain there is also a close relationship between the sciences of experimental knowledge (behavioral knowledge) and moral science. The sciences of experimental knowledge are behavioral in the sense that they are concerned with the investigation of human behavior. Thus they are not the sciences of phenomena (the sciences of the empiriological type) which have no place in practical knowledge. He closely relates moral or practical science (the "science of freedom") with nature, with human inclinations and dispositions. The former does not consider a world which is separated from nature. He insists: "It is rooted in nature, it unfolds itself in every sort of natural condition." in this sense, the degrees of instances of moral science require "as wide as possible a basis of experimental knowledge." Moreover, the two sciences benefit from each other. Since "experience plays a fundamental part in moral science," a large number of scientific disciplines (such as sociology, economics, and what are called the cultural sciences or humanities -- "which are a sort of methodical and scientific investigation of the field of experience")

are preparatory to moral science. On the other hand, "the moralism of moral science" furnishes the value judgments that experimental science needs. "From the instance when the facts and information they [experimental sciences] have gathered are scientifically grouped and classified, they cannot fail to have reference to value-judgments." Thus, when scientists pass explicit value judgments on the material they gather, they are engaged in tasks belonging to the category of practical science.

Maritain warns us, however, that "the sociologist, the ethnologist, the folklorist and the historian especially, while they need to have a moral philosophy so as to understand the things they are talking about, ought to fulfil as far as possible their methodological obligation to avoid those judgments of value which they are always apt to mingle with their work."³³

However, Maritain refuses to recognize the sciences of human behavior as absolutely autonomous sciences. He maintains that they differ from sciences of phenomena (sciences of the empirical type) and purely speculative sciences (sciences of the ontological type) in that the sciences of human behavior are concerned with normative considerations of the regulation of human conduct and are therefore "inseparably" interrelated. "These disciplines are in no sense autonomous sciences comparable with physics or chemistry." Thus he condemns the positivist

³³Science and Wisdom, pp. 210, 211, 213, 219. Herbert Johnston says, "the social sciences will first have to be sound in themselves, pursued, again, as the speculative study of an operable object and leading to value-free, ethically neutral conclusions." And "Personal philosophical convictions on the part of the social scientist are important as well as inevitable; but they are not a part of social science taken in and by itself." "A Pattern for Relating Ethics and the Social Sciences," Ethics and the Social Sciences, pp. 86, 90.

and behavioral approach as being "a great illusion."³⁴

In regard to political philosophy, Maritain indicates that it is a part of moral philosophy and at the same time can be an explicative science (political science in the strict sense). Maritain, like Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, accepts the view that political philosophy occupies "the peak of moral philosophy" in regard to the vita civilis. As moral philosophy in general is subalternated to theology, so is political philosophy; and Maritain specifies a political theology which, in a temporal society, exalts and elevates the supernatural end of man. And there is a distinction between political philosophy and political theology. Maritain gives us the following examples: St. Thomas Aquinas' De Regimine Principum stems from the latter; his commentary on Aristotle's Politics from the former.³⁵ Maritain notes that in De Regimine Principum, "St. Thomas points out the supreme principles of politics, and deals with politics from the viewpoint of their relation with man's eternal destiny." It is "an organic work of moral theology concerning political matters, or else a treatise of theologico-political science." In contrast, a treatise simply on political science "would consider its object politically, and would get down to details while adopting the point of view of temporal life" (without reference to the supernatural life). We have learned, however, that Maritain does not consider Machiavelli's Prince as a genuine treatise on political science. It is "a typical example of political pseudo-science" simply because it is based upon a separated philosophy, which means a philosophy inadequately considered without the illumination from a higher wisdom such as

³⁴Science and Wisdom, pp. 168, 169, 170, 172.

³⁵An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 100.

theological wisdom and infused wisdom. In Maritain's opinion, "We have still to wait for someone to write a treatise on politics simpliciter, from the point of view of a philosophy in union with theology."³⁶ This was said long before he wrote his Man and the State, which, we are inclined to believe, is a treatise on "politics pure and simple." And we are prone to identify that "someone" with Jacques Maritain himself.

Maritain insists that since moral philosophy -- ethics -- is a practical science, it must not be content with "the intrinsic and universal principles"; it must proceed to "the more particular determination of human acts and their rules" -- "the good of the agent himself and the good of others." The virtue of justice (the good of others) in particular introduces "a number of most important questions pertaining to what is called natural right, and treating in the first place of man's obligations to God (a question of natural religion), secondly of his obligations to his fellow-men."³⁷ Moral philosophy also introduces the rights of the individual, the rights of the family, and the rights of society. Hence, political philosophy as a part of moral philosophy emphasizes the moral aspects of human life, and embraces important concepts with which Maritain is concerned, such as the Thomistic natural law, the dignity of the human person, and the spiritual values of justice, freedom, and love. Maritain claims, "It is evident that the normal result of existing with the people is political and social action with and for the people, and an effort to foster the progress of social justice. This is not simply a task of techical adjustment or material

³⁶Science and Wisdom, p. 121.

³⁷An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 99.

improvement. It requires an idea of the dignity of the human person, and of the spiritual values of justice, freedom, and neighborly love. The task is to help prepare for a new order while being intent on the spirit of the Gospel."³⁸ In political philosophy, as in moral philosophy in general, Maritain emphasizes over and over again the theological inspiration and the need of evangelical action in human societies. He resorts ultimately to the supernatural good which theology alone can adequately inspire and illuminate. Since man's conduct must be regulated in reference to the supernatural end, "ethics or philosophic morality is evidently inadequate to teach him everything he needs to know in order to act rightly. It must be completed and elevated by the teachings of revelation."³⁹ But it should be well remembered that although Maritain resorts to the primacy of theology and the supernatural end, the temporal and the natural have not been reduced to nothing. They always have a sphere of their own. "It is not good to despise the creature of flesh and blood."

As Jacques Maritain himself has emphasized, what has been said on the levels of theology, metaphysics, philosophy and, above all, their interrelationships will inevitably produce deep impacts on the cultural order in general and on the mundane level of politics. It is truly the fountainhead from which the various tributaries of cultural, social, and political philosophies continuously flow. Theology is at once a unity, which knows no division of the speculative and the practical. Theology is of its very nature both speculative and practical. Reason, philosophy and nature bow to faith, theology and grace; but theology never throws

³⁸The Range of Reason (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 127.

³⁹An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 267.

dust in the eyes of philosophy. Instead, it illuminates and elevates what is below in an imperfect condition. What is above is continued with what is below. Without seeing the integrative unity and the flow of Maritain's whole system, we merely infatuate and destroy it. As Maritain so well expresses it, "If . . . we look on the coming of an authentically christian philosophy as so characteristic, it is not because we make it prior to theology but because we picture to ourselves an integrally humanist civilisation in which the great waves of wisdom in man, sweeping from the sacred heights of faith to the extreme coast of the human and the profane, will set free all that is true in the human and the profane."⁴⁰

⁴⁰Science and Wisdom, p. 133.

SECTION IV

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JACQUES MARITAIN

CHAPTER XII

MARITAIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY:

A THEOCENTRIC HUMANISM

For Jacques Maritain as well as for other Catholic theologians and philosophers, theology is the queen of all sciences (speculative and practical). But she is not a dictatorial queen; indeed, she is a liberal queen. A philosophy of culture and society is within the proper domain of practical philosophy, since it is concerned with human action and things. "Practical philosophy," Maritain writes, "is still philosophy and remains a mode of speculative knowledge; but, unlike metaphysics or natural philosophy, it is from the outset directed to action as its object, and however large a part verification of fact may play in it, however much it must needs take historical necessities and conditions into account, it is above all a science of freedom."¹ Theology, which is at once speculative and practical, is an overseer of the philosophy of culture.

In contrast to such Catholic theologians as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange who is exclusively concerned with theological problems, Maritain is known as a philosopher of culture and society within as well as without the Catholic circle. Maritain himself writes that "Whereas for centuries

¹True Humanism, p. viii.

the crucial issues for religious thought were the great theological controversies centered on the dogmas of faith, the crucial issues will now deal with political theology and political philosophy." Thus, the center of gravity of "a new approach to God" is neither dogmatics nor speculative knowledge but "the field of culture and in the historical life of man."² The close relation between God and the temporal world, in Maritain's thought, is best expressed in his philosophy of culture. God and culture meet at the summit of Maritain's ideal of a new Christendom. Maritain is truly a philosopher of culture and society rather than a political philosopher. Therefore, we must consider him pre-eminently a philosopher of culture rather than a political philosopher in a narrow sense.³

Maritain's whole system, it is worth while remembering again, is striving for unity and integration that pull the speculative and the practical orders together. Thus, to use the notion of analogy which is an extremely important concept in Maritain's philosophy, what is valid in the relation between theology and metaphysics, faith and reason, grace and nature and between the supernatural and the natural is also valid in the relation between religion and culture and between church

²The Range of Reason (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), pp. 92, 94-95.

³Concerning the expositions of Maritain's philosophy of culture, see particularly: E. L. Allen, Christian Humanism (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952); Charles O'Donnell, The Ideal of a New Christendom, pp. 162-270; Philip S. Land, "Practical Wisdom and Social Order," Social Order, V (November, 1955), pp. 391-400; Francis J. Marien, "Social and Political Wisdom of Maritain," Social Order, V (November, 1955), pp. 386-90; Charles A. Fecher, The Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, chapter xxii, "Integral Humanism," pp. 264-74; Joseph W. Evans, "Jacques Maritain's Personalism," Review of Politics, XIV (April, 1952), pp. 166-77 and "Jacques Maritain and the Problem of Pluralism in Political Life," Review of Politics, XXII (July, 1960), pp. 307-23.

and state. As Maritain himself has repeatedly emphasized, philosophy is subalternated, or is infravalent, to theology; so, too, the same analogy governs the relation between religion and culture.

The order of freedom (in the practical order) is comparable to the order of nature (in the speculative order). Thus, Maritain's philosophy of culture is the philosophy of freedom. The relation between what is speculative and what is practical has been nowhere better expressed than in his "philosophy of freedom." As his speculative system is Thomistic, so is his practical system. St. Thomas Aquinas is always "a contemporary author."⁴ In his philosophy of freedom (or culture), Maritain shows that "the order of Freedom necessarily presupposes the order of Nature [or Being]," although they are two heterogeneous worlds, that is to say, they are distinctively different worlds.⁵ Maritain maintains that St. Thomas Aquinas unites these two orders without confusing them and "grounds" the order of freedom on the order of nature.⁶ To say that freedom presupposes nature means that "ethics presupposes metaphysics and speculative philosophy and that the true use of our freedom presupposes the knowledge of Being and of the supreme laws of Being. Metaphysics is a necessary prerequisite of ethics." Freedom is grounded on reason itself. Thus, for example, the crises in the political and economic order "urge us strongly to study metaphysics."⁷

⁴Jacques Maritain, Some Reflections on Culture and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 1.

⁵Freedom in the Modern World, tr. Richard O'Sullivan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 5.

⁶Ibid., p. 4; Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 11.

⁷Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 13, 14.

Ethics or moral philosophy must be based upon human nature, that is to say, what man is. The question of "what man is" is a metaphysical question and even a theological question. "Ethics," Maritain writes, "which we may consider as the rationalisation of the use of Freedom, presupposes metaphysics as its necessary prerequisite. A system of ethics cannot be constituted unless its author is first able to answer the questions: What is man? Why is he made? What is the end of human life?" Thus, for Maritain, a sound ethics must presuppose human nature or man, who is "a metaphysical being, an animal that nourishes its life on transcendental things." Therefore, ethics, although it has a distinct existence, must depend upon metaphysics for the determination of man's last end (which is the supernatural end) as well as for "a knowledge of the laws which govern the choice of means." These laws arise from the very rational nature of man. Moreover, a proper ethics must require, besides metaphysics, "an immense amount of information of an experimental kind."⁸ Thus, it is obvious why moral philosophy must rest upon speculative knowledge; especially, metaphysics is necessary to determine the last end of man, human nature, the knowledge to obtain proper means for an ethical action, and the knowledge of experimental kind. They are interrelated, but the realm of action is distinct from the realm of speculation, and the realm of freedom is distinct from that of nature.

Maritain's philosophy of freedom has an application in the temporal as well as in the spiritual. He believes that since Kant and his Critique of Practical Reason, the opposition between nature and freedom became a common place in modern philosophy, whereas St. Thomas

⁸Ibid., pp. 14, 19.

Aquinas strived to integrate them.⁹ For Maritain, God alone knows the secrets of freedom. He has created it and "He alone can act upon that Freedom."¹⁰

A philosophy of freedom must begin with a doctrine of free will. The notion of freedom is much wider than the notion of free will. "Free Will is indeed the source and spring of the world of Freedom," and it is "a datum of metaphysics," because it is essentially the question of the "rational nature" of man. For St. Thomas Aquinas and Maritain, the root of freedom is in reason, that is to say, to be free is "of the essence of every intellect."¹¹ However, this metaphysical root of freedom must "develop in the psychological and the moral order." Also, Maritain's philosophy of freedom is bound up with the notion of person. The concept of person is an expression in action of what is in metaphysical order. "It is our duty by our own effort to make ourselves persons having dominion over our own acts and being to ourselves a rounded and a whole existence." A person is defined as "an individual substance of rational nature" (individualis substantia rationalis naturae). And this definition of person is "of fundamental importance in philosophy and law."¹² Moreover, Maritain's philosophy of freedom has an important application in the social as well as in the spiritual order.¹³

⁹Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 11.

¹⁰Freedom in the Modern World, p. 26.

¹¹Some Reflections on Culture and Society, pp. 12, 15.

¹²Freedom in the Modern World, p. 30.

¹³Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 15.

Free will or freedom of choice is not "free from any dangers within us," and it is "immersed in a world of feelings, instincts, passions, and sensible and spiritual desires."¹⁴ Thus, in order that man may become a master of himself and "self-sufficient," that is to say, to govern his own life without external constraint, he needs the aid of what Maritain calls "freedom of autonomy," as the individual needs the person in an analogical sense. Thus, freedom of choice is not an end in itself. Maritain holds that the root of many contemporary errors lies in the confusion of the two kinds of freedom, which he has distinguished above. For Maritain, the common error of moderns is to make freedom of choice the highest end in itself. Freedom of choice is rather "a means to the conquest of freedom in its autonomous sense, and the dynamism of freedom is in this very conquest demanded by the essential postulations of human personality."¹⁵ Consequently, freedom of choice is called "the initial freedom" and freedom of autonomy is called "the terminal freedom."¹⁶

Freedom of choice or free will is of course a prerequisite for morality, but it does not constitute morality itself. Free will does not define "the essence of morality." True morality or a true humanism must raise itself beyond and above free will or the human. This is the dynamism of freedom and a true humanism. Man is given this freedom of choice in order that he may reach freedom of autonomy. "Through the

¹⁴Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁵Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 15; Freedom in the Modern World, p. 31.

¹⁶Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 20.

initial freedom the formation of the political community, begun, prepared and inspired by nature," Maritain writes, "is accomplished as a human work of reason and virtue. This preparation is crowned by the conquest and achievement of the terminal freedom, which at its fullest transcends the order proper to culture and the State."¹⁷ As man's final goal is not a natural one but a supernatural one, analogically speaking, person and freedom of autonomy, rather than individual and freedom of choice, are final or terminal ends. However, it must be made clear immediately that individual and freedom of autonomy are distinct from person and freedom of autonomy, as nature and reason are distinct from grace and faith. This distinction is of utmost importance in Maritain's speculative as well as in his practical system. And the two systems are analogically linked with each other. This is also the architectonic structure of his political philosophy.

Therefore, the freedom of choice of each individual and the common good, which is the right and highest terrestrial good and constitutes a "principal element" in itself, are not the final ends in themselves. They are only infravalent ends. The human person and the autonomous freedom are above the common terrestrial good. The human person strives towards his spiritual perfection and freedom of autonomy, which "proceeds something higher than the State."¹⁸ The supreme type of autonomous freedom is transformed by love and reached by the saint.

The social application of freedom is obvious. There is an analogous problem in the ordering of social life. Maritain himself admits

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 18.

that the idea of freedom dominates the majority of great Western political philosophies of modern times.¹⁹ There are two misconceptions of freedom: one is the "liberalist" or "individualist" conception and the other is the "collectivist" conception of freedom.²⁰ The former is represented by the French example and the other is dressed in German National Socialism and Russian garb. The individualist conception of freedom makes freedom of choice an end in itself. Thus, in the individualist political philosophy, the primacy of social justice and the common good is thrown into the background or neglected. In the collectivist political philosophy, according to Maritain, it is rightly conceived that social life should not be centered or based upon freedom of choice or the initial freedom but should be based upon freedom of autonomy or the terminal freedom.²¹ But it is wrongly conceived in the collectivist political philosophy that the autonomous freedom should be actualized in a transitive type of production, material accomplishment and the realization of power.²² As a consequence of this misconception, "the freedom of the person, freedom of choice and autonomous freedom are eclipsed by the grandeur of collective work."²³

Therefore, it is obvious that Maritain conceives of a third type of political philosophy which rejects the individualist and the collectivist political philosophies. His is "communal and personal," which makes

¹⁹Freedom in the Modern World, p. 39.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 39-41; Some Reflections on Culture and Society, pp. 16-17.

²¹Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 17.

²²Ibid.; Freedom in the Modern World, p. 41.

²³Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 17.

"justice and amity the proper foundations of this [social] life."²⁴ In his personal and communal political philosophy, the common good of the temporal order provides social life with material as well as moral substance, and this terrestrial common good is yet subordinated to the spiritual or eternal good of every citizen and to the autonomous freedom. Therefore, "the common good in the temporal order is an intermediate (not a final) end."²⁵ The interior principle of the spirit belongs to a sacred domain above the state, and it "subordinates all material goods, progress in technique, and development of power, all of which are a necessary part of the common good of the State."²⁶ The common good of the temporal order has its integrity and its proper good; however, it must acknowledge its subordination to the final end and cannot exalt itself to the summit of the absolute good. The purpose of man's possession of freedom of choice is to attain freedom of autonomy and the absolute end. Therefore, these two are integrated but not separated, and at the same time a due recognition is made to the real end of civilization or social life of which the true end is the common good. "Political philosophy," Maritain writes, "being thus directed not towards pure and simple freedom of choice, nor towards the realisation of Freedom of power and domination over the external order of nature and history, but towards the realisation and progress of the spiritual freedom of individual persons, will make of justice and friendship the true foundations of social life."²⁷ "Where the spirit is, there is

²⁴Ibid., p. 19.

²⁵Freedom in the Modern World, p. 42.

²⁶Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 19.

²⁷Freedom in the Modern World, p. 45.

liberty."²⁸ This is the core of Maritain's philosophy of culture, a theocentric conception of culture.

Arnold Toynbee conceives the rise and fall of a civilization as the process of challenge and response. A civilization dies away and is thus temporary. But the Church (the Mystical Body of Christ) is everlasting. Western civilization is dominated by Christianity. "It is dominated, no matter what it may do, and even when it denies it, by Christianity."²⁹ For Maritain, thus, Western humanism springs from religious and transcendental sources. Western humanism springs not only from medieval Christianity but also from the heritage of Greek antiquity in the names of Homer, Sophocles, Socrates and Virgil.³⁰ As it will be clear, we must distinguish the humanism of pagan antiquity from the theocentric humanism of Jacques Maritain. The Hellenic humanism is an anthropocentric humanism, which is expressed in Pythagoras' formula that "man is the measure of all things." The Homeric or Olympic religion, which is the most genuine Greek religion, is truly an anthropomorphic one. Religion here is humanized and temporalized. Erich Kahler expresses this well when he says: "The hieratical inflexibility of the Oriental gods had melted away; all has become human, flexible and diversified. These gods manifest themselves to men not only in human shape, but as

²⁸Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 1. Arnold Toynbee expresses the same spirit when he says: "The realm of the spirit may be freedom's citadel." An Historian's Approach to Religion (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 251.

²⁹Scholasticism and Politics, p. 225.

³⁰True Humanism, pp. xiv-xv.

human beings, with characteristic feelings, thoughts, plans and ways, with complex individual lives adorned by colorful and even libertine adventures."³¹ This anthropomorphic conception is exactly what is not a theocentric humanism.

Maritain's conception of a true humanism is grounded in Roman Catholicism. When Western civilization will reach its loftiest height, it is actualized in the form of Catholicism. Maritain says, "I who am a Catholic understand and appreciate that the momentum of such a movement carries it towards a Catholic form of civilisation."³² Catholicism alone penetrates into the depths of culture and vivifies it. "All religions other than the Catholic religion," writes Maritain, "are in more or less narrow and servile fashion, according as their metaphysical level is more or less elevated, integral parts of certain definite cultures, particularised to certain ethnic climates and certain historical formations. The Catholic religion alone is absolutely and strictly transcendental, supra-cultural, supra-racial and supra-national -- because it is supernatural"³³ However, in his later writings, the basis of his integral humanism seems not limited to Catholicism when he says: "The new approach to God will be a new approach to the true God of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, the true God of the Gospel, Whose grace, perfecting nature and not destroying it, transcends reason in order to strengthen, not to blind or annihilate it, makes moral conscience progress in the course of time, and leads human history, that is, the ceaseless and ceaselessly thwarted effort of mankind toward emancipation, in the

³¹Man the Measure, pp. 82, 87.

³²Freedom in the Modern World, p. 71.

³³"Religion and Culture," Essays in Order, p. 32.

direction of its supratemporal accomplishment."³⁴

It is of cardinal importance to realize, at the outset, that Maritain never identifies religion with culture or civilization. Therefore, the earthly civilization and the Church are "two heterogeneous worlds." Civilization, as the work of reason, belongs to the temporal order, whereas religion belongs to the supernatural order, to the Kingdom of God. In the same manner, the Catholic religion is not the same as the Catholic world or Catholics. Walter M. Horton attributed Maritain's ability to distinguish between Catholicism and Catholics partially to "the fact that he was not born a Catholic, but became one from conviction."³⁵ However, as it is clear now, the distinction between Catholicism (as a religion) and the Catholic world (as a form of culture) is deeply rooted in the very Thomistic interpretation of Maritain, in which theology, faith, grace and the supernatural are distinguished respectively from philosophy, reason, nature and the natural.

However, these two sets of orders are not separated from each other. Maritain writes: "It is of the highest importance to recognise the distinction between these two orders and the independence of the spiritual in relation to the cultural order."³⁶ A Christian civilization, which may be illuminated by the supernatural virtues and end, still remains "something temporal, essentially terrestrial and therefore deficient and belongs to the order of nature."³⁷ Therefore, Maritain is

³⁴The Range of Reason, pp. 93-94.

³⁵Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 51.

³⁶Freedom in the Modern World, p. 97; "Religion and Culture," p. 35.

³⁷"Religion and Culture," p. 35.

in a position to declare that "Catholics are not Catholicism. The errors, apathies, shortcomings and slumbers of Catholics do not involve Catholicism. Catholicism is not obliged to provide an alibi for the failures of Catholics. The best apologetic does not consist in justifying Catholics or making excuses for them when they are in the wrong, but on the contrary, in emphasising their errors and pointing out that, far from affecting the substance of Catholicism, they serve only the better to display the virtue of a religion which is still a living force in spite of them."³⁸ Maritain does not condone the mistakes of some Catholics in the past, and yet he is a staunch and impeccable defender of Catholicism. As we recall, Reinhold Niebuhr has been critical of "the blindness of Catholicism" and of the Catholic being a blind child of light.³⁹ Although Reinhold Niebuhr would be safe in criticizing a Catholic civilization or world, he is nonetheless mistaken in the eyes of Maritain when he uses Catholicism and a Catholic civilization interchangeably. Maritain would be in a position to criticize Reinhold Niebuhr, in turn, on the basis of his distinction between the Catholic world and Catholicism.

It is easy to understand why even the Protestant thinker H. Richard Niebuhr has come to admire the Thomistic position (a "Christ-above-culture" type) of which Jacques Maritain is the most distinguished

³⁸Ibid., p. 37. In regard to this point, see his The Things That Are Not Caesar's which is a passionate condemnation of the movement called the Action-française. The main spirit of this book is expressed when Maritain says: "This supremacy of matter must be resisted not only by the assertion of the rights of the mind and the reason but also by the asseveration of the supremacy of divine grace and the primacy of the spiritual" (p. xxvi).

³⁹The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, pp. 12-14.

representative in the contemporary world. In the Protestant world, no one will surpass Paul Tillich who presents a similar position in his idea of "the theology of culture" or "theonomy." Moreover, it seems that no Protestant theologian is closer to Maritain in his philosophy of culture than Paul Tillich, despite the latter's rejection of the infallible authority of Catholic philosophy and theology. In his characterization of the Thomistic approach to the philosophy of religion, Paul Tillich explains: "The rational way to God is not immediate, but mediated. It is a way of inference which, although correct, does not give unconditional certainty; therefore it must be completed by the way of authority."⁴⁰ Here Paul Tillich raises the most crucial question as to whether philosophical principles and conclusions can be judged by their own light without ultimately resorting to theological authority.

Maritain's "theocentric humanism" is truly a moral "revolution." And it is a "Christian heroism," to borrow his own terminology. Maritain is fond of quoting Charles Péguy's statement that "the social revolution will be a moral revolution or not at all." The complete moral revolution of his theocentric humanism is to reinstate the concept that "man is God and through God, not apart from God."⁴¹ We must be careful not to misunderstand the meaning of "revolution" here. It is more in the sense of "reformation" rather than the modern use of revolution. Maritain's revolution is not like the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution which attempted radically to eradicate the past and replace it with a new epoch. For Maritain as well as for Charles Péguy, the social

⁴⁰The Theology of Culture, p. 16.

⁴¹Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 93.

revolution means that "You can only transform the social order of the modern world by effecting at the same time and first of all within your own soul a renewal of moral and spiritual life; by digging down to the moral and spiritual foundations of human existence, and reviving the moral ideas that govern the life of the social body as such; and by awakening a new impulse in the secret sources of its being."⁴² This view coincides with his philosophy of history, which is essentially realistic in the sense that the past history is not discarded for the sake of a utopian ideal. Maritain often refers to "the concrete historical ideal appropriate to the coming age of civilization."⁴³

Maritain, first of all, notes the fact that the question of humanism is inexactly posed partially because the term "humanism" still has its affinity with the naturalistic conception of the Renaissance and also because "the notion of Christianity is contaminated for many by the memories of Jansenism and Puritanism."⁴⁴ "The dispute is not between humanism and Christianity," but it is between two different conceptions of humanism."⁴⁵ Thus, Maritain renders the widest definition of humanism, which would include at once Ramanuja, Confucius, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, Nietzsche, Ghandi and others. Consequently, Maritain does not criticize humanism as such, but rather a false conception of humanism. He defines culture or civilization in terms of "the common

⁴²Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 142-43; True Humanism, p. 114.

⁴³On the Philosophy of History, p. 113; True Humanism, p. 254.

⁴⁴Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 2.

⁴⁵Ibid.; Freedom in the Modern World, p. 32; True Humanism, p. 19.

good of human beings in the terrestrial or the temporal order."

Therefore, in this sense, "there is no culture that is not humanist."

An anti-humanism is the absolute condemnation and repudication of culture or civilization.

The anti-humanist tendency, in Maritain's opinion, is represented by "the ultra-Calvinism of the theology of a Karl Barth." A Barthian theology tends to repudiate culture or civilization.⁴⁶ From a cultural point of view, Maritain is more realistic than Karl Barth. Many have already pointed out that Christianity is, and has always been, a culture-bound religion; it has been bound up with Western civilization. More realistically speaking, Christianity has influenced the Western cultural modes at different periods and at the same time, the Christian religion itself has been influenced by historical exigencies and cultural and historical contingencies.⁴⁷ Thus, the extreme Barthian position is even attacked within the Protestant camp. Reinhold Niebuhr is the supreme example of those who condemn the "silence" of a Barth or the unrealistic Barthian position. For Maritain, the Barthian position (the condemnation of culture altogether) is not "Christian" but "Manichean," which is incompatible with the central dogma of Christianity. Maritain maintains that the condemnation of the world in the Gospel is not the

⁴⁶Freedom in the Modern World, p. 83; Some Reflections on Culture and Society; The Twilight of Civilization, tr. Lionel Landry (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1943), p. 7. In the Twilight of Civilization Maritain points out that "the splendid attitude of Karl Barth, during the present war, and the progress of his doctrine about the temporal order, are proof that the 'counter-humanism' of his theology is now balanced by more humanistic-conceptions" (p. 7). During the Nazi regime, Barth was a strong opponent of National Socialism.

⁴⁷See Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949). Considering Christianity as a historical religion, he says that "the Christian must find that religious thought is inextricably involved in historical thought" (p. 3).

condemnation of politics per se, but it is a separated politics. Thus, he writes, "The Gospel condemns the world. What is meant by the world in this case is not nature; it is nature only insofar as it pretends to suffice unto itself and reject the gift of God. And what is meant is not politics, but politics only insofar as it claims to regulate entirely by itself alone the lives and destinies of men and to set itself apart from the truth of God, Who has made man according to His own image."⁴⁸ Maritain repudiates what H. Richard Niebuhr has called the "Christ-against-culture" type (e. g., the Barthian position) and, at the same time, the "Christ-of-culture" type (Protestant liberalism of the nineteenth century as well as Catholic liberalism of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century).

As we recall, the question of humanism (or a philosophy of culture) is closely related to the anthropological and metaphysical question of what man is and to the theological question of man and his relation to the supreme principle of his destiny (the relation between grace and freedom). It is evident that Christian psychology necessarily involves the question of man's original sin and therefore his redemption. In Catholic thought, differing essentially from the Protestant Orthodox position, man carries the burden of original sin and requires salvation by the grace of God. But Maritain as well as other Catholic thinkers maintains that man is not entirely corrupted in the substance of his being, but he is merely wounded in his nature. Johannes Messner has already spoken of the idea that man is impaired. This position is unquestionably consistent with the Catholic recognition of the autonomous

⁴⁸The Twilight of Civilization, p. 34.

role of human reason. Therefore, a Calvinistic position or a Barthian position, for Maritain, is "a too simple dramatisation of fallen nature." In Calvinism and Barthianism, "free will" is completely denied to man, that is to say, in Maritain's terminology, the freedom of choice of man based upon the idea that man is an intelligent being is entirely denied. "The Protestant discovery," as Maritain calls it, is that "as a result of original sin man is taken to be essentially corrupt: that is the doctrine of Luther, of Calvin, of Jansenius." Free will or freedom of choice "has been killed by original sin" in Protestantism, and is replaced, in stead, by "predestination."⁴⁹ Man's salvation, according to this Protestant discovery, is accomplished only through the grace of God.

In the contemporary world, this problem is solved within the Protestant camp by the cultural philosophy of Paul Tillich when he recognizes the important role of reason in the cultural world -- in his theology of culture. In this sense, Gustave Weigel found the "Thomistic" element in Paul Tillich. This is also true, to a certain extent, in the cultural philosophy of Emil Brunner who also maintains that religion and culture are not two antimonies. On the other hand, there is an insurpassable difficulty involved in the cultural and political philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr. Reinhold Niebuhr's political realism is based on his theological notion of original sin ("essentially corrupted" human nature) and the selfishness of man. But, in the height of his theological thought, Niebuhr tries to transcend these human frailties. The Christian

⁴⁹True Humanism, pp. 2, 9.

must live in a deeper dimension, that is to say, he must transcend his selfish limitations. However, this seems to be a theoretical impossibility. The sinful man (utterly corrupted) must transcend his limitation on the high level of Christian love and justice; but it is impossible to transcend it precisely because he is completely corrupted. No one has pointed out this difficulty in Niebuhr's thought better than the great admirer of Niebuhr's political realism, Kenneth W. Thompson. Thompson writes, "[Niebuhr's] mind's ascent from the depths of human selfishness and sin to the bright summit of transcendent faith traverses the rough crags and peaks along which are strewn the remnants of earlier philosophical enterprises . . . his religious faith frees him from the need for having illusions about human nature at the same time that it prevents him from making these realities normative. The Christian, he argues, lives in a deeper dimension than the realm in which the political struggle takes place. . . . Indeed, the unsolved problem in Niebuhr's philosophy arises precisely from this crowning point in his thought."⁵⁰

Maritain notes that "In the state of fallen and redeemed nature there is for human life no perfection save a supernatural perfection: and this perfection itself is a paradox -- a more perfect soul is suspended above a more fearful abyss."⁵¹ It is clear that the Barthian position appears to be theoretically more consistent in that the condemnation of culture or civilization based upon his theological conception of man leads him to the side of a cultural and political indifferentism. However, his position is in fact (not theoretically) rather inconsistent since he

⁵⁰"The Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr," Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, pp. 168-69.

⁵¹Science and Wisdom, p. 92.

has none the less been sporadically concerned with current political problems. Niebuhr, on the other hand, is more realistic in that he is intricately involved in social and political problems, but he appears to be in a theoretically impossible position.

For Maritain, there are two conceptions of humanism: one is a theocentric or Christian humanism (distinct from what he calls "classical" (Christian) humanism of the Renaissance); and the other is an anthropocentric humanism (which began with the Renaissance). He apologetically states that the term "anthropocentric" is "not particularly felicitous." But he uses this term due to lack of a better term "to express a concept which shuts man up in himself and separates him from Nature, Grace and God."⁵² The great defect of this anthropocentric humanism is its "negation, denial, and separation." The age of anthropocentric humanism is governed by the law of "the separation and opposition between nature and grace, between faith and reason, between love and knowledge, between the affective life of love and the senses, [and] we are now witnessing a dispersion, a decomposition which is final." For Maritain, the "ultra-pessimist conception of human nature held by Calvin and Jansenius resulted also in an anthropocentric position."⁵³ Therefore, by theocentric humanism Maritain means the "authentic humanism" of St. Thomas Aquinas and St. John of the Cross rather than "the Christian humanism or naturalism which flourished from the beginning of the sixteenth century and of which we have experienced

⁵²The Twilight of Civilization, p. 4; Freedom in the Modern World, p. 89.

⁵³True Humanism, pp. 16, 22.

to the point of nausea."⁵⁴ Consequently, he rejects the anti-humanism of "the theology of grace without freedom" (Luther, Calvin and Barth) and an anthropocentric humanism of the theology or "metaphysic of freedom without grace." This theocentric humanism is also called "integral humanism," because it is the humanism that is integrated with Christianity. It is also the humanism of the Incarnation, because it is essentially linked with the Gospel, love and charity.

Maritain mentions two major difficulties of anthropocentric humanism: "In the first place, it begins by a process humanly disastrous;

⁵⁴Maritain would regard Machiavelli (a child of the Renaissance) as the forerunner of "anthropocentric humanism" in politics. In the Machiavellian conception of Realpoliti, politics is separated from religion (even morality) altogether. Machiavelli is thus considered to be the "father" of modern politics and political science. This process of separation has really consummated in the political philosophy of Hobbes. See Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958) and The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

Describing the rebirth of (anthropocentric) humanism in the Renaissance, Moses Hadas writes: "What the rebirth really meant was a fresh realization of man -- his high achievements and higher potentialities, his independence and his self-sufficiency. The glorification of man was the favorite theme of early Renaissance literature, and concern with man is what gives its primary meaning to the word humanism." Humanism: The Greek Ideal and Its Survival (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 120. Maritain insists that an authentic humanism can never be anti-religious. It must be integrated with religion and, moreover, it is authentically human only if God is served first.

In his brief discussion of the issue between "theistic religion" and "religion without God" (or "anthropocentric humanism" in Maritain's sense), Charles Hartshorne remarks: "There is at least this to be said for humanism, however. It has often been an effective protest against intellectual dishonesty and laziness in religion, as well as against the notion that love of God can really be actualized apart from love of our human fellows. We may learn from the humanists to be more sensitive to the absurdity of a piety which falls short of simple decency and helpfulness in ordinary affairs. . . . We may learn to realize more constantly and fully that loyalty to the objective God, whatever else it may be, must at least be devotion to the knowable truth, and to the full good of humanity." Reality as Social Process (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953), pp. 180-81.

to enrich humanity it must first renounce the heritage to which its whole history is linked; secondly, since it is impossible to establish an integral humanism without integrating it into a religion, and since all the theocentric religions, that is to say, all the existing religions, must by hypothesis be eliminated, there remains for anthropocentric humanism only the founding of a new religion."⁵⁵ "To declare war on God is a religious act," and, moreover, the dialectic of modern anthropocentric humanism, by eliminating all the existing religions, must by necessity create a new religion. Maritain points out the case of Auguste Comte (a religion of "Humanity") and of Russian Communism. In the integral or theocentric humanism of Maritain, there is no conflict between "the vertical movement" towards the supernatural end and "the horizontal movement of historical progression." On the contrary, the latter is served better if it is integrated with the former.⁵⁶ Thus, if God plays a part in human affairs, humanity is served better. The dialectic of the modern world is criticized both for being "humanist" and for being "theocentric." On the former ground, the Orthodox Protestant position is rejected and on the latter ground, anthropocentric humanism is repudiated. In anthropocentric humanism, man is the center of the universe; in theocentric humanism, in contrast, the center for man is God. Theocentric humanism is distinctively human. Anthropocentric humanism denies this human element and becomes "inhuman humanism." A genuinely human humanism, therefore, must recognize the supernatural or the eternal above the natural and the temporal. As they may be distinct

⁵⁵Some Reflections on Culture and Society, p. 4.

⁵⁶The Twilight of Civilization, pp. 13-14.

from each other, so is the relation between religion and culture in general. Therefore, Maritain, as we have seen, is in a position to make a distinction between Catholics (or the Catholic world or culture) and Catholicism (or the Catholic Church). It is the distinction between the things that are Caesar's and the things that are God's, although the latter are on a higher plane than the former.

Consequently, Maritain is in a position to criticize those who consider "Catholicism as though it were itself a terrestrial state or a terrestrial civilisation." This is what he calls "imperialism in spiritualibus."⁵⁷ Theocentric humanism lies neither in the separation of religion from culture nor in the identification of religion with culture. The age of theocentric humanism is truly "the reconciliation of the vision of Joseph de Maistre and that of Lamennais in the higher unity of the supreme wisdom of which St. Thomas Aquinas is the herald to our time."⁵⁸ Looking at theocentric humanism from the Thomistic synthesis, Maritain has already criticized the Protestant Orthodox position or "the satanocratic conception of the world" of Luther, Calvin and Barth. In the same manner, he has objected to the tragedy of the separatism of anthropocentric humanism in our age, which is composed of "three movements" in order of time beginning with the Renaissance. And these three movements, although they have followed one another in time, have co-existed and mixed one with another. The first movement (sixteenth-seventeenth centuries) is essentially "a reversal of the order of ends," that is to say, the supernatural end was replaced by the

⁵⁷"Religion and Culture," p. 36.

⁵⁸Freedom in the Modern World, p. 126.

earthly or natural end. The second movement (eighteenth-nineteenth centuries) is "like a demiurgic imperialism with regard to the forces of matter," where culture is held apart from the supernatural end; and the third movement (twentieth century) has consummated this process in which what is (religiously) human is replaced by materialism (what is material and technical) whose motto is "technique is good, machinery is good." Materialism is equally represented by both Marxism and capitalism.⁵⁹

Maritain has thus criticized the separatism of anti-humanism (based upon the satanocratic conception of the world) and of anthropocentric humanism. The identification of the supernatural (the Kingdom of God) and the natural (the world) is also an error for Maritain. In the identification of these two different realms, they occupy the same ground, and the cultural and political world is regarded as the realization of the Kingdom of God on earth. This error is expressed in what Maritain calls the "theophanic" East and in the "theocratic" West. The error of Eastern Christendom lies in its "cry that here and now heaven should come down upon earth."⁶⁰ Probably the theology of Russian Orthodox Nicolas Berdyaev might be considered to be the best representative of our time. In the West, the Counter-Reformation on the Catholic side, Gallicanism, Josephism, and Puritanism would represent the "theocratic" concept. Historically speaking, the best example is provided by the Spanish Armada at the time of Philip II, when the European Catholics rejoiced that "Spain was clearly the elected champion of God's Church"

⁵⁹True Humanism, pp. 22-24

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 97.

and God would defend the Spanish Armada for the right of the English Channel.⁶¹ For Maritain, this theophanic or theocratic conception is "an outrageous prevarication." And he holds that "medieval Christianity never professed theocracy in the political sense, since it always affirmed the distinction between the two Powers [the supernatural and the temporal]."⁶²

Maritain insists that the coming of a new Christendom based upon theocentric humanism is not a sacred but a secular idea, although it is derived from the true spirit of Christianity (Catholicism). A new Christian order is not sacred but secular in its manifestation in the modern world. This idea of a new Christian order being secular is rooted in Maritain's distinction between religion, Christianity, the Church or the Kingdom of God and culture, Christians or a Christian civilization. Christianity is not the same as the Christian world or civilization. Nor is the Christian religion a kind of anthropomorphism of pagan antiquity, where religion was a (principal) part or one of the constituent elements of its civilization. Instead, Christianity is essentially supernatural and belongs to the domain of God. It is "not a part of man, nor of the world, nor of a race, nor of a culture, nor of civilisation." The Christian religion thus transcends all forms of civilization and particular cultures. Maritain makes it clear that "A philosopher of culture who raises the question of the Christian world is not raising the issue of the truth of Christianity, but of the temporal responsibilities of Christians."⁶³

⁶¹Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), p. 400.

⁶²Freedom in the Modern World, p. 159.

⁶³True Humanism, pp. 34, 89-90.

The Christian religion is one and universal in eternity, but civilization is many, it dies and is reborn.

Under the heading of anthropocentric humanism, there are capitalism, German National Socialism and Communism. Maritain, like Nicolas Berdyaev and Emil Brunner, criticizes capitalism. Berdyaev, who has been influenced by Marxian idealism, has said that capitalism is the worst enemy of Christianity. As for Maritain, Communism is "the final state of anthropocentric rationalism" in the dialectic of the modern world. Communism is the culminating point of the anthropocentric post-medieval era.

For Maritain, capitalist society (or bourgeois society) is but "one aspect of the world of anthropocentric humanism." Max Weber and R. H. Tawney have already related Christianity (Protestantism) with the rise and development of capitalism. As for Maritain, "truly the mere idea of any bond or fellowship between Christianity and such a society [capitalist or bourgeois society] is itself the height of paradox."⁶⁴ He has no objection to the vitalism of capitalism, that is to say, to "a spirit of the exaltation of men's active and inventive powers, of human dynamism and individual initiative."⁶⁵ But he speaks against the "frankenstein of a usurious economy" and "the titanism of industry" in which there is "a spirit of hatred of poverty and of contempt for the poor." In capitalism, he finds "a spirit of the enslavement of all things

⁶⁴Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 116, 119.

⁶⁵True Humanism, p. 108; Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 129, 130.

to the endless increase of the sacred pile of material goods."⁶⁶ In capitalism, "the dignity of labour" is forgotten when the proletariat or the poor becomes "an instrument of production," a "hand" but not a person, on the one hand and the rich becomes merely a "consumer" on the other.⁶⁷ The basis of the worth and dignity of labor lies in "spiritual perfection, the freedom of exultation or fulfilment and of autonomy." In order to bring back the economic order in harmony with social justice and an organic unity in the structure of civil society, we need "a certain measure of collectivisation which bursts the cadres of family economy." Therefore, "the governing rules of the industrial economy ought to subordinate this collectivist movement to the interests of human personality and the common good." Maritain, when he speaks of a usurious economy, is not unlike Emil Brunner who has criticized the capitalist economy for its concentrated energy in profit-making and thus for the loss of Christian communion. Maritain is extremely conscious of the inhuman condition created for the proletariat by an uncontrolled capitalism. As a matter of fact, he conceives of his communal and personalist society "only after the dissolution of capitalist society."⁶⁸

As for Communism or Communistic totalitarianism, Maritain, like Berdyaev, points out its messianic and eschatological elements. In it Christianity is replaced by a new religion, atheism, and it is "anti-Christian" and "anti-Christic." The false idea of the revolutionary thought of Communism is an establishment of "the Kingdom of God in

⁶⁶Freedom in the Modern World, p. 130.

⁶⁷True Humanism, p. 108; Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 58-59, 129.

⁶⁸Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 56, 61.

history."⁶⁹ There is no doubt in Maritain's mind that Communism is anti-Christian rather than what Karl Barth calls a-Christian or non-Christian. For Barth, Nazism alone was truly an anti-Christian doctrine. Nevertheless, Maritain and Barth have something in common in that both think that Nazism is more erroneous and irremediable than Communism. For Maritain, Nazi's racism is "a biological inferno." Nazism is a "pseudo-theism" or the irrationalist perversion of the idea of God. As for Barth, the perversion of Christianity is worse than the atheism of Communism. Maritain expresses the same thought when he says, in reference to Nazism, that "The consequence is that, in actual existence, such a process of spiritual poisoning is for human minds and human history a factor of perversion more irremediable than atheism itself." There is a slim possibility for the cure of the materialist atheism by "some internal transformation," and yet Nazism and its formidable racial paganism had to be cured only by "a crushing defeat of [its] undertakings of aggression." In conclusion, however, "although Nazi racism is more irremediably destructive and constitutes simply the worst plague for our world, there is no human regeneration to be expected either from Communism or from Nazi racism." Therefore, the possibility of some internal transformation of Communism is not due to Communism itself; it is only due to the fact that Communism cannot eradicate the human and religious sources of the Russian people.⁷⁰

So much for the criticisms of anthropocentric humanism of the modern world. We shall return to Maritain's concept of a new Christendom

⁶⁹True Humanism, p. 47.

⁷⁰The Twilight of Civilization, pp. 21, 24, 25-26.

based upon theocentric humanism and the thoughts of St. Thomas Aquinas. Maritain notices the fact that the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas Aquinas had been too late for an application to the Christian order of the Middle Ages. As a matter of fact, "the Augustinian conception of grace and freedom dominated the Middle Ages." As the modern age is governed by Calvinism and Molinism, Maritain holds that "the theology of St. Thomas will govern that of a new Christendom." Therefore, in Thomism, Maritain finds not only a reconstruction of modern philosophy but also a rebuilding of our civilization. The ideal of a new Christendom is not a form of theocracy. For Maritain, civilization can never be identified with religion. Christendom, as Maritain understands it, "describes a certain temporal regime whose formations, in very varying degrees and in very varying ways, bear the stamp of the Christian conception of life. There is only one integral religious truth; there is only one Catholic Church. But there can be diverse Christian civilizations, diverse forms of Christendom. In speaking of a new Christendom, [he is] therefore speaking of a temporal system or age of civilization whose animating form will be Christian and which will correspond to the historical climate of the epoch on whose threshold we are."⁷¹ A new Christendom is not merely a political system but a type of civilization or culture, in which the ideal of a communal and personalist philosophy must be actualized.

A new Christendom is communal because the specifying end of its culture (and its polity) is directed towards the highest temporal end

⁷¹True Humanism, pp. 67, 126.

of the common good which is not "a simple sum of individual goods and which is superior to individual interests in as much as each individual is a part of the social whole." In this sense, Maritain's notion of the common good is something not entirely dissimilar to Rousseau's idea of the volonté générale although Maritain considers the Rousseauian general will as a kind of totalitarian berth. However, the main difference would be that the common good for Maritain is not a final end, it is a temporal end towards the achievement of spiritual perfection and the autonomous freedom. A new Christendom is also personalist, because the temporal common good is essentially directed to the perfection of personality. In short, the common good is the "intermediate or infravalent end" of the accomplishment of the human persona; it does not thus constitute an absolute end in itself. Moreover, it is not the business of the social polity to aim at the perfection of personality and of the freedom of autonomy. Its real aim is to accomplish the common (terrestrial) good and the freedom of choice. Thus, Maritain restates that "the social polity is essentially directed, by reason of its own temporal end, towards such a development of social conditions as will lead the generality of a level of material, moral and intellectual life in accord with the good and peace of all, such as will positively assist each person in the progressive conquest of the fullness of personal life and spiritual liberty."⁷²

Maritain insists that a new Christendom is not a utopia. He reminds us more than once that he can never be an idealist simply because

⁷²Ibid., pp. 127, 128.

Thomism is a realism. He speaks of "the prospective image of a new Christendom," that is to say, "it relates to a concrete and individualised future to the future of our time, but . . . it matters little whether this future be near at hand or far."⁷³ Much later, Maritain wrote that "The hope of the coming of a new Christian era in our civilization is . . . a hope for a distant future, a very distant future." His mood is one of pessimism as to the present but one of optimism as to the future. Although "we have crossed the threshold of the Apocalypse," coupled with the advent of the destructive atomic bombs, this does not imply that "the end of the world is due tomorrow." He still believes that "a new phase will begin, and it is to that phase that [he delegates his] hopes for the coming of a new age of Christian civilization, more successful than the Middle Ages." The Christian era will come, and will come only, in the distant future. As a matter of fact, Maritain finds hope for the realization of a new Christendom first in the soil of the United States if it were ever to come about anywhere in the distant future. Provided that the coming of a new Christendom is not a historical inevitability, but a hope, then this new order is necessary: it becomes a moral imperative to purify the conditions of our present civilization. "If civilization is to be saved," Maritain writes, "the new age must be an age of theocentric humanism."⁷⁴ We must leave to the future historians the final judgment as to whether a new Christian era, conceived as a concrete historical ideal, is realizable.

Maritain's ideal of a new Christendom is compared to that of

⁷³Ibid., p. 135.

⁷⁴The Range of Reason, pp. 93, 217-18.

medieval Christendom. Medieval Christendom, however, was 'only one of its possible forms of realisation.' Maritain's philosophy of history does not recognize the fundamental reversibility of historical movement as opposed to the concept of "eternal recurrence." As Maritain says, "Time is linear, not cyclical."⁷⁵ As to the possible form of a Christian cultural and social order in the circumstances of the modern world, Maritain rejects what he calls "an univocal interpretation" and also "an equivocal interpretation."⁷⁶ The former implies that the rules and principles which govern human action "apply always in the same fashion." On the other hand, the latter implies the other extreme position; that is to say, it means that "historical circumstances grow so different with the lapse of time that they come to depend on principles that are also different."⁷⁷

For Maritain, therefore, the true solution as to the possible form of a new Christendom is found in "the philosophy of analogy." The course of world's history must be interpreted neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. The analogical interpretation of history would imply that "The principles [which govern human action and history] do not vary; nor the governing rules of practice: but they are applied in modes that are essentially different and that correspond to one concept only according to a similarity of proportion."⁷⁸ This philosophy of analogy, of course, dominates Thomism itself. Thus, Maritain considers

⁷⁵On the Philosophy of History, p. 2.

⁷⁶True Humanism, pp. 131-32; Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 103-104.

⁷⁷Freedom in the Modern World, p. 104.

⁷⁸Ibid.

the analogical principle as "the guiding star" for the interpretation of philosophy and history. He affirms the idea that the coming new Christian order would incarnate "the same (analogical) principles, be conceived as belonging to an essentially (specifically) distinct type from that of the mediaeval world."⁷⁹ However, Maritain is silent on the question of whether or not a new Christian order, if it is born in Europe, would be different specifically from that which will be found in the United States.

Maritain is not a dreamer who wishes to transplant medieval Christendom in the contemporary world. As Paul Tillich insists, the Christian answer for contemporary world problems must accept "the modern development as an historic fact." "The Christian message to the contemporary world will be a true, convincing and transforming message only insofar as it is born out of the depths of our present historical situation." Therefore, the true Christian answer would never be utopian and cannot retreat into religious escapism. When the concrete historical circumstances are taken into account, moreover, the Christian answer should be "at the same time both theoretical and practical."⁸⁰ Regardless of whether or not Paul Tillich would agree with Maritain's concept of analogy and the relevance of medieval Christendom to the contemporary world, in spirit they are speaking the same language.

Maritain excludes from a new Christendom Marxian economic determinism, "from which [he notes] many of [its] critics often borrow [its] way of posing the problem." Instead, he proposes to formulate a

⁷⁹True Humanism, p. 133.

⁸⁰"The World Situation," The Christian Answer, pp. 43, 44.

Christian philosophy of culture. "Great as is the part (which I in no wise seek to diminish) played by the economic factor in history," Maritain writes, "it is not primarily from economics but from more human and deeper aspects of culture, and above all from the implications of the spiritual and the temporal in civilisation, that I shall seek my guiding light."⁸¹ As a matter of fact, Maritain warns us not to confuse the political order with the economic order of society. In his organic theory of society, he envisages a union of the two orders; but "the political order, having a more formal and less material character, is superior to [the economic order]." The tendency to assimilate the political into the economic order is "an error arising from a materialist philosophy."⁸²

Now we shall return to the substance of a new Christendom in (analogical) comparison with that of medieval Christendom. The Holy Roman Empire for Maritain is of living significance for today, as the sacrum imperium had been a historic myth of the Middle Ages. "This concrete historical ideal, this myth or symbol of the Holy Empire, corresponds to what may be called a Christian consecrational conception of the temporal."⁸³

The five characteristics of the Holy Empire, which are enumerated by Maritain, are analogically relevant to his conceptualization of a new Christendom. However, the suggested image of a new Christendom is "specifically distinct from that of the Middle Ages and directed by

⁸¹True Humanism, p. 136.

⁸²Freedom in the Modern World, p. 56.

⁸³True Humanism, p. 140.

another ideal than that of the Holy Empire." First of all, the ideal of a new Christendom based upon an integral or theocentric humanism is characterized by an organic unity in pluralism. Medieval Christendom had "a tendency towards an organic unity at the maximum in point of quality: a unity which excludes neither diversity nor pluralism."⁸⁴ Without diversity and pluralism, it would not have been called "organic." Medieval society is pluralistic insofar as the term "pluralism" is defined in terms of "a multiplicity of associations." It was not a pluralist society in the sense that pluralism includes "a multiplicity of affiliations." "So long as no association claims or receives hegemony over many aspects of its members' lives," William Kornhauser writes, "its power over the individual will be limited. This is a vital point, because the authority of a private group can be as oppressive as that of the state." Therefore, lack of multiple affiliations prevented medieval society from having democratic control.⁸⁵

For Maritain, a return to an organic unity in a new Christendom must contain "a much more developed element of pluralism than that of the Middle Ages." The consecrational unity of medieval Christendom was maximal. On the contrary, a coming new Christian order would contain only a minimal unity and the maximum of civil tolerance. However, this minimal unity is essentially organic, not mechanical, and is therefore "much superior to . . . the liberal-individualistic order." Since the pluralist commonwealth is essentially temporal, Maritain insists, "this temporal or cultural unity does not in itself require a unity of faith

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 140, 155.

⁸⁵The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 79-81.

and religion, and . . . it can be Christian while including non-Christians in its circle." However, civil tolerance for Maritain does not imply "dogmatic tolerance," that is to say, the respect for the rights of conscience does not regard "the liberty of error as in itself good." At any rate, Maritain insists that "we must give up seeking in a common profession of faith the source and principle of unity in the social body." The unity of a secular order must be sought "in conformity with good reason and the common good," since a Christian commonwealth is a temporal order only "vivified and impregnated with Christianity."⁸⁶

In a new pluralistic order, Maritain pays due attention to "economic pluralism" and "juridical pluralism." Differing from the medieval order, he takes cognizance of modern economic development and technical and mechanical contrivances of our time in our industrial and agricultural economy. However, these new developments must be in conformity with the communal and personalist conception of society. Therefore, this new order demands, to a certain extent, the collectivization of ownership; and there must be "a renewal and revivification of the family-type of economy and ownership," "co-operative services," and "a trade-union type of organisation," while the new order utilizes the new technology and mechanization.⁸⁷ However, it is difficult to conceive of the family-type of economy and ownership in the age of "the managerial revolution."

Juridical pluralism is the problem that takes into consideration a religious diversity in the new Christian order. It is essentially the problem of unbelievers. While medieval Christendom had no problem with

⁸⁶True Humanism, pp. 155, 157, 165, 166, 168.

⁸⁷Ibid., pp. 158-59.

unbelievers since they "were outside the walls of the city," the new social order must take cognizance of the fact that believers and unbelievers are mingled in the modern state system. Therefore, believers and unbelievers must "live alike and share together in the same temporal commonwealth." "The legislature would hence recognise the differing juridical status of the diverse spiritual groups included in one commonweal." Nonetheless, the Christian spirit must permeate into this secular pluralistic society while "the various non-Christian spiritual groups included in it would enjoy a just liberty."⁸⁸ In short, the organic unity of a new Christian order is "a simple unity of friendship."

Apart from the first characteristic of pluralism, the second characteristic of the medieval order was "the predominance of the ministerial rôle of the temporal order in relation to the spiritual," that is to say, the temporal order was subordinated to the spiritual one. However, in the new Christian order, the temporal order is only a Christian conception of "the lay or secular state." Therefore, the authority of the state is supreme in its own sphere. It will cease to become merely instrumental or ministerial to the spiritual order. Maritain writes that "the secular order has in the course of the modern age built up for itself an autonomous relation with regard to the spiritual or consecrational order which in fact excludes the notion of instrumentality." Realistically speaking, "this is a historical gain, which a new Christendom must know how to preserve." This must not be construed to mean that the notion of spiritual primacy has been abandoned in Maritain's ideal of a new Christendom. On the contrary, the modern lay state is

⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 159-60, 161.

only recognized as "a principal agent on a lower plane," that is to say, it has ceased to be purely instrumental to the spiritual order. Although the new (secular) Christian order remains a real end, it must recognize the final spiritual end or "the highest principal agent" of the spiritual order.⁸⁹

The third characteristic of the medieval Christian order is related to the second characteristic. In correlation to the ministerial function of the state, the institutional forces of the state were used for the spiritual good and the spiritual unity of the social order itself. Therefore, "the heretic was not only a heretic, but one who attacked the lifspring of the socio-temporal community as such." In a new Christendom, however, the notion of instrumentality of the state is excluded. And at the same time "the extraterritoriality of the person" must also be recognized with regard to temporal and political means. In contrast to the medieval order in which the state was merely a sacred arm of the spiritual, now the power of the state is an accomplished fact of history. The freedom of the person (freedom of autonomy) is emphasized in contrast to the freedom of choice which is manifested in the two extremes of the liberalistic and the dictatorial conceptions. God must always be enthroned, but the mode of collaboration between the state and the Church must vary according to historical conditions. "Once it was primarily by the use of temporal powers and legal constraints; in the future it will probably be, even in politico-religious connections, by way of moral influence."⁹⁰ In our age of statism, Maritain rightly stresses the idea

⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 142, 170-71.

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 144, 172.

of freedom (especially the freedom of the person).

As to the freedom of expression, Maritain rejects both the totalitarian control and liberalistic non-regulation. The totalitarian method of regulation is "detestable," and the expression of opinion is not "an end in itself and an unrestricted right." Instead, the "pluralist method" -- by justice and a progressive self-regulation -- strikes Maritain as "good, being no less strong than just." The same principle may be applied in regard to the law. "This pluralist commonwealth, though less concentrated than the mediaeval, is much more concentrated than the liberal conception. It is an authoritarian State" ⁹¹ It seems that we should not misconstrue the phrase "an authoritarian State" in the strict sense that we use in political theory. In an earlier work, Maritain maintained that a communal and personalist society (a new Christian order) will be essentially "a society of corporative, authoritative, and pluralist type." ⁹² Thus, we should use the term "authoritative" instead of "authoritarian" in order to avoid any confusion. Maritain seems to mean that the new order must be based on the sound foundation of authority. Maritain rules out "étatisme" and "the wheels of a bureaucratic machine." And the organic unity of a new order is achieved by chosen leaders in their "responsible office." Maritain's supreme concern here seems to be with the idea of the common good in a new society. In regard to the problem of supreme political control, he is, unlike his master St. Thomas Aquinas, of the opinion that "the stability in the exercise of authority should give way in historical

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 175-76.

⁹²Freedom in the Modern World, p. 55.

conditions where efficiency counts for more even than stability to those which attend the selection, by the appropriate organs in the community, of the man who will be the director-in-chief of the common good."⁹³ Maritain is concerned with the moral authority of the law, which has been "almost totally lost under liberalism."⁹⁴

In the pluralist commonwealth, the economic order, which is subordinate to the political sphere, must strive for the moral accomplishment of personality. Capitalism as well as totalitarianism are completely rejected; and the law of common use (usus communis) of economic goods is the essence of the new order. This can be achieved only after "the liquidation of capitalism." The dignity of the workers is exalted, and a society of persons (workmen, technicians, investors), co-partnership, and "the associative ownership of the means of production" are the components of the new economic order. And "this corporative organisation needs to be conceived as established from below upwards, according to the principles of personal democracy, with the suffrage and active personal participation of all the interests at the bottom, and as emanating from them and their unions"⁹⁵ Be that as it may, these technical morphologies and specifications are subordinated to a higher ethical consideration, the perfection of the common good and, ultimately, of personality based upon a Christian philosophy.

The fourth characteristic of the medieval ideal was "a diversity of social races" on the basis of "the hierarchy of social functions and

⁹³Ibid., p. 57.

⁹⁴True Humanism, p. 176.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 183.

relations of authority." The temporal authority in the Middle Ages was an image of "father's authority in accord with a consecrational conception of the family," e. g., the Roman idea of the paterfamilias. This hierarchical conception of authority, according to Maritain, formed the basis of the economic system of feudalism. The representative example of this medieval conception of hierarchical authority, which played a large part in the formation of medieval culture, is the Benedictine Order. While a certain disparity of social categories was important in the medieval Christian order, the question of political or any other social forms of authority must be grounded on "an essential parity" in a new Christendom. Therefore, Maritain holds that the conception of authority in a new Christendom is found not in the Benedictine Order but in the Dominican Order. In the political order, moreover, the forms of government, although they may be regarded as having their sources of authority in God, must lose "a sacred character." Authority resides in these forms of government only by virtue of "a certain consensus," that is to say, by "a free and vital determination of the multitude" or the populace. Furthermore, authority is "periodically renewable with regard to the holders of power," and "the head [of the power holders] is simply one who has the right of command over others who are his equals or companions."⁹⁶

For Maritain, a personalist democracy in the new Christian order is at once opposed to the sacred character of the Middle Ages and to the Rousseauan conception of democratism. The "affective and moral" conception of a personalist democracy must be conceived so that, on its

⁹⁶Ibid., pp. 145, 147, 194.

external plane, the "inner freedom of the human being" may be translated into political institutions and the social body.⁹⁷ For Maritain, therefore, this ethical conception of democracy really does correspond to "a popular civic consciousness," which implies, on the social and political plane, the respect for human personality in every individual who composes a part of the whole. In this manner, a new society will become a society sans classes. Maritain writes, however, that "this society without a bourgeoisie and without a proletariat will not be a society without any internal structure or any differentiations and organic inequalities. But the hierarchy of functions and advantages will no longer be bound up with hereditary categories fixed theretofore by blood . . . nor as to-day by money"98

The fifth and last characteristic of a new Christendom is its culminating point. In medieval Christendom, the common work for the faithful and the Christian polity was "to build a figurative and symbolic image here on earth of the Kingdom of God." God was enthroned, and an empire was built for Christ. For Maritain, it is naive to maintain that the common task of a new civilization or society is to realize a sacred work on earth or the medieval ideal of building God's empire in this world. Nor is a new Christian order "the myth of a class or of a race, a nation or a State." It is a secular order vivified and impregnated with the Christian spirit; its ideal is guided by the Gospel, which embodies the dignity of personality, a spiritual vocation and fraternal love. The dynamic principle of a new Christendom is its orientation

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 195.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 196; Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 57, 58.

"in its entirety towards a socio-temporal realisation of the Gospel."⁹⁹ Unlike the medieval ideal, a new order is not "consecrationally but secularly Christian." It must now take cognizance of the fact that the modern world is no longer a community of Christian believers alone. The solution for a new Christendom must be sought in the due recognition that this world is a world of believers and unbelievers. Maritain's pluralistic solution for the coexistence of Christian believers and unbelievers is a compromising rather than a dogmatic position of a Christian theologian. His conception of a lay Christian state is more encompassing in scope than the movements of Christian Democracy in Europe. Nevertheless, from a Christian point of view, it embodies a similar philosophy.

Maritain's programmatic proposals for a new Christendom are concerned with (primarily) internal and external transformations based upon a theocentric humanism, whose supreme representatives are St. Thomas Aquinas and St. John of the Cross. This new Christian order is essentially a system of civilization or culture rather than a political or an economic system in the usual sense of the terms. Therefore, Maritain speaks of the transcendence of not only economics but also of politics. In actuality, however, he does not oppose political and economic elements as such in a new Christendom, but he opposes what he calls "economism" and "politicism."

Economism merely retreats to a materialist philosophy like Marxism. As we recall, Maritain is opposed not only to dialectic materialism but also to those who oppose Marxism as such while utilizing

⁹⁹True Humanism, pp. 147, 197, 199.

the fundamentally Marxian techniques. Politicism is "indeed the corruption of politics." It refers to the politics that is devoid of spiritual and moral contents. It refers to the aggrandizement of power by a political party or by a class that conceives of itself "as essential for a 'substantial transformation' of the order of civilization."¹⁰⁰ Politicism is identified with "a purely technical idea of a political activity," that is to say,

political and social activity being then regarded as intrinsically amoral and social facts as special instances of purely physical facts, which it is sufficient to deal with according to purely technical rules, while private conduct remains subject to the rules of personal morality. In this conception political knowledge is essentially identified with a pure and simple art, with a technique; an art which is perhaps subordinated by such a one to some external moral system, but whose ends and particular texture are strangers to morality: ends, for example, such as the purely material existence, the power and material prosperity of the State.¹⁰¹

The supreme example of politicization, for Maritain, is the "immoralism" of Machiavelli. Machiavelli is "the great political heresiarch of modern times." Nonetheless, Maritain admits that "every error has its truth; the truth of machiavellianism is a reaction against a false conception of ethics, against what may be called supermoralism (meaning by this the melancholic claims of a pharisaic morality, one which is purely formal and geometric, which denies at once nature and life)." Although every error may have its truth, this truth never justifies the error. "The political and social sphere is not only technical, but primarily and essentially human, i. e. ethical or moral. The achievements of men in that sphere are intrinsically human and moral."¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰Ibid., pp. 207-208.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 208.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 209.

Political morality rightly conceived, for Maritain, is not individual morality. In this sense, Maritain is truly an Aristotelian. For Aristotle, politics (or political science) was "the supreme practical [or ethical] science." Therefore, it was above, not identical with, individual morality or ethics.¹⁰³ As the common good of a political order is not merely a sum of individual good, Maritain maintains that it is naive to say that "politics is reducible to individual morality or a simple application of the latter." Politics, instead, "is specifically concerned with the good of men gathered in a commonwealth, the good of the social whole." "The particular object of politics is the common good of the social body: that is its measure."¹⁰⁴

Maritain's ideal of a new Christendom based upon a theocentric humanism is not a world of Catholics although it is derived from Thomism, a recognized philosophy and theology of the Catholic Church. Nor is it Catholicism itself. The new Christian order is neither a political system nor an economic order, but a system of civilization. Its economic element rejects the capitalist system which has nothing but contempt and hatred for the poor and enslaves all things to the stockpile of material goods. Nor can the "suffering" proletariat be "liberated" by the erroneous materialism of Marx. A moral restoration of the proletariat is achieved only with due recognition of the dignity of work, the worker and of the human personality of the worker. Maritain thus writes that "the Christian world of to-day as a whole should have broken with the regime of civilisation spiritually founded on bourgeois humanism and

¹⁰³W. D. Ross, Aristotle, p. 183.

¹⁰⁴True Humanism, pp. 210, 212.

economically on the fecundity of money, while at the same time keeping itself immune from the totalitarian and communist errors to which that regime leads as its logical catastrophe."¹⁰⁵ Maritain is critical of the anti-humanist tendency within the Christian camp, some of whose thinkers reject the very idea of a Christian social and political order. For them, "the things of man pull one way, the things of God another way."¹⁰⁶ Nor can Maritain tolerate anthropocentric humanism which has its root in the Renaissance. The "immorality" of Machiavellism is a repudiation of politics itself. Maritain would agree with Eduard Heimann in that "morality is the fruit of religion," and anthropocentric "humanism is often a moving, but always a tragic phenomenon."¹⁰⁷ No sooner than "Man the Measure" is enunciated, the idea is adumbrated and antiquidated. Or is it an "exchange of greeting between Machiavellian immorality and Lutheran pessimism"?¹⁰⁸

A new Christendom, Maritain insists, is not a "utopia," the thing that cannot be realized. On the contrary, it is "a concrete historical ideal" that is realizable. Although it may be actualized in the offing, this new Christian order is yet an aim and, thus, demands preparatory action. This preparatory action is "political action with a remote objective."¹⁰⁹ It is "an effort to renew the temporal order on

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 240.

¹⁰⁶ Freedom in the Modern World, p. 157.

¹⁰⁷ "Christian Foundations of the Social Sciences," Social Research, XXVI (Autumn, 1959), p. 334.

¹⁰⁸ Freedom in the Modern World, p. 157.

¹⁰⁹ True Humanism, p. 254.

Christian principles," the Gospel and charity. It is neither the univocal application nor the equivocal rejection of medieval Christendom. Instead, it is an analogical application that takes into account certain accomplished historical facts and existing conditions. Maritain also recognizes the fact that the theologians have in the past worked out some measures, under the pressure of events in history, in order to resist unjust law and tyranny; and they have contrived certain measures of force which may be instrumental in the establishment and execution of just law. As the political order and the temporal state must use coercion or force to maintain public order, so does the spiritual power have "the right in certain defined cases to use a measure of coercion." But this power of coercion can only be justified when it is used as an instrument of justice.¹¹⁰ At the same time, we must be forewarned of the fact that the totalitarian measure can also be used for the noble name of justice. When coercion is used for the cause of justice, we are not answering the question but, instead, begging the question. Thus we must either define the exact domain of justice or specify the limits of coercion.

A new Christian order is a moral renovation rather than a revolution in the radical sense of the French or Russian Revolution which attempted to discount history or the past. It is a renovation that demands preparatory political action. Now the problem remains in regard to means and ways. Since Maritain speaks from the standpoint of a Catholic, it is the question of Catholic action (not in a political sense) hic et nunc. As to the conduct of the individual Catholic as such, Maritain makes it quite clear that it is "a question for the

¹¹⁰Freedom in the Modern World, pp. 151, 153.

Church . . . moreover, the giving of such instructions is hardly the business of a philosopher." Maritain has been criticized for having offered no prescribed action for the individual Catholic as such and for what had been interpreted as an attitude of "a sanctified detachment." It was felt that his philosophical questions were in fact "'a smoke-screen' concealing impenetrable obscurities." Maritain replied to his critic by saying that the notion of a sanctified detachment is "the very contrary of a Christian attitude."¹¹¹ "The Christian, indeed, is never resigned."¹¹²

Since Maritain holds that he is in no position to instruct Catholic action, it is clear that whenever he speaks of Catholic action for the construction of a new Christendom he expresses either his philosophical and moral conviction or his interpretation of the Catholic Church's attitude concerning morals. Earlier Maritain has said that Catholics or the Catholic world and Catholicism are not the same thing. Therefore, he emphatically maintains that "reform and revolution of the temporal regime are not the affair of the Church, which has not a temporal but an eternal and a spiritual end above and beyond political and social issues."¹¹³ The fact that "the Church is in the world but is not of the world" does not mean that the Church is tied with a temporal order. "If she invites men to be faithful to social institutions . . . it signifies her recognition that the stability of law is an important element in the welfare of mankind."¹¹⁴ The Church (The Mystical

¹¹¹True Humanism, p. 261. Maritain refers to Charles Smith who has criticized Freedom in the Modern World.

¹¹²True Humanism, p. 131.

¹¹³Freedom in the Modern World, p. 147.

¹¹⁴True Humanism, p. 117.

Body of Christ) has no bond with historical exigencies and circumstances. It is not tied with temporary human institutions.

This position seems not without some difficulty. From a Barthian point of view, Maritain's position is exactly one which ties the Church, the Mystical Body of Christ, with the world and civilization. Therefore, it loses its very supernatural character. Looking at it from another angle, some may be able to argue that Maritain's position is a kind of para-dualism. Besides the Church being the Mystical Body of Christ, is it also a human institution (a body of the faithful who are also the citizens of a temporal state) from a purely political and social point of view? Or should it be construed that "the Church takes particular care not to become an adherent of any particular regime or class or party"¹¹⁵ and thus cannot become involved with the Catholic world?

Maritain proffers his own individual position as a Catholic philosopher and theologian. Since Maritain rejects a hybrid conception of religion (Catholicism) and culture (Catholics and the Catholic world), he makes it clear that "the considerations [he is] proffering belong to a wholly different plane from what, since its initiation by Pope Pius XI, Catholics of various countries know under the appellation of catholic action, which belongs essentially to the religious and apostolic order." Maritain rejects clericalism within the Catholic circle when he says: "it is not for the clergy to hold the driving-wheel of truly political and temporal action." He is a forerunner of Christian Democracy when he writes: "It is not for the Church but for Christians as temporal members of this temporal organism to strive directly and immediately to

¹¹⁵Freedom in the Modern World, p. 147.

transform and act upon it in the spirit of Christianity."¹¹⁶ This is exactly the same philosophy that guides Christian Democracy in Europe.

Maritain further clarifies the activity of the Catholic on three distinct levels: the spiritual, the temporal, and the intermediate "which joins the spiritual and the temporal." On the first plane of activity, Catholics act as "members of the Mystical Body of Christ." On the second plane, Catholics act as "citizens of an earthly city." The spiritual and the temporal planes are clearly distinct: there are the things that are God's and the things that are Caesar's. But they are not separated. According to Maritain, the third plane of activity, strictly speaking, belongs to the spiritual order. However, it is intermediate in the sense that "the plane of the spiritual . . . joins the temporal." This position ensues when the Catholic laymen "intervene in political affairs in the defence of religious interests," and therefore it is not "the same thing as working towards a political aim directed to the achievement of a certain conception of the temporal common good." In regard to the encyclical letters that prescribe action for the faithful, Maritain maintains that they are the papal elaborations of "the principles of a Christian political, social and economic wisdom, which does not descend to particular determinations of the concrete, but which is like a theological firmament for the doctrines and more particular activities engaged in the contingencies of the temporal sphere." The recognition of these three positions does not

¹¹⁶True Humanism, pp. 264, 265.

obscure Maritain's own conviction. He as a Catholic may become involved in the mundane affairs of politics by the light of his Catholic conscience, but he maintains that "it would be intolerable if in the so doing [he] claimed to speak in the name of Catholicism and implied that all Catholics as such should follow [his] road."¹¹⁷

For Maritain Catholicism (religion) is not of the temporal or profane order (culture). As religion transcends the world of culture, so Catholicism must transcend the Catholic world. This distinction is of fundamental importance in his philosophy of culture and politics. "To ask Catholicism to specify a political or national ideal . . . would be contrary to the nature of things, precisely because Catholicism is by nature transcendent."¹¹⁸ The temporal or political world is not the Christian religion, but the activation of the Christian ferment or spirit that motivates one's concern over the temporal and political world and things. "The Christian religion is annexed to no temporal regime; it is compatible with all forms of legitimate government; it is not its business to determine which type of civil rule men must adopt hic et nunc; it imposes none on their will nor, so long as the higher essential principles are respected, does it specify any particular system of political philosophy, no matter how general, such as that system which occupies us at the moment."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷Ibid., pp. 293, 294, 295, 300.

¹¹⁸Scholasticism and Politics, p. 209.

¹¹⁹The Twilight of Civilization, p. 60.

CHAPTER XIII

MAN: PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY

In his philosophy of culture and society, Jacques Maritain has already alluded to the fact that the modern world needs "a radical purification." His idea of a new Christendom is a moral and spiritual "revolution" which is analogically but not univocally rooted in medieval Christendom. This new Christendom is truly a philosophy of the mind since it is basically the transformation of the human spirit that will in turn change the outlook of the temporal world. Nor will it be a kind of Nietzschean transvaluation of all values. Maritain has insisted that a new Christian order is not a utopia but a concrete historical ideal because it is realizable in our time, not immediately, but in a relatively indeterminate future. Nor is it a sacred or consecration-al order, but a temporal order impregnated with Christianity. A new Christian order is not identified with political systems as such; rather, it is a form of culture or civilization. Nonetheless, it includes a lesser area of politics.

Man is the basic unit of human civilization and polity; that branch of knowledge which deals with human action is called a practical philosophy. It is practical because it deals with human action. Moreover, all practical philosophy must presuppose the speculative knowledge or metaphysics. The question "What is Man?" is a metaphysical

question. Thus, metaphysics is presupposed and necessary in a philosophy of culture, freedom and polity.

For Maritain, a new Christendom is personalist and communalist at the same time. It is communal in the sense that the aim of society or polity is to achieve its common good. The common good of a temporal order is not merely a sum of individual good and advantages. In this way, Maritain insists, we can avoid the error of the "bourgeois individualism" (or individualistic liberalism) of the nineteenth century. He writes:

The end of the state is the common good, which is not only a collection of advantages and utilities, but also rectitude of life, an end good in itself, which the old philosophers called bonum honestum, the intrinsically worth good. For, on one hand, it is a thing good in itself to insure the existence of the multitude. And, on the other hand, it is the just and morally good existence of the community which may thus be insured. It is only on this condition, of being in accordance with justice and with moral good, that the common good is what it is: the good of a people, the good of a city, and not the 'good' of an association of gangsters or of murderers.¹

The common good, therefore, is "a thing ethically good."² A temporal order, which is at once communal and personal, achieves "the moral realities of justice and civil amity, which . . . correspond to what the Gospel calls brotherly love on the spiritual and supernatural plane."³

The summit of Maritain's philosophy is his insistence upon the idea that the common good of society or polity is not a terminal end as

¹Scholasticism and Politics, p. 73.

²Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, tr. John J. Fitzgerald (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), p. 43; Scholasticism and Politics, p. 73.

³The Person and the Common Good, p. 92.

the temporal order is not a final end. As the temporal end is subordinated to the supernatural or spiritual end, so is the common good. However, we should not forget the fact that the temporal order and the common good are real ends even though they are subordinated to the superior order of the supernatural. This is the inexorable law of Maritain's whole system including his political philosophy. His system, therefore, is a personalist philosophy which culminates in the perfection of spirituality. As the freedom of choice (free will) must strive for the attainment of the freedom of autonomy, so the common good must be directed towards the superior end of spirituality.

It is hardly necessary to repeat that, for Maritain, the right foundations of a sound political philosophy are communal and personal at the same time. Since the end of polity is the common good, we shall return to this communal character of Maritain's political philosophy later. Now we are concerned with the personal character of his political thought. Thus, it is important for us to understand his concept of person or personality, which comes to the fore of his political philosophy (including democracy). Moreover, personalism is the thing common in most contemporary theologians such as Paul Tillich, Emil Brunner, Nicolas Berdyaev and Martin Buber.

Maritain's personalism is based upon the Thomistic "metaphysical distinction between individuality and personality."⁴ This metaphysical distinction of personalism, in turn, bears its fruits in Maritain's own

⁴Ibid., p. 3; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, tr. Doris C. Anson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), pp. 1-2. E. L. Mascall points out that this is an important distinction. The Importance of Being Human: Some Aspects of the Christian Doctrine of Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 39.

social and political philosophy. "The human person," Maritain writes, "is ordained directly to God as to its absolute ultimate end. Its direct ordination to God transcends every created common good -- both the common good of the political society and the intrinsic common good of the universe." As he points out, here is "the very message of Christian wisdom in its triumph over Hellenic thought," and of the Christian character of St. Thomas Aquinas who "did not take over the doctrine of Aristotle without correcting and transfiguring it."⁵ Thus, St. Thomas Aquinas crowned Aristotle with the Christian faith. However, Maritain points out that there is nothing new about the distinction between the individual and the person, which is "a classical distinction belonging to the intellectual heritage of mankind."⁶ E. L. Mascall agrees with Maritain in that the conception of personality is not confined to the Judaeo-Christian heritage. But he also points out that "it is very significant that it was only when it entered into theology, through the controversies in the early Church about the nature of God, that its full content and implications became manifest."⁷ As Maritain himself writes, "the consciousness of the dignity of the person and of the rights of the person remained implicit in pagan antiquity, over which the law of slavery cast its shadow. It was the message of the Gospel which suddenly awakened this consciousness, in a divine and transcendent form, revealing to men that they are called upon to be the sons and heirs of God in the Kingdom of God. Under the evangelical impulse, this same awakening was little

⁵The Person and the Common Good, p. 5.

⁶Ibid., pp. 23-24; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 5.

⁷The Importance of Being Human, p. 38.

by little to spread forth, with regard to the requirements of natural law, over the realm of man's life here on earth, and of the terrestrial city."⁸

A person may be defined as "an individual substance of rational nature" (individualis substantia rationalis naturae).⁹ This intellectual character is what distinguishes man from other living creatures; consequently, the society of persons is essentially different from that of ants. Man is "a political animal because he is a reasonable animal, because his reason seeks to develop with the help of education, through the teaching and the co-operation of other men, and because society is thus required to accomplish human dignity."¹⁰ Moreover, the image of God is found in intellectual creatures alone. To begin with, Maritain notes that "Each intellectual substance is made, first, for God, the separated common good of the universe, second, for the perfection of the order of the universe . . . and third, for itself, that is, for the action (immanent and spiritual) by which it perfects itself and accomplishes its destiny." However, from the standpoint of this world, intellectual creatures are ordained for the perfection of the created world, that is to say, they are "individuals" before they are "persons." It is only from the standpoint of the supernatural world that "they are related to an infinitely greater good -- the separated common Good, the

⁸The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 68, 45, 105.

⁹Freedom in the Modern World, p. 30. It should be noted that this definition of the person as "rationalis naturae individua substantia" (an individual substance of rational nature) is originally defined by Boethius in the early part of the sixth century A. D., and this same definition was adopted by St. Thomas Aquinas. Frederick Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy, p. 103.

¹⁰Scholasticism and Politics, p. 72.

divine transcendent Whole," before being willed and governed for the perfection of this world.

The idea that man is intellectual in the image of God is related to "an essential thesis of Thomism" in which the speculative intellect is superior to the practical. That is to say, "the resemblance to God is less in the practical than in the speculative intellect." The highest end of the practical intellect is a common good. Due to the superiority of the speculative over the practical intellect, the good and the end of the speculative intellect are "superior to every created common good." This is the reason why contemplation is the highest form of human activities. The contemplative life is superior to the political life. Therefore, the problem of action and contemplation is "at the very heart of social philosophy," and its solution is "of prime importance to every civilization worthy of the name."¹¹

With these ideas and the primacy of the common good over the individual or private good in the political order in the foreground, we shall examine the metaphysical roots and the practical implications of the distinction between the person and the individual. Maritain notes the two contradictory conceptions of the person or the self. One is the Pascalian expression that "the self is detestable"; and the other is the Thomistic idea that "the person is that which is most noble and most perfect in all of nature," that is to say, a person is "an individual substance of rational nature."¹² He explains this contradiction in that man is caught "between two poles; a material pole, which, in reality,

¹¹The Person and the Common Good, pp. 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18.

¹²Ibid., pp. 22-23; Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 61-62.

does not concern the true person but rather the shadow of personality or what, in the strict sense, is called individuality, and a spiritual pole, which does concern true personality."¹³

"Outside of the mind," Maritain says, "only individual realities exist." Individuality is the opposite of "the state of universality which things have in the mind." By reason of the very nature of thing's existence, individuality designates a "concrete state of unity and indivision" which distinguishes one thing from others. In the animate or inanimate things that are terrestrial, individuality has its ontological root in matter "in as much as matter requires the occupation in space of a position distinct from every other position."¹⁴ Matter is a kind of non-being; it is "an avidity for being."¹⁵ That is to say, matter bears "the impress of a metaphysical energy -- the 'form' or 'soul'"¹⁶

In man, like other corporeal beings, human individuality is rooted in matter, the indivisible character of which distinguishes him from other things or beings. Man has the soul; the human soul and matter constitute "one substance, which is both carnal and spiritual." Therefore, "soul and matter are the two substantial co-principles of the same being, of one and the same reality, called man."¹⁷ Man, as an individual, is subject to the physical world. That is to say, "each of us

¹³The Person and the Common Good, p. 23; Scholasticism and Politics, p. 63; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴The Person and the Common Good, p. 25; Scholasticism and Politics, p. 65.

¹⁵Scholasticism and Politics, p. 65; The Person and the Common Good, pp. 25, 27.

¹⁶The Person and the Common Good, p. 25.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 26.

is a fragment of a species, a part of the universe, a unique point in the immense web of cosmic, ethical, historical forces and influences -- and bound by their laws."¹⁸ However, man, as a person, frees himself from the control of the physical universe. By reason of man's spiritual soul (or his subsistence), there is within him "a principle of creative unity, independence and liberty."¹⁹

Personality is a much deeper mystery than individuality. The mystery of personality may be clarified when personality is related to love. Love is concerned with persons. Man, by way of personality, is endowed with spirituality, which contains in itself the intellect and freedom. Thus, he is "capable of super-existing by way of knowledge and of love." For Maritain, we find in God "the sovereign Personality whose existence itself consists in a pure and absolute super-existence by way of intellection and love."²⁰ Unlike individuality which is rooted in matter, personality is deeply rooted in the spirit. Man, because he is rooted in the spirit by means of personality, requires the communication of knowledge and love with other persons. The person, on account of its spirituality, is directly linked with the absolute. In this sense, for Maritain, man is created in the image of God. He writes:

the deepest layer of the human person's dignity consists in its property of resembling God -- not in a general way after the manner of all creatures, but in a proper way. It is the image of God. For God is spirit and the human person proceeds from Him in having as principle of life a spiritual soul capable of knowing, loving and of being

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 28; Scholasticism and Politics, p. 66; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 3.

¹⁹ The Person and the Common Good, p. 28; Scholasticism and Politics, p. 66.

²⁰ The Person and the Common Good, p. 30; Scholasticism and Politics, p. 67; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 3.

uplifted by grace to participation in the very life of God so that, in the end, it might know and love Him as He knows and loves Himself.²¹

It is important to note that Maritain distinguishes, but does not separate, personality from individuality. As matter and soul are the two substantial co-principles of the same being, individuality and personality are "the two metaphysical aspects of the human being." Thus, Maritain insists that "we must emphasize that they are not two separate things. There is not in [man] one reality, called [his] individual, and another reality, called [his] person. One and the same reality is, in a certain sense an individual, and, in another sense, a person. Our whole being is an individual by reason of that in us which derives from matter, and a person by reason of that in us which derives from spirit."²²

Individuality, simply because it is rooted in matter, should not be assumed to be "something evil in itself." Instead, it is something obviously good because it is the very condition of human existence. "But it is precisely as related to personality that individuality is good. Evil arises when, in our action, we give preponderance to the individual aspect of our being."²³ The distinction between personality and individuality should not be mistaken for "a separation." The idea of "Death to the individual, long live the person!" is derived from this misconception of separating the person from individuality. "The pity is that,

²¹The Person and the Common Good, p. 32; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 4.

²²The Person and the Common Good, p. 33.

²³Ibid.

in killing the individual, they also kill the person."²⁴ However, if man is bent toward material individuality, then he will be oriented towards the Pascalian detestable ego or self; but if he develops toward spiritual personality, then he will be oriented toward "the generous self of the heroes and saints." Thus, man must win his personality: "man will be truly a person only in so far as the life of the spirit and of liberty reigns over that of the senses and passions."²⁵

Having considered the metaphysical distinction between the individual and the person, we shall now deal with its applications to social and political matters. We have already noted that, for Maritain, man, due to the possession of personality, tends toward the communications of intelligence and love with other persons. Thus, personality tends by its very nature to communion. This is the reason why a sound political philosophy must be personal and communal at the same time. A person is not an isolated entity like the Leibnitzian monad: "the person requires membership in a society in virtue both of its dignity and its needs." Human society is a society of persons, and the person is the social unity.²⁶ Maritain calls this overflow of social communications required by reason of the person "the law of superabundance inscribed in the depths of being, life, intelligence and love." Moreover, he finds this communicative process with other persons necessary due to the deficiencies which derive from individuality. Society alone can provide

²⁴Ibid., p. 35; Scholasticism and Politics, p. 70.

²⁵The Person and the Common Good, pp. 34-35.

²⁶Ibid., p. 37; Scholasticism and Politics, p. 71; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 6.

the person with the "conditions of existence and development which it needs." Person's needs do not mean only material goods such as food, clothing and shelter but include something that elevates the perfection of moral life.²⁷ "Man is a political animal because he is a rational animal, because reason requires development through character training education and the cooperation of other men, and because society is thus indispensable to the accomplishment of human dignity."²⁸

It is of cardinal importance to note Maritain's notions of the person and the common good and how he avoids individualistic liberalism and totalitarian collectivism. He avoids the former by his idea that the end of society (human) is neither the individual good nor the collection of the individual goods of the persons who constitute that society.²⁹ The end of human society is its common good, that is, the common good of a multitude of human persons. It is the good of the body politic as a whole.³⁰ However, the common good of a multitude or a whole is related to the good of a person as "there is a correlation between this notion of the person as a social unit and the notion of the common good as the end of the social whole. They imply one another."³¹ The whole is not merely the sum of its parts, but the parts must benefit from the

²⁷The Person and the Common Good, pp. 38-39; Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 71-72.

²⁸The Person and the Common Good, pp. 38-39; Scholasticism and Politics, p. 72; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 6.

²⁹The Person and the Common Good, pp. 39-40; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 7.

³⁰Scholasticism and Politics, p. 72; The Person and the Common Good, p. 40; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 8, 12.

³¹The Person and the Common Good, p. 39.

whole. The latter statement implies Maritain's avoidance of collectivism, because the common good must flow back to the individual good of a person. This is what Maritain calls "the law of redistribution." This law means that the common good of society must be redistributed to its parts precisely because they are persons.³² "We see, then," Maritain writes, "that the true conception of political life is neither exclusively personalist nor exclusively communal." The reality of the political life must be expressed in terms of "reciprocal subordination and mutual implication."³³

Maritain has so far emphasized the sociability of the person and the nature of the common good or the good of the body politic. Between the concept of the person and the common good, there is "the typical paradox of social life."³⁴ This paradox results from the fact that "each of us is in his entirety an individual and in his entirety a person."³⁵ As it has been noted, the idea of person is "an analogical idea" whose being is fully realized in the absolute of God. Thus, "the person as such is a whole," and we might say that society is "a whole composed of wholes."³⁶ Although the person is to be a part (member) of society, he cannot be "treated in society as a part in a whole." On the contrary, he is to be treated "as a whole in society."³⁷

³²Ibid., p. 66; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 9.

³³The Person and the Common Good, p. 45.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 45, 92; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 18.

³⁵The Person and the Common Good, p. 46.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 46-47; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 3, 4, 5.

³⁷The Person and the Common Good, p. 48.

Moreover, personality as "a spiritual totality" is the transcendent whole, that "surpasses and is superior to all temporal societies." Thus, Maritain comes to the conclusion that "A single human soul is worth more than the whole universe of material goods. There is nothing higher than the immortal soul, save God. With respect to the eternal destiny of the soul, society exists for each person and is subordinated to it."³⁸ Personality as a spiritual totality "transcends political society" because it is ordained to the order of the absolute. Furthermore, the common good of political society is only "a practical good, and not the absolute good which . . . is the supreme object of the theoretical intellect."³⁹ It is an infravalent real end, but its aim is lost if it does not favor the higher spiritual end of the human person.

The paradox of social life, although it is "something natural and inevitable," is thus resolved in what Maritain calls "the law of transcendence" which means that the transcendence of the human person as a spiritual entity is recognized over political society and its common good which is only an infravalent end. Maritain maintains that this solution is "dynamic" or "an heroic philosophy of life fastened to absolute and spiritual values."⁴⁰ It has been indicated that man is by nature sociable and requires society for the perfection of his moral order. But how can he transcend political society which is necessary for his moral perfection? The answer is: man is "not a part of

³⁸ Ibid., p. 51; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 13.

³⁹ The Person and the Common Good, pp. 53-54.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 68.

political society by reason of his entire self and all that is in him." That is to say, he is a part of political society and, as such, he must serve its common good only by reason of certain things (not his entire self) which are in him. And by reason of other things, the human person transcends political society. "In the same way," Maritain writes, "a good philosopher is engaged in his entirety in philosophy, but not by reason of all the functions and all the finalities of his being. He is engaged in his entirety in philosophy by reason of the special function and special finality of the intellect in him."⁴¹

In this manner, Maritain is in a position to criticize individualism and totalitarianism. "Anarchical individualism," he writes, "denies that man, by reason of certain things which are in him, is engaged in his entirety as a part of political society. Totalitarianism asserts that man is a part of political society by reason of himself as a whole and by reason of all that is in him. . . ."⁴² Martin Buber, a contemporary Jewish theologian, comes to the same conclusion insofar as he rejects individualism and collectivism. As he writes, "if individualism understands only a part of man, collectivism understands man only as a part: neither advances to the wholeness of man, to man as a whole. Individualism sees man only in relation to himself, but collectivism does not see man at all, it sees only 'society'. With the former man's face is distorted, with the latter it is masked." However, Buber does not come to this conclusion from the distinction between spiritual personality and material individuality as does Maritain. His

⁴¹Ibid., p. 62; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 14, 15.

⁴²The Person and the Common Good, p. 62; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 8, 15, 16.

alternative solution comes from what he calls "the fundamental fact of human existence": man with man or "between man and man." "The fundamental fact of human existence is neither the individual as such nor the aggregate as such." But it is a kind of personal relation between "I" and "Thou." "I and Thou exist only in our world, because man exists, and the I, moreover, exists only through the relation to the Thou."⁴³

Maritain's criticisms on the political philosophies which are based on a materialistic conception of world and life, are basically derived from his notion of human personality which is rooted in the spirit. These materialistic political philosophies are "bourgeois liberalism," "Communism," and "anti-communistic and anti-individualistic reactions of the totalitarian or dictatorial type." "All three disregard the human person in one way or another, and, in its place, consider, willingly or not, the material individual alone." The materialistic conception of life, for Maritain, does not recognize the spiritual and eternal element in man; thus it cannot understand the nature of a truly human society. The "atomistic and mechanistic" conceptions of bourgeois liberalism destroy the organic unity of society, whereas the totalitarian polity devours the person. Moreover, bourgeois liberalism is "the most irreligious" of the three. "Christian in appearance, it has been atheistic in fact."⁴⁴

In conclusion, Maritain's social and political philosophy is personalist and communalist; a sound political philosophy for Maritain

⁴³Between Man and Man, tr. Ronald Gregor Smith (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 200, 202-203, 205. Also see his classic, I and Thou, tr. Ronald Gregor Smith (2nd ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

⁴⁴The Person and the Common Good, pp. 81, 87, 91.

can be neither exclusively personalist nor exclusively communalist. Man as a spiritual totality enters into "a society that is the mystical body of an incarnate God" where he achieves "his spiritual perfection and his full liberty of autonomy, to his eternal welfare."⁴⁵ True as it may be that man's individual good must be subjugated to the common good of political society, man is made for God and eternal life before he becomes a part of that society; and he is a part of the family before he becomes a part of political society. "This is the origin of those primordial rights which political society must respect. . . ."⁴⁶ The common good of political society, moreover, must be redistributed to the individual good of a person; and the person insists on serving the common good freely.⁴⁷ The paradox of social life is essentially derived from this tension between man's necessary allegiance to political society and the common good and his primary bent toward spiritual perfection.

Maritain's insistence upon the primary importance of spiritual perfection is what makes him essentially a religious thinker. "Absolutely speaking," he writes, "the communion in which each mind enters, in a personal and solitary fashion, with truth through theoretical knowledge, and with God through contemplation, is better than the treasures of communicable culture which minds receive from one another." Therefore, "the paradox of social life is resolved in a progressive

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 70.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 65; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 9.

⁴⁷The Person and the Common Good, p. 67.

moment that will never be terminated here-below."⁴⁸ From the horizontal movement of political society and history, man must ascend towards the vertical movement. To begin with, the person is subordinated to the common good of political society; and at the same time the latter must flow to the good of a person. In view of man's transcendental end, "it is essential that society itself and its common work are indirectly subordinated."⁴⁹ In the end, a sound political philosophy must be one which responds to "the most profound aspirations of human nature." It must recognize the truth, in Maritain's thought, that man is a religious animal.

As Mascall points out, we need not "go all the way with Maritain's strict Thomist Aristotelianism in order to accept the general features of his exposition."⁵⁰ Man, due to the possession of his personality, is distinct from other corporeal beings (or other animals). Man is not exalted just because he is man, but he is elevated because he is created in the proper image of God. Thus, the notion of personality is closely linked with his "integral humanism." Martin Buber arrived at his I-Thou relation (or between man and man) in a manner different from

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 74, 92.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 92-93; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 18-19.

⁵⁰ The Importance of Being Human, p. 42. Frederick Copleston explains the major theme of contemporary personalists is that man is more than a mere member of society or a mere part of the whole. Thus, for personalists, "to interpret the person as a mere part of the state or of the race or of the class or even of humanity is to misinterpret him." Moreover, he says that, although one may or may not agree with these kinds of statements, "they are not without some practical relevance." Contemporary Philosophy, p. 124. See especially chapter vii, "The Human Person in Contemporary Philosophy," pp. 103-24.

that which led Maritain to his conception of man, but they reach a common conclusion when they reject both atomistic individualism and totalitarian collectivism.

CHAPTER XIV

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL SOCIETY

The summit of Jacques Maritain's political philosophy as well as of his philosophy of culture is the conception of personality which is rooted in the spirit and linked with God. It is clear, as Maritain says, that the "distinction between the individual and the person, when applied to the relations between man and city, contains, in the realm of metaphysical principles, the solution of many social problems."¹ By reason of personality, man attains "a richer and nobler existence" (or spiritual superexistence) than "a mere parcel of matter" in which individuality is rooted. He is not merely a part of political society, but is a whole: "he is a universe unto himself, a microcosm in which the whole great universe can be encompassed. . . ."² Therefore, the height of human spirituality surpasses all the common good of political society. As Maritain has often pointed out, this "spiritual dynamism" at work in human culture implies a two-fold movement:

First, there is the movement of descent, the movement by which the divine plenitude, the prime source of existence, descends into human reality to permeate and vivify it. For God infuses in every creature goodness

¹Three Reformers, p. 23.

²The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 3.

and lovability together with being, and has the first initiative in every good activity. Then there is the movement of ascent, which is the answer of man, by which human reality takes the second initiative, activates itself toward the unfolding of its energies and toward God. Speaking absolutely, the first movement is obviously what matters most; to receive from God is of greater moment for man than to give to God, and he can only give what he has received.³

The human person transcends all temporal societies and is superior to them. "A single human soul," Maritain writes, "is of more worth than the whole universe of bodies and material goods."⁴

The essential and primordial objective of political society is to produce its common good; and "the political task is essentially a task of civilization and culture." What is "political" here is truly Aristotelian. Maritain characterizes his conception of society, in the first place, as "personalist"; second, as "communal"; third, as "pluralist"; and fourth, "theist" or "Christian." As we have already noticed in his philosophy of culture, these four characteristics are the principles that Maritain found in medieval Christendom which was "humble and magnanimous." However, he has not ignored the historical progress and development of human society; thus, these medieval principles are applied analogically (not univocally) to the contemporary world. The ideal of a new Christendom and the creation of the "New Man" is inspired by the Gospel and related to "something beyond history, and represents for human history a 'myth' -- the 'myth' which temporal history needs. If we understand it as applying to states where human existence is progressively established by the structures of common life and

³The Range of Reason, p. 3.

⁴The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 13.

civilization, it concerns history itself and represents a 'concrete historical ideal,' imperfectly but positively realizable."⁵

The gravitational center of Maritain's political philosophy is not purely Aristotelian. Aristotle was a pagan. Instead, Maritain has truly inherited the Christian tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas -- of course, tinged with Aristotelianism. Maritain writes that the Aristotelian conception of political society is "freed of its slavery-condoning dregs as well as of the static quality to which Greek thought was generally subject, and made dynamic by that revelation of the movement of history, and of the infinite aspirations of the person, and of the evolving potential of humanity, which was brought to us with the coming of the Gospel." Thus, for Maritain, St. Thomas Aquinas improved Aristotle whenever necessary, and the former perfected the latter. "The most fundamental aspiration of the person is the aspiration towards the liberty of expansion and autonomy," that is to say, towards spiritual perfection.⁶ Aristotle is exalted in the social and political philosophy of Jacques Maritain as well as in that of his master, St. Thomas Aquinas. After all, "every interior act of the soul which involves order and government belongs to reason."⁷ As Aristotle says, man is "a political animal." Thus, "the human person craves political life, communal life, not only with regard to the family community, but with regard to the civil community. And the commonwealth, insofar as it deserves the name, is a society of human persons." For

⁵Ibid., pp. 20-21, 44, 47-48.

⁶Ibid., pp. 44, 45-46.

⁷Three Reformers, p. 39.

Maritain, the Aristotelian dictum that man is a political animal means, not only that man belongs naturally to political society, but also that "man naturally asks to lead a political life and to participate actively in the life of the political community."⁸

As his political thought grew mature, Maritain came to the conclusion that the realization of a new Christendom is a political task, and the ideal of this new Christian order became associated with a "new Democracy" based directly upon the Gospel. As a matter of fact, his whole emphasis has shifted from a purely epistemological and metaphysical excursion to the application of the derived principles to cultural and political matters. This political task must tend, not only to the common good of the multitude, but also to "the betterment of the conditions of human [internal] life itself."

Maritain's conception of political society, based upon the reality of human nature and the human person, has been named by himself "a humanist political philosophy, or a political humanism." "It represents the political philosophy which [he holds] to be true, and to be the only true one." He warns us that we should not confuse this humanist political philosophy -- as a matter of fact, a political philosophy itself -- with a particular form of government or regime. It may be realized in various forms of government. However, he considers this political humanism as best realizable in Aristotle's "mixed" regime, which he names "the democratic regime." "The regime which political humanism regards as the best in itself is a mixed regime in which the type characteristics of the three classical regimes, or rather of the

⁸The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 13.

three abstract outlines, the three pure forms, elicited by Aristotle, are organically united. . . . The three classical forms of government do not realize in an equal and univocal manner the requirements of humanist political philosophy. They realize them analogically, and after a fashion more or less perfect." A "mixed" (or republican) regime for the realization of this humanist political philosophy will fulfill "its requirements in a manner proportionate to the conditions and the possibilities of our time." It is the "'new Democracy' which is in preparation at the core of the present death-struggle," presumably against totalitarianism and bourgeois or capitalist liberalism. We let Maritain summarize his own conception of "a sane political society," a humanist political philosophy, or a "new Democracy":

[Its keynotes are]: the common good flowing back over individuals; political authority leading free men towards this common good; intrinsic morality of the common good and of political life. Personalist, communal, and pluralist inspiration of the social organization; organic link between civil society and religion, without religious compulsion or clericalism, in other words, a truly, not decoratively, Christian society. Law and justice, civic friendship and the equality which it implies, as essential principles of the structure, life and peace of society. A common task inspired by the ideal of liberty and fraternity, tending, as its ultimate goal, towards the establishment of a brotherly city wherein the human being will be freed from servitude and misery.⁹

Natural Law and Human Rights

Jacques Maritain makes some casual references to natural law throughout his writings, but natural law doctrine does not play any forefront role in his political philosophy until he confronts the

⁹ Ibid., pp. 43, 50, 51, 54-55.

discussion of the rights of man.¹⁰ "In order to treat the problem of the rights of the human being . . . in a philosophical manner," he writes, "we must first examine the question of what is called natural law."¹¹ In another place, he asks: "How could we understand human rights if we had not a sufficiently adequate notion of natural law?"¹² He is primarily concerned with the moral aspects of natural law as the basis of human rights. Therefore, we should not overlook his exposition on natural law when the rights of man occupy a significant place in his practical aspects of politics.

Ernest Barker speaks of the "timeless and spaceless core" of the natural law school and of "the undying spirit of Natural Law."¹³ "Today we are faced with a revival of Natural Law," writes Franz Neumann.¹⁴ Recently, this renaissance of natural law was highlighted by the publication of Natural Law Forum.¹⁵ Of course, natural law doctrine is not

¹⁰ Freedom in the Modern World, p. 72; True Humanism, p. 106. The most comprehensive recent treatise of society based on natural law appears to be: J. Messner, Social Ethics.

¹¹ The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 59.

¹² Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 85.

¹³ "Introduction," Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 1.

¹⁴ "Types of Natural Law," The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), p. 69.

¹⁵ The annual published since 1956 by the Natural Law Institute which was organized in 1947 as a function of the Law School of the University of Notre Dame. Joseph O'Meara, the Dean of the Notre Dame Law School, states that the Natural Law Forum proceeds from "the faith that natural law can help solve some of our problems." "Foreword," Natural Law Forum, I (1956), p. 1. See especially, A. P. D'Entrèves, "The Case for Natural Law -- Re-Examined," Natural Law Forum, I (1956), pp. 5-52.

monopolized by the Catholic circle in contemporary legal and political theories. However, its upsurge is largely accounted for by the revival of Thomism.¹⁶ In this sense, Arnold Brecht, in his survey of the twentieth-century political theory, comments that natural law has staged its revival "in the wake of religious crusaders."¹⁷ Franz Neumann comments that natural law doctrine has even an "ideological character" of the Roman Catholic Church.¹⁸ Natural law doctrine has confronted a staunch attack from the Protestant sources. Therefore, Heinrich A.

¹⁶In regard to the modern trends of natural law theory, see Gottfried Dietze, "Natural Law in the Modern European Constitutions," Natural Law Forum, I (1956), pp. 73-91; René Théry, "Ten Years of the Philosophy of Law in France," Natural Law Forum, I (1956), pp. 104-14; Freiherr von der Heydte, "Natural Law Tendencies in Contemporary German Jurisprudence," Natural Law Forum, I (1956), pp. 115-21; Guido Fassò, "Natural Law in Italy in the Past Ten Years," Natural Law Forum, I (1956), pp. 122-34. Freiherr von der Heydte, in his discussion of "the natural law tendencies in contemporary German jurisprudence," mentions the neo-Thomists, the Protestants, the neo-Hegelians and the neo-Kantians. We also find such names as F. C. S. Northrop, Leo Strauss, Lon L. Fuller and John Wild. For an historical survey of natural law doctrine from a Catholic point of view, see Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy, tr. Thomas R. Hanley (St. Louis and London: B. Herder, 1948).

F. Lyman Windolph, by his own admission, takes the middle ground between a Thomas Hobbes and a St. Thomas Aquinas. Leviathan and Natural Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951). He notes "the disagreement between political philosophers known as positivists and the adherents of natural law. The positivist insisted that in order to think clearly about political matters [one] must make a rigid separation between politics and morality -- between things as they are and as [one] might conceive that they ought to be. The champion of natural law answered that such a separation was undesirable and, in any event, impossible. Natural law represented the common reason of mankind and was the only basis and justification of political forms. To this the positivist replied that natural law was 'nothing but a phrase'" (p. vi). As it will be discussed later, therefore, the battle between the natural law theorist and the positivist is essentially one of the relation between the "ought" (value) and the "is" (fact).

¹⁷Political Theory, p. 322.

¹⁸Op. cit., pp. 82-83.

Rommen writes, "The student of the history of natural law will notice that there exists an interdependence between natural theology, metaphysics, and political theory. He will also notice that the idea of natural law flourishes when law is defined as the rule of reason and for reason and that it recedes into the background when law is defined as will."¹⁹ It would be a mistake, however, if we construe that all Protestant thinkers are against natural law doctrine. Natural law doctrine also faces its foe in Ernest Nagel.²⁰ Having noted that a renaissance of natural law would have been inconceivable at the turn of this century, Franz Newman cites the case of "Karl Bergbohm's witchhunt against Natural Law in all its forms, and in all juridical disciplines. . . ." ²¹ However, the Catholic defense of natural law doctrine as "a fundamental basis for a rational ethical system" is expressed by John A. Ryan and Francis J. Boland when they say:

There are some who deny the existence of natural law and ridicule the term as outmoded, anti-modern, and possessing merely an historical interest. Conceptions of the natural law and of natural rights were peculiar to the Schoolmen, it is averred, but are without legitimate place in modern moral philosophy and politics. No substitute exists, however, for the natural law, as a fundamental basis for a rational ethical system, and the result is that much of modern

¹⁹The State in Catholic Thought, p. 166.

²⁰Ernest Nagel, "On the Fusion of Fact and Value: A Reply to Professor Fuller," Natural Law Forum, III (1958), pp. 77-82; "Fact, Value, and Human Purpose," Natural Law Forum, IV (1959), pp. 26-43. The discussion began with an article written by Lon L. Fuller in support of natural law: "Human Purpose and Natural Law," Natural Law Forum, III (1958), pp. 68-76. See also Fuller's reply to Nagel in "A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel," Natural Law Forum, III (1958), pp. 83-104.

²¹Op. cit., p. 69.

political thought, from the view of ethics, is without principle. Politics, without the natural law as an ethical basis, finds ultimate expression in the absolute or totalitarian State which denies the traditional determinants of morality and makes the fiat of the State the moral law. Political philosophy that rejects the principles of natural law, must also reject the principle that the human personality is a distinct entity, created by God, with rights and duties and destined for an eternal end with God.²²

The natural law doctrine of Jacques Maritain is, needless to say, a Thomist theory of natural law. He writes:

The genuine idea of natural law is a heritage of Greek and Christian thought. It goes back not only to Grotius, who indeed began deforming it, but before him to Suarez and Francisco de Vitoria; and further back to St. Thomas (he alone grasped the matter in a wholly consistent doctrine, which unfortunately was expressed in an insufficiently clarified vocabulary, so that its deepest features were soon overlooked and disregarded); and still further back to St. Augustine and the Church Fathers and St. Paul (we remember St. Paul's saying: 'When the Gentiles who have not the Law, do by nature the things contained in the Law, these, having not the Law, are a law unto themselves . . .'); and even further back to Cicero, to the Stoics, to the great moralists of antiquity and its great poets, particularly Sophocles.²³

Natural law is defined as "participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura."²⁴ As nature comes from God, the natural law comes from the eternal law. "Natural law is law only because it is a participation in Eternal law."²⁵

²²Catholic Principles of Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 1.

²³Man and the State, pp. 84-85. Earlier, Maritain had made a similar statement. But he did not seem to consider that Grotius deformed the idea of natural law. See his writing, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 59-60.

²⁴Freedom in the Modern World, p. 80.

²⁵Man and the State, p. 96; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 61.

Natural law is an unwritten and unchangeable law.²⁶ In this sense, Antigone is regarded by Maritain as "the eternal heroine of natural law."²⁷ Natural law is "even known to human reason not in terms of conceptual and rational knowledge," but in terms of connaturality. Natural law is not like a geometrical proposition. Its immediate origin of artificial systematization, for Maritain, has begun with Grotius and has been completely distorted in eighteenth-century rationalism. Thus, natural law conceived after the pattern of written code is "in reality arbitrarily and artificially formulated."²⁸ For Maritain, eighteenth-century rationalism has completely distorted the true conception of the classical and Christian tradition of natural law.

Maritain, at the outset, makes it clear that "The [natural] law and knowledge of the [natural] law are two different things," that is to

²⁶ Man and the State, p. 85; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 60, 62.

²⁷ Man and the State, p. 85; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 60. Sophocles presented Antigone's reply to the accusation of Creon for having violated "the proclamation by which the rites of burial were denied to her [Antigone's] brother": Antigone says, "It was not God's proclamation. That final Justice that rules the world below makes no such laws. Your edict, King, was strong, but all your strength is weakness itself against the immortal unrecorded laws of God. They are not merely now: they were, and shall be, operative for ever, beyond man utterly." As quoted in F. Lyman Windoph, Leviathan and Natural Law, pp. 19-20.

²⁸ Man and the State, pp. 82-83. Ernest Barker notes that Gierke's study concerning natural law from 1500 to 1800 is the question of "a secular Natural law." "The School is thus a rationalistic school, emancipated from the Church; its tendency, we may say, is to subject the Church to Natural Law rather than Natural Law to the Church; and its thinkers seek to determine the nature of the Church, and the proper scheme of its relations to the State, by principles which are themselves independent of the Church. . . . the school of Natural Law is not only emancipated from the Scriptures of the Church: it is also emancipated from the ratio scripta of Roman law." "Introduction," Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800, xli-xlii.

say, "knowing that there is a law does not necessarily mean knowing what that law is."²⁹ He agrees with Max M. Laserson when the latter says: "The doctrines of natural law must not be confused with natural law itself. The doctrines of natural law, like any other political and legal doctrines, may propound various arguments or theories in order to substantiate or justify natural law, but the overthrow of these theories cannot signify the overthrow of natural law itself, just as the overthrow of some theory or philosophy of law does not lead to the overthrow of law itself. The victory of judicial positivism in the XIXth Century over the doctrine of natural law did not signify the death of natural law itself. . . ."³⁰

As it has been noted, for Maritain, as for all Thomists, natural law is the foundation of the rights of man (or natural rights). From a practical point of view, the foundation of the rights of man may not be important as long as every one agrees with those specific provisions of human rights. However, Maritain as a philosopher stressed the importance of theoretical discussion and foundation of human rights (natural law) are important to him. As he himself states, "With regard to Human Rights, what matters most to a philosopher is the question of their rational foundations." For him, there is no question that "the philosophical foundation of the Rights of man is Natural law."³¹ Nonetheless, Maritain is not a dogmatic philosopher who would reject the same practical rights of man as he conceives them merely because they are

²⁹ The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 62.

³⁰ As quoted in Man and the State, p. 81.

³¹ Ibid., p. 80.

not derived from the same foundations or justifications as is his own conception of natural law. He has made it clear that it is possible to formulate the common principles of action for human rights even if we are powerless to agree upon their theoretical justifications.³² He thus regards the gap between practical conclusions and rational justifications as a kind of paradox. For him, it is paradoxical fundamentally because we cannot agree upon a common rational justification and yet it is indispensable. Nonetheless, Maritain, as a philosopher, cannot ignore the "right" theoretical justification of human rights. He is convinced that his "way of justifying the belief in the rights of man and the ideal of freedom, equality, and fraternity is the only one which is solidly based on truth." But he is tolerant of other points of view when he says: "That does not prevent me from agreeing on these practical tenets with those who are convinced that their way of justifying them, entirely different from mine or even opposed to mine in its theoretical dynamism, is likewise the only one that is based on truth."³⁴

Although it may be true, as E. L. Allen thinks, that, in regard to the rights of man, "Maritain has nothing new to offer,"³⁵ it would be a grave mistake to ignore his rational justification of the rights of man, that is to say, to ignore his philosophical explanation of natural law. There are two essential characteristics or components in

³²His speech is reported in "The Possibilities for Co-operation in a Divided World: Inaugural Address to the Second International Conference of UNESCO," The Range of Reason, pp. 172-84.

³³Man and the State, p. 76.

³⁴The Range of Reason, pp. 180-81; Man and the State, p. 78.

³⁵Christian Humanism, p. 38.

Maritain's notion of natural law: one is the "ontological" element and the other is the "gnoseological" element. The first is looked at from the essence or ontological structure of human nature, and the second, from "natural law as known."³⁶

Maritain takes it for granted that "there is a human nature, and that this human nature is the same in all men." And he also takes it for granted that man is a being gifted with intelligence or reason.³⁷ Therefore, man who is endowed with a nature and intelligence possesses "the power to determine for himself the ends which he pursues." "This means that there is, by the very virtue of human nature, an order or a disposition which human reason can discover and according to which the human will must act in order to attune itself to the essential and necessary ends of the human being. The unwritten law, or natural law, is nothing more than that."³⁸ Thus, unlike many Protestant thinkers, Maritain believes that human reason directs the human will in pursuit of man's ends. For the majority of Protestant thinkers, natural reason is incapable of directing human action and ends; human action must be directed by man's will which is directly linked with God. For Maritain, this unwritten law comes from the eternal law; but natural law as such is a natural question. Huntington Cairns, in reference to the legal philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, notes that "Truth for the thirteenth

³⁶"Natural Law and Moral Law," Moral Principles of Action: Man's Ethical Imperative, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), p. 62; Man and the State, pp. 85, 89.

³⁷The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 60; Man and the State, pp. 85-86.

³⁸Man and the State, p. 86; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 61.

century could be known either by means of revelation or reason, and it was plainly St. Thomas' intention to construct a legal system the justification of which rested on rational grounds. His philosophy as a whole was directed ultimately towards the problems of revelation and faith; but it could in its legal aspects, at any rate, be tested at all points by the processes of reason."³⁹

The term "law" in natural law is not jus but lex, Maritain explains. Thus natural law is lex naturalis. In natural law, (human) reason is "the measure of human actions." Human reason is "a measuring measure (mensura mensurans)," but it is also "a measured measure (mensura mensurata), for human reason is not the supreme rule of good and evil." In order to measure human conduct, practical reason is measured by natural law.⁴⁰ In regard to its first element, that is its ontological element, natural law is "the normality of functioning of the human being."⁴¹ That is to say, natural law (the normality of functioning) is "grounded on the essence of that being: man."⁴² By reason of its specific structure and ends, therefore, natural law "should achieve fulness of being in its growth or in its behavior." "Every kind of being existing in nature, a plant, a dog, a horse, has its own 'natural law.'" According to Maritain, the word "should" has a metaphysical meaning. It is used in the sense that: "a good or a normal eye 'should' be able to read letters on a blackboard from a given distance." However, "the

³⁹ Huntington Cairns, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1949), p. 204.

⁴⁰ "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 62.

⁴¹ Ibid.; Man and the State, pp. 86, 87, 88.

⁴² Man and the State, p. 88.

same word should starts to have a moral meaning, that is, to imply moral obligation, when we pass the threshold of the world of free agents."⁴³ Natural law for man is moral law. It is moral law, because man obeys or disobeys it freely.

Natural law, as we have considered in the preceding pages, is "the ideal formula of development of a given being; that is to say, in its ontological structure, "natural law is an ideal order relating to human actions, a divide between the suitable and the unsuitable, the proper and the improper, which depends on human nature or essence and the unchangeable necessities rooted in it."⁴⁴ "Thou shalt do no murder" is "a precept of natural law," because the preservation of man's being is his right. As Maritain says, "Man's right to existence, to personal freedom and the pursuit of the perfection of moral life, belongs, strictly speaking, to natural law."⁴⁵ On the same principle, it is clear that genocide is against the very notion of natural law itself. In short, natural law is "something both ontological and ideal." As such, it is "coextensive with the whole field of natural moral regulations, the whole field of natural morality. Not only the primary and fundamental regulations but the slightest regulations of natural ethics means conformity to natural law. . . ."⁴⁶

The second element, or gnoseological element, of the notion of

⁴³Ibid., p. 87; "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 62.

⁴⁴Man and the State, p. 88; "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 63.

⁴⁵The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 71.

⁴⁶Man and the State, p. 89; "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 63.

natural law, for Maritain, is concerned with natural law "in so far as it is naturally known: That is to say, known through inclination, by way of congeniality or connaturality, not through conceptual knowledge and by way of reasoning."⁴⁷ Natural law is made manifest by way of certain judgments; but since it is "knowledge through connaturality" these judgments, unlike rational knowledge, are not obtained by any "conceptual, discursive, rational exercise of reason."⁴⁸ Thus, the regulations of natural law are not known like "a series of geometrical theorems." They are not discovered by an intellectual or rational exercise, or by way of rational knowledge. Rather, they are known through "the guidance of the inclinations of human nature." Therefore, this kind of knowledge "is not clear knowledge through concepts and conceptual judgments; it is obscure, unsystematic, vital knowledge by connaturality or congeniality, in which the intellect, in order to bear judgment, consults and listens to the inner melody that the vibrating strings of abiding tendencies make present in the subject."⁴⁹

Maritain writes that "The only practical knowledge all men have naturally and infallibly in common as a self-evident principle, intellectually perceived by virtue of the concepts involved, is that we must do good and avoid evil. This is the preamble and the principle of natural law." However, "it is not the law itself. Natural law is the ensemble of things to do and not to do which follow therefrom in necessary fashion, and from the simple fact that man is man, nothing else being

⁴⁷"Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 63; Man and the State, p. 89.

⁴⁸"Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 63.

⁴⁹Man and the State, pp. 91-92.

taken into account."⁵⁰ Therefore, natural law known through connaturality or (human) nature's inclinations is in its fullest sense an unwritten law.

Natural law, for Maritain, "deals only with principles immediately known." Since it is known through inclinations, it is obvious that it is known "in an undemonstrable manner."⁵¹ However, we must distinguish human inclinations from animal instincts quo animals (not human beings). Inclination, for Maritain, is still "refracted through the crystal of reason in its unconscious or preconscious life."⁵² If these natural inclinations presuppose "a primary, self-evident principle" like "do good and avoid evil," are they then a sort of Bergsonian intuition? Will Herberg seems to be convinced that connaturality is a kind of "intuition."⁵³ Kai Nielsen calls knowledge through connaturality "a murky doctrine."⁵⁴

There is evidence that Maritain would not equate knowledge by connaturality with intuition when he says: "Henri Bergson and William James, who were so much concerned, the one with intuition, and the other with experience, never did, I think, bring out and make use of the old notion of knowledge through connaturality." Thus, he seems to distinguish knowledge by connaturality from intuition. But he does

⁵⁰The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 63; Man and the State, p. 90.

⁵¹The Range of Reason, p. 27.

⁵²"Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 64.

⁵³Four Existentialist Theologians, p. 11.

⁵⁴"An Examination of the Thomistic Theory of Natural Moral Law," Natural Law Forum, IV (1959), p. 49.

not seem to make clear anywhere how they differ. Is knowledge by connaturality distinct from intuition because it is still a mode of "knowing"? If so, how can it be distinguished from "intuitive knowledge"? Or is it a "murky doctrine"? However, Maritain seems to agree with Bergson in that "mystical experience" of Christian contemplatives has the full fruit of knowledge of connaturality. He does not dwell on this point because it is "more theological than philosophical."⁵⁵ This is what J. Messner calls "a theology" of natural law. Messner himself is a Thomist when he says: "There is certainly no real objection to a 'theology' of natural law which lays open a rich fund of problems of an anthropological, metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological character. But it seems indisputable that less today than ever before the 'philosophical' investigation into, and establishing of, natural law should be questioned as the central task of natural law theory. It is certainly not by chance that Thomas Aquinas, having the best of the Middle Ages with him, in spite of the prevailing uniform Christian outlook, treated natural law theory philosophically, and that he does so in his Summa Theologiae."⁵⁶

Natural law as an unwritten law is not conceived as static in so far as it is knowable through connaturality. "Man's knowledge of it," Maritain writes, "has increased little by little as man's moral conscience has developed." Our knowledge through moral conscience is imperfect, but "very likely it will continue to develop and to become

⁵⁵The Range of Reason, pp. 22, 24.

⁵⁶Johannes Messner, "The Postwar Natural Law Revival and Its Outcome," Natural Law Forum, IV (1959), p. 103.

more refined as long as humanity exists."⁵⁷ For Maritain, there is no doubt that our knowledge of natural law has been "progressively shaped and molded by the inclinations of human nature, starting from the most basic ones." But he is unable to provide evidence for this development. He merely says: "Do not expect me to offer an apriori picture of those genuine inclinations which are rooted in man's being as vitally permeated with the preconscious life of the mind, and which either developed or were released as the movement of mankind went on. They are evinced by the very history of human conscience."⁵⁸

Moreover, the knowledge of natural law was "first expressed in social patterns rather than in personal judgments." Thus, Maritain says that the knowledge of natural law "has developed within the double protecting tissue of human inclinations and human society." It seems obvious that knowledge by connaturality and the manifestations of human society in regard to natural law must coincide. Natural law contains only "basic principles in moral life -- progressively recognized from the most common principles to the more and more specific ones." Moreover, "Only when the Gospel has penetrated to the very depth of human substance will natural law appear in its flower and its perfection."⁵⁹

Since the knowledge of natural law can be known by the development of human inclinations and human society, Maritain comments that "a careful examination of the data of anthropology would show . . . the

⁵⁷Man and the State, p. 90.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 92.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 90, 92-93.

fundamental dynamic schemes of natural law."⁶⁰ J. Messner is particularly concerned with this anthropological question in regard to natural law. Although "the anthropology centering on the idea of the 'animal rationale' still stands," he notes that "the schools of biological, evolutionary, historical, sociological, psychological, ethnological anthropology have broken so much new ground that natural law doctrine will have to show in much greater detail how its metaphysical anthropology fits in with indisputable empirical facts." This seems to be the fundamental question for the Thomist. Since they refuse to impose the theological truth or the authority of God on the realm of natural law (nature in general), Thomistic philosophical doctrine must show that its natural law doctrine has no contradictions with empirical facts. Messner again notes that "Comparatively, the medieval natural law school had knowledge only of a very narrow range of empirical facts. Since then we have learned that mankind has existed at least half a million years, that the very highly developed ancient civilizations never approached scientifically the problem of natural law, that innumerable peoples and tribes are guided by codes of law or rules of custom which, *prima facie*, seem very difficult to fit into the medieval natural law doctrine."⁶¹

As we have seen, Jacques Maritain has assumed the continuous development of the basic tenets of natural law since the dawn of civilization. Messner seems to have questioned Maritain's very assumption when he says that the ancient rules of custom seem very difficult to

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁶¹ "The Revival of Natural Law Revival and Its Outcome," p. 103.

fit into the medieval natural law doctrine.

For Maritain, we must consider natural law in terms of the obligations and the rights involved in the requirements of natural law. He notes that the ancient and medieval worlds have given more attention to the obligations than to the rights of man, and that it was not until the eighteenth century that the rights of man (probably in reference to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man) have been brought to the fore in natural law. "That discovery was essentially due to a progress in moral and social experience, through which the root inclinations of human nature as regards the rights of the human person were set free, and consequently, knowledge through inclination with regard to them developed."⁶² Although Maritain has totally rejected the rationalistic philosophy of natural law of the eighteenth century, he has given it credit for its having brought forth the light of human rights that are required by natural law.

As a Thomist, Maritain cannot ignore the relation of natural law to eternal law. He says, "the concept of Natural Law is given its definitive meaning only when that of Eternal Law has been established." He maintains that "the concept of Eternal Law is not solely theological," and one may make a philosophical excursion to eternal law. "God exists. He is the first cause of being, activating all beings." For Maritain, as well as for St. Thomas Aquinas, "Eternal Law is one with the eternal wisdom of God and the divine essence itself." Since God is the first cause and law is a measure and a rule, "a thing is ruled and measured insofar as it participates in the measure and rule existing in the one

⁶²Man and the State, p. 94.

who rules." Moreover, all things are measured and ruled by Eternal Law. For that reason, "they participate in this Law insofar as they derive from it the inclinations through which they tend naturally toward their proper operations and ends." Thus, it is essential to note that "the divine reason alone is the author of Natural Law." The divine reason is the cause for the existence of natural law, and it is also the cause of both human nature and its essential inclinations. The knowledge of human nature and its inclinations is thus dependent upon eternal law. "Natural Law is a participation in the Eternal Law."⁶³ We must be cautioned finally that the principle of analogy alone is applicable to the relation between two different types of law: the notion of law is analogically common to eternal law and natural law, eternal law and human law, and natural law and positive law.

For Maritain, the most significant aspect of natural law is its moral implications. As Heinrich Rommen points out, "[A] reason why the Catholic philosophy of the state emphasizes the principle of natural law is the relation of ethics and politics."⁶⁴ However, we must also stress the importance of practical applications of natural law to the rights of man in the political philosophy of Jacques Maritain. In the postwar natural law discussion, J. Messner expresses his concern over the focus on the fundamental natural law principles such as their ontological and metaphysical foundation or their political and social validity in most general terms. "Thus it has been occupied with problems which St. Thomas thought should not be so much in vogue, since the

⁶³"Natural Law and Moral Law," pp. 65, 67.

⁶⁴The State in Catholic Thought, p. 195.

fundamentals of natural law, namely, its general principles, were, he thought, established and were familiar to the human mind. . . . What he thought to be the chief task will still have to be the main pursuit of the traditional natural law doctrine: the application of the natural principles to the changing world in the political, social, economic, cultural field."⁶⁵ In this sense, Maritain's practical applications of natural law to the rights of man import an added significance in his political philosophy.

The true philosophy of human rights must be based upon the idea of natural law. "The same natural law which lays down our most fundamental duties, and by virtue of which every law is binding, is the very law which assigns to us our fundamental rights."⁶⁶ Natural law is not a written law; its first principle or preamble is "Do good and avoid evil." Now we shall examine the relation of natural law (lex naturalis) to "natural right" (jus naturalis), to "the law of nations" (jus gentium), and to "positive law" (either customary or statute law).

When it is a question of written law, the relation between lex and jus is simply a relation of identity. Thus, positive right and positive law are synonyms: "positive right and positive law emanate from social authority and are sanctioned by the constraints of society." Thus, we are concerned here with "the notion of debitum legale," that is to say, we are concerned with the order of legality or the juridical order which, of course, supposes the moral order. However, natural law deals with the domain of morality, not that of legality. It is

⁶⁵"The Postwar Natural Law Revival and Its Outcome," p. 105.

⁶⁶The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 66; Man and the State, p. 95.

concerned with the notion of "debitum morale." Natural law is promulgated in our reason as knowing through connaturality or inclinations.

Juridical authority, not the moral order, is inherent in human species; the right of legal constraint derives from it. Therefore, Maritain writes, "there is a natural juridical order contained with the Natural Law and the natural order of morality, but in a simply virtual manner." In this sense, we can speak of natural right. "As soon as a precept of Natural Law is expressed in written law, it becomes a precept of written law and by this token it is part of positive right, of the juridical positive order." Natural right, since "it remains enveloped in the Natural Law," does not require "formulation in positive law and in the juridical order in the full and formal sense of the word." It is, for example, unlike the law of nations in which "the notion of right (jus) no longer takes on merely a virtual, but a formal and actual meaning as well."⁶⁷

The law of nations or the common law of civilization, for Maritain, is unlike natural law in that the former is known through "the conceptual exercise of reason" while the latter is known through inclinations or connaturality.⁶⁸ This is the specific difference between natural law and jus gentium. The law of nations is known through "the rational, logical, conceptual exercise of the common reason, starting from more profound and more primary principles which are the principles of Natural Law."⁶⁹

⁶⁷"Natural Law and Moral Law," pp. 69, 71, 72.

⁶⁸Man and the State, p. 98; "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 72.

⁶⁹"Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 69.

However, Maritain says that it is difficult to define the law of nations because it is "intermediary between natural law and positive law."⁷⁰ The law of nations contains both things which belong to natural law and which are beyond natural law. It specifically contains the things beyond natural law because it differs from natural law in the manner in which the knowledge of that law is attained. Thus, the distinction between the law of nations and natural law is not based on their content. From a point of view of its content, the law of nations must contain certain regulations which are based upon human nature or which are connected with the first principle of natural law: "Do good and avoid evil." Therefore, jus gentium must deal, like natural law, "with rights and duties which are connected with the first principle in a necessary manner."⁷¹ In short, "the law of nations belongs at once to the moral order and to the juridical order; it presupposes a debitum morale, a moral obligation appealing to conscience, before the legal obligation, debitum legale."⁷² However, we must remember Maritain's distinction between natural law and the law of nations. This distinction lies in the mode of knowing rather than in the content of the law.

Positive law or right is "the body of laws," whether it be customary law or statute law. While the law of nations is connected with the first principle in a necessary manner, positive law is connected with it in "a contingent manner."⁷³ It is not concerned with the whole

⁷⁰ Ibid.; Man and the State, p. 98.

⁷¹ Man and the State, p. 99.

⁷² "Natural Law and Moral Law," pp. 74-75.

⁷³ Man and the State, p. 99; The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 70; "Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 75.

body of civilization or humanity. Rather, it is the laws and customs of "a particular social group" or society. "Human reason intervenes here as a creative factor not only in that which concerns the knowledge of the law -- as in the case of the law of nations -- but in that which concerns the very existence of the law."⁷⁴

Now, there is the inseparable relation of the law of nations and positive law to natural law. It is the virtue of natural law that both the law of nations and positive law take on the force of law. "They are a prolongation or an extension of natural law, passing into objective zones which can less and less be sufficiently determined by the essential inclinations of human nature."⁷⁵ Natural law, therefore, provides its general (moral) guidance for the law of nations and positive law; it leaves certain regulations "to the ultimate determination and initiative of the human reason." "The Natural Law itself requires that what it leaves undetermined be ultimately determined by human reason." There are "imperceptible transitions" between natural law, the law of nations and positive law.⁷⁶

Finally, we can relate the law of nations and positive law to eternal law, since the former are co-extensive with natural law and, in turn, natural law is a participation in eternal law. As Maritain writes, "the positive law obliges men in conscience -- in other words the debitum legale that it institutes is also a debitum morale -- because it obliges by virtue of the Natural Law. By the same token

⁷⁴"Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 75.

⁷⁵Man and the State, p. 99.

⁷⁶The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 71; Man and the State, p. 100.

we see that an unjust law is not a law. This follows as a consequence . . . from the fact that the positive law obliges by virtue of the Natural Law which is a participation in the Eternal Law."⁷⁷

Natural law, which is an unwritten and immutable law, serves as the foundation of the rights of man; and the most significant aspect of natural law is that it can offer the moral basis of human rights. As Maritain has said, natural law is moral law. Although natural law is the only true theoretical or rational justification of human rights, Maritain has not dogmatically rejected other practical ideologies and conclusions concerning human rights as long as they are concordant with his own. Therefore, Maritain's conception of the law of nations is essentially the same as President Roosevelt's four-point program which can fulfill the yearnings of the civilized world community. The Four Points of Roosevelt, as Maritain lists them, include: (1) "Freedom of speech and expression everywhere in the world"; (2) "Freedom of every person to worship God in his own way everywhere in the world"; (3) "Freedom from want"; and (4) "Freedom from fear."⁷⁸ When politics is a practical art, then the practical conclusions of human rights embody far more important consequences in political society which must implement and actualize the rights of man. Although man's right to existence, to personal freedom, to the pursuit of the perfection of moral life and to the private ownership of material goods belongs to natural law,⁷⁹ the details of economics, politics and social activities

⁷⁷"Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 76.

⁷⁸The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 72; Man and the State, p. 100.

⁷⁹Man and the State, p. 100. The right to material goods

are subject to positive law.

In the discussion of "the rights of the human person," Maritain makes an important distinction between "the possession and the exercise of a right." There are certain inalienable rights of man which are grounded on the very nature of man. Therefore, man possesses these rights absolutely. However, since man is living with other persons in a civil society, the exercise of his rights is nonetheless restricted under certain circumstances. Every law must aim at the common good of political society or the body politic. In the same manner, the exercise of man's right is subject to the common good and social justice. Thus human rights are "inalienable only substantially."⁸⁰

In Maritain's discussion of human rights, there are essentially three categories: the rights of human persons, the rights of the civic person (political rights) and the rights of social persons (particularly in reference to the worker). The importance of the rights of human persons springs from Maritain's own personalist social and political philosophy. We must consider here that human personality springs from the very nature of man: Man is a religious animal. Man as a spiritual animal transcends the natural or temporal order itself, as the supernatural world and the Gospel are above the profane world. Thus, human personality is inviolable. The transcendence of the person is directly linked with God. The human person transcends the State. Nonetheless,

belongs to natural law, "insofar as mankind is naturally entitled to possess for its own common use the material goods of nature; it pertains to the law of Nations . . . in so far as reason necessarily concludes that for the sake of the common good those material goods must be privately owned, as a result of the conditions naturally required for their management and for human work. . . ."

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 101.

for Maritain, the grace of God "perfects nature and does not destroy it."⁸¹

Even "the universe of truths" (of science, of wisdom, and of poetry) belongs to a higher plane than the political community. Although the state may oppose "the propagation of errors which might threaten the fundamental ethics of common life" and may ask a mathematician or a physicist to teach mathematics or physics, it cannot force these scientists to adopt certain philosophical or mathematical doctrine.⁸² The Russian scientist Lysenko's genetics is sheer nonsense.

The rights of human persons include the provisions of natural law: the right to existence and life, the right to personal freedom and the right to the pursuit of the perfection of moral and rational life. Maritain also stresses "family society," which is primordial and prior to the political society. Thus, "The rights of the family, the rights of the human person as father or mother of the family, belong to natural law in the strictest sense of the word."⁸³ The same is said about religious liberties. In the rights of human persons, the freedom of religious association and of marriage is included.

Political rights are predicated upon the Aristotelian dictum that man is a political animal: he is not only naturally born into political life, but is also obliged to participate in the political life of the community. Among political rights and liberties, Maritain is emphatic about universal suffrage. It is necessary for free men to

⁸¹The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 74.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 76-77.

⁸³Ibid., p. 82; Man and the State, p. 104.

choose those who hold authority towards the common good. As Maritain says, "this is the most elementary form of active participation in political life."⁸⁴ The second aspect is concerned with political parties. Maritain condemns the totalitarian single party system as "the worst form and the catastrophe of the party system." "What we ask of a new Democracy is not to abolish political parties, but rather to regulate the make-up of the State, of the legislative assemblies and the organs of government, in such a manner that the latter, while subject to the control of the assemblies in matters of major interest, would be freed from party domination."

The root of a true political democracy lies in the political rights of citizens. The right of the people to choose their constitution and form of government is "the first and most fundamental of political rights," although they are subject to "the requirements of justice and natural law." Maritain envisages what we call the constitutional government or the democratic government. Other political rights include "the three equalities: political equality assuring to each citizen his status, security and liberties with the State; equality of all before the law, implying an independent judiciary power which assures to each one the right to call upon the law and to be restrained by it alone if it has been violated; equal admission of all citizens to public employment according to their capacity, and free access of all to the various professions, without racial or social discrimination."

The political rights also include the right of association and freedom of expression. Maritain prefers the term "freedom of

⁸⁴The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 84-85.

investigation and discussion" to "freedom of speech and expression." Freedom of investigation is "a fundamental natural right, for man's very nature is to seek the truth." It is not an unlimited right. However, he rejects censorship and police methods as the worst way even to insure the repression of activities which are detrimental to political society. "In any event I am convinced," Maritain writes, "that a democratic society is not necessarily an unarmed society, which the enemies of liberty may calmly lead to the slaughterhouse in the name of liberty."⁸⁵ As Maritain has already emphasized, his proposal for the effective defense of liberty is based upon an organic and pluralist philosophy.

Maritain's political rights, as we have seen, do not contain any drastic provisions that differ from those of the constitutional governments we find in Europe and the United States. There is nothing new in his proposals in contrast with the operating factors in American democracy. His practical conclusions on politics might have well been influenced by American democracy since his arrival in this country.

In his third category of human rights, social rights or the rights of the social person, his particular concern over the workers is indicative of his social thinking. He is particularly concerned with the amelioration of the worker. His personalist social and political philosophy is clearly reflected upon social rights.

For Maritain, the economic and the social orders are as important as the political order for the improvement of human conditions. His emphasis upon "the dignity of work" implies that the worker is not

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 86, 87, 88, 89, 90.

merely a commodity, he must be treated as a human person. Thus, the dignity of work is "a moral datum."⁸⁶ In this sense, he not only represents the voice of Christian theologians, but also has provisions similar to those found in the encyclical letter of Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (1891).

The right to work means "the right of every one to find work which will afford a living for himself and his family . . . [and] as men become aware of this right, it will assume a powerful force of social transformation."⁸⁷ Social rights also include the right to a just wage, the right to relief, unemployment insurance, sick benefits, and social security.⁸⁸ The rights of the working groups include freedom to organize and to join trade-unions of their own choice and the right to strike. His drastic proposal is "a system of joint ownership and of joint management," which is based upon the idea of "the worker's title." This proposal is opposed to both the socialist planned economy and the capitalist system. It is what he calls "'associative' enterprise."⁸⁹ As we may recall, his personalist philosophy would only be materialized after the breakdown of individualistic capitalism, which sacrifices the dignity of work for "a commodity of labor" and for the fecundity of money.

Maritain is opposed to Marxian socialism because it grants "primacy to economic technique," it tends "to entrust everything to the

⁸⁶ Man and the State, p. 105.

⁸⁷ The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 94.

⁸⁸ Man and the State, p. 104.

⁸⁹ The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 98.

power of the State, administrator of the welfare of all, and to its scientific and bureaucratic machinery." In short, it "leads in the direction of a totalitarianism with a technocratic base." His "associative" proposal does not imply any kind of "paternalism" on the part of the management for the benefit of the workers. As he says, "such a conception tends to treat the worker as a minor, and opposes in the most radical manner that consciousness of the social dignity and the rights of the working person. . . ." Nor does Maritain favor "State corporatism." For him, "the State has a simple function of coordination and control. A fundamental truth must here be safeguarded, that of the distinction between the political order and the economic order, between the political structure of the State and the economic organization of society. The idea of an economic State is a monstrosity." This is perfectly consonant with his pluralist philosophy.

Maritain has consistently proposed a personalist philosophy of society as opposed to the two extreme "liberal-individualistic" and "communistic" types. "The political life of the State must express the thought and the will of the citizen, with regard to the common good and to the common task, which are of an order, not merely material, but principally moral and truly human."⁹⁰ "The advocates of a personalistic type of society," he writes in another place, "see the mark of human dignity first and foremost in the power to make these same goods of nature serve the common conquest of intrinsically human, moral, and spiritual goods and of man's freedom of autonomy. Those three groups [liberal-individualistic, communistic, and personalistic] inevitably will

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 97, 99-100, 103.

accuse each other of ignoring certain essential rights of the human being. It remains to be seen who makes a faithful image and who a distorted image of man."⁹¹

A few remarks are in order in the conclusion of Maritain's conception of natural law and human rights. As he has maintained, natural law is the only true justification of the positive rights of man. It is based upon the ontological structure of the human being and is knowable through inclinations or connaturality. The supreme virtue of natural law is its moral content that provides the basis of positive law or human rights. Thus, Maritain rejects a moral or political philosophy which "recognizes Fact alone" as opposed to the notion of "Value": "If the affirmation of the intrinsic value and dignity of man is nonsense, the affirmation of the natural rights of man is nonsense also."⁹² In the Thomistic tradition, the foundation of this ideal order of natural law, that is, the derivation of natural law, is of course "the Eternal Law." Thus, his notion of "value" is derived from the recognition of this fact: natural law is a participation in the Eternal Law.

As we have seen, the contents of Maritain's human rights are not different from the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Four Points of President Roosevelt. If natural law is the basis of human rights, then the latter must be deducible from the former. Unfortunately, Maritain has nowhere shown this process of deduction. Furthermore, there is no absolute guarantee in his system that the

⁹¹Man and the State, p. 107.

⁹²Ibid., p. 97.

enumeration of human rights would be consonant with the true tenets of natural law itself. As Maritain himself said, the knowledge of natural law and natural law are two entirely different things. The first principle of natural law is "Do good and avoid evil," which the law of nations and positive law must take into account. Granted that it is a good moral principle, the problem in moral philosophy still remains in its determination, in an objective fashion, of what is good and what is evil. Of course, good is the consonance with the essence of human being and evil is its opposite. Thus, the problem remains in the determination of what is really the true nature of the human being. We are still not convinced that Maritain's enumeration of human rights is consonant with the true essence of the human being as expressed in law. Such a doubt arises simply because there is no theoretical guarantee that his knowledge of natural law captures the true essence of natural law. Yet, practically speaking, we must not overlook the value of his categories of human rights because they embody democratic principles.

If natural law is known at all, it is known only through inclinations or connaturality. Will Herberg spoke of connaturality as a kind of Bergsonian intuition. But, to take the words of Maritain seriously, it is not "intuition." Knowledge by connaturality is neither a rational knowledge nor intuition. Not too surprisingly, Kai Nielsen calls "knowledge through inclinations" a "merky doctrine." Maritain even distinguishes "authentic and fundamental inclinations"

from "warped, perverted or devious inclinations."⁹³ But he does not provide any justification of how we know which inclinations are authentic or perverted. Vernon J. Bourke, in defense of Jacques Maritain, arbitrarily distinguished "two kinds of knowledge of natural law: a) the way in which most men (not moral scientists) may grasp natural moral law; and b) the way in which a moral expert reflects on, and endeavors to offer a scientific or philosophical explanation of natural law."⁹⁴ And Maritain is a moral expert; when he speaks of knowledge of natural law by inclination or connaturality, he refers to the first category above. However, this would seem to be a misinterpretation of Maritain's notion of the knowledge of natural law. It is true that he considers the knowledge of natural law to be in a primitive stage. When he speaks of knowing natural law through inclination or connaturality, he is not merely including "the ordinary person" (non-expert on morals). He speaks of the perfection of knowledge by connaturality in Christian contemplatives, which cannot be explained by concepts or ideas, that is, by rational knowledge or explanation. Nonetheless, it is connaturality. Maritain, as a moral expert, will have better knowledge of natural law than the ordinary person. But his knowledge of natural law is nevertheless knowledge by connaturality. Bourke admits that "modern Thomists are not yet doing a proper job of making their position clear to their

⁹³"Natural Law and Moral Law," p. 65.

⁹⁴Vernon J. Bourke, "Natural Law, Thomism -- and Professor Nielsen," Natural Law Forum, V (1960), p. 115.

colleagues."⁹⁵ Since the knowledge and the existence of natural law are two entirely different things, as Maritain insists, the former does not affect the latter in any significant manner. We are only concerned with our epistemological root, that is, the knowledge of natural law.

The ultimate justification of the natural law theory of Maritain must be found in the Thomistic tradition. Since he insists that philosophy cannot be separated from theology in the true tradition of Thomism, natural law must not be separated from eternal law and the essence of the human being must not be separated from the divine essence. Maritain, therefore, rests his ultimate justification on the authority of God. He writes:

In the last analysis, as every creature acts by virtue of its Principle, which is the Pure Act; as every authority worthy of the name (that is to say, just) is binding in conscience by virtue of the Principle of beings, which is pure Wisdom; so too every right possessed by man is possessed by virtue of the right possessed by God, Who is pure Justice, to see the order of His wisdom in beings respected, obeyed, and loved by every intelligence. It is essential to law to be an order of reason; and natural law, or the normality of functioning of human nature known by knowledge through inclination, is law, binding in conscience, only because nature and the inclinations of nature manifest an order of reason, -- that is of Divine Reason. Natural law is law only because it is a participation in Eternal Law.⁹⁶

A basic argument against natural law is pointed up by the Humean tradition. This argument, among other questions, declares that

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 119.

⁹⁶Man and the State, p. 96.

the "ought" can never be deduced from the "is." Natural law is the law that takes into account the essence of the human being or human nature. Thus, for instance, the first principle of natural law is a moral prescription. The fact of human nature has been taken into account in this moral prescription. It would seem that there is a factual relation between the "ought" and the "is," although the former is not identical with the latter nor can the former be deduced from the latter. However, the relation between natural law and human nature is an extremely difficult problem. There is no conclusive evidence as to what really constitutes the thing called human nature. Granted that the existence and the knowledge of human nature are two entirely different things, we are concerned here with the knowledge of human nature. As Kai Nielsen says, "the concept of human nature is a rather vague cultural concept; it is not a scientific one. While I think this criticism is surely debatable, it does raise a problem for the natural moral law theory since it is clear that the statement, 'there is an essential human nature,' is not the obvious, self-evidently true statement Aquinas and his contemporary followers take it to be."⁹⁷

However, the crucial difficulty stems from the fact that there are varying and even opposing theories concerning human nature as such. Maritain assumes that there is an immutable natural law or an unchangeable human nature. At the same time, he insists that the knowledge of

⁹⁷ Op. cit., p. 57.

natural law must take into account the discoveries of anthropology. Even modern scientific anthropology has yet to find an answer as to whether or not human nature is immutable. Margaret Macdonald argues that "human beings are not like exactly similar bottles of whisky each marked 'for export only' or some device indicating a common destination or end. Men do not share a fixed nature, nor, therefore, are there any ends which they must necessarily pursue in fulfilment of such nature. There is no definition of 'man'. There is a more or less vague set of properties which characterize in varying degrees and proportions those creatures which are called 'human'."⁹⁸ In knowledge of human nature and natural law, we must yet find certain objective standards to distinguish between perverted and authentic human nature: i. e., find natural law.

The Common Good

Jacques Maritain has often stressed the fact that his philosophy of culture and society is personalist and communalist. We have examined in detail the "personalist" emphasis of his political philosophy. Since these two cardinal aspects of his political philosophy are the two sides of the same coin, we have sporadically commented on its communal characteristic. But we have not considered the communal aspect or the notion of the common good in his social and political philosophy.

Yves R. Simon remarks that ". . . the idea of common good

⁹⁸"Natural Rights," Philosophy, Politics and Society, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 44.

dominates the whole political philosophy of St. Thomas."⁹⁹ In Maritain's social and political philosophy, its personalist character comes to the fore and is preponderant; and yet the achievement of the common good remains the supreme aim of political society or a temporal order. As the temporal order is a real but infravalent end to the supernatural order, so is the communal to the personalist aspect. Maritain says that "it is essential to the common good that it respect and serve the supratemporal ends of the human person."¹⁰⁰ This merely follows from the fact that the temporal common good is the intermediate or infravalent (or relatively absolute) end of the human person. "A civilisation, then, the common good of which is referred to a type so transcendent," Maritain writes, "should necessarily aim at securing for the mass of its citizens conditions that are worthy of man and that will put each citizen thus equipped for the life of reason and of virtue in the way of advancing towards perfect freedom and of achieving his eternal destiny."¹⁰¹

Nor is the common good of political society (a temporal order) construed merely as a material end, it is also moral. As Maritain writes, "It is . . . an error to consider, as is sometimes done, that the temporal common good, the end of the State, means an exclusively material good. It is both material and moral, but mainly moral: the upright life on this earth -- in time -- of the human multitude assembled

⁹⁹"Thomism and Democracy," Science, Philosophy and Religion: Second Symposium, p. 258.

¹⁰⁰True Humanism, p. 127; Freedom in the Modern World, p. 42. Heinrich A. Rommen says, ". . . the common good is not an absolute value." The State in Catholic Thought, p. 311.

¹⁰¹Freedom in the Modern World, p. 44.

in a social body."¹⁰² Thus, the common good is something ethically good.

The common good is the end of society or a temporal order. The notion of the common good, of course, finds its origin in the Greeks. The notion of the common good is well expressed by Heinrich Rommen when he says: "The common good is the prevailing principle that controls any other interest in its order. It is the creative principle, the conserving power of the body politic; it is the final cause of the state, its intimate end; it and nothing else gives the political, sovereign power its moral authority and legitimacy."¹⁰³

The common good as the good of the whole multitude has an organic connotation. Maritain makes it absolutely clear that "the social body and the common good are realities that are irreducible to a single enumeration of individuals and of individual goods or virtues."¹⁰⁴ Much later, Maritain added another meaning to the notion of the common good when he said: "The common good of the city is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole. . . . It is the good human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living. It is therefore common to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn, must benefit from it."¹⁰⁵ Yves R. Simon has been quite concerned with the

¹⁰²The Things That Are Not Caesar's, p. 139; Freedom in the Modern World, p. 42.

¹⁰³The State in Catholic Thought, p. 310.

¹⁰⁴Freedom in the Modern World, p. 103; The Things That Are Not Caesar's, p. 139; The Person and the Common Good, p. 42.

¹⁰⁵The Person and the Common Good, pp. 40-41.

notion of the common good. His is the best expression of the idea that the common good is not the sum of individual goods. He writes:

This philosophy [of the common good] rests on a realistic conception of the social body, that is, that society enjoys a reality of its own, a reality that cannot be reduced to a sum of individual realities. The good which is the object of political activity, the common good, is not reducible to a mere sum of individual accomplishments; it is the perfection, the good, of the whole as such, the perfect cooperation of men in their corporate life and in their collective action. Accordingly, political power cannot be exercised for the private good of a master or for the particular welfare of any group within the state. The only legitimate purpose of politics is the perfect living and acting together of all parts of the body politic. Every idea of exploitation of other men for the sake of the men in power is radically excluded by the very object of political activity.¹⁰⁶

It is very important to note that Maritain's conception of the common good contains the germ of both anti-individualism and anti-totalitarianism. When he says that the common good is not a mere sum of individual goods, he is essentially anti-individualistic. At the same time, this, with a slight shift of emphasis, might have sounded like an authoritarian creed. Maritain also said that the common good is not merely the proper good of a whole. Thus, he built a dam against a totalitarian system in which the individual good appears only to be a dot in its immense universe. Heinrich A. Rommen expresses a similar view as opposed to individualism and totalitarianism in that, in individualism, the individual remains "a social monad" in Leibnitz' sense; man is not considered as a political being; and thus, "what is called common good is merely a distributive sum of the interests and private goods of the individuals." On the other hand, in totalitarianism, the individual

¹⁰⁶"Thomism and Democracy," pp. 258-59.

goods are completely submerged in societal ends, and "the individuals are mere marionettes in the service of impersonal powers of economic productive relations or of a mystical and irrational spirit of the nation revealed in a deified leader for ends and purposes that are utterly foreign to the individual."¹⁰⁷ For Maritain, his "law of redistribution" is essentially an element of anti-totalitarianism and a sheer statism.

The common good demanded by the body politic, for Maritain, espouses "not only the collection of public commodities and services which the organization of common life presupposes: a sound fiscal condition, a strong military force; the body of just laws, good customs, and wise institutions which provide the political society with its structure; the heritage of its great historical remembrances, its symbols and its glories, its living traditions and cultural treasures"; but the common good also includes "the sociological integration of all civic conscience, political virtues and sense of law and freedom, of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches of unconsciously operating hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism in the individual lives of the members of the body politic."¹⁰⁸

The common good and authority are closely related; as a matter of fact, "the common good is the basis of authority, authority, when it is unjust, betrays its own political essence."¹⁰⁹ When the notion of

¹⁰⁷The State in Catholic Thought, pp. 315-16.

¹⁰⁸Man and the State, pp. 11-13; The person and the Common Good, pp. 42-43.

¹⁰⁹The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 11.

authority is translated into "power" in the sense of Realpolitik, then Maritain is in a position to criticize Machiavellianism; coupled with his own notion of the common good which entails necessarily a moral good, Machiavellianism becomes sheer obscurantism of immoralism and a caricature of power politics.

Yves R. Simon raises an objection to the common belief that, because of the Thomistic emphasis on authority, "the political philosophy of St. Thomas is wholly incompatible with any kind of democratic spirit." However, Maritain has said that the common good alone is the foundation of political authority. Further, "The essential function of authority," according to Simon, "is to direct the multitude toward its common good."¹¹⁰ For Maritain, authority is necessary to direct the common good of persons; the achievement of the common good "requires that certain individuals be charged with this guidance, and that the directions which they determine, the decisions which they make to this end, be followed or obeyed by the other members of the community." Moreover, besides its essential function to achieve the common good, authority for Maritain, "must exercise subsidiary functions" not only of penal sanction but also of moral direction and training.¹¹¹

Maritain distinguishes authority from sovereignty. According to him, it is permissible to use the latter term only insofar as it means "either the natural right of the body politic to full autonomy, or the right which the State receives from the body politic to topmost independence and topmost power with regard to the other parts and power

¹¹⁰"Thomism and Democracy," pp. 261, 262.

¹¹¹The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 9-10, 56.

agencies of the political society or with regard to the external relations between States." However, since he treats the notion of sovereignty, not in terms of juridical theory, but in terms of political philosophy, he believes that "political philosophy must get rid of the word, as well as the concept, of Sovereignty . . . because, considered in its genuine meaning, and in the perspective of the proper scientific realm to which it belongs . . . this concept is intrinsically wrong and bound to mislead us if we keep on using it." Both in the past and in the modern totalitarian states, sovereignty has meant "power without accountability" and "the right to be obeyed" and in effect it is "but one with the concept of Absolutism." Hence Maritain feels that "there is no valid use of the concept of Sovereignty" in the political sphere. Nevertheless, he has set down two elements of what he calls "genuine Sovereignty": the first is a natural and inalienable right to supreme independence and supreme power; and the second is the absolutely and transcendently supreme character of that independence and power. What he says, however, is that "neither the first nor the second element inherent in genuine Sovereignty can by any means be ascribed to the State. The State is not and has never been genuinely sovereign."¹¹²

Authority is necessary in political society, and it must be directed to the accomplishment of the common good of the people. Authority is exercised by the leaders who, as we have already noted, must be chosen (elected) by the fundamental right of the people. Authority has been distinguished from sovereignty, and, moreover, authority is not power. Maritain says that "power is the force by means of

¹¹²Man and the State, pp. 29, 43, 50.

which you can oblige others to obey you. Authority is the right to direct and command, to be listened to or obeyed by others. Authority requests power. Power without authority is tyranny."¹¹³

It seems necessary here to discuss Maritain's concepts of "community," "society," "nation," "state," and "body politic." These concepts have been used in Maritain's earlier writings; but they are clarified as his political thought becomes more mature. Primarily, Maritain did not make any noticeable distinction between the state and the body politic. For instance, he said in one place that the temporal common good is the end of the "State." Also, he had to re-define the notion of "people" as a social and ethical concept.

Maritain notes that, although community and society "may licitly be used synonymously," there is a preliminary distinction to be made between them. "A community is more a work of nature and more nearly related to the biological; a society is more of a work of reason, and more nearly related to the intellectual and spiritual properties of man." The former is "a product of instinct and heredity in given circumstances and historical frameworks," whereas the latter is "a product of reason and moral strength." While the community "springs up from nature," the society "finally springs from human freedom."

In regard to the concept of nation, Maritain maintains that "the Nation is a community, not a society. The Nation is one of the most important, perhaps the most complex and complete community engendered by civilized life." He defines a nation as "a community of people who become aware of themselves as history has made them, who

¹¹³Ibid., p. 48.

treasure their own past, and who love themselves as they know or imagine themselves to be, with a kind of inevitable introversion. . . . Yet for all of that the Nation is not a society; it does not cross the threshold of the political realms. It is a community of communities, a self-aware network of common feelings and representations that human nature and instinct have caused to swarm around a number of physical, historical and social data."

In contradistinction to the nation, "both the Body Politic and the State pertain to the order of society, even society in its highest or 'perfect' form." Maritain warns that "serious misunderstandings follow upon any failure to distinguish clearly between the State and the Body Politic. . . . These do not belong to two diverse categories, but they differ from each other as a part differs from the whole." The body politic or the political society is the whole, whereas "the State is a part -- of this whole. . . . Political society, required by nature and achieved by reason, is the most perfect of temporal societies. It is a concretely and wholly human reality, tending to a concretely and wholly human good -- the common good. It is a work of reason, born out of the obscure efforts of reason disengaged from instinct, and implying essentially a rational order. . . . Justice is a primary condition for the existence of the body politic, but Friendship is its very life-giving form," He explicitly rejects the absolutist's notion of the state, though being the uppermost political agency, is "neither a whole nor subject of right or a person." Thus democracy alone provides for the common good demanded by the body politic. Maritain accepts the popular notion of democracy wherein political authority originates from the people. "The people are the very substance, the living and free

substance of the body politic. The people are above the State, the people are not for the State, the State is for the people." The people, who are united under just laws by mutual friendship and for the common good of their human existence, constitute a political society. The notion of body politics implies the whole unit composed of the people.¹¹⁴ As Maritain writes, "The notion of people is a social-ethical idea, with the word 'ethical' only emphasizing . . . the very word 'social.'" The ethical (human) content of the people is used in opposition to the concepts of "race" (as in Nazism) and of "class" (as in Marxism). For Maritain, only the broader concept of the people "is possessed of a primordial social value on a genuinely human level."¹¹⁵

Maritain's Philosophy of International Relations

No serious philosopher of our time can readily dismiss the question of international affairs. With the advent of the atomic bomb, coupled with the periodic recurrences of world-wide war, "the future of mankind" seems to be at stake. Karl Jaspers, an existentialist philosopher, has recently raised his voice to bridge the gap between philosophy (thought) and politics (action). Since politics alone "cannot solve the question whether or not mankind will survive . . . philosophy and politics should get together."¹¹⁶

Jacques Maritain is by no means as prominent and discerning a thinker and regular commentator as is his Protestant counterpart,

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp. 2-6, 9-11, 24, 26.

¹¹⁵The Range of Reason, p. 122.

¹¹⁶The Future of Mankind, pp. viii-ix.

Reinhold Niebuhr, on the problems of world politics. However, he provides an alternative view. When the theological notion of original sin overplays its role, the traditional Christian ideal of peace and brotherly love must inevitably stage its metamorphosis into power politics. Niebuhr has a deep insight into the realities of contemporary international politics, but it may safely be said that he does not suggest any definite future goals for international society.¹¹⁷ The ideal of "eternal peace" will never be fully realized, but Kant had foresight and an ideal and never suffered from myopia.¹¹⁸

Maritain's conception of world government, like his ideal of a new Christendom, is tinged with a concrete historical ideal. He speaks of "the organisation of the international community on a foundation of friendship and of justice."¹¹⁹ He once commented that "The common good in our day is certainly not just the common good of the nation and has not yet succeeded in becoming the common good of the civilized world community."¹²⁰ It would be unrealistic for us to expect a world

¹¹⁷ Niebuhr's view on international politics can be found in Christian Realism and Political Problems, Christianity and Power Politics, and Moral Man and Immoral Society. Kenneth W. Thompson surveys "political realism" in international relations in Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics. Among political scientists, the names of Hans J. Morgenthau and George F. Kennan are well-known. See Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951) and Realities of American Foreign Policy; Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946) and In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). It is interesting to compare the pessimistic view of human nature between Niebuhr and Morgenthau, which may justify their realistic view of international politics.

¹¹⁸ See Carl J. Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948).

¹¹⁹ Freedom in the Modern World, p. 108.

¹²⁰ The Person and the Common Good, p. 45.

government today or in the near future. But to have a realizable ideal for our future events is no harm; man cannot live in the darkness of immediate exigencies of time and place alone.

Maritain makes it clear at the outset that he considers "the problem of world government from the point of view of political philosophy and not from that of immediate practical activity."¹²¹ Thus, he is not concerned with the details of the realization of world government; to do so is no less dangerous than unnecessary for a professional philosopher: it is dangerous for a philosopher to enter the unfamiliar dark room of politics.¹²² He shares the philosophy of "the Committee to Frame a World Constitution."¹²³

For Maritain, the problem of our world is an "either/or" choice. He writes that "The problem of World Government -- I would prefer to say, of a genuinely political organization of the world -- is the problem of lasting peace. And in a sense we might say that the problem of lasting peace is simply the problem of peace, meaning that mankind is confronted today with the alternative: either lasting peace or a serious risk of total destruction."¹²⁴ Probably the advent of the atomic bomb made him hasten to this conclusion. Although his immediate

¹²¹ Man and the State, p. 188.

¹²² The details of the similar view are found in G. A. Borgese, Foundations of the World Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

¹²³ Committee members were: Robert M Hutchins, G. A. Borgese, Mortimer J. Adler, Stringfellow Barr, Albert Guérard, Harold A. Innis, Erich Kahler, Wilbur G. Katz, Charles H. McIlwain, Robert Redfield and Rexford G. Tugwell. G. A. Borgese, op. cit., p. v; Maritain, Man and the State, p. 200.

¹²⁴ Man and the State, pp. 189, 191.

influence might have been incurred from the "secular opinions" of some one like Emery Reves, Maritain never loses his Thomist moral insight in world problems.¹²⁵ His picture of the world, therefore, is not that of "an essentially economic interdependence" and "the pathological claims of opposed nationalisms." It is fundamentally a "recasting of the moral and political structures of human existence." He writes:

In the first place, both economic life and political life depend on nature and reason, I mean nature as dominated by material forces and laws and by deterministic evolution, even when the human mind interferes in the process with its technical discoveries -- and on reason as concerned with the ends of human existence and the realm of freedom and morality, and as freely establishing, in consonance with Natural Law, an order of human relations. In the second place, it is nature and matter that have the upper hand in the economic process; and it is reason and freedom that have the upper hand in the political, the genuinely political process.¹²⁶

Maritain's emphasis on the moral and political structures of human existence, as we have already noted, is entirely consistent with his fundamental position. Morality, of course, implies the idea that natural law is moral law of which the first principle is "Do good and avoid evil." As Robert M. Hutchins writes, "St. Thomas said that peace was the work of charity and justice, of charity directly and of justice indirectly. The work of religion and the church is charity. The work of the state and government is justice. Church and State -- universal and world state -- must now work together for world peace founded on universal charity, which would realize the brotherhood of man, and

¹²⁵ See Irving Louis Horowitz, "Jacques Maritain: The Thomist World State," The Idea of War and Peace in Contemporary Philosophy (New York: Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1957), pp. 65-79.

¹²⁶ Man and the State, p. 190.

universal democracy, which would bring justice to all mankind."¹²⁷

Moreover, Maritain's concern with the political over the economic is derived from his ability to recognize first, the distinction between politics and economics and then, the primacy of the political over the economic.

Maritain rejects not only the Marxian economic interpretation of social process, but also Hegelian statism. "The fundamental amorality of the foreign policy of modern states" is grounded on the idea of the omnipotent state and "a right of absolute sovereignty." Hegel "gave full metaphysical expression to the idea of the State as a super-human person."¹²⁸ As Maritain insisted, the state is not above the body politic: it must always be in the service of human ends. As the end of the state is the common good of the people, so the end of a world state is the common good of international society as a whole. This implies Maritain's rejection of a recent school of "national interest theory" whose renowned representative and originator is Reinhold Niebuhr. Maritain would agree with Emery Reves when the latter says:

Nothing can distort the true picture of conditions and events in this world more than to regard one's own country as the center of the universe, and to view all things solely in their relationship to this fixed point. It is inevitable that such a method of observation should create an entirely false perspective. Yet this is the only method admitted and used by the seventy or eighty national governments of the world, by our legislators and diplomats, by our press and radio. All the conclusions, principles and politics of the peoples are necessarily drawn from the warped

¹²⁷St. Thomas and the World State (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1949), p. 44.

¹²⁸Man and the State, p. 192.

picture of the world obtained by so primitive a method of observation.¹²⁹

Therefore, for Maritain, "the two main obstacles to the establishment of a lasting peace are, first, the so-called absolute sovereignty of modern states; second, the impact of the economic interdependence of all nations upon our present irrational stage of political evolution, in which no world political organization corresponds to world material unification."¹³⁰

Maritain's main concern here is what he calls "the inorganization of the world" of today. It is our necessity for a world government or "a one world politically organized."¹³¹ Maritain agrees with his colleague, Mortimer Adler, in that "the only cause of war is anarchy." Logically, a world government repudiates anarchy; the cause of war is eliminated; and finally a lasting peace is established. As the preamble to the Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution (1948) reads,

The people of the earth having agreed that the advancement of man in spiritual excellence and physical welfare is the common goal of mankind; that universal peace is the prerequisite for the pursuit of that goal; that justice in turn is the prerequisite of peace, and peace and justice stand or fall together; that iniquity and war inseparately spring from the competitive anarchy of the national states; that therefore the age of nations must end, the nations have decided to order their separate sovereignties in one government of justice, to which they surrender their arms; and to establish, as they do establish, this Constitution as the covenant and fundamental law of the Federal Republic of the World.¹³²

¹²⁹ The Anatomy of Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 1.

¹³⁰ Man and the State, p. 194.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 196.

¹³² G. A. Borgese, op. cit., pp. v-vi.

Maritain's reply to the objections to the idea of a world government is that "if the idea is grounded, as we believe, on true and sound political philosophy, it cannot be impossible in itself." Moreover, he maintains that he is "not much of an idealist" since he is an Aristotelian realist. The idea of a world government is not a "beautiful idea" but "a great idea" and "a sound and right idea."¹³³

Maritain distinguishes, in the establishment of a world government, what he calls "the fully political theory" from "the merely governmental theory." The latter is associated with his concepts of state and government, the former is considered in terms of body politic. For him, a world government based upon the merely governmental theory "would be wrong and disastrous." The difference of these two theories lies essentially in his distinction between state and body politic. As we have noted, the basic political reality for Maritain is not the state itself. The state is only a part of body politic which is an organic concept of political society. The body politic is grown out of the moral sense of the people who are organized under just laws and control the state itself. Therefore, it is in the service of men. The root of governing function lies in the body politic, not in the state.

The idea that "one body politic is one organized people" does not imply "a federal unity." It is based upon "a pluralist unity." The pluralist unity is predicated upon a world-wide civic friendship (which is not charity) and a world common good. As the body politic of one nation is based upon the principle of pluralism, the pluralism of a

¹³³ Man and the State, pp. 200-201.

world government implies "the particular bodies politic themselves, with their own political structures and lives, their own national and cultural heritages, their own multifarious institutions and communities -- all this being enveloped, treasured and held sacred by the same will which would tend, beyond all this, to a world-wide living together, and which would have achieved this aim by the foundation of a world political society." The world society based upon this pluralistic principle of the "supra-national State and the multiplicity of nations" alone can in the long run promote peace, happiness and freedom.

For Maritain, a world government presupposes, first of all, "a will to live together developed in all the peoples." This is what we usually call the development of the sense of "world community." Secondly, "the passage to a one world politically organized can only occur after a long time." This is the same condition in regard to the coming of a Christendom in the remote or indeterminate future. Maritain has never failed to emphasize the fact that our moral condition today is in a primitive stage and that "mankind is still in a pre-historic age with regard to the application of the Gospel in actual life."¹³⁴

Finally, Maritain envisages "a kind of world council" in the establishment of a world government. Its main virtue is that it is "endowed with unquestionable moral authority" with which to exercise spiritual responsibility. Thus, its function would be "only a function of ethical and political wisdom." And the world council "would be made up of the highest and most experienced authorities in moral and juridical

¹³⁴Ibid., pp. 202, 209, 210, 212.

sciences." It is not like the present International Court of Justice, especially in its moral and political function. The members of the council would be picked from various nations in an equitable proportion and would be directly elected by the people of all nations, among men proposed in advance by nations' respective governments. They would lose their national citizenship and be given world citizenship so that they might be completely free from the control of their respective governments. Maritain thinks that "the idea of such a supreme advisory council could perhaps have a chance of being accepted by all States and governments." This supreme advisory council would constitute "the foundation of a world community politically organized." Since it is "a senate of wise men," it is reminiscent of the philosopher-kings in Plato's Republic, if we only remember their differences in the exercise of authority and function.

Maritain's conception of a world government is vulnerable to criticisms, those criticisms which we usually attach to what we label the "idealist" school in international politics. The tincture of Maritain's idealism is not a dogmatic imposition of the theological notions of the Kingdom of God and of charity on international society. As he writes, "Civic friendship will still remain infinitely different from charity, just as the world society will remain infinitely different from the Kingdom of God." And he merely insists on "a change in the inner structures of

man's morality and sociality."¹³⁵ The meaning of Maritain's idea of a world government is found in some of what G. A. Borgese calls "seven pillars of social and political planning" for a world constitution. Among these seven pillars, Maritain has similarly emphasized the democratic character, the primacy of ethics to politics, the ethics of power for the administration of justice, and the idea of a lasting peace.¹³⁶

Irving L. Horowitz, in his examination of Maritain's ideas of international society, has commented that "the main locus of international conflict embodies primarily the struggles within an economic world order, and the joint struggle against a different economic ordering of things." He criticizes Maritain for the latter's failure "to go beyond the idea of the State as a political instrument to the State as representative of the dominant military, political and economic forces" and for "[floundering] in a sea of metaphysical abstractions."¹³⁷

If Maritain's conception of a world government and society lacks elaboration, we must remember that, at the outset, he made it clear that he was not going to consider this problem from the point of view of practical details. His lack of elaboration, therefore, does not stem from his blindness to the present realities of international politics. He is looking at the problem of world government from the standpoint of political philosophy. We also could question, outside the metaphysicians' circle, whether international conflict should be explained primarily in terms of economic causes.

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 206, 213-16.

¹³⁶ Op. cit., pp. 288-300.

¹³⁷ Op. cit., p. 69.

Maritain's philosophy of culture has been focused on the ideal of a new Christendom, which stemmed analogically from medieval Christendom. His idea of a world government is one of what Henri Bergson calls "open society" and "dynamic morality," which also have the same qualifications of a Christian order. Unfortunately, Maritain does not allude the hope of a new Christian order to international society. We might cogently ask whether the ideal of a new Christendom is suitable for an international order? In conclusion, idealism on a philosophical plane should not be rejected as something useless as many of us tend to believe. "The commonwealth of man"¹³⁸ is an ideal which, Maritain himself confesses, may be "the old temptation of philosophers."¹³⁹ Ideal, however, is not an illusion but a goal we can strive for apart from our realization of the present realities of power politics and national interest. What we seem to need is a vision with which to see the future rather than our immediate "cash-value." As Hannah Arendt says, "even if all criticism of Plato is right Plato may still be better company than his critics."¹⁴⁰

The Relation of Church and State

One of the most persisting problems of Western civilization is undoubtedly the proper relation between religion and culture. Even before the rise of the modern state system and the schism in Christianity

¹³⁸ This is the title of a work by Frederick L. Schuman, The Commonwealth of Man (New York: Alfred N. Knopf, 1952).

¹³⁹ Man and the State, p. 216.

¹⁴⁰ Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Viking Press, 1961), pp. 275-76.

itself, there not only persisted a power struggle between the religious and the secular orders but also, as Joachim Wach writes, "internally, the Christian community was frequently torn by struggles and discussions over issues of doctrine, cult, and organization."¹⁴¹ We find an ebb and flow in the power struggle between the religious and the secular orders. The Gelasian theory, the Gregorian theory, the doctrine of Hildebrand, Boniface VIII's Unam sanctam (1302), the divine right of kings, etc. are all reminiscent of this power struggle in the past. With the development of the modern state system and the rise of Protestant Reformation, the separation of church and state is an established political doctrine and the guarantee of religious freedom has become a constitutional issue. As Jerome G. Kerwin writes, "The problem of the relationship between Church and state has occupied men's minds for centuries. With the dawn of the Christian era, the emphasis of Christianity on the dignity and worth of the individual, and on the primary allegiance of man to God rather than to any human agency, immediately posed the problem of the relationship of man's supernatural allegiance and his functions and duties in a man-made society."¹⁴² This controversy continues to our day. As Kerwin says, "'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's' became for Christianity a guiding

¹⁴¹Sociology of Religion, p. 327.

¹⁴²Catholic Viewpoint on Church and State (Garden City, N. Y.: Hanover House, 1960), p. 7. Among numerous writings on the relation between church and state, see especially Frank Gavin, Seven Centuries of the Problem of Church and State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938) and Albert Hyma, Christianity and Politics: A History of the Principles and Struggles of Church and State (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1938).

principle of the new dispensation."¹⁴³ However, we must add that this is subject to various interpretations. Loren P. Beth captures the core of this problem when he says: "The conflicts between church and state through history have seldom been based on the assumption that each did not have a separate sphere of legitimate action, but have instead turned on the questions of where the boundaries shall be and of who shall decide disputes arising which concern both; i. e., who shall draw the boundaries. Merely to assert a doctrine of separation does not answer these questions."¹⁴⁴ Theocracy and caesaropapism are the things of the past, as philosophy has ceased to be solely the handmaid of theology. And at the same time many would also argue that total separation of church and state is as much undesirable as impossible. Thus, the problem is to find a formula for peaceful coexistence.

This section is not intended to be a discussion on the whole problem of church and state. Such a discussion is not only impossible in a short span of time but also unnecessary. But a few things must be clarified before we plunge into Maritain's exposition concerning the relation between church and state. In our discussion, it seems quite important to distinguish the two aspects of the Church, on the one hand, and to distinguish the theory from the practice of separation, on the other. And these two things are not totally unrelated. The Church, when it is used in a theological discourse, has the meaning of being a supernatural society that transcends the world and history; the second meaning of the Church is that it is an institution in time and space.

¹⁴³ Op. cit., p. 15.

¹⁴⁴ The American Theory of Church and State (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958), p. 136.

From a point of view of practical politics, the Church as an institution in time and space would, of course, be more important than the Church that is regarded as a supernatural order. The distinction between the theory and the practice of separation seems to be of cardinal significance in discussing any theologian's position. What Maritain says here on a theoretical plane should not be confused with the practice of the Roman Catholic Church as an institution in space and time. We always find some discrepancies between theory and practice. Frank Gavin pinpoints this matter when he says: "In the whole problem of the relations between Church and State there are two fundamental poles: First and foremost is the theological issue, and depending upon what you think the Church is will be the Church's attitude toward the State; the other pole is the practical and historical exigency, and again and again in human history men have had to make compromises, sacrificing principle in order to provide opportunity for the necessary minimum fulfilment of so much as can be salvaged from a situation theoretically impossible."¹⁴⁵ We cannot criticize Maritain's theoretical position from the ill-practices of the Roman Catholic Church, provided that we find some ill-practices. We must consider his conception of the relation of church to state on its own merit and/or demerit, unless he himself refers to the practices of the Church itself.

Moreover, we must avoid a tendency to dichotomize Protestant and Catholic on the relation between church and state. True as it may be that Protestant countries like the United States have lived up more faithfully than have Catholic countries to the principle of separation,

¹⁴⁵Op. cit., p. v.

this is not always the case. The case of the sixteenth century shows the best example. As J. W. Allen writes,

The line of main division between those in the sixteenth Century who thought of the State in terms of relation, was between those who identified or tended to identify Church and Commonwealth and those who practically separated the two. Almost all those who conceived of the Church as a body governing itself by its own organs apart from the State, held that the Church should have a controlling direction of all secular policy. On the other hand, those who regarded Church and Commonwealth as but two aspects of one thing, necessarily placed control of the Church in the hands of the civil magistrate. The controversy between the exponents of these two views is the sixteenth-century form of the medieval controversy as to the relation between Pope and Emperor. All through the century the main division of opinion in the Middle Ages was reproduced. That division corresponded in no way to the division between Catholic and Protestant.¹⁴⁶

Jacques Maritain makes it clear, to begin with, that the term "the Church" is used in "the Catholic concept of the Church." Therefore, his argumentation on the problems of church and state is related to other churches "only in an indirect and qualified manner," if at all. Moreover, he states that he will discuss these problems as a Christian philosopher, not as a theologian.¹⁴⁷

The term "separation of church and state" has a definite meaning in political theory. When Thomas Jefferson spoke of "a wall of separation between Church and State," he meant constitutional guarantee for no established church and the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. Therefore, the doctrine of separation of church and state is predicated upon the supposition that there is a domain which belongs only to the churches and an autonomous domain which belongs to the

¹⁴⁶ A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1960), p. 11.

¹⁴⁷ Man and the State, p. 147.

state. This is the political and legal expression of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Maritain does not use the expression "separation of church and state," because it is rather "a misleading expression." Instead, he uses the expression "the principle of cooperation" between church and state. This seems to be due to his European background. Maritain understands the American doctrine of separation of church and state to mean "a refusal to grant any privilege to one religious denomination in preference to others and to have a State established religion, a distinction between the State and the Churches which is compatible with good feeling and mutual co-operation." Although there may be a "sharp distinction," there is "actual cooperation" at the same time. His "principle of cooperation" is, needless to say, essentially the American doctrine of separation of church and state. He seems to be more appreciative of the American practice than the European one when he says of the former: "Sharp distinction and actual cooperation, that's an historical treasure, the value of which a European is perhaps more prepared to appreciate, because of his own bitter experience."¹⁴⁸ As Jerome G. Kerwin explains the Catholic theories on church and state,

It should be pointed out as obvious that no Catholic could accept the union of church and state which would blur the distinction between the two. The Catholic also rejects the principle of modern positivism that makes every act of the state legal because it is enacted by the state -- a doctrine that sets aside divine or natural law as a standard by which all political acts must be measured. The Catholic also refuses to accept any idea of separation of church and state which sets off each in an isolated compartment, each part having no relationship in co-operating for the common

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 182-83.

good. The Church cannot ignore men's temporal needs. The Church has a vital concern in whether a man receives a living wage, whether he lives in decent housing, whether his treatment is fair, humane, and just under the law. Man must eat in order to pray. To set off the two spheres, temporal and spiritual, in an artificial manner is wrong in theory and impossible of realization. The state will either be friendly to religion or hostile -- there is no middle ground. The Catholic also rejects the idea that religion is the expression of a national spirit and that it is English, French, German, or Spanish. As has been said, the Church's intent is not primarily in the polis but in the cosmopolis.¹⁴⁹

Maritain's position on the problems of church and state is closely related to his philosophy of culture and history. As we have already seen, there is, for him, an important distinction between religion and culture as theology and as philosophy. But they are not separated. Therefore, he has objected both to separatism which isolates culture from religion and to "theological liberalism" which identifies religion with culture. This position has been most clearly shown in his philosophy of a new Christendom. For Maritain, the hope of a new Christendom has become a political "myth," since it is essentially a political task.

A discussion of Maritain's conception of the problems of church and state involves essentially a restatement of his philosophy of a new Christian order. The idea of the republica Christiana of the Middle Ages is not dogmatically imposed upon the creation of a new Christian order. Instead, its principles are applied only analogically; and this new order is a myth that aims at "the very unity of the human person, simultaneously a member of the body politic and of the Church. . . ."

¹⁴⁹ Op. cit., p. 83.

It is a secular order only evangelically inspired by Christianity. The hope of a new Christendom may be materialized only through the psychological transformation of the individual mind. "The unity of religion is not a prerequisite for political unity."¹⁵⁰ It is a political society where the believers and the unbelievers can coexist side by side.

This is the reason why we must understand the real value of Maritain's philosophical concept of analogy. In order to understand the notion of analogy in the problems of church and state, we must first of all discuss what Maritain calls "the general immutable principles." There are three general principles. The first one is "the law of the primacy of the spiritual."¹⁵¹ As a consequence of this principle, we must recognize the fact that the Church is superior to the body politic or the state.¹⁵²

For Maritain, there is no question that the human person is infinitely superior to the body politic as the supernatural end is a higher end than the natural end. The end of the human person transcends the body politic and is above "the common good of what might be called civilization as a whole." The natural end of civilization and the intrinsic common good of the universe are not the absolute end; they are indirectly ordained to the supernatural end. This is the law of

¹⁵⁰ Man and the State, p. 160.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 150. See his Things That Are Not Caesar's and Joseph Lecler, The Two Sovereignities: A Study of the Relationship Between Church and State, tr. Hugh Montgomery (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1952), chapter iv, "The Primacy of the Spiritual: Its Practical Expression Throughout the Ages," pp. 50-84.

¹⁵² Man and the State, pp. 148, 150, 151-52, 153, 154, 156, 157-59, 167-68, 171.

the supremacy of the spiritual or the human person. Although the Church is "in the body politic," for Maritain, there is an order of values: the eternal life is higher than the order of temporal life, that is, the body politic.

The second general principle is "the freedom of the Church to teach and preach and worship, the freedom of the Gospel, the freedom of the word of God." From the standpoint of the unbelievers, the Church is an association of the faithful. For Maritain, the right of freedom of association is the most basic and inalienable of all human rights. However, for the believers, the Church is a supernatural society which leads them to a supernatural life. In short, there must be the freedom and independence of the Church without interference from the body politic. Moreover, for Maritain, an absolute division between the Church and the body politic is like cutting the human person into two. Thus, the third general principle is "the necessary cooperation between the Church and the body politic or the State." This third general immutable principle is highly important in Maritain's conception of the problems of church and state.

These general principles are immutable; however, the ways of applying and realizing them are only analogical to any given historical era. That is to say, the application of these immutable principles "takes various typical forms in reference to the historical climates or historical constellations through which the development of mankind is passing. . . ." The historical climates are the existential conditions of the social, political, juridical, moral and ideological characteristics of the human community at a given time. Maritain characterizes the historical climate of the Middle Ages as "a sacral

age." It was sacral because the power of the Church was superior to that of the prince; the temporal power was merely an instrument to realize the spiritual aims of the Church. The second historical climate is "the baroque age" which is represented by post-medieval centuries. In this age, although "the tenets of sacral civilization were more or less preserved," the notion of state-religion came to the fore.

The third historical climate, for Maritain, is represented by the modern age which "is not a sacral, but a secular age." In this secular age, for the first time in Western history the order of temporal life itself "has gained complete differentiation and full autonomy." Therefore the modern secular age is different from the sacral Middle Ages in that its political power is no longer the spiritual arms of the Church and in that the equality of all the members of the state is recognized regardless of their religious affiliation -- whether they are believers or unbelievers. The ideal of a new Christendom must take into account these considerations. If this new order is to be realized, it will be "a body politic Christianly inspired." Since this Christianly inspired political society is a moral society, it still "could and should never endorse or approve any way of conduct contrary to Natural Law." The object of law is always to make men morally good.¹⁵³

Now we shall examine the specific provisions of what Maritain calls the principle of the necessary cooperation between the Church and the body politic. "The things that are Caesar's are not only distinct from the things that are God's; but they must cooperate with them."¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³Ibid., pp. 167-68, 171.

¹⁵⁴Loren P. Beth enumerates eight pure categories of the relationship between church and state: (1) pure theocracy, (2) total

For Maritain the principle of cooperation has three implications: the most general and indirect form of mutual assistance, the public acknowledgment of the existence of God, and the specific forms of mutual assistance.

The first category of cooperation implies the idea that the body politic can assist the Church if it fulfills its own duties and ends in accordance with the principles of natural law. To fulfill the demands of justice is the first and necessary contribution of the body politic to the spiritual interests of the Church itself. The second category is rather self-evident. However, Maritain does not imply by any means that Roman Catholicism is to be recognized publically. He would prefer that the public expression of a common faith would be of a form of Christian confession. But the other religious confessions are not excluded here: "the other religious confessions institutionally recognized would also take part in this public expression."

In the third category of the specific forms of cooperation, Maritain explains more details of the problems of church and state. He makes it clear that the spiritual mission of the Church rather than the political power or privileges of its members (i. e., the clergy) must be helped. He writes, "a social or political discrimination in favor of the Church, or the granting of juridical privileges to her ministers or to her faithful, would be precisely of a nature to jeopardize, rather than to help, this spiritual mission." However, Maritain considers the exemption of the clergy from military obligations, not as a social

separation, (3) mixed theocracy, (4) total identification, (5) total conflict, (6) Erastianism, (7) totalitarianism and (8) partial separation. He chooses "partial separation" as the realistic relationship between church and state for the modern condition. Op. cit., pp. 124-25.

privilege, but merely as the recognition of the fact that the clergy have a God-given peaceful mission in the human community.

For Maritain, the idea that the body politic must not encroach upon the matters of religion does not imply that it is without authority for "the exercise of justice and the enforcement of law." It only means that the state cannot "impose any faith whatsoever upon, or expel any faith whatsoever from, the inner domain of conscience." The civil power can even "request the prayers of the religious communities historically rooted in the life of the people" and should grant "institutional recognition to those religious communities -- as well as to all associations, religious or secular, educational, scientific, or devoted to social service, whose activity is of major importance for the common welfare -- in contradistinction to other religious groups or secular associations which enjoy freedom but not institutional recognition." Moreover, the state can exercise its authority to dissolve any religious sect which is destructive to its common life. Although the body politic "would recognize the juridical personality of the Church as well as her spiritual authority in ruling her members in her spiritual realm, and it would deal with her as a perfect and perfectly independent society," the Christian faithful are the citizens of the state. As such, Christian citizens "are no more legally privileged than any other citizens."

In short, the body politic must guarantee and recognize the full freedom of the Church and insure its full liberty and exercise of spiritual mission as well as the rights of the human person. For Maritain, more positively speaking, the principle of cooperation or assistance is "a two-way traffic," not a one-way notion: the Church may be asked to help accomplish the common good of the body politic, on

the one hand and the latter may help the former in the fulfillment of its spiritual mission, on the other.¹⁵⁵

It seems that, for Maritain, the United States is the best embodiment of his principle of necessary cooperation between the Church and the body politic. As the American Declaration of Independence is best in accord with his conception of natural law and natural rights, the Constitution of the United States is the best expression of the principle of necessary cooperation between church and state. Although Maritain does not ignore the rationalist influence of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, "the Constitution of this country is deep-rooted in the age-old heritage of Christian thought and civilization." This Constitution can be described as "an outstanding lay Christian document tinged with the philosophy of the day. The spirit and inspiration of this great political Christian document is basically repugnant to the idea of making human society stand aloof from God and from any religious faith."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁵ Man and the State, pp. 171, 172, 173, 173b, 174, 175, 178.

¹⁵⁶ Loren P. Beth describes the revolutionary American mind as "a rationalistic view of human nature: morality derives from the nature of humanity, not from specific religious beliefs. . . . From this it followed that the religious beliefs of any individual make no difference to social morality. . . . They were personal affairs between God and man." And this rationalistic belief in a natural religion and a natural law is "divorced from the medieval natural law connected with the divine law." Indeed, it is a secularized belief. Thus, the Founding Fathers, although not irreligious, "were likely to be anti-clerical, anti-ecclesiastical, anti-scriptural, anti-authoritarian." Op. cit., pp. 66-72. Cornelia Geer Le Bourtillier considers the American theory of natural law as empirical, non-metaphysical and non-transcendental in American Democracy and Natural Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), especially chapter iii, "Natural Law in America," pp. 109-53. Therefore, according to Beth and Le Bourtillier, the Founding Fathers are closer to the philosophy of the Enlightenment than to the Christian tradition.

Otto Gierke did not extend his research of natural law to the

Maritain is a Roman Catholic thinker, and he makes a few remarks in defense of the Roman Catholic Church especially against the accusation that it is an "authoritarian Church."¹⁵⁷ He denies that the Church's exercise of authority on its faithful is fostering authoritarian trends in political life. He believes that this accusation comes essentially from lack of a theological and historical insight. First of all, the lack of historical insight implies the fact that the critics of Catholicism "do not grasp the significance of the diversity of historical climates which in past times made the authority of the Church over the State -- and now make the mutual freedom of the State and the Church -- requisites of the common good of civilization." Secondly, these critics are lacking theological insight in that they do not realize the fact that the authority of the Church is merely the

American Revolution. But Ernest Barker tells us that "in the Puritan atmosphere of North America the secular Law of Nature recovers its theological basis." "Introduction," Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800, p. xlvii. There is no doubt, as Carl L. Becker and Le Bourtillier say, that natural law concept was accepted as a commonplace at the time of the American Revolution. However, Carl L. Becker believes that "the eighteenth century did not abandon the old effort to share in the mind of God." The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 39. Moreover, Becker, in The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, has attempted to prove that "the Philosophes [of the eighteenth century or the Enlightenment] were nearer the Middle Ages, less emancipated from the preconceptions of medieval Christian thought, than they quite realized or we have commonly supposed" (p. 29).

¹⁵⁷One of the most severe attacks on this matter is found in Paul Blanshard, American Freedom and Catholic Power (2d ed.; Boston: Beacon Press, 1958). Maritain dismisses Blanshard's book "because it is simply unfair . . . [in its] criticisms [which], instead of clarifying matters, are constantly vitiated by biased and devious interpretation, and which confuse all issues in a slandering manner, up to ascribing to the Catholic Church 'a full-blown system of fetishism and sorcery'." Man and the State, p. 184. James M. O'Neill may balance Paul Blanshard in Catholicism and American Freedom (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952).

expression of its bondage to God and its spiritual mission and, thus, its organization is essentially contrasted with the organization of political society. The authority of the Church originating from above downwards is only due to the fact that "the Pope in the Church is the Vicar of Christ." However, the foundation of political society from below upwards is precisely due to the fact that "the rulers in political society are the vicars of the people."

Moreover, for Maritain, "no government is less authoritarian than the government of the Catholic Church." The Church has no police force or physical coercion: it is only responsible for the spiritual common good of the people. In addition, "The bishops are not to the Pope as generals to a chief of supreme headquarters, or as civil servants to the central administration." Maritain maintains that the Church, by preaching the Gospel and the liberties of the spirit, "has taught men freedom." "The cause of freedom and the cause of the Church are one in the defense of man."

Maritain, in his discussion concerning the problems of church and state, recognizes without any doubt the primacy of spirituality of the human person and, thus, champions the freedom of the Church. The principle of the necessary cooperation between church and state, as he sees it, is essentially the expression of the Constitution of the United States or the American doctrine of separation of church and state, which represents "a sharp distinction and actual cooperation." Maritain's realistic recognition of the fact that the modern age is a secular age, coupled with his idea concerning the relation between religion and political society, would produce, as we have seen, immense consequences in his political philosophy -- particularly in his approach

to the problems of church and state. Jacques Maritain, like John Courtney Murray, is seeking to accommodate his Catholic thinking and principles to democratic ideas. He often quotes Cardinal Manning's reply to Gladstone: "If Catholics were in power tomorrow in England, not a penal law would be proposed, not the shadow of a constraint put upon the faith of any man. We would that all men fully believed the truth; but a forced faith is a hypocrisy hateful to God and man. . . . If the Catholics were tomorrow the 'Imperial race' in these kingdoms they would not use political power to molest the divided and hereditary religious state of the people. We would not shut one of their Churches, or Colleges, or Schools. They would have the same liberties we enjoy as a minority."¹⁵⁸

From a practical point of view, the problems of church and state, as Loren P. Beth has suggested, appear to be more subtle than the mere assertion of the doctrine of separation of church and state. The subtle problems seem to be the twilight zone created by religious and political issues and the authority to decide who should control this twilight zone itself. For Maritain, there would be no problem if both the Church and the body politic come to an agreement as to whether a particular problem is religious or political. In case of conflict between church and state, Loren P. Beth suggests that "Modern Roman Catholic political theory seems to assert the right of the church as the divine agent of God on earth to make the decision."¹⁵⁹ Generalization is always a risky venture; Loren P. Beth must exclude at least Maritain in his statement.

¹⁵⁸ Man and the State, pp. 181, 184, 185-86, 187.

¹⁵⁹ Op. cit., p. 136.

When the principle of cooperation, as Maritain suggests, loses its effect in certain circumstances, it seems that there is no realistic solution except mutual restraints: where the principle of cooperation fails, there is no recourse but mutual restraints or, more positively speaking, compromises.

Maritain has completely rejected the idea that the hierarchic authority of the Church would have any impact upon the working of political society and suggested, at the same time, that the Church, by preaching the liberties of the spirit, has taught men freedom. These two aspects seem rather contradictory. The first seems to claim that we cannot translate what is on the religious plane into the political, on the one hand and the second maintains that spiritual freedom can be translated into political freedom, on the other.¹⁶⁰ As a statement of fact, even in the modern age, Protestantism seems more congenial to the nourishment of democratic ideas (including political freedom) than does Roman Catholicism -- not to mention the past. Theodore M. Greene points out the fact that the doctrine of the papal infallibility is a form of authoritarianism.¹⁶¹ To be sure, this rejects only that part of Maritain's defense for the Catholic Church which seems to equate the cause of the

¹⁶⁰ Judith S. Shklar seems to dismiss the correlation between a theological notion and its political implication when she says: ". . . religious toleration is not easily translated into social or political tolerance, and the effect of religious doctrine and policy on subsequent secular behavior is remote in this, as in all other, cases. This of course is the stumbling-block of social theology." After Utopia, p. 191. This kind of conclusion is plausible when one looks at the problem from a practical point of view. However, from a theoretical point of view, there is an intimate relation between one's theological attitude and his political views.

¹⁶¹ Liberalism: Its Theory and Practice pp. 66-67.

Catholic Church with political freedom. The democratic character of Maritain's approach remains none the less intact. As it has been suggested earlier, the practice of the Roman Catholic Church and Maritain's theory are two entirely different things. For Maritain, church and state must be driven "not as a tandem but in double harness."¹⁶² It must be cautioned, furthermore, that the religious factor alone does not seem to be capable of explaining the success or failure of modern democracies. A mono-causal explanation, which seems to be a perennial human tendency, is not only too simplified a view, but also an aberration of the complicated social process of the modern age.

¹⁶²Nathaniel Micklem, The Theology of Politics, p. 145.

CHAPTER XV

MARITAIN'S PERSONALIST PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY

William Ernest Hocking has once said that there is no settled truth. The same may be said of the truth of democracy. Starting from the eulogium of the Funeral Oration of Pericles that eloquently expressed the Athenian ideal of democracy, many great Western minds have occupied themselves with the precious thing called democracy.

The rise of totalitarianism in this century has urgently necessitated reassertion of the value and faith in democracy. As John U. Nef aptly puts it, "The future of constitutional government has become so precarious that its defense concerns every American who cares about the future of civilization. It is hardly possible for any scholar who is deeply interested in his work as an economist or a historian, or even as a philologist, a chemist, or a geologist, to ignore the challenge."¹ Bronislaw Malinowski has also said that human civilization cannot survive without freedom and democracy, and the maintenance of the democratic principles is the minimum conditions of freedom which are so vitally necessary for the life and advancement of civilization. For

¹The United States and Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 350.

²Freedom and Civilization (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960), p. 14.

Reinhold Niebuhr, "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."³ Thus no serious mind that values human civilization and life can dismiss the question of the democratic faith in the midst of the upsurge of totalitarianism and dictatorship. With "the degradation of the democratic dogma"⁴ it is the time for us to reassert the value of the democratic way of life.

For Maritain, the problem of democracy is essentially that of civilization itself. As his cultural thought has gradually become mature, he seems to have come to the conclusion that the transformation of civilization, that is, the coming of a new Christendom, is a political task. This new Christian order, therefore, is essentially "the democracy of the person" as opposed to "the democracy of the individual."⁵ It is obvious that the metaphysics of personality is closely linked with the democracy of the person. While the individual is associated with materiality, the human person is directly linked with the Supreme Being. Thus Maritain rejects the materialist philosophy of the world and life, e. g., the Rousseauian philosophy of democracy and bourgeois liberalism. For him, "Democracy of the person and humanism of the person spring forth from a theocentric inspiration." Maritain feels that modern democracies suffer from lack of moral and religious vitality. As he writes, "Modern democracies suffer from a philosophy of life which undermines and annihilates their vital principle from within. If they must refind the

³The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, p. xiii.

⁴This is the title of a work of Henry Adams (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958).

⁵Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 79-115.

sense of justice, and of risk, and of heroism, it is under condition of rejecting their materialist philosophy, and of viewing in full light a personalist conception of life and of society."⁶

Realizing the mistakes of the rationalism of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, Maritain insists that we must now face "the fact that religion and metaphysics are an essential part of human culture, primary and indispensable incentives in the very life of society."⁷ However, he is not imposing Christian inspiration on the secular political order. The method of fermenting the leaven of the Gospel is essentially one of persuasion. As Alfred North Whitehead has said, "The creation of the world . . . is the victory of persuasion over force. The worth of men consists in their liability to persuasion. They can persuade and can be persuaded by the disclosure of alternatives, the better and the worse. Civilization is the maintenance of social order, by its own inherent persuasiveness as embodying the nobler alternative. The resource to force, however unavoidable, is a disclosure of the failure of civilization, either in the general society or in a remnant of individuals."⁸

"Democracy," John H. Hallowell writes, "rests upon a faith in

⁶Ibid., pp. 85-86, 88.

⁷Man and the State, p. 109; The Twilight of Civilization, p. 59. The encyclical letter of Pope Leo XIII, Graves de Communi (On Christian Democracy) of January 18, 1901, stresses the role of religion to solve social problems. The Church Speaks to the Modern World, pp. 320-21.

⁸Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 105. F. A. Hayek notes that one of the three chief arguments which justify democracy is that "Democracy is the only method of peaceful change that man has yet discovered." The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 107.

man as a rational, moral, and spiritual creature, and it is as much aspiration as it is fact."⁹ Democracy must be based at least upon the supposition that "man is a moral agent," that is to say, man "can distinguish between good and bad, right and wrong; moreover, he can deliberately take sides with moral responsibility."¹⁰ And John Middleton Murray writes: "Just as the democratic society freely chooses its government, so the democratic citizen must freely choose to do his duty to the commonweal. He puts his conscience in control of his actions. He obeys the law, not as an external command, but as the expression of his own better self, which wills to act in obedience to a law which its reason recognizes to be necessary. . . . Democracy is based not only in theory but in fact upon the reality of a universal obligation to obey the moral law. If that obligation is not recognized, and acted on, democracy must, in time of real stress, collapse. If the validity of the moral law is an illusion, so is the validity of democracy."¹¹

For the Christian thinker the idea that man is a moral agent is derived from religious sources. Since Christian morality is the only true morality, it follows that democracy, which is essentially moral, must necessarily be Christian. Zevedei Barbu says that it is not entirely true that religion gives rise to anti-democratic trends in the pattern of a culture, and Christian religion has actively contributed to

⁹The Moral Foundation of Democracy, p. 128.

¹⁰Theodore M. Greene, Liberalism, p. 74.

¹¹As quoted in John H. Hallowell, The Moral Foundation of Democracy, p. 124 from "The Moral Foundations of Democracy," Fortnightly (September, 1947), p. 168.

the creation of a democratic way of life.¹² Thomas I. Cook also says that "the generic psychology out of which Western democracy grew was Christian." It rested on the following two fundamental ideas: first, man is a spiritual animal endowed with moral purpose; and secondly, he is finite and imperfect -- marked by original sin and potential goodness.¹³

Maritain's conception of democracy seems to have been considerably influenced by the working of American democracy. "In actual fact," he wrote in 1958, "it is in America that I have had a real experience of concrete, existential democracy: not as a set of abstract slogans, or as a lofty ideal, but as an actual, human, working, perpetually tested and perpetually readjusted way of life. Here I met democracy as a living reality. . . ." From American democracy he learns "a great and illuminating, an unforgettable lesson in political philosophy." Noticing "a puzzling diversity which resembles a medieval feature" and "the democratic philosophy of life at work in everyday existence" in the United States, he remarks further that "the average citizen . . . is aware of his basic freedom and dignity as a human being . . . in the common consciousness and the common existence of the people," and that "political society is a work of reason and virtue, and implies a will or consent to live together which freely emanates from the 'multitude,' or the people." "The American body politic is the only one which was fully and explicitly born of freedom, of the free determination of men to live

¹²Democracy and Dictatorship: Their Psychology and Patterns of Life (New York: Grove Press, 1956), p. 59.

¹³"Democratic Psychology and a Democratic World Order," World Politics, I (July, 1949), p. 553.

together and work together at a common task" in the sense of Lincoln's phrase about "the government of the people, by the people, and for the people," which is still "the best definition of political democracy." He thus believes that "if a new Christian civilization, a new Christendom is ever to come about in human history, it is on American soil that it will find its starting point."¹⁴

Writing in 1942, Maritain was deeply impressed with the fact that "America feels the necessity of revising its table of moral values and of renewing its political philosophy." This American attitude was an extremely important phenomenon for Maritain. He has applauded the fact that "America understands that she must at one and the same time defend democracy and work out a new democracy, and that this work is not possible unless the Christian values are vitally integrated into it."¹⁵ Here Maritain reminds us of his nineteenth-century French predecessor Alexis de Tocqueville.

"Democracy" has many meanings. Maritain realizes that "the word 'democracy' leads itself to so many misunderstandings that from the speculative point of view it would perhaps be preferable to find a new word."¹⁶ For Maritain as well as for many others,

¹⁴Reflections on America (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 161, 168-69, 188.

¹⁵The Twilight of Civilization, p. 53.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 56.

the term "democracy" stands for more than political democracy or a form of government. Democracy is "foremost a general philosophy of human and political life, and a state of mind."¹⁷ As such the democracy of the person is aiming at the transformation of the human mind, that is to say, the internal transformation of man. "Thus a monarchic regime can be democratic, if it is consistent with this state of mind and with the principles of this philosophy."¹⁸ Still other definitions of democracy are found in Arne Naess.¹⁹ Paul Tillich also finds the ambiguity in the term "democracy." But he says that Christianity must support democracy both as "a way of life" and as "a constitutional procedure." Christianity must support democracy "not by technical or legal suggestions, but primarily by the creation of a new community which can find expression in political forms."²⁰ As F. A. Hayek writes, "if democracy is a means rather than an end, its limits must be determined in the light of the purpose we want it to serve."²¹

¹⁷Christianity and Democracy, tr. Doris C. Anson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), p. 33. Maritain recognized three meanings of democracy: social democracy (democracy as a social tendency), political democracy and democratism. He used social democracy because democracy is a question of the social relations of men. He equated democracy with St. Thomas Aquinas' Republic (politia), which is "a sort of mixed system." The Things That Are Not Caesar's, pp. 131-33 and see also Freedom in the Modern World, p. 72.

¹⁸Christianity and Democracy, p. 33.

¹⁹Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity (Oslo: University Press, 1956).

²⁰"The World Situation," The Christian Answer, p. 24.

²¹Op. cit., p. 107.

As religion (Christianity) is intrinsically above civilization, the same relationship holds true in regard to Christianity and politics or democracy in this case. For Maritain "it is obvious that Christianity and Christian faith can neither be made subservient to democracy as a philosophy of human and political life nor to any political form whatsoever. That is a result of the fundamental distinction introduced by Christ between the things that are Caesar's and the things that are God's, a distinction which has been unfolding throughout our history in the midst of accidents of all kinds" It does not imply that Christianity is not linked with politics or democracy. On the contrary, democracy is essentially the fermentation of the Gospel: "Democracy is linked to Christianity and . . . the democratic impulse has arisen in human history as a temporal manifestation of the inspiration of the Gospel." Thus democracy is by no means a sacral doctrine. It is a secular order inspired by the leaven of the Gospel or "the spiritualization of secular existence." In the message of the Gospel there are social and political implications.²² For Maritain "the tragedy of the modern democracies is that they have not yet succeeded in realizing democracy."²³ That is to say, democracy has not been materialized because it was not inspired by the leaven of the Gospel.

Maritain's insistence that democracy, although it is the

²²Christianity and Democracy, pp. 36, 37, 66. Christopher Dawson stresses that "what our civilization lacks is not power and wealth and knowledge, but spiritual vitality." He believes that "the Christian life is not an ideal for the mind and conscience alone; it is a new life that embraces both body and spirit in a vital synthesis. It is not merely an order of faith; it is the order of spirit in a vital synthesis. It is not merely an order of faith; it is the order of charity fulfilled in action." Enquiries into Religion and Culture, pp. 293, 308.

²³Christianity and Democracy, p. 28. Although John Dewey's

fermentation of the Gospel, is not a sacral doctrine stems from his realistic recognition that our age, unlike the sacral era of the Middle Ages, is a secular age. In the modern age, therefore, it is inconceivable for Maritain to build a political community based "on the foundation of the unity of theological faith and religious creed." However, this new democracy will not ignore religion. It will at least recognize "the value and sensibleness of the Christian conception of freedom, social progress, and the political establishment"24 It is essentially an affirmation of "a common faith" and of the common humanity.²⁵

Maritain's recognition that ours is a secular age, as we have already seen in the discussion of the problems of church and state, leads him to an undogmatic position although he is fundamentally a religious thinker. It has led him to insist that we must find a practical formula for coexistence between believers and unbelievers. He has also made an important point in the previous discussion of natural law and human rights in that we must find a practical area of agreement in human rights for action although he believes that the Thomistic rational justification of human rights, that is, human rights based on the Thomistic conception of natural law, is the only true one.

In the same manner, Maritain has concerned himself with finding

conception of democracy differs entirely from that of Maritain, he also asserts that, "The cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy." The Public and Its Problems (Denver: Alan Swallow, 1927), p. 146.

²⁴Man and the State, pp. 108, 109.

²⁵Concerning the idea of "a common faith," see John Dewey, A Common Faith.

practical conclusions in the arena of democracy although he firmly believes that "the idea of man propounded by the metaphysics of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas is the rational foundation of democratic philosophy, and that the Gospel inspiration is its true living soul," and he is confident that "the Christian leaven would play an ever-growing part" in the democratic way of life.²⁶

The reconciliatory approach of Maritain is due to the fact that he regards our age as a secular age and, at the same time, he is a pluralist. His recognition of pluralism (e. g., believers and unbelievers) and his sincere search for practical conclusions have led him to affirm a "genuine and vital reconciliation between democratic inspiration and evangelical inspiration" in our way of life. Therefore, Maritain urges that "it would be especially desirable to develop the understanding of the pluralistic principle and the techniques of pluralistic co-operation" even though he vehemently disagrees with Sidney Hook theoretically.²⁷ What we need, he insists, is not dogmatic agreement but practical agreement. As Paul Tillich has said, a Christian thinker must not remain only theoretical, but he must become practical as well.

Therefore, for Maritain, a genuine democracy practically considered implies, first of all, "a fundamental agreement between minds and wills on the bases of life in common." That is to say, "it must be capable of defending and promoting its own conception of social and political life; it must bear within itself a common human creed, the creed

²⁶The Range of Reason, p. 170.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 168, 170.

of freedom." This common faith of a genuine democracy is of course "a civic or secular faith, not a religious one." A genuine democracy cannot impose on its citizens any philosophic or religious creed or doctrine. This is what distinguishes it from the totalitarian state which imposes on its citizens its official ideology, demands obedience and controls the mass "by the power of propaganda, lies, and the police."²⁸

The secular common faith deals with "practical tenets." It is a common faith, regardless of metaphysical or religious divergencies, because these practical tenets revere "truth and intelligence, human dignity, freedom, brotherly love, and the absolute value of moral good."²⁹ As Maritain insists, we must sharply distinguish "a set of practical points of convergence" from its "theoretical justifications." It is important for Maritain to stress the moral charter of the common faith of a genuine democracy. There must be "the code of social and political morality" in the body politic, which would be concerned with the following aspects:

rights and liberties of the human person, political rights and liberties, social rights and social liberties, corresponding responsibilities; rights and duties of persons who are part of a family society, and liberties and obligations of the latter toward the body politic; mutual rights and duties of groups and the State; government of the people, by the people, and for the people; functions of authority in a political and social democracy, moral obligation, binding in conscience, regarding just laws as well as the Constitution which guarantees the people's liberties; exclusion of the resort to political coups (coups d'état) in a society that is truly free and ruled by laws whose change and evolution depend on the popular majority; human equality, justice between persons and the body politic,

²⁸Man and the State, pp. 109, 110-11.

²⁹Ibid., p. 111.

justice between the body politic and persons, civil friendship and an ideal of fraternity, religious freedom, mutual tolerance and mutual respect between various spiritual communities and schools of thought, civic self-devotion and love of the motherland, reverence for its history and heritage, and understanding of the various traditions that combine to create its unity; obligations of each person toward the common good of the body politic and obligations of each nation toward the common good of civilized society, and the necessity of becoming aware of the unity of the world and of the existence of a community of peoples.³⁰

From the standpoint of a theoretical justification, Maritain is certain that this content of the moral charter is best justified by Christian philosophy. As we have seen in his discussion of natural law and human rights, these human rights are justified by natural law itself. Thus this moral charter must presuppose the first principle of natural law: "Do good and avoid evil."

The body politic of a genuine democracy would not impose on its citizens any philosophic or religious creed. But this does not imply that it should be "an unarmed society." For Maritain, the discipline of the democratic polity is the problem of what he calls "the political heretics." In the sacral era of the Middle Ages, the heretic was "the breaker of religious unity." In the democratic polity of our secular age, on the contrary, the (political) heretic is one who breaks the "common democratic beliefs and practices," which have no connection whatsoever with religious creed. Political heresy is concerned strictly with political and legal activities of the democratic polity. Moreover, the democratic body politic provides for the political heretic "the institutional guarantees of justice and law."³¹

³⁰Ibid., pp. 112-13.

³¹Ibid., pp. 114-15.

As Maritain points out, the difficulty of heresy "begins when it comes to the speaking and writing activity of the political heretic." This is the question of freedom of expression. For Maritain, "Freedom of expression is a human right, but this right is only a 'substantially,' not an 'absolutely,' inalienable right." Thus freedom of expression is not an absolute right: "The State is entitled to impose limitations on freedom of expression, in view of particularly serious circumstances."³² However, censorship, police methods and any direct restriction of freedom of expression are contrary to "the very spirit of a democratic society."

As we have seen, the common faith of democracy is neither doctrinal nor ideological. It is merely practical. Political heresy must be concerned only with "the tangible acts." "The State is not equipped to deal with matters of intelligence." In this sense, Maritain becomes a staunch advocate of intellectual freedom. The work of art has an intrinsic quality which the state cannot judge as moral or immoral. Moreover, "It is too much for the State to judge whether a political theory is heretical with regard to the democratic faith."³³ This is the reason why John U. Nef could say: "The survival of creative scholarship depends upon the maintenance of democracy, upon the maintenance of the rights of free intellectual inquiry and artistic expression which have been kept alive among the Western peoples"³⁴

Maritain believes that education is an important factor for

³²Ibid., p. 117.

³³Ibid., p. 118.

³⁴The United States and Civilization, p. 350.

inculcating among the citizens of a democratic society its common faith and practical tenets. "Education," he writes, "is obviously the primary means to foster common secular faith in the democratic charter." Through education, we must find an area of "agreement between minds and wills which lies at the root of the political society . . . despite the diversity or the opposition between [citizens'] spiritual traditions and schools of thought." The educational system of a democratic society "must cling only to the common practical recognition of the merely practical tenets."³⁵ Thus Maritain would not go so far as to say, as did John Henry Newman, that a university worthy of its name must have a theology school.³⁶ Nonetheless, there is no question in Maritain's own mind that Christian education is truly congenial to a democratic society. He says: "a general Christian education for the nation, a general development of Christian habits and Christian instincts is, in fact, a condition for the political success of democracy."³⁷

Maritain's conception of the democracy of the person is "an organic democracy" as opposed to the atomized individualism of the nineteenth century in which he feels that the notion of authority played no significant role. As the location and the mode of authority determine the form of government, we cannot fail to recognize the important role that authority played in Maritain's conception of a personalist democracy.

³⁵Man and the State, pp. 119, 120-21.

³⁶The Idea of a University (Garden City, N. Y.: Image Books, 1959). Maritain's ideas on education are found in Education at the Crossroads (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943).

³⁷Scholasticism and Politics, p. 111.

His personalist democracy is organic in that a political society conceived in terms of pluralism is directed to the realization of its common good. For him authority must be directed to the common good of a democratic society as a whole. And the function of authority is "to look after the realization of freedom and friendship, rather than after the fulfilment of discipline of a military type." He writes: "The principle of an organic democracy does not pretend to suppress authority. It demands that authority should be just, which means an authentic authority."³⁸

The necessity of authority in a political society "is inscribed in the very nature of things."³⁹ Authority as such is thus related to, or derived from, natural law. "Authority is the right to direct and command, to be listened to or obeyed by others."⁴⁰ It proceeds from natural law. As Maritain says, "if the state of culture necessarily entails the existence in the social group of a function of commandment and government directed to the common good, then this function is demanded by Natural Law, and implies a right to command and govern." For him authority is grounded in, and proceeds from, natural law or the very nature of things (the very nature of political society). Thus, authority which is the right to command and direct "has its primary source in the Author of nature."⁴¹

To say that authority has its primary source in the Author of

³⁸Ibid., pp. 102, 108.

³⁹Ibid., p. 98.

⁴⁰Man and the State, p. 126.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 126-27.

nature does not mean that political authority is derived directly from God. On the contrary, "Authority derives from the will or consensus of the people, and from their basic right to govern themselves, as from a channel through which nature causes a body politic to be and to act."⁴² As a matter of fact, any regime of political life derives its authority from the people. It is especially true in democracy: "Democracy is only real if it is immanent to the people itself, and ordained to the immanent common good of the people."⁴³

Now we must ask where the basic right of the people to govern themselves comes from. For Maritain an answer is an obvious one: the people's right to self-government and authority to govern themselves are given by God. Here we must consider Maritain's explanation of the relationship between the people and God and between the people and their rulers to determine his conception of a type of "popular sovereignty." First of all, Maritain explains that the right of the people to govern themselves is received from God "in an inherent manner" rather than "in a merely transient and transitory way." "This authority comes from God as Primary Source and Primary Cause, even comes from Him 'immediately,' in the sense that human nature, naturally demanding what is necessarily implied in social life, immediately proceeds from God."⁴⁴

As regards the relationship between the people and their rulers, Maritain reasons that, even if the people delegate authority to their rulers, they do not lose their right to self-government. The right of

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 107-108.

⁴⁴Man and the State, p. 128.

the people to self-government is inherently received from God, and they keep this right permanently. We may safely consider that this inherent and permanent right of the people would last forever as long as human civilization exists. We may call this people's right the divinely-given popular right. In view of these considerations, we find sufficient reason for Maritain to consider the democratic philosophy of government as the only true political philosophy. This is essentially his philosophical justification of "popular sovereignty." As he himself writes, "The realization of this basic verity . . . has been a conquest of democratic philosophy. In this connection, whatever the political régime may be, monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic, democratic philosophy appears as the only true political philosophy."⁴⁵

Accordingly, the representatives of the people are the "images of and deputies for the people." "Those who represent the people are not the image of God. The Pope in the Church, being the vicar of Christ, is the image of Christ. The Prince in political society, being the vicar of the people, is the image of the people." The representatives of modern assemblies receive their authority from the people. And the people, in the exercise of their inherent and permanent right to self-government, have the right to choose or elect their representatives. The right of the people to designate their representatives also implies the right of the people to control them. The same may be said of administration (or what Maritain calls "management"), which is accountable to the people. Nonetheless, "the representatives of the people are not mere instruments, but rulers invested with real authority, or right to

⁴⁵Ibid.

command."⁴⁶ For Maritain, therefore, the "errand-boy" representation of the American type would appear to be a misunderstanding of the true nature of political authority.

In order to insure the organic type of democracy, Maritain makes a few suggestions. These suggestions are not explained in detail, but they are footnoted "in order to prevent the suspicion that I have no definite idea of what such a system might be"⁴⁷ We can find some of these suggestions as far back as in True Humanism.⁴⁸ In his personalist democracy, the idea of universal suffrage is a starting point. The right to vote is granted to women as well as to men. For Maritain, universal suffrage does not only have "a symbolic democratic value" but also offers the people "a recourse against political enslavement." However, Maritain thinks that universal suffrage would have "a genuine value . . . only if it is itself engaged in a pluralist organization, and completed by the representation of various social bodies: communities of labour, spiritual families, regional institutions, etc."⁴⁹ Thus, his representative system is not a geographical representation divided into electoral districts, but it is a type of functional representation in terms of groups, organizations, or communities whether they be professional or otherwise.

As regards the party system, Maritain is not impressed with

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 130-34.

⁴⁷Scholasticism and Politics, p. 113.

⁴⁸See pp. 168-69.

⁴⁹True Humanism, p. 169; Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 111-12.

omnipotent modern parties. He seems particularly displeased with party control over the management of government. However, he is by no means in favor of the abolition of the modern party system. As he writes, "I believe that it is important not to suppress parties, but to suppress that which corrupts them and turns them into instruments of corruption of the public good." To achieve the maximum of the common good of a political society, Maritain believes that government should be free from party control or "independent of these political parties." It seems that the traditional conception of the party system as an electoral instrument and as an instrument of selecting political leaders may lose its value altogether. Instead, a party would be formed "on the one basis of a certain political conception." Thus the party system envisaged by Maritain would become an ideological type. It may serve the political education of citizens. As he himself admits, this type of party is not a "political party" in the true sense of the term, but it is a "political school." Moreover, he repudiates "the parliamentary system of the British type . . . which suited the age of liberalistic individualism."⁵⁰

The reform of the modern party system and the representative government, Maritain maintains, can assure the working of the democratic principle. It seems that his rejection of the modern party system is due to his association of a party in terms of the totalitarian single party, to the clustering of local interests (not the public good) and to money. If we get rid of these three things, according to him, then a

⁵⁰ Scholasticism and Politics, pp. 112-13.

party would not enslave men nor would money enslave the human person. Moreover, it would serve the public good rather than special interests.

In regard to Maritain's conception of a "new representative system" to insure an organic democracy, there are some sketchy proposals. For Maritain, the political life in an organic democracy would involve "two very distinct orders of functions. One is consilium or the preparation of authoritative decisions, and the other is these decisions themselves (judicium ultimum and imperium). An assembly is vested with the first function, that is, preparation and deliberation; and an executive or praesidium is vested with the second function or decision and execution.

The officials of an executive branch would not be elected by the assembly, but "proposed by the organ of the superior order, and accepted by the popular vote of the area which would thus be governed."⁵¹ In case these proposed members are not accepted by the popular vote of a specific area, then the superior organ must propose new members until they may be accepted by the populace of the area. The size of an area is not specified, however.

Moreover, "A similar form would occur for the highest structures of the State." That is to say, there would be an assembly which is charged with "the legislative and executive work in close collaboration with the governmental organs and to exercise an office of control and of regulation."⁵² The pyramid of authority in the assembly would be from below upwards. The executive organs or governmental organs assume

⁵¹Ibid., p. 113.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 113-14.

the ultimate decisions (not preparation) of the legislative and executive nature. They are concerned with the administration of the common good, and thus "independent of the representative assemblies." The order of these executive organs is arranged from the top of a supreme organ downwards. The authority of this supreme organ is derived from the people. Its members are designated by "the representatives of consultative assemblies and by the principal organs of the life of the country," and are subject to the popular approval by referendum. Presumably, if they are not accepted by a popular referendum, then new members must be proposed.

The above proposals of Maritain seem to be merely an outline of how a modern state may actualize an organic democracy. One would hope that these governmental machineries should be elaborated in detail. The representative assembly and the executive proposed by him are not totally dissimilar to the present arrangement and function of the legislative and the executive in democratic countries. However, the "supreme organ" seems to be completely new. He does not elaborate on what would be the nature of this supreme organ and its relationship to the assembly. All in all, Maritain has proposed some revolutionary measures in the machinery of government and the political process of the state in order to demonstrate how an organic democracy could be successfully implemented. Although we may appreciate the philosopher's efforts to dig the dirt of politics, we must admit that we are more impressed with his political philosophy than his short flight into the world of practical politics.

As Arnold Toynbee believes that the creative minority is the life of a civilization, democracy, for Maritain, needs "the prophetic

shock-minorities." These shock-minorities are not Carlyle's "heroes" or Nietzsche's "supermen." They are comparable to what Sidney Hook describes as the "event-making" men.⁵³ Democracy cannot do without a prophetic factor. Maritain says that it is "a sad necessity." Moreover, "The people are to be awakened -- that means that the people are asleep. People as a rule prefer to sleep."⁵⁴

Maritain by no means approves the dictatorial role of these shock-minorities; they are "the inspired servants or prophets of the people."⁵⁵ They are not necessarily the elected representatives of the people. They are needed in time of the crisis or transformation of a democratic society. The reconstruction of a political society is the problem of leadership. He writes: "The essential problem of reconstruction is not a problem of plans, it is a problem of men, the problem of the new leadership to come."⁵⁶ These prophets are like Tom Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Ghandi, F. D. Roosevelt and even John Brown. They are not born to enslave, but to emancipate the people.

Maritain's philosophy of democracy is deeply rooted in Thomism.⁵⁷

⁵³The Hero in History, p. 154.

⁵⁴Man and the State, pp. 142-46.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 139.

⁵⁶Christianity and Democracy, p. 79.

⁵⁷In regard to the relation of St. Thomas Aquinas to democracy, see Yves R. Simon, "Thomism and Democracy," Science, Philosophy and Religion: Second Symposium, pp. 258-72 and Edward F. Murphy, St. Thomas' Political Doctrine and Democracy (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1921). Etienne Gilson comments that "Thomas stresses two points which today would be considered rather 'democratic' in their inspiration. The first one, borrowed from Aristotle's Politics, is 'that all should take some share in the government, for this form of constitution insures peace among the people,

His philosophy of culture based upon personalism and communalism, in fact, corresponds to his new conception of democracy. As he sees it, the creation of a new Christendom is essentially a political task. Maritain has been too realistic to yield to a temptation of applying a set of the immutable principles of medievalism to the conditions of the twentieth-century world. He has come to the realistic conclusion that the modern age is not sacral (nor should it be sacral) like the Middle Ages where unity was achieved by religious faith. The modern age is a secular one. As history itself is irreversible and not cyclical, Maritain has accepted our secular age as a "historical gain." The organic unity of our age envisaged by him is not the maximal unity of the Middle Ages, but it is the minimal unity conceived in the pluralistic conditions of modern society. However, the rational justification of his new democracy is based upon the Gospel itself when he says that democracy is inspired by the leaven of the Gospel. In order to understand him, we must recognize his own important distinction between the practical points of convergence and the theoretical justifications of democracy. Moreover, in his new conception of democracy, Maritain does not rule out a common secular faith achieved from a pluralistic reconciliation. Indeed, it is necessary. Thus the common democratic faith conceived by Maritain is not unlike what Will Herberg discovered to be "the American way of life" whether the American be a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew.⁵⁸

As John U. Nef writes, "In order to prove that democracy is

commends itself to all, and is most enduring.' The second point is that the best there is in the forms of constitution should be included in the constitution of the well-balanced State." Elements in Christian Philosophy, p. 273.

⁵⁸Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1960), especially pp. 74-90.

worth saying it is not necessary to prove that it is the best form of government ever devised. It is enough to show that it is superior to the alternative confronting us. That alternative is despotism."⁵⁹ Democracy, for Maritain, is first of all a Weltanschauung. Democracy is an end or an ideal of life; it is what David Riesman calls a "utopia," which is a belief, not an existing reality but a potential reality.⁶⁰ As John H. Hallowell writes, "The ideals of democracy never have been and never will be achieved with perfection -- they are goals constantly to be striven for but never perfectly realized."⁶¹ J. L. Talmon, moreover, has conclusively shown what would happen if we take a perfectionist attitude: "Totalitarian democracy early evolved into a pattern of coercion and centralization not because it rejected the values of eighteenth-century liberal individualism, but because it had originally a too perfectionist attitude towards them. It made man the absolute point of reference. Man was not merely to be freed from restraints. All the existing traditions, established institutions, and social arrangements were to be overthrown and remade, with the sole purpose of securing to man the totality of his rights and freedoms, and liberating him from all

⁵⁹The United States and Civilization, p. 353. For an exposition of democracy against the alternative of despotism, see Charles E. Merriam, The New Democracy and the New Despotism (New York: Whittlesey House, 1939).

⁶⁰Selected Essays from Individualism (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1955), p. 70. A classic on this subject is Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, tr. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940).

⁶¹The Moral Foundation of Democracy, pp. 128-29.

dependence."⁶²

For Maritain, although democracy is a political concept, that is, a form of government, it is primarily a philosophy of mind and life that is conceived as opposed to totalitarianism. The ideal of a new democracy is thus achieved primarily through the transformation of the human mind rather than through the reforms of political machinery. We can readily see why education must play a large part in the realization of democracy. John U. Nef stresses that "the final end of civilization is to cultivate morality" as well as intelligence and beauty.⁶³ Where philosophers conceive democracy primarily as a philosophy of life, there is their profound contribution to political philosophy. As Ralph Barton Perry notes, "Democracy, although usually described as a 'form of government,' is in fact a social system, of which government in the strict sense is only a part. It may properly be called an ideology, since it defines an order of values which pervades all of the major aspects of human life."⁶⁴ Thus the all-inclusive democratic "ideology" would involve three aspects: "an underlying ethical premise, a conception of society, and a conception of government."⁶⁵

The moral conception of democracy is indispensable to Maritain as well as to other Christian or non-Christian thinkers. Democracy

⁶²The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 249.

⁶³The United States and Civilization, p. 261.

⁶⁴Realms of Value, p. 273.

⁶⁵Ralph Barton Perry, Shall Not Perish from the Earth (New York: Vanguard Press, 1940), p. 20.

conceived as a moral concept is the basis for Christianity being considered as so relevant to democracy. Democracy must at least be predicated upon the idea that man is a moral agent. For Maritain as well as for other Christian thinkers, man's morality is deeply rooted in religious sources. That is to say, the idea that man is a moral agent presupposes the idea that man is a religious animal. A table of Christian values of democracy is aptly described by Emmet John Hughes when he writes:

The faith of democracy is a faith in the essential worth of all men and the essential equality of all men -- deriving from men's creation in the image of God and their equality in the final judgment before their Creator: a faith which asserts the consequent inalienable right of all men to share in the benefits of social organization, in just proportion to their recognition of the obligation to contribute to the well being of that society and of fellow men. It is a faith which takes man as its central figure, his freedom as a moral agent as its central fact, his infinite value and infinite latent potentialities as its central truth. It then dedicates itself to the fullest possible assertion, the clearest possible articulation of those infinite potentialities: to which end all institutions and all social forms must be but as instruments.⁶⁶

Democracy is an ethical concept, primarily a philosophy of life. Thus a political conception of democracy is a means to the realization of the terminal end, that is, the ethical end of life. In this sense, F. A. Hayek said democracy is a means. The same can be said of Maritain's conception of a "renewed democracy." Democracy as a political concept must proceed from the determination of the ethical end of life. Otherwise, political democracy is meaningless. Yves R. Simon says that "... deliberation is about means and presupposes that the problem of ends has been settled. In the order of action, propositions relative to ends have

⁶⁶The Church and the Liberal Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 258.

the character of principles; they are anterior to deliberation and presupposed by it. . . . Under fully normal circumstances the propositions relative to the very ends of social life are above deliberation in democracy as well as in any other system."⁶⁷ In view of these facts and the changing circumstances of human civilization, we can explain the truth of Hocking's statement that there is no settled truth. The question of democracy has become a perennial question for philosophers after the panegyric of Pericles. As such, we must value Maritain's philosophical inquiry into a new democracy conceived in the fermentation of the Gospel.

The democrat, for Maritain, would not be the same "democrat" portrayed by Plato in his Republic who is atomized and prone to become a "despot." Nor is he an amorphous individual who has been glorified in the nineteenth-century "liberalistic individualism." He would not be attached to "the acquisitive society" in which material gain is the prize for life. Maritain, as a political hygienist, portrays an orderly democrat who has a deep sense of the common good of a political society, civic friendship and social justice. He is ready to obey the authority which he himself endowed to his rulers or representatives with which to direct and command a political society for its common good. The warning for atomized individualism began with Plato and runs through the minds of contemporary political sociologists, philosophers and psychologists.⁶⁸

⁶⁷Philosophy of Democratic Government, p. 123.

⁶⁸See, for example, Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944); Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951); William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society; Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941).

They have shown conclusively why the mass man is likely to become dangerous to a stable democratic society. One hardly need mention the Nazi man who blindly plowed the ground for a garrison state.

No matter what a new conception of democracy may be, it is still a battle of what J. Roland Pennock calls a trinity of democracy: liberty, equality and fraternity.⁶⁹ For Maritain, equality is not "arithmetical equality, which excludes all differentiation and inequality and which would bring all human persons down to the same level." To him man is not conceived in the equalitarian garb of liberalistic individualism.⁷⁰ Maritain accepts the natural inequalities of man. Nor is equality a quantitative concept. As the Hungarian-born, Noble prize winner, biologist Albert Szent-Gyorgyi notes, "our [quantitative] reasoning [of equality] is analogous to saying that if one woman can produce a child in nine months, nine women will produce it in one."⁷¹ For Maritain as well as St. Thomas Aquinas, equality is not the equality of nature. As Maritain quotes St. Thomas Aquinas, "It is up to friendship to put to work, in an equal manner, the equality which already exists among men. But it is up to justice to draw to equality those who are unequal: the work of justice is fulfilled when this equality has been achieved. Thus equality comes at the terminus of justice, and lies at the base and origin of friendship."⁷² If equality is "an offspring of

⁶⁹Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects, pp. 3-96.

⁷⁰See especially chapter i, "Human Equality," Redeeming the Time, pp. 1-28.

⁷¹"Secret of the Creative Impulse," New York Times Magazine (July, 30, 1961), p. 14.

⁷²The Rights of Man and Natural Law, p. 36.

justice," political equality or equal consideration cannot be denied to any man in a political society whose end is social justice. If the concept of equality in democracy includes the equality of nature, then it is futile for us to seek a political democracy in the philosophies of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas and Jacques Maritain; rather, we must look for it in Cynics or "dog-philosophers" who believed that "human beings are all alike."⁷³

The major battle of democracy is fought between freedom and order. The importance of the balance between freedom and order is aptly described by Eduard Heimann when he says: "Modern democracy everywhere is in danger of violating the equilibrium between liberty and order." He continues: "Order can be said to be more physically necessary, freedom more spiritually so. Order is the necessity of the physical life of a society with a division of labor; an attack on order, even with a view to establishing another order, temporarily jeopardizes our very physical existence. Freedom is of quite a different nature; it is the air which we must breathe for the spiritual realization of ourselves. The nature of man is such as to require order for his physical life and freedom for his spiritual life. Order is more fundamental, freedom is higher."⁷⁴ In the perpetual battle between order and freedom, when order enslaves and devours freedom the Hobbesian leviathan is an inevitable consequence.

As Jacob Taubes notes, authority and obedience had predominated

⁷³Erich Kahler, Man the Measure, pp. 124-25.

⁷⁴Freedom and Order: Lessons from the War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), pp. 11, 12.

the ancient and the medieval societies. Order and unity must necessarily go together. Not only had nature itself a hierarchic order, but also knowledge was graded in the Middle Ages. As Etienne Gilson notes, the Thomistic doctrine of order applies to the celestial hierarchy, the ecclesiastical hierarchy and, finally, to the political hierarchy.⁷⁵ However, ". . . with the negation of the transcendent God, the idea of hierarchy and the concept of degree lost their validity."⁷⁶

The battle between freedom and authority has been fought between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism not merely on a theological plane but also on a practical level. For Maritain, there is no necessary contradiction between freedom and authority, as there is an equilibrium between freedom and order. They are complementary to each other. The maximal unity of the hierarchic order of the Middle Ages is not emphasized by Maritain, as he analogically applies the immutable principles of medievalism to the contemporary world. A new Christendom or a new democracy requires only a minimal degree of unity. The organic unity implies pluralism in our age as well as in the Middle Ages. To be sure, the source of authority in a democratic society is derived from the people who are inherently and permanently endowed with authority from God. Moreover, not only is freedom necessary for man's spiritual perfection, but also the only true idea of freedom is derived from spirituality. Maritain cannot be placed along with Robert Filmer, Joseph de Maistre, or Charles Maurras. But, without doubt, he must be placed with

⁷⁵Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 268.

⁷⁶Jacob Taubes, "Theology and Political Theory," Social Research, XXII (Spring, 1955), p. 59.

John Locke and Alexis de Tocqueville.

Maritain's philosophy of democracy, as he himself frankly declares, has been inspired by American democracy. However, we cannot help but notice an unbridgeable gap between his conceptualization of American democracy and its historical development. Individualism and a laissez-faire economy are parts of the same parcel of American democracy that produced an acquisitive society. As a matter of fact, capitalism cannot be separated from the development of modern liberal democracy. The idea of the frontier's man epitomizes rugged American individualism.⁷⁷ All Americans are the born sons of John Locke. As Ralph Barton Perry sees it, there could only be a universal harmony of individual interests, which differs from Maritain's conception of the common good of a political society. The common good is not a collection of individual goods or interests. Individualism is what is described as "characteristically American."⁷⁸ We must remember that David Thoreau was the product of American individualism although he was by no means a typical American. "The lasting elements of individualism" are the ingredients of American democracy. As William Ernest Hocking writes, "This word individualism is a common word; it signifies a principle which has entered deep into American life; it has long historic

⁷⁷The notion of American liberal individualism runs through the history of American political thought. See, for example, Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (3 vols. in 1; New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955); Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1954).

⁷⁸Ralph Barton Perry, Characteristically American (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949).

roots."⁷⁹ Individualism is truly an American way of life.⁸⁰ When Maritain was inspired by American democracy, he saw everything but the individualism of American democracy.

⁷⁹The Lasting Elements of Individualism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), p. 1.

⁸⁰Horace M. Kallen, Individualism: An American Way of Life (New York: Liveright, 1933).

SECTION V

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER XVI

CONCLUSION

In the beginning of this essay, the present writer has stressed that political philosophy must be concerned with what ought to be done. Since the purpose of political philosophy is essentially to prescribe man's political action or to be the guide for a good political life, it is intimately related to moral philosophy or ethics. Political philosophy is concerned with the ends of political action and political society. A few prominent political theorists and philosophers have come to the conclusion that political philosophy has declined in our time largely due to the dominating influence of positivism and historicism. The decisive influence of positivism on political science can readily be noticed in the preoccupation of political science with its methodology. Arnold Brecht has rightly observed that this century is the century of methodology. The primary purpose of political philosophy is not to analyze the facts of political society and political phenomena, but it is to provide not only the foundation of political society but also guidance and direction for the science of politics.

Despite the sign of "declining" political philosophy, a contribution to political philosophy comes from contemporary theologians. In addition to Jacques Maritain, we have already noted the eminent names such as Reinhold Niebuhr, Emil Brunner, Paul Tillich, Nicolas Berdyaev

and Martin Buber. The contemporary theologians' concern over our civilization is not altogether one of "fatalism," noted by Judith N. Shklar.¹ She seems to have ignored the positive side of the social and political ideas of Christian theologians in her passionate pursuit to discover the reasons for "the decline of political faith." It goes without saying that the theologians are much more pessimistic than the philosophes of the Enlightenment. Pessimism may not be cherished for its own sake, and yet it is much better than optimistic complacency. Nor should the political ideas of theologians be readily dismissed as "a confused mixture of diluted religious ideas spiced with a dash of market-place virtues."^{1a} One failure on the part of most political scientists is that they have not yet taken seriously the social and political ideas of the theologians. However, we must admit, either readily or reluctantly, the fact that the theologians constitute one of the best intellectual corps of our time.

An examination of the relationship between theology and politics may be considered as the subject matter of "political theology" or, to avoid some misunderstandings, "theological politics." Theological politics is essentially an expression of the relationship of a trinity: "God, Man and Politics." From a political point of view, the relationship between theology (or religion) and politics cannot be construed as the German expression "politische Theologie," which is not a part of mundane politics based on what is theological. Politische Theologie, instead, is regarded as a part of general theology. Theological politics or political theology used in this essay is neither sacred nor part of general

¹See her After Utopia, pp. 164-217.

^{1a}Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision, p. 288.

theology. It is not meant to be based upon the proposition that political truth is part of the revealed truth of God. Political theology is based at most on the supposition that, as Nathaniel Micklem has said, all the political problems are at bottom theological. It considers politics from a theological point of view. Political theology, as it is used in this essay, is the similar idea conveyed in the French expression "théologie politique" which, as Jacques Maritain notes, differs from the German expression "politische Theologie." The meaning of "théologie politique" is that "politics or political thought, like all things belonging to the domain of morals, is a subject for the theologian as it is for the philosopher, by reason of the primacy of the moral and spiritual values which are involved in the political order, and because these values, in a world at once fallen and redeemed, imply a reference to the supernatural order and to revelation, which is the proper object of the theologian. Thus there is a theology as there is a philosophy of politics, a science whose object is secular and temporal and which judges and knows that object by the light of revealed principles."²

As we have already seen, the political thought of Jacques Maritain, considered ultimately, is truly a théologie politique or theological politics. Maritain himself has declared that the truly "explicative political science" ought to be a political theology. Moreover, in accordance with his distinction between theology and philosophy, we must consider his political thought from the standpoint of both

²True Humanism, p. 92. Maritain interprets politische Theologie as "the messianic and evangelical idea of the Kingdom of God, whose realisation they seek to find in time and in history" (p. 93). Thus, it seems that politische Theologie is contrary to his distinction between religion and culture.

a political theology and a political philosophy. We must once again recognize the fact that, in Maritain's system, theology always occupies a superior position to philosophy. That is to say, the ultimate concern of political philosophy is a political theology.

We have noted that there are three positions within the Christian camp in regard to the relationship between Christianity (as a religion) and civilization. The attitude of the theologians towards culture is largely determined by their views on the relation between reason and faith. Theological liberalism is essentially the identification of Christianity and culture; the Protestant Orthodox fideist position is the complete separation of Christian faith from culture. Karl Barth is the best representative of this attitude in our time. The third position is most aptly represented by Jacques Maritain and the Thomists. In this category we also include Paul Tillich and Emil Brunner. Gustave Weigel has commented that there is something "Thomistic" about Paul Tillich, and Walter M. Horton has noted a certain "scholasticism" in Emil Brunner, which parallels the scholasticism of Maritain.

The political scientist is incompetent to render any judgment upon the theological or religious truth. Moreover, such a judgment on the part of the political scientist seems unnecessary for an understanding of the interrelationship between religion and politics. However, from a practical point of view, the complete "indifferentism" of religion from culture, e. g. the Barthian fideist position, seems not merely unrealistic but also almost impossible. In fact, Karl Barth himself could not remain silent during the Nazi period. Christianity has been a culture-bound religion, that is to say, it has permanently cast its lot

with Western civilization. To say that Christianity is related to culture is not to affirm that Christian faith is tied with a particular political regime. Herbert Butterfield speaks of the idea that "belief in God gives us greater elasticity of mind." And "Christianity is not tied to régimes -- not compelled to regard the existing order as the very end of life and the embodiment of all our values." "We can do worse than remember a principle which both gives us a firm Rock and leaves us the maximum elasticity for our minds: the principle: Hold to Christ, and for the rest be totally uncommitted."³

Religion is relevant to politics. This does not imply, however, that "religion alone would suffice to restore a moral soundness to mankind."⁴ William H. McNeill states that "Without religious revival on a grand scale, I should think it likely that moral lassitude and a spirit of indifference, a sense of futility, and, perhaps, a supine fatalism would increasingly gain hold of men's minds"⁵ Nor is it correct to say that the religious thinkers are seeking their religious scapegoat in the modern social ills. Paul Tillich has stressed the idea that Christianity must provide practical as well as theoretical solution for the contemporary world. However, we cannot help but assent to the remarks of Portia in The Merchant of Venice that express the chasm between what is good to do and what can be done: "If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches and poor men's cottages princes' palaces."

The lesson that we can learn from religious belief seems to be

³Christianity and History, pp. 145-46.

⁴Past and Future (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 174.

⁵Ibid., p. 175.

not its uncompromisable dogmatism but its affirmative certitude. Paul Tillich speaks of the element of "doubt" in faith which is not the same as being skeptical. As S. Radhakrishnan says, "Where nothing is certain, nothing matters."⁶ It is hardly necessary to reassert that Christianity contains the germ of democratic ideals. It provides us with the certitude of the absolute value of democratic ideals in the world which is stricken with "the acids of skeptical nihilistic relativism" -- to use the words of Theodore M. Greene.⁷ As Frederick Watkins notes, the political tradition of the West is "in the throes of a major crisis" with liberalism. And if "liberalism fails to survive, it will mean the end of the Western political tradition."⁸

It seems that the religious impulse is deeply rooted in human nature. We must also recognize the fact that we are living in the world of not a religion but of religions. As William Ernest Hocking says, "In its nature, religion is universal and one; yet everywhere it is local, partisan, plural."⁹ Therefore, if religion provides any solution at all for contemporary problems we must look for "a world faith" or "a common faith" rather than for one religion or one sect of the same religion. Jacques Maritain has once said that it is mischievous for the the Catholics to conceive that they alone possess the truth. As Hocking

⁶Eastern Religions and Western Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 314.

⁷Liberalism: Its Theory and Practice, p. 67.

⁸The Political Tradition of the West: A Study in the Development of Modern Liberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. ix.

⁹Living Religions and a World Faith, pp. 17-18.

says again, we must make "the continuing enterprise of reconceiving religion through world culture, and world culture through religion."¹⁰ We must agree with Radhakrishnan when he says: "It is argued that this or that religion has been an instrument of greater progress, and so has higher truth. It is represented as the power of a superior type of civilization. It is difficult to determine what constitutes the content of progress or superiority."¹¹ Moreover, Paul Tillich, in an exposition of his "theonomy," comes to grips with a profound truth when he says: "The Thomistic philosophy, as well as the Protestant ideal of personality, is a transitory form of religious culture, but neither has any claim to ultimacy and finality; and the same holds true of the Greek concepts in the dogma of the church, of the feudal pattern of the Roman hierarchy, of the patriarchalistic ethics of Lutheranism, of the democratic ideals of sectarian Protestantism, and even of the cultural traditions which, for instance, are embodied in the biblical language and world view."¹²

The thought of Jacques Maritain runs from the theological and metaphysical heaven to the world of mundane politics. His ideas are deeply and intricately rooted in Thomism. It is the nature of Thomism itself that determines the depth, width and scope of his ideas. Thomism, as Etienne Gilson notes, "is a philosophy inasmuch as everything in it hangs on the truth of a first metaphysical principle."¹³ The principles

¹⁰Ibid., p. 208.

¹¹Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 322.

¹²Protestant Era, pp. 57-58.

¹³Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 280.

of Thomism channel the flow of Maritain's social and political thought. Perhaps partially due to modern historical circumstances, however, Maritain has devoted himself far more to cultural and political problems than did his master, St. Thomas Aquinas.¹⁴

Maritain has insisted that he is vehemently opposed to the "modernization" of Thomism. He has said that he would rather become a paleo-Thomist than a neo-Thomist. However, he is not ignoring the seven centuries of human progress. In order to avoid the dilemma of keeping the Thomistic immutable principles intact on the one hand and not to ignore human development since the time of St. Thomas Aquinas on the other, Maritain has distinguished methodically the nature of philosophy from the state of philosophy. In the nature of philosophy, the Thomistic principles are immutable or Thomism is a perennial philosophy. By contrast, in the state of philosophy, Thomism can absorb the seven centuries of man's progress including his scientific development.

In Maritain's whole system, all types of knowledge are distinguished from each other. But they are certainly not "separated." However, theology remains unquestionably the queen of all sciences. In his system, Maritain maintains that, for instance, a genuine political science and a genuine political philosophy are indeed possible. However, we cannot avoid certain criticisms that can be leveled against the whole system of Maritain. Maritain has implicitly assumed that there would be no contradiction, say, between theology and science (or even political

¹⁴William Ebenstein, in his review article of Thomas Gilby's The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas, comments that "Like most medieval theologians Thomas Aquinas was not primarily interested in problems of government, politics, or economics, but rather in the eternal issues of theological and metaphysical speculation." Journal of Politics, XXI (August, 1959), p. 531.

science). This assumption, in his hierarchic order of knowledge, is grounded on the idea that every type of knowledge occupies an "infra-valent" or "subalternate" position to theology. When one type of knowledge cannot be separated from a higher type or ultimately from theology, how meaningful is it to say that this infravalent knowledge has its "autonomy"? How meaningful is it to say that political science is "autonomous" while it is maintained that the only genuinely explicative political science must be a political theology? Moreover, it is certainly difficult to see how Maritain's insistent opposition to the modernization of Thomism is compatible with certain conclusions of modern science. It seems that we must abandon medieval cosmology altogether in the light of the development of modern astronomy and physics. What would be the result of Maritain's assumption if theological premises and certain scientific conclusions are in fact incompatible? For example, there seems to be a conflict between Maritain's assumption and the following statement of Bertrand Russell: since the time of Copernicus, "whenever science and theology have disagreed, science has proved victorious."¹⁵ I am not questioning the truth or falsity of Russell's statement that: "Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know."¹⁶ But I am merely questioning Maritain's assertion concerning the immutability of the Thomistic principles in spite of the seven centuries of human

¹⁵Religion and Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 244. Homer H. Dubs notes that "The Copernican astronomy was opposed by the strongest organization for the control of human opinion the world has ever known, the Roman Catholic church." "The Logical Derivation of Democracy," Ethics, LV (April, 1945), p. 199.

¹⁶Religion and Science, p. 243.

progress and knowledge and his insistence that science can be autonomous, say, from theology while the former occupies an infravalent position to the latter. Without "modernizing" Thomism, the question is: How can Thomism be reconciled with the new frontiers of human knowledge?

Maritain has also distinguished reason from faith, as philosophy must be distinct from theology. The result is that one may become a Thomistic philosopher without becoming a good Catholic. However, an analogous situation seems to exist in the relation of science to theology. The question here is whether a philosopher can become a secular Thomist. Since faith and theology cannot be divorced from reason and philosophy, it is highly questionable whether a philosopher can become a good Thomist without becoming a good Catholic at the same time. We must always remember the fact that St. Thomas Aquinas never sacrificed Christ for Aristotle but he utilized Aristotle for Christ. This does not imply that Thomism is a synthesis of the pagan philosophy and Christian faith or of reason and faith. The question here is of the ultimate nature of authority. As Paul Tillich says, the question of the Catholic faith is ultimately that of authority whereas "doubt" is the Protestant principle.

It is also highly questionable whether science in its strict sense is, as Bertrand Russell sees it, the only source of knowledge or truth. Nor is it to be construed that religion and science are altogether incompatible. Charles Morris has maintained that if an empiricist is equipped with semiotic or the theory of signs he need not oppose religion completely. Theodore M. Greene says that science, in the strict sense of the term, is not all-inclusive. Rather, it is "a specific type of inquiry

into a specific area of reality for a specific reality."¹⁷ Alfred North Whitehead has also recognized the implication of religion in philosophy. As John Herman Randall, Jr. writes, "Religion . . . is a distinctive human enterprise with a socially indispensable function of its own to perform. It is not primarily a set of beliefs offering knowledge to men. It is not a kind of bastard science, whose superstitions are at war with scientific truths. Nor is it a kind of super-science proclaiming a 'higher' form of knowledge forever beyond the reach of 'mere science' and its crude laboratory methods. Religion is not essentially knowledge at all. Yet it clearly involves knowledge, many different kinds of knowledge."¹⁸

Maritain has long ago shifted his concern to the philosophy of culture and society from a purely philosophical preoccupation. As he himself has emphasized, the crucial issues of the contemporary world are not the great theological controversies centered on the dogmas of faith in religious thought as they were once before but the questions of political theology and political philosophy. His philosophy of culture has centered on what he calls "a theocentric humanism" which is the application of the Christian principles to the secular world. His theocentric humanism is not a sacred order, but it is humanism that is impregnated with Christianity, especially with the Gospel. His ability to distinguish between religion (Catholicism) and culture (Catholics or the Catholic world) is rooted in his Thomistic principle. Maritain has accepted, mutatis mutandis, the historical fact that ours is a secular

¹⁷"Man, In the Twilight, Need not Falter," Christianity and Reason, ed. Edward D. Myers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 9.

¹⁸The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion, p. 6.

age. Therefore, a new Christendom is not the imposition of theological doctrines on the modern world. It is a secular order inspired by the leaven of the Gospel.

Maritain has insisted that a new Christendom is a concrete historical ideal. Thus it is not a utopia but an ideal that is realizable. He has emphasized the idea that a new Christian order would be realized primarily through the transformation of the human mind. In the creation of a world government Maritain has said that he is not much of an idealist since he is an Aristotelian realist. However, he has admitted at the same time that he has perhaps yielded to "the old temptation of philosophers." The conception of Maritain's ideal of a new Christendom contains nothing ambiguous. He does not seem to propose to eradicate all the ills of the modern world but, rather, to palliate them. However, in regard to the actual realization of a new Christian order, one may cogently argue that there is something ambivalent in it. Maritain has already spoken of the "myth" of this new Christian order. Is it a kind of political myth that Ernst Cassirer talks about? Is it an "invulnerable" political myth which is beyond the power of philosophy to destroy and "impervious to rational arguments"?¹⁹ I think not. As Maritain has insisted, a new Christendom is a "utopia" in the sense that David Riesman uses it, that is, "a potential reality." Kenneth E. Boulding has suggested the importance of "the image" in the social sciences.²⁰ The image of a new Christendom is not totally devoid of

¹⁹Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1955), p. 373.

²⁰The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956).

what Karl Mannheim calls a "wish-image" or "the utopian mentality."²¹ Nor is the ideal of a new Christendom immune from what Karl Popper has so vehemently criticized, the fallacy of "historicism."²² In short, Maritain's ideal of a new Christendom is clear in its conceptualization, but it is not entirely clear in its realization. It oscillates from a concrete historical ideal or a potential reality to a "wish-image," a "myth," and to a "norm." The value of such an ideal, however, is not questioned here. The question is entirely concerned with the clarification of the conception of a new Christendom in terms of its actual realization in the "indeterminate" future. As Hannah Arendt has commented, Plato is still better company than his critics even though all their criticism is valid.

It is of cardinal importance to realize that, stemming from the principle of Thomism, Maritain has emphatically and repeatedly stated that culture or a political order is a real end, although it is an infravalent end to the ultimate end of the supernatural. His philosophy of culture has gradually shifted and culminated in his conception of democracy, which is organic, personalist, and pluralistic. He has declared that the transformation of culture is a political task. The importance of his conception of democracy lies in its moral primacy. For Maritain, democracy is essentially a way of life and mind. A new democracy is essentially a secular order inspired by Christianity: it is the fermentation of the Gospel. Democracy as a political concept

²¹Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940), pp. 193-94.

²²See his The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950) and The Poverty of Historicism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

must aim at the moral realization of the Christian values. Moreover, the true democracy must also take into account the moral precept of natural law. It must implement the items of all "human rights," which are justified by natural law. In turn, natural law is the law that participates in eternal law. Political democracy must take seriously the moral principle of the immutable principle of natural law: "Do good and avoid evil."

Erich Kahler notes that "Democracy . . . shows a tense ambivalence, a fluctuation between individualistic and collectivistic trends, and its functioning depends on the maintenance of balance between the two."²³ The personalist conception of democracy rejects both "individualistic liberalism" and collectivism. As a matter of fact, Maritain has envisaged the coming of a new Christian order only after the collapse of capitalism. On the other hand, collectivism is rejected because of its repudiation of human dignity and freedom. Thus Maritain has attempted to balance extreme individualism and collectivism, and he believes that the balance between authority and freedom is possible. He is convinced that "If it is correct to say that there will always be rightist temperaments and leftist temperaments, it is nevertheless also correct to say that political philosophy is neither rightist nor leftist; it must simply be true."²⁴ For him, social justice is as important as order and freedom. As Arnold Toynbee says, we are entering a new "chapter of history" in which there must be "a new balance between justice

²³Man the Measure, p. 385.

²⁴The Twilight of Civilization, p. 57.

and freedom."²⁵ In order to understand Maritain's social and political philosophy, we must conceive his ideal of a new Christendom and a new democracy as truly a "moral revolution." Maritain, under the spell of the influence of Charles Péguy, has accepted the idea that no revolution is worthy of its name unless it is moral.

As Paul Weiss notes, "The task of philosophy is to understand and evaluate. . . . Its function is neither to attack nor to defend, to apologize nor to propagandize for any limited custom, transient fact or local ideal. It is its duty resolutely to oppose what is false and evil, and boldly to support the true and good, and this, irrespective of where they are found."²⁶ Even those who do not share the philosophical conclusions of Paul Weiss must at least agree with what he says about the task of philosophy. However, the contemporary problems of philosophy arise, not from lack of resolution to uphold what is true and good and to reject what is false and bad, but from different ideas about truth and falsity or the good and the evil. As G. E. G. Catlin insists, "Our age is one rich in a multiplicity of conflicting ideals and traditions. It is an age which pays for this wealth by an enervating scepticism. Its chief need is the recovery of a conviction of values."²⁷

Maritain has recognized this conflict in our world rich with

²⁵M. B. Schnapper (ed.), New Frontiers of Knowledge (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. 23.

²⁶"Democracy and the Rights of Man," Science, Philosophy and Religion: Second Symposium, p. 273.

²⁷"Symposium: What Can Philosophy Contribute to the Study of Politics?" Creativity, Politics and the A Priori (Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. XII), p. 117.

various ideas. However, he has never retreated from his firm conviction that Thomism is the only true philosophy. For instance, he holds that the only true rational justification of "human rights" is based upon natural law which is a participation in eternal law. Nonetheless, as he has recognized the irreversible fact that the modern age is a secular one, he also admits that our world is a pluralistic world. Thus he has sought a "pluralistic reconciliation." As a result, he has resorted to reconciliation in practical conclusions, not in theoretical justifications. He has sought a compromise between his Thomistic principles and pragmatism in the area of practical conclusions and asked us for practical reconciliation.

As Thomas Ernest Hulme once said, it is very difficult to see a particular philosophy when one is inside it. "But if one looks at it from the standpoint of another philosophy, it at once becomes obvious."²⁸ Thus we must look at Maritain's philosophy of democracy in comparison with other alternative theories. Charles Morris, who shares the pragmatic tradition of Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey and George Mead, not unlike Jacques Maritain, has once expressed his concern over the modern world: "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that momentous days lie ahead, and that the middle-class cultural synthesis of the West has become a forlorn thing in rags and tatters, its social life disordered, its economic life in chaos, its art feeble, its vision unclear, its philosophy inarticulate."²⁹ However, unlike Maritain, he believes that pragmatism is a solution for the preservation and future of democracy

²⁸Thomas Ernest Hulme, Speculations, p. 12.

²⁹Pragmatism and the Crisis of Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), p. 7.

when he says: "it is this reaction which has its social ideal in democracy and its philosophical formulation in pragmatism that may provide the road to the future."³⁰ We find that modern empiricists and pragmatists are the strongest critics of Jacques Maritain. As a matter of fact, they oppose any religious justification of democracy.³¹ In particular, modern empiricists point out the incompatibility of democracy with the authority of the Catholic Church. For them "the scientific spirit" alone is compatible with "democratic faith." Horace M. Kallen says that the method of science is "always a technique of doubt and inquiry, never a grammar of assent."³² Catholicism, for Kallen, is "a spiritual fascism, a moral and intellectual totalitarianism, which has its peers in those of the Nazis and their ilk."³³ Thus, the result is what Francis M. Myers calls "the warfare of democratic ideals."³⁴

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Horace M. Kallen, "Freedom and Authoritarianism in Religion," The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith (New York: King's Crown Press, 1944), pp. 3-11; Sidney Hook, Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy (New York: John Day, 1940), pp. 76-104 and "Naturalism and Democracy," Naturalism and the Human Spirit, ed. Yervant Hovhannes Krikorian (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), pp. 40-64; Hans Kelsen, "Foundations of Democracy," Ethics, No. 1, Pt. 2 (October, 1955), pp. 62-67; Francis M. Myers, The Warfare of Democratic Ideals (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1956), pp. 85-135; Frank H. Knight, Freedom and Reform (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), pp. 262-300; Charles Frankel, The Case for Modern Man (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), pp. 47-84; Samuel DuBois Cook, An Inquiry into the Ethical Foundations of Democracy (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation; Columbus: Ohio State University, 1954), pp. 129-84.

³²"Freedom and Authoritarianism in Religion," p. 6.

³³Ibid., p. 10.

³⁴Op. cit. In order to clarify fundamental issues regarding the meaning of democracy, he examines "traditional empiricism," "neo-Thomism," some "Protestant absolutisms," and "instrumentalism."

Maritain has spoken of the idea that Christianity is "a religious creed," distinct from culture or a political order. Nonetheless, democracy is the fermentation of the Gospel. "If Christianity as religious creed," argues Hans Kelsen, "is politically indifferent, it cannot ferment political life and cannot become an historic energy at work in the world; consequently there cannot be an essential connection between Christianity and any political system. Maritain speaks of a 'secularized Christianity,' but this is a contradiction in terms." Furthermore, Kelsen points to the difficulty of proving that Christianity offers a more efficient form of democratic government than any other religion. "One cannot maintain," he says, "that there exists a connection between the essence of democracy and a definite religious system because this system guarantees to democratic government a higher degree of efficiency than any other religious system."³⁵ Moreover, Kelsen believes that it is hardly possible to derive the most important principle of democracy, that is, "the government of the people, by the people, and for the people," from the Gospel. And he further stresses the fact that "the Catholic as well as the Protestant churches were . . . more in favor of an autocratic than a democratic government." Nevertheless, he does not deny that Catholics as well as Protestants supported the democratic form of government after it had been established."³⁶

³⁵"Foundations of Democracy," p. 64. "The antique democracy," he remarks in another passage, "was connected with a religion totally different from Christianity, and there is no reason to assume that a people who have another than a Christian religion should not be able to establish a true democracy."

³⁶Ibid., pp. 64-65. Frank H. Knight also argues: "The essence of the original Christian social teaching was literal acceptance of

Many empiricists argue that the religious justification of democracy is a form of absolutism which endangers the working formula of a democratic society.³⁷ It is hardly necessary to emphasize the fact that democracy, as justified by the pragmatists, rejects moral as well as political absolutism and is concerned largely with the means

established political forms and obedience to established authority, whether it be autocratic or democratic." Freedom and Reform, p. 279 (*italics added*). David Spitz writes that "whatever its statements concerning social and political justice, the Catholic Church has shown that it can get along with any regime that lets Catholics practice their religion -- preferably as the sole religion, but if necessary as one among many." Democracy and the Challenge of Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 115.

Charles Frankel states that, "It is not usually our general moral principles that become subjects of doubt or controversy; it is the application of these principles to specific cases," and that "[Maritain's] discussion only suggests the classic story about the philosopher and the theologian strolling in the gardens of one of the colleges at Oxford." The Case for Modern Man, p. 62.

³⁷Charles Frankel in The Case for Modern Man rejects absolutism in support of a relativistic philosophy. It is worth noting various arguments on the relationship between philosophical and political absolutism and between philosophical and political relativism. Kelsen, like John Dewey, Sidney Hook, Jacques Barzun, and Charles Frankel, argues that there is a parallelism between philosophical and political absolutism: that is to say, philosophical absolutism leads to autocracy while philosophical relativism leads to democracy. "Absolutism and Relativism in Philosophy and Politics," American Political Science Review, XLII (October, 1948), pp. 906-14. On the other hand, in criticizing this theory of Kelsen as "a false one" or at best "a half-truth," René de V. Williamson argues that "the historic and truly great thinkers and champions of democracy believed in absolute values and took their stand there." "The Challenge of Political Relativism," Journal of Politics, IX (May, 1947), pp. 147-77. Eduard Heimann makes the same point in Freedom and Order, p. 289. An intermediate position is that of Morris Ginsberg in "Ethical Relativity and Political Theory," British Journal of Sociology, II (March, 1951), pp. 1-11. Felix E. Oppenheim argues that "logically, there is no necessary connection between any particular value-judgment and either absolutism or relativism." However, according to him, "absolutists are often psychologically inclined to become intolerant and fanatical," and "a relativistic outlook promotes our democratic way of life" and upholds "the values of human dignity -- fervently, but with humility." "In Defense of Relativism," Western Political Quarterly, VIII (September, 1955), pp. 411-17; also, "Relativism, Absolutism, and Democracy," American Political Science Review, XLIV (December, 1950), pp. 951-60.

to be employed rather than the ultimate end or goal in a political society. David Spitz warns us that political society "may utilize the procedure of democracy to destroy the principle of democracy."³⁸ John Dewey, the American philosopher of democracy, points to the crux of this problem when he says: "They [the doctrines] lived to cumber the political ground, obstructing progress, all the more so because they were uttered and held not as hypotheses with which to direct social experimentation but as final truths, dogmas."³⁹ He also believes that political democracy is "not a mystic faith as if in some overruling providence that cares for children, drunkards, and others unable to help themselves."⁴⁰

Jacques Barzun, in the vein of American pragmatism, speaks of the virtue of "the Neo-Aristotelians and Neo-Thomists" who "emphasize the need for logic and good thinking" and "put history and science in lesser niches as fact-furnishing aids to metaphysics." However, he questions the capacity of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy to "solve

³⁸Op. cit., p. 109.

³⁹Eliseo Vivas criticizes Deweyan instrumentalism by stating that: "What Dewey has tried to do is to take philosophy out of the sacristy and hire her out as bottle washer in the laboratory." According to him, "John Dewey is doing nothing more than throwing his weight behind some of the most sinister forces that are operative today in the world . . . since the effect of his philosophy is to thin and trivialize the dignity of men." The Moral Life and the Ethical Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 126-27; his criticism of instrumentalism is found on pp. 100-37.

⁴⁰The Public and Its Problems, p. 146. Dewey recognizes many meanings of democracy. However, political democracy "denotes a mode of government, a specified practice in selecting officials and regulating their conduct as officials" (p. 82).

our social and economic problems." Nevertheless, he is wholeheartedly sympathetic with "the demand for philosophic thinking."⁴¹

Barzun, like Maritain, defines democracy as "a culture," specifically the culture wherein "the free play of mind" is possible in the intellectual activities which characterize art, science, education and government. Therefore, the notion of democracy for Barzun is not limited to political democracy which is only a part of cultural democracy. In his own words, "Democratic conduct . . . is primarily cultural and indirectly political." "Democracy," he says, "is an age-old desire for a free culture." Thus democracy is as old as Socrates and Jesus, and Barzun is able to find democrats in Greece and in feudal Europe as well.⁴²

Taking account of humanistic values as found in James and Dewey who advocate a relativistic, pragmatic philosophy, Barzun damns the absolute.⁴³ "The quest for certainty, the passion for absolutes, and, even worse, the lustful desire to enforce the commonest jerry-built

⁴¹Of Human Freedom (Boston: Little, Brown, 1939), pp. 179-80. Barzun attacks contemporary scientism, though he fully recognizes the importance of fact finding in the social sciences. He advocates "the historical method" and "pragmatic empiricism" as intellectual reasoning tools. "The function of historical thinking in a democratic culture is to supply us not only with certain facts but with an organization, a scale of values and tenable conclusions, the whole to be welded into a work of art by a combination of faithful scholarship and straight thinking" (pp. 186-87).

⁴²Ibid., pp. 11, 264. Similar points are made by Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 173, and Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), p. 186.

⁴³He cites William James: "Royce, you're photographed! I say Damn the Absolute!"

absolutes are the death of democratic culture and a denial that life is worth living." In this respect, humanistic pragmatism is a philosophy of American democracy. Barzun speaks as the voice of democracy, "in the name of peace and pragmatism, let us face with open eyes a pluralistic world in which there are no universal churches, no single remedy for all diseases, no one way to teach or write or sing, no magic diet that will make everyone healthy and happy, no world poets and no chosen races cut to one pattern or virtue, but only the wretched and wonderfully diversified human race which can live and build and leave cultural traces of its passage in a world that was apparently not fashioned for the purpose."⁴⁴

Sidney Hook, an outspoken follower of John Dewey, believes that there is an intimate connection between a philosophy and a social or political attitude. He states that "by and large, empiricism as a movement has usually been associated with a scientific or experimental (materialistic) approach to values while absolutists have adopted either an intuitive or a metaphysical approach."⁴⁵ He also notes that, "Empiricism . . . is commitment to a procedure, not to a theory of metaphysics. Empiricism is a generic term for the philosophical attitude which submits all claims of fact and value to test by experience."⁴⁶

⁴⁴Of Human Freedom, pp. 276-77. He also says: "The absolute is commonly nothing more than a penny foot rule applied to cases where we need complicated instruments of precision. In the realm of ideas it is a single arbitrary notion used where we need a flexible and many-sided concept" (p. 40).

⁴⁵"Metaphysics and Social Attitudes," Social Frontier, IV (February, 1938), pp. 153-80.

⁴⁶"The Philosophical Presuppositions of Democracy," Ethics, LII (April, 1942), p. 280. Thus he maintains that he differs from J. L. Stocks who also advocates democracy on an empirical ground. See Stocks'

Hook's position is that political democracy ("a democratic state in which the basic decisions of government rest upon the freely given consent of the governed") is but a means to the ideal of ethical democracy. Noting three other generic types of the justification of democracy -- religion, metaphysics, and preferences -- he is inclined to postulate his ethical democracy as a hypothesis. He maintains that, "It could be conclusively established that the great institutional religion has always been able to adapt itself to any form of government or society which will tolerate its existence." He holds that the two cardinal propositions of natural theology -- "God exists" and "Man has an immortal soul" -- constitute neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for affirming the validity of democracy. On the contrary, the belief in the immortality of the soul has been used "to sanctify the tightest system

empirical basis of democracy in Reason & Intuition and Other Essays (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), especially pp. 98-115, 128-44. Bertrand Russell also takes empiricism as the basis of democracy: "The only philosophy that affords a theoretical justification of democracy in its temper of mind is empiricism." Moreover, "empiricism . . . is to be commended not only on the ground of its greater truth, but also on ethical grounds." Refuting "arrogant dogmatism," he says that "systems of dogma without empirical foundation, such as those of scholastic theology, Marxism, and fascism, have the advantage of producing a great degree of social coherence among their disciples. But they have the disadvantage of involving persecution of valuable sections of the population." Unpopular Essays (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), pp. 1-20. In discussing "individual and social ethics," he states that "although it is not dependent upon any theological belief," his view is "in close harmony with Christian ethics." He believes that a sense of moral compulsion regarding creativity and a sense of moral exaltation is "the basis of what the Gospels call duty to God, and is . . . separable from theological belief." Authority and the Individual (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 70-71. For his philosophical position see: Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), Human Society in Ethics and Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), and My Philosophical Development (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959). Ernest Troeltsch maintains, however, that ethical empiricism "ceased to be able to furnish a foundation for any abiding system of Morality, and led to a general moral scepticism or to a mere Practicism or Pragmatism." Christian Thought, p. 72.

of antidemocratic social stratification that the world has ever seen" (He refers to the Hindu doctrines of samasra or karma). As to the relationship between systems of metaphysics and democracy, he states that systems of idealistic metaphysics "have been more generally employed to bolster antidemocratic social movements than systems of empirical or materialistic metaphysics."

Although democracy as a way of life "embodies a certain complex of moral ideals," Hook is willing to accept the theory of moral ideals only as hypotheses. He maintains that "terminal values are always related to specific contexts; there is no absolute terminal value which is either self-evident or beyond the necessity of justifying itself if its credentials are challenged." Thus, according to him, "democracy needs no cosmic support other than the chance to make good."⁴⁷

⁴⁷The basic principle of ethical democracy is "a principle of equality -- an equality not of status or origin but of opportunity, relevant functions, and social participation." "The Philosophical Presuppositions of Democracy," pp. 277-96. John H. Hallowell believes that the doctrine of human equality "rests upon an ethical basis, derived in part from the Christian concept of the salvation of individual souls. The scientific method, as applied to social phenomena, . . . did not originate the idea of individual equality but rather gave assurance to an affirmation rooted in religious beliefs." "The Decline of Liberalism," Ethics, LII (April, 1942), pp. 323-49. See also The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1943). A. D. Lindsay also recognizes the Christian contributions of the doctrine of human equality and freedom in the modern democratic state. The Modern Democratic State, p. 251. Although Glenn R. Morrow agrees with Hook's notion of ethical democracy, he maintains that there is a relationship between religion and democracy as well as between metaphysics and democracy. A metaphysical presupposition of democracy is that man is essentially a rational being, and a religious presupposition emphasizes man as the image of God. "The Philosophical Presuppositions of Democracy," Ethics, LII (April, 1942), pp. 297-308.

As Alfred North Whitehead has noted, human civilization is the victory of persuasion over force. One of the fundamental principles of democracy, as F. A. Hayek has noted, is the peaceful solution for social problems. Maritain has refused to accept any other justifications of true democracy except one which is based upon the Thomistic principles. However, he has offered the way in which all the democrats, regardless of their religious creeds and preferences or of their philosophical justifications, may reach practical conclusions for the furtherance of democracy which we value so dearly. Since we all agree that democracy is something valuable and must be preserved, it is very desirable for us to find a genuine area of agreement on democratic faith. As Lincoln said, a house divided cannot stand. We must cooperate to make democratic values more secure.

Democracy must at least be predicated upon the idea that man is a moral agent. In this sense, Christian faith provides us a vital moral foundation for democracy. As Brand Blanshard says, "The religious spirit, far from being an enemy of democracy, is, as I conceive it, a vitalizing and sweetening leaven for democratic life."⁴⁸ Democracy has been undermined, as J. Roland Pennock shows, by the rise of scientific relativism. Whatever the relationship between democracy and absolutism may be, we must affirm the belief that the democratic values are absolute. It has often been argued that the Roman Catholic Church is incompatible with the essential principles of democracy. In Protestantism the individual is glorified and considered to be his own priest. Its

⁴⁸"Theology and the Value of the Individual," The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith, p. 75.

exaltation of "the infinite value of the individual" is more congenial to the fermentation of democracy. But we must also say that atomized individualism is detrimental to the working of a democratic society. Order is necessary in democracy, although freedom is more valuable. Moreover, we must distinguish Maritain's conception of democracy inspired by the leaven of the Gospel from the practice of the Catholic Church. We must judge the value of Maritain's conception of democracy on its own merit.

It is not certain how much influence the political ideas of Maritain have had in practical politics. His political ideas are certainly congenial to the European movements of so-called "Christian Democracy." Leicester C. Webb notes some influence of Maritain in Italian politics. He writes that "In fact, Maritain has been a substantial though usually a minority influence on Italian Catholic thought, with a particular appeal for Dossetti and La Pira and their colleagues of the 'academic left' of Christian Democracy." Although "this group waged a vigorous battle against what it regarded as a dangerous tendency to carry through a political mobilization of Catholic Action," the influence of Maritain was "greatly weakened by the withdrawal of Dossetti from politics in 1951 and by the winding up in the same year of Cronache Sociali, the organ of his group."⁴⁹

The democratic mind of Jacques Maritain is truly in the great Western tradition of democracy. In the history of political philosophy, therefore, Maritain is not placed with Robert Filmer whose Patriarcha

⁴⁹Leicester C. Webb, Church and State in Italy 1947-1957 (Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1958), pp. 55-56.

tried to justify an absolutist political system based upon the original "fatherly authority" given by God to Adam. Maritain has no need to defend his democratic theory against the Filmerian conception of absolute monarchy. Three centuries ago, John Locke had systematically and completely refuted Filmer. Maritain may be considered to be close, in spirit, to the great Anglican political theologian Richard Hooker who tried to justify the origin of political society from the Gospel. "The judicious Hooker" -- as Locke called him -- retained the medieval ideas of law and nature as well as the classical tradition of man's sociability and reasonableness, but his opus magnum, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, presents a transition from the medieval tradition to the modern period. Maritain has been inspired by the "medieval" principles but he has come to terms with the modern conditions. He has evoked the "medieval" principles only in order to apply them to the realities of contemporary civilization. He has repeatedly made it clear that modern civilization is not sacral but secular.

In the French Catholic political tradition, Maritain, like many contemporary Thomists who have followed his example, completely breaks away from the monarchical and conservative traditionalism which had been adhered to by Catholics like Joseph de Maistre whose political logic had even "a Hobbesian touch." He shares none of the "providential religious metaphysics" of de Maistre. Moreover, Maritain has repeatedly repudiated the "immoralism" of Machiavelli and Hobbes, and, for him, the Hegelian assertion that the State is the march of God in history is sheer blasphemy. Although he once was sympathetic with the political ideas of Charles Maurras, he later completely dissociated himself from them. The

present-day democratic theory of Maritain has nothing in common with Maurrasian monarchism and Catholic traditionalism. Instead, Maritain shares the great democratic tradition of his French compatriot Alexis de Tocqueville. Maritain's admiration of American democracy are somewhat reminiscent of his French predecessor.

Moreover, Maritain must be properly placed with Jules Fabre who was an ardent "Republican" politician and a "militant democrat" (as Raïssa Maritain calls him) of the Third Republic, and who happened to be Maritain's grandfather. The militant democrat was no original and systematic political thinker and, by the same token, Maritain is no great politician. What Fabre had practised, Maritain has actualized in a political philosophy and theory. The latter's philosophy of democracy might well be regarded as the theoretical embodiment of the former's political practice.

Whatever his critics may say about Maritain's theoretical justification of the democratic theory, his practical conclusions are impeccably those of democratic principles. On a theoretical level, that is to say, insofar as the justification of democracy is concerned, Maritain is as assiduously unyielding as his critics simply because the theoretical justification of democracy is the matter which concerns the truth of political philosophy. For Maritain, the only true philosophy of democracy as well as of political philosophy in general are those which are based upon the Thomistic principles. The theological and metaphysical system of St. Thomas Aquinas lays the foundation for the true philosophy of politics. In his construction of the hierarchy of knowledge, Maritain has defined the proper and true place of political philosophy. He has already stated that the philosophy of democracy is the only true political

philosophy. When political philosophy as a type of knowledge is placed in his pyramid of knowledge and its proper domain and role are determined, Maritain is in a position to discuss the contents of a true political philosophy, that is, the practical principles of democracy. On a practical level, Maritain is far more flexible than his critics. Although Maritain has made no concessions or compromises in his theoretical justification of the theory of democracy, he has, nonetheless, left ample room for practical agreements with his "opponents" and other democrats. Thus we may well be impressed with his practical flexibility.

As we have seen, the political thought of Catholic thinkers is by no means monolithic. It is also true to say that Christian theologians in general produce no monolithic structure of political philosophy as much of their theological ideas and dispositions vary widely. Their Christian theologies range from the rational position of Catholic Jacques Maritain to the fideist position of Protestant Karl Barth. Also, there are some modified versions of Emil Brunner and Paul Tillich. Within the Christian camp, the extreme fideist position like that of Karl Barth seems to be adhered to by a small minority even though many may be sympathetic with Barthian crisis theology. There is no question about the great status of Karl Barth as a theologian. He not only has a theological depth but is also regarded as the theologians' theologian. However, from a cultural and political point of view, the fideist position of Karl Barth is undoubtedly unrealistic. Even his politically-outspoken Protestant colleague Reinhold Niebuhr accused him of being unrealistic and indifferent to politics.

Jacques Maritain is akin to the rational position of Paul Tillich, probably more akin to him than to any one else in the Protestant camp.

As the Jesuit scholar Gustave Weigel once said, there is something "Thomistic" about Paul Tillich not because Tillich condones Catholic or Thomistic principles which, as a matter of fact, he vehemently rejects, but because he shares the rational outlook of Thomism. While both Jacques Maritain and Reinhold Niebuhr are politically outspoken, the theological foundations of their political philosophies leave us with an unbridgeable gulf between these two theologians. The "realist" political philosophy of Niebuhr is deeply rooted in his conception of original sin. His portrait of the selfish and sinful man has led him to adopt the "political realism" in international politics. However, the political height of his realism is reached only when the selfish and sinful man can ascend to the Christian ideas of love and justice. Thus, Niebuhr leaves a wide gap between his notions of Christian love and justice and that of sinful man. When man is pictured as a totally corrupted animal, then there is no moral choice for sinful man to transcend his limitation except by the grace of God. Ultimately, there is no rational moral choice for sinful man to lead a virtuous political life. Man's moral life on earth is his deliberate choice of accepting what is good and of rejecting what is bad. Thus, in the ultimate theological justification of political life, Niebuhr, like Barth, must end with the fideist point of no return. Paul Tillich has gone so far as to say that the rational conception of man is more congenial than the traditional Christian concept of original sin to the theory of democracy, although Tillich is in no position to condone the "authoritarian" outlook of the Roman Catholic Church. Once again we find a meeting ground between Jacques Maritain and Paul Tillich despite their fundamentally different theological dispositions.

In practical politics, there is sufficient reason for Niebuhr to call Maritain a political "idealist" in regard to international politics. When we come to terms with Niebuhr's own conception of political realism, Maritain's idea of a world government appears to be an "idealist" position. Maritain himself has explicitly admitted that the old temptation of philosophers may be creeping in when he presents his conception of a world government. But, at the same time, he denied the charge that he could be much of an "idealist" since he is an Aristotelian realist. Whatever may be the truth of an argument between realism and idealism, the short-sightedness of "political realism" seems to be its separation of what is amorally political from what is morally good. As a result, the political realist leaves no room for a better political life. In terms of international politics, the "idealist" position does not imply by any means that we should establish a world government in the immediate future. On the contrary, it is merely suggesting a moral goal or ideal for the commonwealth of mankind to exert a better political life in the future. The Kantian ideal of "eternal peace" may be the goal which is not forthcoming, but it is a worthy goal to strive for.

Jacques Maritain voices the essential principles of democracy inspired by the leaven of the Gospel. His metaphysical and philosophical system is intimately related to his social and political ideas. The Thomistic principles, applicable only analogically to the modern secular conditions, are the main spring of his social and political thought. Although philosophical expositions are his main concern, Christian theology is not only the keystone of speculative philosophy, but also the bedrock of practical philosophy from which his political philosophy springs. Thus, for Maritain, political issues and problems are inseparable

from Christian theology. As he has declared, the genuine explicative political science must be a political theology. In this respect, Jacques Maritain, in the most exalted moment, is a Christian theologian who utilizes theological ideas for political purposes without committing the fallacy of "theological liberalism." Catholicism is distinguished but not separated from the Catholic world and culture as the supernatural end remains always above the temporal end of man. Yet the political order is a real end, and his highest ideal is the hope of the realization of a new Christendom not sacral but secular.

The farther one pursues knowledge,
 The less one knows.
 Therefore the Sage knows without running about,
 Understands without seeing,
 Accomplishes without doing.

-- Lao Tzu

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
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I


DIAGRAM OF THE ORDERS



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APPENDIX II

DIAGRAM OF THE SCIENCES



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APPENDIX III

THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY

- | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|---|--------------------|---|---------------------------------|------------------|---|-------------------|-------------------|---|------------------------------------|
| I
LOGIC | { | 1. <u>Minor</u> or <u>formal logic</u> : the rules of reasoning
2. <u>Major</u> or <u>material logic</u> : the matter of reasoning | | | | | | | | | |
| | { | 3. The <u>philosophy of mathematics</u> : quantity
4. The <u>philosophy of nature</u> : <table border="0" style="display: inline-table; vertical-align: middle; margin-left: 10px;"> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: middle;">the material world</td> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">}</td> <td style="vertical-align: middle;"><u>cosmology</u></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: middle;">man</td> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="vertical-align: middle;"><u>psychology</u></td> </tr> </table> | the material world | } | <u>cosmology</u> | man | { | <u>psychology</u> | | | |
| the material world | } | <u>cosmology</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| man | { | <u>psychology</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| II
SPECULATIVE
PHILOSOPHY | { | 5. <u>Metaphysics</u> <table border="0" style="display: inline-table; vertical-align: middle; margin-left: 10px;"> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: middle;">truth</td> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="vertical-align: middle;">(epistemology) <u>criticism</u></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: middle;">being in general</td> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="vertical-align: middle;"><u>ontology</u></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: middle;">being a <u>se</u></td> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="vertical-align: middle;">(natural theology) <u>theodicy</u></td> </tr> </table> | truth | { | (epistemology) <u>criticism</u> | being in general | { | <u>ontology</u> | being a <u>se</u> | { | (natural theology) <u>theodicy</u> |
| truth | { | (epistemology) <u>criticism</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| being in general | { | <u>ontology</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| being a <u>se</u> | { | (natural theology) <u>theodicy</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| III
PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY | { | 6. The <u>philosophy of art</u> : making
7. <u>Ethics</u> or <u>moral philosophy</u> : action, conduct | | | | | | | | | |

Reproduced from Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 271.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

The author was born on the seventeenth of May, 1932 in Chinju, Korea. His college education was temporarily interrupted by the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. Fortunately, with the assistance of numerous friends, he resumed his study in this country in September, 1954. Having studied one year at Wabash College, Crawfordsville, Indiana, he went to Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia where he received his B. A. and M. A. in 1957 and 1958 respectively. Since September 1958, he has been a student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Florida.

He has published The Foundation of Jacques Maritain's Political Philosophy (University of Florida Social Sciences Monographs No. 7, Summer 1960; Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960).

This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.


February 3, 1962



Dean, College of Arts and Sciences

Dean, Graduate School

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:



Chairman









